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Human development, as an approach, is concerned with what I take
to be the basic development idea: namely, advancing the richness of
human life, rather than the richness of the economy in which human
beings live, which is only a part of it.
Amartya Sen, Professor of Economics and Philosophy, Harvard
University, Nobel Prize in Economics (1998)
Without commonly shared and widely entrenched moral values and
obligations, neither the law, nor democratic government, nor even
the market economy will function properly.
Václav Havel, last president of Czechoslovakia (1989–1992) and the
first president of the Czech Republic (1993-2003)
Humanistic Culture is vital to democracy because it educates
informed, empathetic, and critical world citizens: the sort of people
necessary to sustain democratic societies.
Martha Nussbaum, Ernst Freund Distinguished Service Professor of
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What is Europe’s relevance today? What is its cultural heritage, its
values and norms, its societal mode and economic structure? The
answers to these fundamental questions will shape both Europe’s future
and the building of future European societies. Is Europe still an inspiring
idea(l) of a value-driven society, worthwhile of pursuit? Will Europe
survive the global competition? Themes such as the frontiers of Europe,
European citizenship, cultural diversity and the role and purpose of
Europe in a global perspective all require a human-centred vision of
what Europe is and should be.
In today’s multi-faceted and multi-layered globalisation era, the EU
is in need of a revisited political project and a common long-term
(inspiring) vision, to counterbalance the increasing influence of national
interests on European policy-making, at the expense of the “European
commons”. There is a danger today that the Union, faced with the
growing frustration, criticism and indifference of its citizens, could
become a mere union of economic interests, detached from its very
nature and identity, i.e. a community of opportunities and shared values.
The undermining of these fundamentals could negatively influence
Europe’s economic, social and ecological welfare and finally lead to its
marginalisation in the era of globalisation.
A Europe of authentic and open dialogue, both internally and
externally defined, in which cultures are perceived as constructive
binding forces within and beyond societies, can provide a solution for
Europe’s future in the emerging global landscape. It is only through
strengthening the bonds of participation and cooperation in exploring
innovative solutions to its many challenges, and humanising the
relationships between living, working and learning together, that Europe
will succeed.
Still we believe that Europe’s flexible, communitarian model of
society, business and citizenship is best suited to the challenges of the
21st century. Europe is ideally positioned between the pronounced
individualism of America and the strong collectivism of Asia to lead the
world into the new age. Europe can be a living laboratory for examining
the positive and negative consequences of globalisation, in a genuine
dialogue of mutual respect, i.e. by adopting a human-centric point of
departure, as embodied in the idea of “homo Europaeus”. Europe can
create a global public square, characterised by unity in diversity, where
Globalisation vs Europeanisation: a Human-centric Interaction
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peoples can live together with a common vision of inclusion, sustainable
development, universal human rights and genuine peacebuilding. It is
the only way to survive as an economic, social and political macro
region while keeping and strengthening its own identity and value
system. Courage, inspiration and involvement are needed to make this
renewed European dream true and to revitalise the sense of the
European construction, which is based on a cultural, inspirational and
moral heritage.
I wish to thank the students who have followed my courses
throughout the years at various European universities, especially those
who took my courses in the framework of my Jean Monnet Chair at the
University of Padua. They were a continuous source of motivation and
feedback. Also my own trajectory, much characterised by the ongoing
exchange and interaction of teaching and research, conversations and
meetings throughout Europe and beyond, bridging concepts with
differentiated realities and transmitting commitment and ideas for
Europe’s future within a globalising context, has resulted in a fruitful
process of lifelong mutual learning. It gave ample satisfaction and
content strength for practising change and building responsible
citizenship in a value driven and trustworthy path towards Europe’s
future destiny.
I do hope the content of the book serves its purpose, i.e. as a
contribution to the learning of a comprehensive understanding from a
human-centric perspective of the issues involved in the complex and





Professor Emeritus of the University of Padua, Jean Monnet
Professor ad honorem, Chairholder Unesco Chair human rights,
democracy and peace
The European Union’s governance capabilities are being increasingly
challenged by the tentacular dynamics of the process of globalisation. Its
first response lies in recovering the collective awareness that the EU is
an original model of governance, able to set an example to the entire
world, as a system specialised in pursuing objectives of both social
peace within its borders and international peace, using the resources
which nourish the soft power of a macro civil actor.
Among the several resources available to the EU, it is worth
underlining the vision of economy as a social market economy oriented
to full occupation, the practice of the internal and external “dialogues”
of the Union (social dialogue, civil dialogue, intercultural dialogue,
political dialogues with third countries), the valorisation of the role of
local governments as well as of the “platforms” of civil society
organisations, with particular attention to be paid to the architecture of
subsidiarity. Moreover, the fact that the EU has broadened the practice
of democracy within its borders, both representative and participatory,
and the fact that it has introduced the “human rights clause” into all its
agreements signed with third countries is certainly indicative, inter alia,
of its ability to “lead by example”.
With the Lisbon Treaty, which assigns fully binding legal character
to the Charter of Fundamental Rights proclaimed in Nice in 2000, the
whole system of the Union is marked with the seal of
“constitutionality”, summarised in the triad “rule of law, human rights,
and democratic principles”. The Charter of Fundamental Rights itself
presents elements of originality within the typology of international
human rights legal instruments: it includes both civil and political rights
and economic, social and cultural rights, with a logical reference to the
principle of their interdependence and indivisibility. Therefore, the
Charter also provides an explicit legal basis for a social market
Globalisation vs Europeanisation: a Human-centric Interaction
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economy; in other words, it compels the Union to authentically be a
“Social Europe”.
Léonce Bekemans plans his explorative journey through the thematic
galaxy of globalisation and the interactions existing between the
processual and institutional reality of Europeanisation, proving himself
capable of building a systematic analytical scheme allowing him to avail
himself of conceptual categories located in the most advanced frontier of
international and European studies: multi-level governance, plural
citizenship, multiple identities, sustainable statehood, humancentrism.
Throughout this stimulating analytical journey, he accompanies his
scientific exploration with a compass that allows him to evaluate
processes and institutions against the yardstick of universal ethics. This
is the compass of human rights, recognised at both the global and
European levels. This is empirical evidence that neither political science
nor international relations scholars can ignore. One only has to recall
that reference to a paradigm based on values is indispensable for an
action – and policy – oriented type of analysis, such as the one carried
out by Bekemans. Far from invalidating the scientific accuracy of this
analysis, a wise usage of this compass, beyond conferring an added
quality value, allows the author to give the reader a glimpse of the new
challenges and opportunities available for the same work of theorisation:
hence, the also heuristic utility of this book.
Léonce Bekemans’s preoccupation with good governance and with
the example that the European Union is urged to set in this field, brings
him to make strongly relevant the quality of political culture and,
therefore, the strategic role of human rights-based education, with a
view to training new generations of citizens and leaders so that they are
disposed to pursue common good objectives, such as intercultural
dialogue in respect of diversity, and the affirmation of equal citizenship
rights in inclusive cities and in an inclusive Europe. The message for the
European Union is that it needs to make its educational policy more
systematic and turn it into a quality education more marked by human
rights than by market demands.
Léonce Bekemans, both in his vocation and as a result of his life
experience in a space that is authentically glocal and multi-dimensional,
is an educator capable of translating his vast scientific knowledge
through publications that are, at the same time, useful to both decision-
makers and students. This current volume, which is structured as a
compendium of systematically undertaken reflections and as a strategic
agenda for European Union policies, will be particularly appreciated by
those who want to see what opportunities might emerge around the
corner for human development and human security in Europe and,
beyond Europe, in the world.
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Preface
Luc VAN DEN BRANDE
Former Minister-president of Flanders, Belgium, Former President
of the Committee of the Regions, European Union
The European movement, which was formed after the Second World
War, was built upon the conviction that sustainable peace on our
continent was only possible if cooperation replaced the confrontations
between nation-states that has led to so much human devaluation and
destruction in previous centuries.
The founders of the current political European Union recognised that
Europe’s future was to be rooted in partnership; however, they could not
avoid the fact that the scars of the geographical and subsequently
democratic re-allocation of the past, would lead to a Cold War which,
until the fall of the Berlin Wall, would result in a worldwide bipolarity.
Simultaneously a second movement took shape and what neither
religion nor the Enlightenment had been able to achieve, happened: the
recognition of human rights as an individual and inalienable right.
Despite how imperfect democracies may be, these fundamental rights
have been enforced by the European Convention, and now have full
European support.
Our world has since been profoundly changed. Multilevelness has
replaced centralism. States and institutions have steadily lost their
importance. Secularisation has progressed. Glocalism has replaced
epicentrism. Citizens have become much more emancipated. New inter-
connections have emerged, stimulated by the powerful force of the
media. Networking is dominating. Sustainability has become an integral
part of economic activities and policies. The paradigm that only
centrally governed processes and institutions can obtain results has been
rendered outdated. Multilateralism, Multi-level Governance and Multi-
Actorship have forcefully entered the academic and policy debate.
Not only has the global and European setting been drastically
changed, but the interconnection of mutually influencing views and
transformations is urging Europe to reflect on its future, its vision and its
mission. Europe is at a crossroads, during a time when economic crisis
Globalisation vs Europeanisation: a Human-centric Interaction
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is raging and young people have fewer perspectives. This particular
crisis, along with other equally important others, are the consequence of
the insecurities felt at numerous levels and illustrate a multiple lack of
confidence. This increasing lack of confidence is being felt among
people and in the face of structures and mechanisms that have long been
inviolable, but are now slowly crumbling away.
All this has been understood by Prof. Dr. Léonce Bekemans. In this
comprehensive work the genesis and subsequent slow construction of
Europe has been sharply analysed and evaluated. His reflections depart
from, rather uniquely, an interdisciplinary context, and go beyond the
too often cherished and rigid partitions. Starting from integration,
inclusion, diversity and governance he scientifically distances himself
from the traditional conceptual framework and introduces new insights
and actors to the enlarged and deepened playing field of global and
European relations. He further applies this renewed conceptual
framework to a number of crosscutting policy areas such as foreign
relations, culture, and education with some interesting policy practices.
The attention he devotes to the true significance of citizenship is
striking, based on the importance of education and shaped by the
changed context of multiculturalism towards interculturality. He adopts
a cosmopolitan approach and focuses on the regional and territorial
identity of the European integration process within the growing
globalisation. This brings him to a renewed and applied conceptual
framework for the future, a rich idea of a humanising and active “nova
civitas”.
Not least is to his great merit that he does not limit himself to an
indepth analysis and committed reflection, but he further suggests new
paths and directions which may once more make Europe more attractive
– not only for Europeans themselves but also for the world.
Furthermore, his work is also a clear and innovative appeal and plea: a
new future for Europe is only possible if it becomes “human-centric”.
When all attention seems to go to organisational, rule-setting and
institutional issues – regardless of their importance and necessity – it
seems paradoxical to put the main emphasis on a human-centric
perspective. But the real capital for cohesive and sustainable society
building, not only for Europe, is the “human capital”.
This magnum opus is undoubtedly an important guideline to
identifying and straightening out the existing deficits of Europe’s future,
which the rest of the world is also confronted with. I call these the
“Triple D-deficit” (delivery, democracy, and destiny).
A “human-centric” approach to the interaction between globalisation
and Europeanisation can offer new content support to a participative,
deliberative and inclusive democracy, at the global and European level,
Preface
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through a collaborative process driven by committed people and
communities.
I am convinced that the “explorations” and proposals of Prof. Dr.
Léonce Bekemans will find their way to many – academics and
students, and people responsible for politics as well as a host of






The ongoing and radical process of the transformation of European
societies needs a proper contextualisation within a globalising,
europeanising, regionalising and localising context. Questions about
identity, citizenship, governance, borders, dialogue and human security
are in need of proper answers. The EU’s role in the world is rooted in its
very existence, as an emerging form of multi-lateral governance of
national and local diversities towards increasing regional convergence at
the European level. What matters is the consolidation of a complex set
of common institutions and a mixed intergovernmental/supranational
regime among its Member States, sharing several common interests,
objectives, values and policies. The European integration process is to
date the world’s most advanced post-national constellation of states. As
such, it has become a laboratory for scholars and philosophers of
political theory and international relations and those interested in
studying and developing workable models of supranational and/or
global and multi-level governance.
Europe is at the crossroads of its historical destiny, rooted in its past,
present and future developments and is at a turning point with regards to
its integration process. Its historical development shows a dynamic and
evolving entity with many faces, multiple identities and diversified
cooperation forms. The challenges are manifold both inside and outside
of Europe. We are confronted with a number of (internal and external)
challenges to the European model of socio-economic cohesion and
cultural and regional diversity.
Still, Europe has a mission and a responsibility to the globalising
world. It requires an inspiring narrative that responds to institutional
governance structures, financing internal and external European
solidarity and a vision that motivates the participation of its citizens.
Today Europe has an appointment with its destiny. Its model of society,
based on a fundamental set of human rights, culture as a vehicle of
emancipation, on sustainable development and socio-economic
cohesion, and on a multilateral vision of the world order, has been put
under stress and pressure. In other words, we are experiencing a
confrontation between Europe’s actual confusing (political, economic,
cultural and institutional) reality and its global responsibility, in the
context of an ever-increasing globalisation.
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Foundation: In the fast changing global landscape, Europe is
confronted with the preoccupation, but also with the moral
responsibility, to maintain its own model of integration and diversity
within a resolutely changing world system. This consists of the values,
methods and capacity to deal with change processes, global commons
and the integration of people in respect of their diversity. It implies that
Europe should defend its values and principles of solidarity, tolerance
and democracy in the limited but open dialogue between cultures and
peoples within and outside Europe. It certainly requires in today’s world
a change in mentality, a broad imagination and proactive thought and
action from the outset. Finally, Europe’s future is to be founded on
(political, economic, business and spiritual) leadership rooted in an
education that focuses on learning responsibility at different levels of
space and time.
Questions have to be asked about whether Europe, within a further
unifying European economic space, can guarantee an acceptable
common institutional basis in which states, regions and communities
can live in their diversity (guarantee of internal solidarity) and whether
Europe can offer an open societal model within the process of further
globalisation (guarantee of external solidarity).
Challenge: The challenge for further European integration (and
Europe’s survival) is the search for a new equilibrium between diversity
and unity in a globalising world (universalism vs particularism). The
European model should take into account the economic, historic, social
and political changes that are taking place at the international level, but
it must remain faithful to its principles of internal and external
solidarity. “Repenser l’Europe” implies the recognition of a radical
increase in the level of complexity within our societies, the further
development of a multiple citizenship within multiple identities and the
elaboration of multi-level governance.
Vision: We once more need an inspiring and mobilising vision,
which can raise a renewed spirit and enthusiasm within the citizen.
Furthermore, we must dare to recall the enthusiasm and faith in the
European project that was embodied by the Founding Fathers of Europe.
They wanted to guarantee a sustainable peace within the European
borders and had a long-term vision as well as the pragmatic conviction
to write a new chapter in the relations between European peoples and
countries. Economic arguments supported the political goodwill.
Therefore, Europe needs bridge-builders who can concretely complete
the rhetoric of the European story, promote the European ideals of
peace, unity in diversity, freedom and solidarity and mobilise young
people towards the European model of society. The role of education is
herein fundamental. In this model, new forms and places of dialogue,
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active citizenship and of cooperation, emerge outside of the existing
institutionalised structures of representative representation. The
European civil society becomes emancipated and develops opportunities
in the globalising society through which persons, peoples and cultures
within and outside Europe can meet peacefully and respectfully.
Historical lessons: The history of the European integration process
shows that in the course of three generations, the EU developed, with
both successes and failures, to a community of now 28 countries, all
former enemies, with different histories and diverse expectations. Now a
unique union of more than 500 million citizens exists, stretching out
from the Irish Sea to the gates of Russia; this geographical area
constitutes the first transnational political space, based on a community
of shared values, which are both multiculturally and multilinguistically
defined. It was a success story, but it is now confronted with internal
and external tensions and is experiencing a deep sense of crisis.
Different from the traditional forms of politics, mainly geared to
market and power the extension and appropriation of human, natural and
territorial resources, the EU was conceived and developed out of the
realisation of a consensus around collective interests, the extension of
reciprocity to all its citizens and the realisation of a durable peace
founded on mutual respect between peoples. Despite all the current and
dramatic changes, Europe remains a civilisation project, characterised
by a rich intellectual (material and immaterial) cultural heritage and
common values. Up to now, this has guaranteed a good quality of life,
sustainable development, a respect for human rights and internal and
external solidarity; in short it has provided economic welfare and built
bridges of peace and understanding.
Future fundamentals: Dreams express expectations of people, not
their conditions. Still the rhetoric needs to be translated into a workable
forward-looking reality, amidst a radically changing world. In spite of
its failures and imperfections in the integration process, project
“Europe” has been a permanent workplace for “active dreamers” to
define the European common good and to develop a unique institutional
and operational framework. I distinguish four fundamental tasks:
Firstly, Europe has the moral responsibility to establish best practices
of cooperation, both internally and externally. The individual and
collective well-being depends more and more on the comprehension of
man’s capacity to recognise important emerging global trends and act
accordingly in the pursuit of economic and social welfare for its citizens.
We are in need of a radical change in our vision and methods in order to
survive as a European civilisation.
Secondly, Europeans also have the moral responsibility to show that
people can live together in the world, despite any differences in
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language, culture, religion, origin, etc. Europe’s motto is “unity in
diversity”, but in practice, Europeans still need to show that they can
form an international public space where a cultural diaspora can exist in
mutual respect, tolerance and dialogue. European citizens need to be
inspired by clear messages, examples and testimonies.
Thirdly, all European countries and regions have to work
continuously to make their social and economic systems individually
more efficient, so that the weaknesses of one can be compensated by the
strength of others. This implies the importance of encouraging
individual initiative, of aiming for a broad and just distribution of the
benefits of economic welfare and of revalorising senses of responsibility
as part of a value driven education with a European dimension.
Finally, Europeans should play a more courageous and dynamic role
on the international political scene, by defending Europe’s model of
peace and transnational cooperation and strengthening its method of
collaboration with other macro regions. Europe should work for a
transition from the traditional management of geopolitical and global
economic conflicts to a new transversal policy of the global political and
economic landscape.
Objective of the Book: Globalisation is one of the most important
phenomena and processes confronting the world today. Globalisation
affects every aspect of society, including economics, politics and culture
as well as personal developments. This book offers a general
introduction and critical overview (i.e. concepts, definitions, approaches,
historical developments and assessment) of the future of the EU in a
globalising context. It looks at the phenomena from a multitude of
perspectives – as it is studied in different disciplines and perceived by
different regions across the world. Globalisation is viewed in all of its
dimensions, including economic globalisation, political globalisation,
and the globalisation of civil society, global knowledge and global
environment.
A mobilising, forward-looking and human-centric European
perspective could favour the transition to a global transnational era.
Courage and inspiration are needed to make a renewed European dream
worthy of envisaging, rediscover the purpose of the European
construction and to give life to a voice of the European civilisation
project that responds to the cultural and moral traditions rooted in the
ambitions of its fathers. A value-driven and human-centric based
approach to Europe’s future may provide a possible, soft and “slow”,




The content of the book is structured along three major parts divided
into sixteen chapters. In a first introductory chapter we present our
points of departure. This deals with the origin and development of the
European integration process, the scientific context and content, the key
concepts of the proposed analysis and a few guidelines for its
elaboration. Part I (Chapters 2, 3 and 4) concerns a contextualised
analysis of the idea and practice of Europe in an historical and forward-
looking perspective. The theoretical Part II (Chapters 5 to 8) deals with
the need for a renewal of the conceptual framework of understanding
Europe’s future. It introduces some new concepts, tools and perspectives
of addressing the major challenges in today’s European transformation
process. This also has an impact on the context and content of European
Studies. The policy-oriented Part III (Chapters 9 to 16) illustrates and
applies the contextual and conceptual framework to various cross-
cutting policy fields and issues such as international relations,
globalisation, culture and (inter)cultural dialogue, education, European
identity building and citizenship and (participatory) democratic
practices.
While the focus is on the societal changes that have taken place in
Europe, it also offers interested readers of European affairs, in particular
students from different disciplines, an opportunity to reflect and debate
on the emerging themes, challenges and inclusive policies in the future
of European societies within a globalising context, in particular the
social and cultural dimensions of globalisation. The opportunities,
challenges and threats that the process of globalisation presents need to
be considered, analysed, assessed and managed accordingly, in view of
the future perspectives of mankind and Europe’s role and responsibility
in a multi-level governance structure. This has become even more
urgent in the midst of the current global economic crisis and Europe’s
lack of vision.
The book wraps up my applied thinking and reflections on the role of
Europe in the globalising world. It proposes a new conceptual
framework – a human-centric cosmopolitan and public goods
perspective of sustainable statehood – and applies it to a number of
specific policy areas for human-centric development in Europe (such as
external relations, culture, intercultural dialogue, citizenship building,
education and territorial cooperation). It is both informative and






The process of European integration, now in the midst of a radically
changing economic, social and political landscape, still needs to be
understood in its conceptual, theoretical and historical context. Only in
such a way can the actual role of Europe be assessed from a global
perspective. Points of departure of such a broad understanding refer to:
Europe as a visual expression of diversity in unity in a variety of areas
and dimensions; Europe as a civilisation and model of society; Europe
as a (changing) historical and (loose) geographical entity; and Europe as
a community of values and principles. Its raison d’être is linked to the
principles of peace, safety & security, unity and equality, fundamental
freedoms, economic and social solidarity, respect of cultural
diversity/identities as well as European cultural heritage, inclusiveness,
etc.
Europe is a two thousand year old civilisation. Throughout the
centuries of its existence it has exhibited different expressions and
experienced various historical stages. It is rooted in a religious, mythical
and artistic background and first developed into a geo-political entity
under Alexander the Great. This was inspired by the Aristotelian
paradigm of linking the individual and the community through the
“ethos”. Under the reign of the Roman Empire, Europe shifted its power
centre to the West and slowly developed into a Christian era in the
Middle Ages, where the Christian sense of community became the
binding and exclusive element of the European people.
With the arrival of the Renaissance and the rebirth of Greek classics
through Arab influence, commercial routes and artistic exchanges made
city states flourish because of flexible linkages and cooperation. Since
the Treaties of Westphalia (1648) and Vienna (1815) the role of nation
states in international relations has been legally defined and the
boundaries of states have been fixed. In the 19th century Napoleon tried
in vain to integrate Europe, using military force.
The dramatic consequences of the two World Wars finally led to an
American financed voluntary-based economic integration of former
European enemies. During 60 years of phased development, the
economic community of the founding member states has evolved into a
European Union of now 28 member countries and more than 500
million citizens. However, Europe as a civilisation and the European
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Union as a unique process of integration are now at a crossroads, shaped
by challenges of content, structure and destiny.
Since the fall of the Roman Empire, Europe has not been united for a
sustained period of time, despite the many military, economic, political
and cultural attempts that have been made at integration. Europe exists
and is developed as a vague geographical and historical framework of a
community of shared values. A cultural integration, which would lead to
an American type of “melting pot”, is certainly not desirable. What’s
needed is a community of countries, regions, cities and persons that is
built on a clear multi-level institutional structure that binds citizens in a
sustainable and cohesive way and introduces rules that respond to its
democratic founding principles. The European institutional architecture
is in need of strength and transparency, a sense of belongingness that
brings people, especially younger generations, closer to the real issues at
stake. This must be supported by a learning environment that favours
true European citizenship and that structures the wealth of differences
within a shared, sustainable but adaptable process to the changing new
economic structures of the global landscape, in respect of universal
rights.
Europe, in the light of its colonial past, cannot present itself as the
only entity that disseminates principles of freedom and democracy
without any territorial anchorage. Europe’s main task and moral
responsibility to the world is a synthesis of the demand for freedom and
the pursuit of equality both within and outside of Europe. Freedom must
be prevented from becoming a privilege in a world of conflicts and
inequality. It cannot be an empty ideological slogan. Each country and
each region has its own history and need to communicate and engage in
dialogue with the history of each other’s. Each citizenship and each
citizen presents its own story and characteristics and needs to be
guaranteed and maintained at various levels to become a multiple,
inclusive identity. The European Union should include any form of
regional, local and citizen participation because the European common
good serves the national, regional and individual interest.
I. European Integration Process: Origin and Development
The originality of the European Union is derived from the special
way in which its various constituent parts have evolved. The European
Union came into being with the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht in
1992, when it brought together three organisations established in the
1950s to integrate activity in specific sectors (the European
Communities), and two areas of intergovernmental cooperation
(common foreign and security policy and justice and home affairs).
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Since then, the resulting structure has been described as one built on
three pillars, the first of which is supranational, comprising of the three
European Communities, each of which has its own legal personality.
The European Union does not have legal personality, however, even
though it encompasses the community pillar and the two
intergovernmental pillars within a common institutional structure.
The European Union is the first “general-purpose” international
organisation to derive, not from a coordination of its members’ national
policies, but from the pooling of some of those policies under the
umbrella of the European Communities. The result of this pooling of
policies was an innovative type of body, i.e. a supranational
organisation, formed by the voluntary transfer of certain sovereign
powers by its member states. Member states did not surrender their
powers, but decided to exercise them jointly at a higher level that had
common institutions. Thus, 1951 saw the creation of the European Coal
and Steel Community (ECSC) and in 1957 the European Economic
Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community
(EAEC or EURATOM).
As specialist organisations, each of the three Communities holds
only those powers attributed to them by Member States. The principle of
attribution requires that each Community “shall act within the limits of
the powers conferred upon it […] and of the objectives assigned to it”
by the treaties which established them (i.e. the Treaty of Paris
establishing the ECSC and the Rome Treaties establishing the EEC and
EURATOM). Likewise the Community institutions, i.e. Parliament,
Council, Commission, Court of Justice, Court of Auditors, assisted by
an Economic and Social Committee and a Committee of the Regions,
must each “act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it” by the
Treaties.
With the aim of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of
Europe, integration has proceeded step by step, firstly by the pooling of
policy on certain sectors of member states’ national economies, then by
the creation of a common market, followed in turn by the gradual
introduction of economic and monetary union. Notwithstanding its
economic foundations, the objective of European Union was a priori
political. The functional approach taken by the “founding fathers” of the
Communities, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, held that it was
necessary to move from the economic to the political sphere. In effect,
specific actions in a given sector of the economy were bound to have an
impact on the way in which other sectors operated. The questions raised
needed answers, which required political choices.
Thus, the completion of a common market in which there was free
movement of goods raised the question of the movement of people,
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services and capital, requiring the introduction of a raft of flanking
policies in the areas of competition, industry, agriculture, transport,
research, etc. Ultimately – little by little – complementary policies
addressing the problems of highly sensitive national prerogatives were
adopted. This was the case with social and fiscal policy. In addition, the
organisation’s internal policies had ramifications outside of it, which the
organisation, as an entity under international law, had to manage in its
dealings with non-member states and other international organisations.
As a result it forged external relations in the areas of world trade,
development aid, immigration, defence, etc.
Whilst the organisation is a constantly evolving one, the degree of
integration achieved at each stage is the result of compromise, which is
not always easy to secure. Member states, each with their own economic
and social baggage and national susceptibilities, struggle between the
benefits of solidarity and the drawbacks of having their political and
budgetary autonomy curtailed, something often perceived as a surrender
of national sovereignty. Meanwhile the organisation, in a way the victim
of its own success, has to manage two inseparable processes at the same
time: widening itself through enlargement, with the admission of new
member states upon application, and deepening itself by extending its
powers and institutional procedures. The imperative is to meet the
legitimate expectations of applicant countries without undermining the
operational efficiency of the common institutions. Consequently, the
collective agreement put in place by the founding treaties evolves
pragmatically over time, to reflect the structure of the organisation, the
priorities of the various players in the process of building Europe, and
changes in the geopolitical environment.
Major reforms to the founding treaties were made with the adoption
of the Single European Act in 1986, the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992,
the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and the Treaty of Nice in 2001. Of
these, the Maastricht Treaty was the one that most radically altered the
structure of the organisation. It established the European Union, with its
pillar-based structure, and placed the EEC, now the European
Community (EC), at the heart of its edifice. In 2002 the ECSC Treaty
expired, after 50 years of existence. 2004 saw the signing in Rome of
the treaty establishing a constitution for Europe, which must be ratified
by all member states of the Union before it can come into effect. This
“Constitutional Treaty” would repeal all the earlier treaties apart from
the EURATOM Treaty and would at last give the Union legal
personality. The European Union established by this new treaty would
thus be the successor to the European Union established by the
Maastricht Treaty and to the European Community.
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The changes in the nature and operation of the organisation, brought
about by successive revisions of the original treaties, reflect the degree
to which compromise is possible at any given moment in history. In an
increasingly enlarged and diverse Union, in light of opposition from
certain member states and their obsession with sovereignty, it can
sometimes seem that integration is not the way, or not yet the way, to
address the new challenges which the world throws up. In such cases the
search for viable solutions acceptable to the greatest number leads to the
adoption of new forms of intergovernmental cooperation (cf. Maastricht
Treaty) or to enhanced cooperation by a smaller number of member
states which are keen to go further (cf. Amsterdam Treaty). That is not
to say that an area initially dealt with by intergovernmental cooperation
(visas, asylum, immigration) cannot subsequently be moved up to
Community level, or that a Member State cannot subsequently join a
process of enhanced cooperation which it was not part of to begin with.
Given the major enlargement of the European Union in 2004, fresh
compromises appear essential in order to ensure that institutions with 25
and more member states can function. In response to the unsatisfactory
outcome of the reform brought about by the Nice Treaty of 2001,
changes were made to the procedure for amending the original treaties
by means of intergovernmental conferences (IGCs), in an attempt to
make this procedure more flexible and more effective. Following the
model of the convention which drafted the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the Union in 2000, the European Convention met in Brussels
from 2002 to 2003 with the aim of preparing a draft treaty which would
form the basis for the work of the next IGC.
The European Convention was made up of representatives of the
Heads of State or Government, the national parliaments, the European
Parliament and the European Commission, and it introduced a new
method of reforming the Union, offering greater transparency and more
participation by the players concerned. Member states will still be
“masters of the treaties”, but this new procedure, which is designed to
be more democratic and more consensual, goes beyond the classic
method of multilateral diplomatic negotiation and further down the road
of gradually constitutionalising the founding treaties. The negative
outcomes of the French and Dutch referenda on the “Treaty establishing
a Constitution for Europe” in 2004 and the negative result of the Irish
referendum on the “Reform Treaty” in 2007, have put the further
process of integration at risks. The global finance crisis has aggravated
the present economic and political situation but has, simultaneously
opened up new possibilities for a stronger political and economic
European integration within the global landscape.
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II. Scientific Context and Content
1. The International Relations theory
The study of international relations takes a wide range of theoretical
approaches.1 In spite of this diversity, several major schools of thought
are discernable, differentiated principally by the variables they
emphasise – e.g. military power, material interests, or ideological
beliefs. In general, the theory attempts to provide conceptual models
upon which international relations can be analysed. Each theory is
reductive and essentialist to different degrees, relying on different sets
of assumptions respectively. The number and character of the
assumptions made by each international relations theory also determine
its usefulness. In general, international relations theories can be divided
into positivist/rationalist theories, which focus on a principally state-
level analysis, and post-positivist/reflective ones, which incorporate
expanded meanings of security, ranging from class, identity to gender
and post-colonial security.
Classical realism is a state level theory that argues that all states seek
power. This parsimonious and very essentialist theory considers that the
international system is anarchic, that states are self-interested, rational
actors seeking to survive while increasing their material conditions, and
that uncertainty pervades relations between countries. Neo-realism is a
system level theory that sees the cause of power struggles and rivalries
not as a function of the nature of states, but as a function of the nature of
the international system. The realist theories are useful in accounting for
historical actions based on the balance of power systems and
international power politics but limited in both explaining systemic
change and predicting future events.2
Institutionalists share many of Realism’s assumptions about the
international system but rely on microeconomic theory and game theory
to reach a radically different conclusion, i.e. that cooperation between
nations is possible. The central insight of institutionalism is that
1 Viotti, P.R. and Mark V. Kauppi, International relations theory, realism, pluralism,
globalism, and beyond, 5th edition, Pearson, 2012; a short review of the main
theories is given by Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Relations, Principal
Theories, in Wolfrum, R. (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International
Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
2 Waltz, K.N., Theory of International Politics, Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979. JJ
Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, in 19(3) International
Security, 1994, p. 5–49.
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cooperation may be a rational, self-interested strategy for countries to
pursue under certain conditions.3
Liberal theory considers individuals and private groups, not states, as
the fundamental actors in world politics. It is a state level theory, which
argues that in many instances cooperation is a better strategy that
conflict. States don’t just compete or worry about power. States try to
build a more just world order. One of its most prominent developments
has been the phenomenon known as democratic peace, first imagined by
Immanuel Kant. Liberalism examines a wide number of conditions, is
less useful in making predictions, but can be insightful when analysing
past events.4
Constructivism is a theory that examines state behaviour in the
context of state characteristics. All states are unique and have a set of
defining political, cultural, economic, social, or religious characteristics.
It challenges the rationalist framework that underpins many theories of
international relations and creates constructivist alternatives in each of
these families of theories. In the constructivist account the variables of
the international system are important because of their social meaning.5
Moreover, a focus on the social context in which international relations
occur leads constructivists to emphasise issues of identity and belief. It
is also attentive to the role of social norms in international politics6 and
emphasises the role of non-state actors more than other approaches.7
The Theory of International Relations has long studied European
relations and has always perceived Europe, in particular the European
Union, as an international entity with specific and unique characteristics.
Within international relations literature various theories have been
applied to the study of European relations since the First World War.
These have been applied over time to the specific process of European
integration. In the following, we briefly synthesise the major theoretical
approaches with the various entities and actors involved in the
integration processes. Briefly summarised they can be listed as follows:
3 Keohane, R.O., After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political
Economy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
4 Moravcsik, A., Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International
Politics, in International Organisation 51, 1997, p. 513–53.
5 Wendt, A., Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge: CUP, 2000.
6 March, J.G. and J.P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of
Politics, New York: The Free Press, 1989.
7 Keck, M.E. and K. Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in
International Politics, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998.
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Federalism8 is a political theory in which a group of (subnational)
states are bound together with a governing representative head. It
describes a system of government in which sovereignty is
constitutionally divided between a central governing authority and its
constituent political units, such as states, regions or provinces.
Therefore, federalism is the system in which the power to govern is
shared between the national and state governments, creating what is
often called a federation. There is a constitutional division of power
between one general government (that has authority over the entire
national territory) and a series of subnational governments (that
individually have their own independent authority over their own
territories, whose sum total represents almost the whole national
territory).
A Federation consists of a central federal government with specific
and well-defined legal/policy competences and self-governmental units,
based on a constitution. Examples of federal states in Europe are
Belgium, Germany, Austria and Switzerland. A confederation or
association of (regional) states (e.g. Switzerland) is a group of
empowered states or communities, usually created by treaty but often
later adopting a common constitution. Confederations tend to be
established for dealing with critical issues, such as defence, foreign
affairs, foreign trade, and a common currency, with the central
government being required to provide support for all members. A
confederation, in modern political terms, is usually limited to a
permanent union of sovereign states for common action in relation to
other states. The nature of the relationship between the entities
constituting a confederation varies considerably. Likewise, the
relationship between the member states and the central government, and
the distribution of powers among them, is highly variable. Some looser
confederations are similar to international organisations, while tighter
confederations may resemble federations.
Functionalism9 is a theory of international relations that arose during
the inter-war period, principally from the strong concern about the
obsolescence of the state as a major form of social organisation. Rather
than the self-interest of nation-states as a motivating factor of
international relations, functionalists focus on common interests and
needs shared by states, but also by non-state actors in a process of global
integration triggered by the erosion of state sovereignty and the
increasing weight of knowledge in the process of policy-making.
8 Dosenrode, S., Federalism Theory and Neo-Functionalism: Elements for an




Functionalism can be seen as a pioneer in globalisation theory and
strategy. States had built their authority structures upon a principle of
territoriality. State-theories were built upon assumptions that identified
the scope of authority with territory. Functionalism proposes the
building of a form of authority based on functions and needs, linking
authority with needs, scientific knowledge, expertise and technology,
i.e. it provides a supra-territorial concept of authority.
According to functionalism, international integration, i.e. the
collective governance and material interdependence between states,
develops its own internal dynamic as states integrate in limited
functional, technical, and/or economic areas. International agencies
would meet human needs that can be aided by knowledge and expertise.
The benefits rendered by the functional agencies would attract the
loyalty of the populations and stimulate their participation and expand
the area of integration. There are strong assumptions underpinning
functionalism: the process of integration takes place within a framework
of human freedom; knowledge and expertise are currently available to
meet the needs for which the functional agencies are built and; states
will not hinder the process.
Functionalism further developed to neo-functionalism and became a
theory of regional integration. It was built on the work of Ernst B.
Haas,10 an American political scientist and leading authority in the field
of International Relations theory. Unlike previous theories of
integration, neo-functionalism presents a non-normative approach and
tries to describe and explain the process of regional integration based on
empirical data. Integration is regarded as an inevitable process, rather
than a desirable state of affairs that is introduced by the political or
technocratic elites of the states involved. Its strength, however, is also
its weakness: while it understands that regional integration is only
feasible as an incremental process, its conception of integration as a
linear process makes an explanation of any setbacks impossible. It
nonetheless remains an important theory in the study of international
relations.
Neo-functionalism assumes a decline in the importance of
nationalism and the nation-state; it argues that the pursuit of the welfare
objective by the executive power and the interest groups within states is
best satisfied by the integration of EU states. The thought behind neo-
functionalist theory is best understood by explaining the three
mechanisms which neo-functionalists see as key to driving the process
of integration forwards: positive spillover, transfer of domestic
allegiances and technocratic automaticity.
10 Haas, Ernst B., Beyond the Nation State, Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1964.
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The positive spillover effect is the concept that integration between
states in one economic sector will quickly create strong incentives for
integration in further sectors; and finally fully capture the benefits of
integration in the original sector.
The mechanism of a transfer in domestic allegiances can be best
understood by first noting that an important assumption within neo-
functionalist thinking is of a pluralistic society within the relevant nation
states. Neo-functionalists claim that, as the process of integration
gathers pace, interest groups and associations within the pluralistic
societies of the individual nation states will transfer their allegiance
away from national institutions towards the supranational European
institutions. They will do this because they will, in theory, come to
realise that these newly formed institutions are a better placed conduit
through which to pursue their material interests than the pre-existing
national institutions.
Finally, technocratic automaticity describes the way in which, as the
process of integration develops, the supranational institutions set up to
oversee that integration process will themselves take the lead in
sponsoring further integration, as they become more powerful and more
autonomous of the member states.
In its application to European integration neo-functionalism argues
that the supranational institutions of the European Union themselves
have been a driving force of European integration, by expanding EU
rule-setting and decision-making into new and more diverse areas.
Moreover, the theory of neo-functionalism explains much of the
thinking and acting behind the early proponents of the European
Community. Jean Monnet’s approach to European integration, which
was aimed at integrating individual sectors in the hope of achieving
spillover effects to further the process of integration, has clearly
followed a neo-functional path: an increased European integration was
perceived as the most important driving force to a peaceful Europe.
The increasing complexity of international relations has led to a
theory of transnationalism, a field of study which argues that states are
not the only significant actors, and whose focus is cross-boundary
political space. This theory transgresses the traditional boundaries of
sovereign territory, emphasising instead the direct linkages across
international boundaries. It is an international process grown out of the
heightened interconnectivity between people all around the world and
the loosening of boundaries between countries.
As an economic process it involves the global reorganisation of the
production process, in which various stages of the production of any
product can occur in various countries, with the aim of minimising
costs. Economic transnationalism was spurred on in the latter half of the
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20th century by the process of (economic) globalisation. Multinational
corporations can be seen as a form of transnationalism because of their
operational organisation irrespective of political boundaries.
In practice, transnationalism refers to increasing transborder relations
between individuals, groups and firms and to mobilisations beyond state
boundaries. Individuals, groups, institutions and states interact with each
other in a new global space where cultural and political characteristics
of national societies are combined with emerging multi-level and
multinational activities.
Proponents of transnationalism seek to facilitate the flow of people,
ideas, and goods between states and regions. They believe that it has
increasing relevance with the rapid growth of globalisation. They
contend that it does not make sense to link specific nation-state
boundaries with migratory workforces, globalised corporations, global
money flow, global information flow, and global scientific cooperation.
The present financial crisis has shown the limits of this approach.
Very careful distinctions are now being made between international
or multinational relationships, i.e. relations between and among nation-
states or agents, and transnational relationships, i.e. interactions between
and among individuals and other entities, regardless of nation-state
boundaries. As a consequence, internationalism refers to a cooperation
between nation states, and points to the affairs between nation-state
governments, while transnationalism refers to a cooperation between
people, and points to activities, which transcends national boundaries
and in which nation-state governments do not play the most important or
even a significant role. Furthermore, transnationalism often entails a
vision of the obliteration of nation states to make way for a unified
world government.
Examples of internationalism refer to broad United Nations
institutional architecture, international treaties, international customs
and tariff regulations. International organisations have an international
scope on specific issues, are based on a treaty and subject to
international law (e.g. IMF, World Bank, OECD, EU, etc.). Examples of
transnationalism include NGOs such as Greenpeace or “Médecins sans
Frontières” as well as global financial activities, global science research
and global environmental concerns.
When we look further and deeper into the scientific analysis of the
European experience in international relations, the present stage of the
European integration process is more and more shaped by the ongoing
conceptual and policy debate between intergovernmentalism and
supranationalism. Two elements should be stressed: decision-making
method and application to the European integration process.
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Intergovernmentalism is an approach to integration that treats states
and national governments in particular, as the primary actors in the
integration process. The power in international organisations is
possessed by its member states and decisions are made by unanimity or
coordinated consensus. Independent appointees of the governments or
elected representatives have solely advisory or implementation
functions. In short, in an intergovernmental organisation, member states
keep power and the decision-making process is managed through
unanimity/ consensus rules. Intergovernmentalism applies to most
international organisations today such as the UN, UNICEF, UNESCO,
OECD, Council of Europe, etc.).
As a theory of regional integration applied to European integration,
intergovernmentalism rejects the idea of neo-functionalism. The theory
suggests that governments control the level and speed of European
integration. It is said that any increase in power at the supranational
level results from a direct decision by governments. The theory rejects
the concept of the spillover effect that neo-functionalism proposes, as
well as the idea that supranational organisations are on an equal political
level as national governments. Various intergovernmental perspectives
have been offered in order to explain periods of radical change in the
European Union (because of the converging governmental preferences)
and periods of inertia (due to the diverging national interests).
Supranationalism, on the other hand, is a method of decision-making
in multi-national political communities, wherein power is
democratically entrusted to independent, experienced, appointed
personalities or to representatives elected by the legislatures or people of
the member states. Member state governments still have power, but they
must share this power with others. Because decisions are made by
majority votes, it is possible for a member state to be forced by the other
member states to implement a decision. Unlike a federal state, member
states fully retain their sovereignty and participate voluntarily, being
subject to the supranational government only in the sectors agreed,
according to those rules agreed for each sector. In supranationalism, as
opposite to the decision-making method in intergovernmentalism,
member states already agree on goals and the methods for making
decisions together.
In supranational organisations a division/sharing of power between
member states and central authority exists; the decision-making process
is centralised and the executive power is held by civil servants. As to
European supranationalism, Weiler11 distinguishes two main functional
11 Weiler, J.H.H., The Community System: The Dual Character of Supranationalism, in
Yearbook of European Law, 1 (1), 1981, p. 267-306.
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dimensions: the executive dimension, in which the relationships and
hierarchy which exist between Community policies and legal measures
are on one hand and the competing policies and legal measures of the
member states are on the other; and the legislative-juridical dimension,
in which the institutional framework and decision-making by which
such measures are initiated, debated, formulated, promulgated and
finally executed.
2. Emerging scientific context and content
The scientific context and content of European developments are
being challenged by various trends. It is therefore important to identify
the major socio-cultural transformations which are challenging Europe’s
future in a globalising context, and shaping the emerging scientific
context and content: the (neo-) liberalist thinking has resulted in an
exclusively market-based society with subsequent commodification and
monitarisation of exchanges and relations; democratic governance
practices in politics are confronted with a plural vision of the world and
human beings; the existence of multi-cultural societies implies the need
for interdisciplinary concepts and approaches and for pedagogical tools
to learn how to dialogue and to manage diversity towards
interculturality; growing societal complexity leads to growing
uncertainties and human (economic, social, political, etc.) insecurity,
which produces a crisis of the sense of belonging at a social level (i.e.
growing individualism, the principle of the predominance of “I”,
individual and collective egoism) as much as at the cultural level (i.e.
cultural relativism, attitudes of indifference, neglect and intolerance);
and the globalisation vs Europeanisation debate shapes the nature of
internal and external relations within and beyond Europe, and requires
specific European answers. In short, the ongoing interaction between
these societal characteristics leads to increasing pluralism in scientific
perspectives and analysis with a differing disciplinary and
interdisciplinary focus on the challenges of the current fragmented post-
modern societies.
Within this changing international economic and political landscape
the role of the main shaping actors also influences the scientific
perspective of the role of the State and the Society:
As to the role of the State, the modalities and targets as well as the
capacity for state intervention have changed drastically in the global
economy as a result of increased flexible accumulation. Increasing
international competition forces all states to become more
entrepreneurial to create a favourable business climate. Also,
international organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank have
gained policy importance in managing the global economy and
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international financial negotiations. The role of the state has become
much more problematic in present times, being only one of the many
shaping actors of the relationship between economy and society;
As to the role of Society, two seemingly contradictory trends seem to
be at work. On the one hand, norms, habits, political and cultural
attitudes have shifted since 1970 from collective norms and values
towards a much more competitive individualism as the central value of
entrepreneurship. On the other hand, at times of fragmentation and
economic insecurity, the desire for stable values leads to an increased
emphasis on the moral authority of basic institutions such as the family,
religion, the state, the firm, etc. to manage the tension between
flexibility and stability. The evolving individualising society seems to
develop on a double basis: incentive-based at the economic level
(globalisation) and value-oriented at the societal level (cultural
assertivity). It seems that “flexi-security” represents the new working
base for societal development.
Although exposure to extra-European social and economic forces is
not new to European history, the new qualities of the globalisation
process today are shaping the very nature of Europe’s future: changes in
the global location of production activities exceed any capacity of state
regulation (e.g. social dumping, financial markets, regulation of the
deregulation); and inward migration flows have an increasing impact on
existing economic, social and cultural structures in European societies.
This profound and worldwide global transition heralds a new phase of
sociological analysis and urges the development of new approaches to
capture these processes of transformation.
Sociologically, the process of modernisation describes the movement
from traditionalism, in which religion, ascribed status, locally-rooted
and small-scale, culturally-specific communities predominate, to
rationalism in which science, achieved status, convergent, large scale
organisation, and cosmopolitan urban societies take the lead. This notion
has now collapsed because there are no longer any grand narratives or
meta-narratives – there is no history. Themes of fragmentation and
arbitrariness have led to a breakdown of social reforms, an increased
heterogeneity and disorganised societies. We come across images and
ideas that have little connection with the history of the areas in which
we live, or with our own personal histories. This emerging post-modern
society is highly pluralistic and diverse, much dominated by media and
communication tools.
Post-modernism posits an increasingly decentred and fragmented
society, lacking any overarching framework of social order and
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regulation.12 This notion of “decentredness” and fragmentation is linked
with a perceived pluralism of cultural meaning and practice. It rejects
universal cultural ideals and focuses on differentiation and cultural
specificity away from the political and public sphere. Post-modernism
implies a fragmentation of forms, rather than rational directness,
randomness, chaotic variety, an end to unidirectional progress and a
rapprochement between the modern and traditional world.
As a response to the economic and social changes in societies
scientific literature is introducing new concepts to the policy debate
These concepts refer to reflexive modernity13 (i.e. the essential
characteristic of modern scientific thought of reflecting upon and
constantly changing its conclusions: knowledge of the world contributes
to its unstable or mutable character), risk society14 (i.e. risk implying a
measured approach to the calculation of probabilities: by identifying and
calculating risks and then making reasoned judgements about the
probability. These global threats relate to unequal human development,
environmental damage and rising crime) and globalisation15 (i.e. a sense
of the interdependence of the entire world and of the interchangeable
ability of many of its elements). The disintegrative trends in societies
are signs of increasing difficulty and crisis in the management of
tensions inherent to the social compromise model. Some of these trends
will be further developed in the following chapters.
12 See Baudrillard, J., Simulacra and Simulation, Michigan University Press, 1994; Jean
François Lyotard, The Post-Modern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, Manchester
University Press, 1984, 110 p.; Harvey, D., The Condition of Postmodernity,
Cambridge MA & Oxford U.K.: Blackwell Publishers, 1990, 378 p.; Bourdieu, P.,
Outline of a Theory of Practice, Cambridge Studies in Social and Cultural
Anthropology, Cambridge University Press, 1977.
13 Beck, U., Giddens, A. and Lash, S., Reflexive Modernization. Politics, Tradition and
Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order, Stanford University Press, 1994.
14 Beck, U., Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, London: Sage, 1992; Ibid., World
Risk Society, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998; Ibid., World at Risk, Cambridge: Polity
Press, 2008.
15 See Beck, U., What is Globalization, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001; Castells, M.,
The Information Trilogy: Econmiomy, Sociery and Culture, Vol. I, II, III, Cambridge
MA & Oxford U.K.: Blaclwell, 2000; Giddens, A., Runaway World: How
Globalisation is Reshaping Our lives, London: Profile, 1999; Ibid., The Global Third
Way Debate, Cambridge: Polity, 2001; Ibid., Europe in the Global Age, Cambridge:
Polity, 2007; Habermas, J., The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays,
Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2001; Morin, E., La Complexité humaine, Paris:
Flammarion, 1994.




(Economic, social, political) Integration refers to a variety of
processes by which individuals and groups of people are incorporated
into various social arenas and segments of society. Therefore, the
essence of integration is the acceptance and tolerance of and respect for
people who possess differing values and beliefs and who behave
differently, while at the same time being committed to and working
towards a common future, in which all will have a fair share.
Living with differences in societies requires the management of
differences. Two areas of management are fundamental: the cultural
field and the field of material resources, or rather, access to resources. In
order to live together in a cohesive community with different cultures,
synchronisation in public space is necessary in order to prevent open
conflict and promote cooperation and a sense of belonging to the
community. We perceive integration therefore not as a flattening process
of assimilation but as a two-way process, based on a framework of basic
values, i.e. the human rights paradigm, in which equal opportunity,
cultural diversity and mutual tolerance are respected.
Furthermore, the European context implies that integration is
understood from within its existing multicultural environment.
Multiculturalism advocates that society allows and includes distinct
cultural groups with equal status but differing cultural identities. A
useful reminder of this perspective is the distinction Amartya Sen makes
in his book Identity and Violence between the idea of cultural liberty,
which focuses on the freedom either to preserve or to change priorities,
and of valuing cultural conservation.16 In reality multicultural practices
sometimes lead to an entrenchment of cultural identity, “ghettoization”
of particular groups or a policy of separate development of ethnic
minorities.
2. Inclusion
It is a two-sided process of people’s capability to participate fully in
economic, social, political and cultural life, based on a community of
values (e.g. full respect for the dignity of each person, the common
good, pluralism, non-violence, solidarity). It encompasses all aspects of
social development and all policies. It requires the protection of the
weak, as well as the right to differ, to create and to innovate
(Copenhagen Declaration 1995).




The growing interest in the inclusion of wider social, cultural and
environmental concerns into all areas and levels of policy-making, has
led to the adoption of the now fashionable term of mainstreaming. As a
consequence, policies have moved from a narrow basic human needs
approach to a wider view of an inclusive and cohesive society. Such
inclusive policies can be promoted through the participation of public
bodies, social partners, NGOs and other relevant actors. Partnerships of
community leaders and elected municipal politicians are emerging with
the aim of strengthening the capacity of cities to create and sustain
inclusive communities for the mutual benefit of all people and to ensure
that community voices of diversity can be recognised.
3. Diversity
Diversity is a much more nebulous concept than inclusion or
integration. Within the context of this paper, diversity is defined as
recognising, appreciating, valuing and utilising the unique talents and
contributions of all individuals regardless of their differences in values,
beliefs and lifestyle, culture, language, religion, etc. Diversity means
more than just acknowledging and/or tolerating difference. It develops
in a globalisation context of various spheres of belonging and needs to
be accepted, acknowledged, valued, promoted and managed in a
balanced framework of rights and responsibilities.
The Human Development Report 2004 of the UNDP refers to a set
of conscious practices that involve:17
a) understanding and appreciating interdependence of humanity, cultures,
and the natural environment; b) practicing mutual respect for qualities and
experiences that are different from our own; c) understanding that diversity
includes not only ways of being but also ways of knowing; d) recognizing
that personal, cultural and institutionalized discrimination creates and
sustains privileges for some while creating and sustaining disadvantages for
others; and e) building alliances across differences so that we can work
together to eradicate all forms of discrimination.
The report concludes that an enriching effect of the recognition of
diversity for democracy and progress can be obtained through building
multicultural democracies and various forms of advanced democracy.18
4. Governance
Governance is a policy concept that tries to capture/respond to the
challenges of the globalisation vs culture debate, set in the radical
17 UNDP, Human Development Report 2004: Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse
World, New York: Oxford University Press; 2005, Ch. 1.
18 Ibid., Ch. 3.
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transformation of our societies. We are moving from state-centric to
human-centric structures to decide, influence and shape decisions.
Governance describes the process whereby elements in society
(institutions & civil society) wield power and authority and influence
and enact policies and decisions concerning public life, economic and
social development. Global governance is then defined as the system of
rules and institutions established by the international community and
private actors to manage political, economic and social affairs.
Global governance, a shared communication tool, is a familiar
concept in multidisciplinary literature, focusing on emerging
decentralised and informal forms of governance and the declining forms
of traditional institutionalised state-centric government. Understanding
to what extent global governance could be driven by economic
globalisation and complex interdependence will be crucial in defining
the EU’s future status as either a leader or a marginalised international
player.
To respond to the increasingly interconnected internal and external
challenges to societies, a rather innovative new policy concept is being
introduced in the present debate, i.e. multi-level and multi-actor
governance. The concept of multi-level governance19 refers to “the
existence of overlapping competencies among multiple levels of
governments and the interaction of political actors across those levels”.
It is the process whereby elements/actors/layers in society at various
international, European, national, regional and local levels (institutions
& civil society) wield power and authority and influence and enact
policies and decisions concerning public life, economic and social
development. The general policy characteristics refer to frequent and
complex interactions between governmental actors and increasingly
important dimension of non-state actors. In particular, multi-level
governance crosses the traditionally separate domains of domestic and
international politics.
The conditions for a proper multi-level governance structure can be
summarised as follows: In the fields of economic governance rule
setting is required for managing and controlling market economies; In
the field of political governance the debate concerns the revisiting of
some major policy themes (such as institutional efforts, the role of the
state) on the origin of the rule of law, democratic institutions and
working with social actors, in view of the fact that the nation state is
only one of many actors in the international political system; In the
19 The concept was introduced by Gary Marks two decades ago, Structural Policy and
Multi-level Governance in the EC, in Cafruny, A. and Rosenthal, G. (eds.), The State
of the European Community, New York: Lynne Rienner, 1993, pp. 391-410.
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people and citizens oriented social/cultural governance, internal and
external solidarity should be guaranteed as well as better proximity of
the citizens to the institutional fabric. (e.g. a fairer framework for the
movement of people and respect for cultural diversity are essential.)
The European expression of multi-level governance20 is exemplified
by the EU, being a political system with a European layer (i.e. European
Commission, European Council and European Parliament, etc.), a
national and a regional layer. There is mutual interaction across different
levels of government (i.e. a vertical dimension) and with other relevant
actors within the same level (i.e a horizontal dimension). The policy
results are frequent and complex interactions between governmental
actors and an increasingly important dimension of non-state actors. In
particular, multi-level governance crosses the traditionally separate
domains of domestic and international politics. Its application to the
practice of European governance suggests that the EU is considered a
multilayered system of decision-making in dealing with complex
societal problems where the institutional redistribution of competences
is not based on a territorial dimension but on functional and issue-
related criteria.
IV. Guidelines
In proposing a critical overview and analysis of the relation between
globalisation and Europeanisation from a human-centric approach in the
various parts and chapters of this book, we have adopted the following
major working hypotheses.
The new post-modern conceptualisation of governance, citizenship
and (social, civic, intercultural and interreligious) dialogue in European
and global relations requires a multiplicity of citizenship as a political-
legal status (i.e. post-nationalism), a recognition of diverse and multiple
identities (i.e. multiculturalism and interculturalism) and a citizens’
participation on all levels of sovereignty (i.e. transnationalism).
The current multidimensional process of globalisation has a
paradoxical impact on the external and internal relations of states. The
dominant spatial paradigm of territoriality and identity-building is being
undermined by globalising forces. But the power of the territorial
narrative remains strong through the re-emergence of communal,
nationalist and ethnic identities, the misconceived interpretation of
sovereignty and the exclusive focus of locally based communities for
sustaining social solidarity. Its seemingly contradictory nature reveals
new opportunities for institutional structures along with new forms of
20 See European Governance, 2001 White Paper.
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politics and civility and, as a consequence, offers a reading of
sustainable statehood from a cosmopolitan and public goods
perspective. (See Part II, in particular Chapters 5 to 7.)
Europe today is characterised by a seemingly contradictory process
of increasing diversity, unifying governance and undermining credibility
in a globalising context. However, it is not fully equipped with the
proper institutional architecture to cope with the economic, political,
social and cultural challenges of the current systemic crisis and to
inspire a motivational drive to its future. In Part III we try to analyse
some specific areas of human-centric development in the ongoing






The Idea of Europe: an Historical Perspective1
Introduction
History illustrates that Europe is a dynamic and evolving entity with
many faces, multiple identities, multiple expressions and experiences
and diversified cooperation forms.2 Europe is a two thousand year
civilisation with a multiplicity of cultures; it is also a socio-economic
model and exhibits a unique integration process. The whole of European
history is characterised by forms of and attempts at economic, political,
military and cultural cooperation, as part of the search for equilibrium
between integration and diversity within certain contours. Europe is,
however, in the first place a community of shared values, based on
values such as the centrality of the human being, freedom, equality,
respect for human rights, and acceptance of diversity as an asset,
tolerance, justice and solidarity. Europe is also a political project trying
to unite people while respecting their diversity. Today, however, Europe
is struggling to keep its diversified societal model alive in the midst of
complex and interconnected issues of globalisation vs Europeanisation.3
In his essay “The Crisis of the Mind” Paul Valéry,4 the French
poet and philosopher, describes the common characteristics of Europe. It
is a Europe of the spirit which is shaped by the legacies of Rome,
Athens and Jerusalem, has made humanism its foundation and is rooted
in Christianity. This means that Europe is a world of historical
1 Parts of this contribution have benefitted from Andrea Chiarello, European Identity
beyond the Nation State. Plurality and Inclusion for a new Democratic Space,
Thesis, June 2012, University of Padua.
2 An innovative analysis of ideas about Europe from an interdisciplinary perspective is
given by Dainotto, R.., Europe (in Theory), Durham: Duke University Press, 2007.
3 Giddens, A., Europe in the Global Age, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007; Habermas, J.,
Europe. The Faltering Project, Cambridge: Polity, 2009.
4 “The Crisis of the Mind” was written at the request of John Middleton Murry. “La
Crise de l’esprit” originally appeared in English, in two parts, in The Athenaeum
(London), April 11 and May 2, 1919. The French text was published the same year in
the August number of La Nouvelle Revue Française (From History and Politics,
translated by Denise Folliot and Jackson Mathews, Vol. 10, pp. 23-36.).
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references, memories and experiences shared by people. He defines the
“Homo Europaeus” as:
a man in whom the European mind can come to its full realization.
Wherever the names of Caesar, Caius. Trajan, and Virgil, of Moses and St.
Paul, and of Aristotle, Plato, and Euclid have had simultaneous meaning and
authority, there is Europe. Every race and land that has been successively
Romanized, Christianized, and, as regards the mind, disciplined by the
Greeks, is absolutely European.
In his book The Origins of European Civilisation5 Hendrik Brugmans
identified two major elements of European civilisation: the active
participation to its many spiritual heritages and a series of historical
experiences from the Roman Empire onwards. He distinguished three
phases: the Empire of Constantine or a Mediterranean Europe, Medieval
or Christian Europe and the Europe of the Nation-State. It is in the
broader space of today’s Europe that the original virtues of the spirit of
Europe, namely democracy, dialogue, respect for rights and harmonious
development should be understood, sharing a common heritage and
rooted in Christian values.
I. Classical Origin
The term “Europe” has many origins and interpretations. For some
authors it derives from the Greek word “eurus” meaning “wide”; some
others refer to the dualism in the Acadian language between “asu/acu”
and “erib/ erebu”, where the first means “to rise” and would indicate the
dawn, i.e. the East and Asia in particular and the second means “to
enter” and stands for the sunset, so the West and specifically Europe.6
In Greek mythology “Europa” was the daughter of Agenor, the
Phoenician king of Tyre. The God Zeus felt in love with her,
transformed himself into a bull and brought her to Crete, where he
assumed human form and had three sons by her. It can be argued that
the opposition between the West and the East was illustrated in the
Classical Age by the Greek and the Persian world, where the first was a
symbol of democracy and freedom, opposed to the absolutism and
despotism of Persian rule. According to Herodotus, the geographical
boundaries of Europe were defined by the Mediterranean Sea in the
south, the Sea of Azov and the River Don in the east, and Gibralter’s
5 Brugmans, H., Europe: One Civilization, One Destiny, One Vocation, in Brugmans,
H. (ed.), Dream, Adventure, Reality, New York: Greenwood, 1987, p. 11-39.
6 Mikkeli, H., Europe as an Idea and an Identity, Basingstoke: Palgrave Publishers,
1998.
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Pillars of Hercules in the west, which was also considered the limits of
the human civilisation.
Following the historical path of the origin of Europe, authors such as
Mikkeli and Braque argue that the Roman Empire cannot be defined as
the first European superpower.7 According to Mikkeli, the principal aim
of the Roman Empire was to control the main commercial routes,
extending its territorial power to the southern coast of the Mediterranean
and parts of Asia. However the impact of various philosophical and
religious currents made it difficult to define Europe ideologically.
Brague follows the same of line of reasoning, asserting that the constant
confrontation with “the Other” during the Roman Era, represented the
most significant element on which a European common cultural heritage
could be understood.8 This perspective conceives the European culture
not as a fixed set of values, but in terms of “cultural transmission”. The
myth of the “abduction of Europa” underlines the fact that its origins
were constructed from an appropriation of what belonged to others,
moving from the East to the West.9
It is clear that in the Ancient Age, Europe was not perceived as a
political community with unifying characteristics, but rather as a
geographical area with unstable borders. In spite of some mythological
common origin, none of the citizens of the Roman Empire defined
himself/herself as a European, preferring instead the image of Rome as
caput mundi. After the schism in 395 AD, the term “Europe” became
more and more used to identify the western part of the Empire, whose
identity was strongly shaped by Christianity.10
II. A Res Publica Christiana in the Middle Ages
The period after the fall of the Western Roman Empire, which
coincides with the enormous Arab expansion, was characterised by
cultural fragmentation. The Frankish attempt to build a united political
community is considered by many authors as the very origin of Europe.
This term was used in the Middle Ages to create a sense of solidarity in
addressing a common enemy, the struggle against Islam to preserve
Christianity as the religion of Europe.
7 Ibid., p. 18.
8 Brague, R., Eccentric Culture: A Theory of Western Civilization, South Bend, Ind.:
St. Augustine’s Press, 2002.
9 Boon, V. and G. Delanty, Europe and its Histories, in H. Persson and B. Strath,
Reflections on Europe, Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2007, pp.159-182.
10 Delanty, G., Inventing Europe. Idea, Identity, Reality, London: MacMillan Press
UTD, 1995.
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During the battle of Poitiers (732 AD) the word “Europeenses”
(meaning “Europeans”) was used to refer to Charles Martel’s coalition
army against the Arabs.11 However, there are some criticisms to the
alleged unifying role of the Frankish Empire, as it did not cover the
whole of Europe and it co-existed with the remaining Roman territories
in the East. For some authors, the Carolingian period cannot be defined
as the starting point of the European integration process and would be
better termed as the end of a specific historical era, characterised by the
attempt of Charlemagne to combine the classical heritage of the Romans
with Christianity.12 The Crusades need to be understood in this historical
context. The beginning of the crusading period is generally attributed to
Pope Urban II’s calling of the First Crusade at the Council of Clermont
in 1095 to an armed pilgrimage to the Holy Land to defend Europe from
the Muslim invasion.
One of Christianity’s important contributions to European unity was
from the Catholic Church. Its aim was the creation of a community of
independent states, under the spiritual guidance of the Pope. It promoted
a policy of international mobility of students and lecturers, with Latin as
the vehicular language. In the 9th century the term “christianitas” stood
for the whole territory inhabited by Christian people, with a focal
attention towards universalism. Pope Innocent III (1198-1216), one of
the most powerful and influential popes of the Middle Ages, affirmed
the existence of a Christian territory (“terrae Christianorum”), with
specific borders (“fines Christianorum”) and one single “populus
christianus”, under different political communities, but with the
common need to defend its identity against non-believers.
A crucial historical moment in the identification of Europe with
Christendom was the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans in 1453. It
resulted in a clear separation between the Christian Europe and the
Muslim Asia. Although the fragmentation caused by the schism between
the Orthodox and the Catholic Church was reduced, a sense of unity in
the continent was not yet present. The crusaders went fighting for
Christendom and not for Europe.
Still the importance of Christianity in Europe needs to be put into its
proper perspective. It was an Asian religion, born in the Middle East,
with a universal message that transcended European borders.
Nonetheless it gave Europe its territorial grounding and became the
symbol of European unity against the Islamic East.13 In Pagden’s words,
11 Wilson, K. and J. Van der Dussen (ed.), The History of the Idea of Europe, Taylor &
Francis, 1995, p. 26.
12 See for example Mikkeli, H., op. cit. p. 27.
13 Delanty, G., Inventing Europe. Idea, Identity, Reality, op. cit.
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it means that “an abducted Asian woman gave Europe her name, a
vagrant Asian exile gave Europe its political and finally its cultural
identity; and an Asian prophet gave Europe its religion”.14
To summarise, it is difficult to state that the idea of Europe in the
Middle Ages assumed a strong political connotation; it was instead used
as a vague geographical expression which covered the cultural and
religious common heritage of Christianity and the Classical Roman Age.
The unification of the continent was therefore merely an answer to
external threats and internal common interests were not strong enough
to favour a process of actual integration.15
III. A Process of Secularisation towards a European
Civilisation
History shows that the idea of Europe assumed many different
connotations throughout the centuries, according to political and cultural
contexts. In the humanistic culture of the Renaissance during the 14th
and 15th centuries, the word “Europe” regained a strong meaning,
recognised as a common reference by the intellectual classes in most
European countries.16 From the beginning of the 16th century
Christianity gradually lost its central role in the conception of Europe.
Both the outbreak of religious conflicts with the Protestant Reformation
challenging the role of the Catholic Church as European cultural unifier,
and the discovery of the New World with the colonisation of American
territories, led to a process of secularisation. The ties with Christianity
were loosened and the affirmation of a European civilisation emerged,
exhibiting a high level of intellect and a differentiated culture.17 The
Protestant Sebastian Münster describes Europe in Cosmographia
Universalis as the most fertile and cultivated area despite its relatively
small dimensions. The actual conceptualisation of a “European
civilisation”, however, was made during the Enlightenment (17th-18th
century).
From the political point of view, the Peace of Westphalia in 1648
marked the beginning of a new European era, where the balance of
power between sovereign states came to be a central element. The term
“Europe”, detached from its religious connotations, came into common
usage among political decision-makers. Moreover it constituted the
14 Pagden, A. (ed.), The Idea of Europe from Antiquity to the European Union,
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2002.
15 Mikkeli, H., op. cit. p. 36.
16 Wilson, K. and J. Van der Dussen (eds.), op. cit. p. 36.
17 Mikkeli, H., op. cit. p. 44.
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basis of political projects that aimed to achieve an internal peaceful
organisation of the continent.
On the cultural side, Europeans believed in the universal value and
superiority of their civilisation. It was seen as a process leading towards
a virtuous and ideal state18 and finally to eternal peace.19 The highest
expression of civilisation was represented by the nation-state, which was
to be legitimised in the context of “methodological nationalism”.20 The
idea of different yet equally valuable forms of society was not taken into
consideration, and so other populations were labelled as “barbarians”
who needed to be civilised by having European values imposed upon
them. This concept of civilisation is thought to be the secular substitute
for Christendom as the unifying element for the continent. Norman
Davies notes that in the early phase of the Enlightenment “it became an
embarrassment for the divided community of nations to be reminded of
their common Christian identity; and ‘Europe’ filled the need for a
designation with more neutral connotations”.21
Another contribution recognising the European common culture
came from the French philosopher Voltaire. He argued that, in spite of
political fragmentations, Europeans share the same religious background
and the same civil principles. Strong focus was put on arts and natural
sciences, which create close ties among nations and result in a
“République littéraire”. This was, in his view, the decisive element that
made Europe the most civilised continent in the world. It should be
added, however, that the feeling of belonging to the same cultural
community was shared only by the closed circles of intellectuals with
the same classical education, without much influence on ordinary
people; for them, the privileged reference was to their closer local
community and the idea of Europe was seen as abstract.22
Conclusion
As previously mentioned, the idea of Europe has mainly emerged out
of a constant confrontation with otherness. However, this process is
more complex and cannot be reduced to a mere clash or rigid distinction
from the “Other”. Hobson argues that Europeans have always had
intense interaction and exchanges with the Eastern countries. In fact,
18 Wilson, K. and J. Van der Dussen (eds.), op. cit. p. 64.
19 Kant, I., Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, 1795.
20 Beck, U. and E. Grande, Cosmopolitan Europe, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007,
p. 94-97.
21 Davies, N., Europe: a history, London: Oxford University Press, 1996.
22 Burke, P., Did Europe exist before 1700?, in History of European Idea, Vol. I, 1980,
p. 21-29.
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some elements of European culture are originated and borrowed from
outside Europe. It is worth reminding that the mathematical models used
by Copernicus were invented by Ibn al-Shatir and that the typical British
tea-drinking comes from the Chinese tradition.23 The distinctive feature
of European culture is often the appropriation, acculturation and
reworking of elements of other cultures.
The fundamental ambiguity accompanying European identity-
building throughout the centuries has been the constant effort to provide
its identity with a kind of substance,24 referring to an alleged common
geographical belonging, ethnic origins, or to a common cultural
heritage. This effort has often implied the demonisation of the “Other”
and the refusal to build constructive forms of dialogue with them,
looking instead for unity in the form of a common opposition to an
enemy. History shows however that every attempt to purify Europe from
the presence of an alleged hostile “Other” has always turned into
tragedy.
Understanding the historical trajectory of how the idea of Europe has
evolved and how its identity has built over the years into a common
cultural heritage, is fundamental to interpretting today’s scenarios and to
making policy assessments for Europe’s future. Some of the cultural
specificities of Europe can therefore be related to: 1) the rescue of
history from memory to focus on ideas that travel irrespective of
borders; 2) the move beyond assimilation and multiculturalism towards
interculturalism to management of diversity and living with differences;
3) the acceptance of change so that dialogue and mutual listening
becomes the driving social force and 4) the learning from humility so
that Europe can draw from its religious and non-religious traditions and
from its Christian roots when learning how to practice humility. We
consider these characteristics major components of the European spirit.
In order to valorise these components, a cosmopolitan perspective of
the European integration process might be helpful in recognising plural
and multifaceted identities in Europe, accepting its constitutive
otherness and benefiting from its diversity. Stimulating intercultural
dialogue25 as an instrument and objective of building cohesive and
sustainable societies might therefore create new forms of relationship
23 Hobson, J., Revealing the Cosmopolitan Side of Europe: the Eastern Origins of
European civilisation”, in G. Delanty (ed.), Europe and Asia Beyond East and West:
Towards a new Cosmopolitanism, London: Routledge, 2006.
24 Ibid., p. 180.
25 See Bekemans, L. (ed.), Intercultural Dialogue and Multi-level Governance. A
Human Rights-based Approach, Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 607 p., 2012.
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Identity and identity-building have been examined by numerous
scholars from various disciplines and perspectives. Many have
contributed to an understanding of the complexity and the dynamism of
these terms and have even offered theoretical instruments to deal with
their changing realities. However identity remains an open concept,
increasingly shaped by growing interdependencies and transformations
in the current international system. The globalising world is
characterised by some asymmetry between the growing extra-territorial
nature of power relations and the continuing territoriality of the ways in
which people live their everyday lives.
The European Union can be perceived as a unique but complex
system of governance with a policy mix of supranational and
intergovernmental elements. After many centuries of rivalries and wars
among European countries, the end of the Second World War paved the
way for a peace-building process of integration. This process has
followed a “neo-functionalist” step-by-step approach very much
embodied by Jean Monnet, envisaging spillover effects from the
economy to the political area and beyond. We are convinced that the
only way of making people identify with Europe and build a sense of
belonging without trying to replace national affiliations or marginalise
regional or national identities, is the development of a community-
driven political project, embodied in a set of shared values and common
principles. Such a political consensus might give coherence to its
actions, legitimacy to its institutions and inspiration to the citizens of
Europe.
I. Concept of Identity
Identity is related to the way individuals reach certain self-
awareness, in relation to their family, social or ethnic group, language,
culture, religious affiliation and political commitment. It is often
expressed by the idea of “belonging”. Therefore psychological and
social factors play an important role in creating that awareness. As
identity always implies both a strong interaction between the individual
and the group and an affirmation of a group as distinct from other
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groups, its political implications are fundamental. This is especially the
case in the different ways identity can be experienced or exploited.
However, identity determination is not a constant invariable process,
but changes over time according to criteria such as birth, family,
language, religion, territory, etc. Nowadays this has become more
complex with the heightened mobility of people and the trespassing of
visual and virtual borders; it has also become more disturbed by the
growing individualisation and vagueness of the moral norms within
society. In short, given the growing interdependent globalisation trends
in today’s world, a shift has been taking place from a more static
definition of identity to a more contextual and dynamic understanding of
identity.
Such a relational identity requires an open attitude towards “the
Other”. It requires a desire to listen to them and to induce
comprehension of and benefit from dialogue with them. However many
people are still afraid that intercultural encounters result in a loss of
identity and create insecurity. Therefore, to overcome the perception of
“the Other” as a potential threat, it is necessary to build the sense of
belonging as close as possible to the citizen and to valorise local
communities and cities as living places of intercultural conviviality.
Subsequently, a spillover effect can support the building up of identities,
characterised as belonging to a group differentiated but sharing a basic
set of common values and interests.
II. Concept of European Identity
In search of the identity of Europe we have to accept that Europe
presents a whole range of peoples and thus a great diversity of
languages, cultures and religions. In theory and in practice Europe
should be seen as an added (enriched) value to our multiple identities.
The European identity relates to a community of shared values such as
solidarity, the rule of law, respect for diversity, attention to the person
and the human dignity. Debates about European identity have
intensified in the context of EU enlargement and the EU Constitutional
Treaty. Although the motto “unity in diversity” is generally seen as best
describing the aim of the EU, opinions differ widely as to how it should
be understood.
The point of departure of most discussions on European identity is
the idea that a political community needs a common set of values and
references to ensure its coherence, to guide its actions and to endow
them with legitimacy and meaningfulness. With the fall of Communism
in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the founding of the “European Union” in
1992 with the Maastricht Treaty, endowing the European Community
with new and stronger competences in a wide range of areas (e. g. in the
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field of foreign affairs, security and defence), two questions gained
renewed urgency: the definition of EU borders and that of the political
legitimacy of the Union in the eyes of its citizens – the “glue” that unites
all Europeans and keeps the Community together. However, despite
fundamental differences, preconditions for the emergence of a European
identity are linked to the strengthening of democratic participation at all
levels of decision-making, the valorising of the European dimension in
education and culture and achieving social and economic sustainable
cohesion.
Still the nation-state continues to be the predominant reference for
European citizens despite the growing Europeanisation of identity-
building. The Eurobarometer surveys show that EU citizens continue to
identify first of all with their own country. A relatively low political
participation and weak attachment poses, of course, a legitimacy
problem to the EU.1 Moreover, in the current period of dramatic
transformations of societies within the globalising context, new (and
different) political actors are shaping the world scene, undermining
traditional forms of national statehood.2
III. Models of European Identity-building
Literature presents different models of European identity-building
with various policy consequences.
1. Europe of cultures
The Communitarian view stresses the Europe of culture as a family
of nations anchored in a common history and culture. It emphasises that
European identity has emerged from common movements in religion
and philosophy, politics, science and the arts and argues for a stronger
awareness of the Christian (or Judeo-Christian) tradition. Therefore,
they tend to exclude Turkey from the ranks of possible future member
states. “United in diversity” is taken to refer to Europe as a “family of
nations”. On this basis, it is high time to define EU borders. It is evident
that if what is considered as an original “culture” is a very complex
phenomenon mixing a multitude of human traditions, characters and
behaviours, then the way a group tries to express its own particular
“cultural identity” is very often focused on one aspect of that
complexity, because it is considered as the most essential element which
reveals it. The selection of such an element is not always rational, but it
finds its source in the recent history of the group, in sentiments and
1 Eurobarometer 71, The Future of Europe, January 2010, 169 p.
2 Papisca, A., Dallo stato confinario allo stato sostenibile, in Pace, Diritti dell’uomo,
diritti dei popoli, Anno VI, numero 3, 1992 (1994).
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reactions born from a particular social or political situation, and also
very often in what still appears to be presenting a problem, or a question
raised when facing an uncertain future. However, opponents argue that
this view is a form of “Euro-nationalism” that leads to exclusionary
policies within European societies (as regards non-European
immigrants) and the polarisation of global politics, with the “clash of
civilisations” prophesied by the scholar Samuel P. Huntington as its
worst possible outcome.
2. Europe of citizens
On the contrary, the Liberal and Republican view argues for a
common political culture, or civic identity, based on universal principles
of democracy, human rights, the rule of law etc. expressed in the
framework of a common public sphere and political participation, a
Europe of citizens or “constitutional patriotism”.3 They believe that
cultural identities and religious beliefs should be confined to the private
sphere. For them, European identity will emerge from common political
and civic practices, civil society organisations and strong EU
institutions. It is said that cultural identities, religious beliefs etc. should
be confined to the private sphere. According to this view, European
identity “United in diversity”, will emerge from the common political
and civic practices of citizens sharing the same political and civic
values, while at the same time adhering to different cultural practices.
The limits of the community should be a question of politics, not
culture. The liberal-republican view is often criticised for what is seen as
the artificial distinction between the private and the public, the
subjective and the universal. Democracy and human rights, according to
critics, are not universal values, but themselves spring from specific
cultural traditions. Problems related to cultural differences are ignored,
rather than dealt with. Furthermore, solidarity and emotional bonds in
societies can only result from cultural feelings of belonging together,
never from purely abstract principles.
3. Europe of encounters
Constructivists believe that a “European identity” can only emerge as
a consequence of intensive civic, political and cultural exchanges and
cooperation. As identities undergo constant change, European identity
would be encompassing multiple meanings and identifications and is
constantly redefined through its relationships with others. According to
this view, “United in Diversity” means a participation in collective
3 Habermas, J., The European Nation State. Its Achievements and Its Limitations. On
the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship, in Ratio Juris, Vol. 9, Issue 2,
June 1996, p. 125-137.
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political and cultural practices. It would be wrong and impossible to fix
EU borders.
This view, according to critics, overemphasises people’s ability to
adapt to a world in flux and underestimates their need for stability. Too
much diversity can eventually lead to the loss of identity, orientation
and coherence, and can therefore undermine democracy and established
communities. However, despite fundamental differences there are a
number of factors that are seen by most as preconditions for the
emergence of a European identity: politics: the strengthening of
democratic participation at all levels and more democracy at the EU
level; education and culture: strengthening of the European dimension in
certain subjects (especially history), more focus on language
learning, more exchanges etc.; and social and economic cohesion:
counteracting social and economic differences.
IV. Process of European Identity-building
The identity of the European Union has predominantly been defined
politically. According to the Treaties, the EU is founded “on the
principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law” (Article 6 TEU).
Fundamental disagreements emerged in the work on the EU
Constitutional Treaty about a reference to “God” or “Christianity” in the
preamble. It now only refers to the “religious heritance” of Europe. In
accordance with the principle of “unity in diversity”, it shall promote the
diversity of its cultures, while “bringing the common cultural heritage to
the fore” (Article 151 TEU). Furthermore, the EU must respect
fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental freedoms and the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the Union.
As regards the accession of new members, any European state can
apply for membership, while Europe and its borders are left undefined
(Article 49, TEU). The Copenhagen criteria of stable and democratic
institutions, a functioning market economy and adequate administrative
structures, are to be interpreted in this process of European identity-
building and possible membership. The prospect of Turkey’s possible
EU membership, as well as issues related to globalisation and
immigration, have further added to the identity debates. Relatively low
political participation and weak attachment pose a legitimacy problem to
the EU. However, there is little agreement on how identification can be
strengthened.
The recent developments in European identity-building very much
refer to the EU legal context. The treaties from 1951 onwards, up to the
Treaty of Lisbon, highlight the different contexted approaches which
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were used to strengthen the idea of Europe and European identity.
During the first decades of the European integration process the only
reference to the identity issue was made to distinguish Europe from
other international political actors. From the second half of the 1980s,
Europe has been conceived more and more as a community of shared
values and a political space for active citizens, embodied in the Treaty
of Lisbon and implemented in various EU programmes.
1. The first years of European integration
The end of the Second World War paved the way for the process of
European integration. The French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman
stressed in his Declaration on May 9th, 1950, that durable peace in
Europe could only be achieved if the age-old rivalry between France and
Germany was eliminated. The first period of an economic driven
integration was thus characterised by a strong pragmatism and a “step-
by-step” strategy aimed at building up a common economic space.
In this context, little space existed for debating about identity. The
preamble of the treaty that established the ECSC in 1951 expressed the
conviction that “the contribution which an organised and vital Europe
can make to civilisation is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful
relations”. The pursuit of common economic interests would create “the
basis for a broader and deeper community among peoples long divided
by bloody conflicts” or, as the Treaties of Rome suggest, “lay the
foundations of an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe”.
The idea of Europe that emerges from the first treaties is deeply
influenced by the historical tragedies of the First and Second World
Wars. Economic areas were privileged for their cooperation, in
accordance to the neo-functional approach. It was nevertheless always
the objective to develop the process of integration beyond the European
Economic Community. However, in the early years, most attempts to go
beyond the mere economic orientation of the European integration
process failed.
2. The Declaration on European Identity (1973)
The concept of European identity was introduced for the first time in
the European political agenda with the “Declaration on European
Identity” (Copenhagen, December 14th, 1973). It was said that
cooperation among European peoples represented a real need to
effectively face the current global threats. The action proposed was
oriented to “defend the principles of representative democracy, of the
rule of law, of social justice – which is the ultimate goal of economic
progress – and of respect for human rights. All of these are fundamental
elements of the European identity”.
Identity-building in Europe
69
A number of articles from the Copenhagen Declaration are
illustrative for this changed (at least rhetoric) focus on European
identity-building. Very interesting from this perspective is Article 3:
The diversity of cultures within the framework of a common European
civilization, the attachment to common values and principles, the increasing
convergence of attitudes to life, the awareness of having specific interests in
common and the determination to take part in the construction of a United
Europe, all give the European Identity its originality and its own dynamism.
Article 4 reaffirms the open nature of the Community, leaving space
for further enlargements to peoples who share its same ideals. Another
important aspect is the external dimension of identity, i.e. Europe’s
place and responsibility in the international landscape. Article 6
recognises that global problems can no longer be solved at a national
level and consequently that Europe is to “speak increasingly with one
voice” to other countries and regional areas.4
It has already been stated that in the first decades of integration, the
issue of European identity was raised mainly in its external dimension,
as an attempt to collocate the new supranational actor within the world
context, or as a common project, founded on the search for “l’intérêt
communautaire” in the coordination of national policies. But from the
Single European Act onwards, the existence of a community of citizens
was to be taken into consideration.
3. Europe as a community of citizens
The first attempt to push European integration beyond the notion of a
common market dates back to 1976 with the Tindemans Report. In the
chapter, “Europe of the Citizens”, a community of citizens was
proposed by raising European awareness through visible (symbolic)
measures (e.g. the unification of passports, the vanishing of border
controls, the common use of the benefits of the social security systems,
the accreditation of academic courses and degrees, etc.). In 1984 the
European Council of Fontainebleau set up the Adonnino Committee to
address issues related to a “people’s Europe”. In spite of their ambitious
goals, only some (modest) proposals were adopted to increase the sense
of belonging to the European Community (e.g. the European flag, a
unified passport and the anthem).5 In the same year, Altiero Spinelli
advocated a more ambitious idea of the establishment of a political
4 Strath, B., A European Identity: To the Historical Limits of a Concept, in European
Journal of Social Theory, Sage Publications, 2002.
5 Panebianco, S., European citizenship and European identity: from the Treaty of
Maastricht to public opinion attitudes, JMWP no. 03/96, December, 1996.
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union, which wasn’t, however, translated into a more political
commitment.
The Treaty of Maastricht (1993) represents a milestone in the
European integration process. It instituted the establishment of a
“European citizenship”, a legal status that guaranteed a set of rights to
individuals possessing the nationality of one of Europe’s member states.
At last, a path had been forged that was headed towards an ever-closer
relationship between the European institutions and their citizens.
European identity was no longer exclusively addressed to the external
dimension, but acquired a more specific internal meaning. It was no
longer simply an instrumental usage for coordinating national policies.
Instead it created a constitutional and founding value of the concept of a
“Europe of citizens”.
Still the debate on the existence of a European demos, which often
refers to “the peoples of Europe” remains open to various
interpretations. The construction of a single European subject is an
ongoing process thanks to the direct application of EU norms to its
citizens. The democratic base is no longer the representation of “the
peoples of the European States brought together in the Community” (art.
189 TEC); in fact “Citizens are directly represented at Union level in the
European Parliament” (art.10.2 TEU).
The Convention on the Future of Europe produced a draft for a
Constitutional Treaty which expressed an intention to increase the level
of participation from European citizens in the decision-making process.6
Despite its failure following the negative outcomes of the French and
Dutch referenda in 2005, the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) has finally
followed the same focused line on citizenship. Next to the principle of
representative democracy, which is at the basis of the functioning of the
Union (Art. 10.1 TEU), Article 11(1) states that “the institutions shall,
by appropriate means, give citizens and representative associations the
opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all
areas of Union action”. The method chosen to put this general principle
into practice is the “Citizens’ Initiative”, as formulated in article 11(4):
Not less than one million citizens who are nationals of a significant number
of Member States may take the initiative of inviting the European
Commission, within the framework of its powers, to submit any appropriate
proposal on matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is
required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties […].
6 Dauvergne, A., The Treaty of Lisbon: Assessments and Prospects as of Summer
2011, Notre Europe, Studies & Researches, 2011.
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According to Article 24 of the Lisbon Treaty, the details and the
conditions for an effective implementation of the Citizens’ Initiative
have been discussed by the Council and the European Parliament within
the so-called “ordinary legislative procedure” and a specific regulation
has been adopted.7 The ECI was finally launched on May 9th, 2012 with
the registration of Fraternité 2020.
4. The role of cultures and EU founding values
The aspect of the cultural and religious heritage of the European
peoples is introduced in the treaties as an element of differentiation
rather than unification. However, to imagine a Europe beyond the well-
worn path of institutional, economic and political integration requires a
value driven foundation of the search for the European identity.8 This is
underlined by the words of Karel Verleye, one of the founders of the
College of Europe in Bruges:
It is excluded that a European citizenship or a European commitment will be
stimulated with the population, when no ample consideration will be given
to a number of forgotten or undervalued factors in the construction of the
new Europe, such as the cultural, regional, ethical, historical and spiritual
dimensions.
European identity-building within the EU legal context is not based
on a common linguistic nor cultural nor religious origin; the focus is
instead on the necessity for EU institutions to “respect the equality of
Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities”
(Art. 4.2 TEU). The Treaty of Lisbon includes the Title XIII on culture
and clearly defines the role of the Union in cultural matters in its Article
167. It affirms that “The Union shall contribute to the flowering of the
cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and
regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural
heritage to the fore” (Art 167.1). Furthermore, “The Union shall take
cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of the
Treaties, in particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity of
its cultures” (Art 167.4).
A clear sign of the EU attitude is the lack of reference to Europe’s
Christian roots in the Constitutional Treaty. Despite a strong opposition
from the Catholic Church, the preamble reads as follows: “Drawing
inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of
Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the
7 Regulation (EU) no. 211/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
citizens’ initiative, 16/02/2011.
8 Bouckaert, L. and J. Eynikel (eds.), Imagine Europe: The search for European
Identity and spirituality, Leuven: Garant, 2009.
Globalisation vs Europeanisation: a Human-centric Interaction
72
inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom,
democracy, equality and the rule of law (…)”. The same formulation has
been adopted within the Treaty of Lisbon, adding the intention “to
deepen the solidarity between their peoples while respecting their
history, their culture and their traditions”.
In recent years, significant progress has been made in recognising the
importance of fundamental rights within the European Union. The
Amsterdam Treaty (1997) introduced for the first time a specific
reference to human rights. The Treaty of Lisbon reinforced this
perspective:
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom,
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including
the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to
the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination,
tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail
(Art. 2).
It also stipulates that
the Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as principles of
Community law (Art.6.2).
Moreover the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
has been given the same legal value as the treaties. Its binding value
commits the EU to building a political community within which human
rights have the utmost importance as the ultimate reference.9 It
illustrates a relevant qualitative shift in European integration, leading
towards an inclusive community where the citizens can be the real
protagonists.
Conclusion
The historical path of the idea of Europe shows that European
identity-building is the result of a mixture of numerous elements coming
from different contexts, set in a process of cultural appropriation and a
continuous reworking of a dialogue of civilisations. The evolution of the
European identity issue within the main European treaties highlights the
fact that it was only in the 1980s, when the importance of the political
legitimisation of EU institutions was clearly perceived, that the
9 Papisca, A., “Europe 2020”: What Compass, What Soul, Which Kind of Architecture
for the EU Governance? The Need for Human Rights Mainstreaming, in Pace diritti
umani - Peace Human Rights, 3/2010, 22 p.
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European Commission started engaging in the cultural sphere. It defined
EU founding values and officially embraced the universal human rights
paradigm. The relative failure of the EU in its attempt to make people
identify with the European project is partly due to the state-like “top-
down” strategy and the lack of a genuine post-national identity.
Prospecting a sustainable European future today requires more
advanced forms of supranational and multi-level governance, capable of
managing complex and interconnected economic and political issues
while strengthening a common sense of belonging. It is therefore
important to understand the necessity for European identities to be
inclusive and intrinsically plural, far from the exclusive national patterns
of identity, nationality and citizenship. It would be undesirable, and
rather impossible for the EU to return to the historical path of nation-
state building. Europe does not represent an actual European “demos”;
its borders are not fixed and it contains many different peoples and
cultures. That’s why the “Unity in Diversity” motto represents some big
institutional and political challenges in today’s Europe
Cosmopolitanism as a new way of conceiving cultural otherness
opposes both hierarchical subordination and universal equality,
recognising instead the existing (and undeniable) differences between
peoples and giving them a positive value. Territorial boundaries, social
groups and cultural barriers are transcended. The ultimate reference
remains “the worldwide community of human beings”10 where everyone
is seen as both equal and different in order to expand the concept of the
public beyond its national borders, opening it up to an emerging
European space.
10 Nussbaum, M., Patriotism and cosmopolitanism, in Nussbaum M. et al. (eds.), For





Europe’s Challenges and Responsibilities
in a Globalising World
Introduction
What is Europe’s relevance today? What is its cultural heritage, its
values and norms, its societal model? The answers to these fundamental
questions will shape the European future and the building of our
European societies. Is Europe still an inspiring idea(l) of a value-driven
society, worthwhile of pursuit? Themes such as the frontiers of Europe,
European citizenship, cultural diversity, and the role and purpose of
Europe in a global perspective all require a vision of what Europe is and
should be.
Europe is at a cross roads between its past, present and future. We
are now confronted by a number of (internal and external) challenges to
the European model of socio-economic cohesion and cultural and
regional diversity. Nonetheless, Europe still has a mission and
responsibility in the globalising world.
Europe is at a crucial intersection in its history and at a decisive
moment in the process of European integration. History illustrates that
Europe is a dynamic and evolving entity with many faces, multiple
identities and diversified cooperation forms. The recent enlargement (or
re-unification) of 10 new member states reinforces this image.
Europe has an appointment with its destiny. Its model of society,
based on fundamental human rights, culture as a vehicle of
emancipation, on sustainable development and socio-economic
cohesion, and on a multilateral vision of the world order, has been put
under stress and pressure. In other words, we are experiencing a
confrontation between the confusing actual European (political,
economic, cultural and institutional) reality and Europe’s global
responsibility in the context of an ever-increasing globalisation.
The challenges are multiple and multi-dimensional within and
outside the EU. It requires a new mobilising myth for Europe, i.e. a
project for further European integration that guarantees institutional
governing structures and financing mechanisms for European internal
and external solidarity. Only such a vision may inspire the commitment
of its citizens (and certainly of its young people), and strengthen the
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European role in the globalising world. However, recent political signals
have not been very hopeful. Discussions on the European Constitution,
the debate surrounding and methods being used to create the new
Commission, are already very telling. And today’s European approaches
to policy and its answers to the global financial and economic crisis,
demonstrate tension and incomprehension between the member states.
This chapter consists of three main sections: the first section briefly
describes the historical context of Europe’s future; the second section
examines five main challenges to the European societal model (i.e.
globalisation, Europeanisation, identity and specificity, culture and
perception) and the final section presents three major European tasks for
the future (i.e. the quest for meaning, favouring European citizenship
and responsibility at the global level).
I. Historical Context: Europe at the Cross Roads between
Past, Present and Future
Hendrik Brugmans, the first rector of the College of Europe, wrote
many years ago:
Europe is not any longer an abstract concept, neither is it a mere
geographical, difficult confining area. It is a culture circle/environment, a
community. Now it is on the way to become an ordered society, with
citizens who take up civil responsibility for the whole, although this is not
yet clear for many. Transition times as ours are characterized by extra-
chaos. The hope is focuses on a change in continuity. But a radical change
Europe has to draw from the many lessons it has learnt from both its
distant and more recent past. The whole of European history is
characterised by forms of, and attempts at, economic, political, military
and cultural cooperation, which attempted an equilibrium between
integration and diversity within certain contours. However, Europe is
first and foremost a diversified but coherent societal model shaped by
vague geographical frontiers, fundamental values of freedom, solidarity
and respect for the other, its common cultural heritage and shared
historical experiences. In short, both the historic and recent development
of the current European integration process is marked by an ongoing
search for equilibrium between integration and cohesion on the one
hand, and maintenance of diversity and regional and cultural identity on
the other hand, within certain governance structures and institutions.
This radical change in continuity is not an objective in itself, but a
process that prioritises the objectives of peace and sustainable
development both within and outside Europe. The main lesson we can
draw from the past is that Europe’s reality and responsibility is to a
multiplicity, a plurality of diversity, with positive and negative
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consequences. The solution is neither a dogmatic Euro-centrism nor a
cultural relativism but a critical European-centrism based on what James
Tully excellently describes as
practical identity; that is the aspects of citizens’ identities that matter to
them, transform our societies into multiple minorities contending and
collaborating with a general ethos of forbearance and critical responsiveness
and make our institutions diversity-aware.
II. Challenges to the European Model of Socio-economic
Cohesion and Regional Diversity
The present European debate is animated and confronted by internal
and external challenges. They shape the current and future wellbeing of
Europe, i.e. the sustainability of the European model of society as a
macro regional reality with global responsibility. I distinguish five
fundamental challenges:
1. Globalisation
A first important challenge refers to the process of globalisation.
This process leads to a radical decrease in the political-economic power
of states in the management of socio-economic activities, an increasing
domination of democratic societies by transnational plutocracies and to
a slow depersonalisation of economic relations, which undermines our
societies. Economic globalisation strongly influences territorial re-
organisation and the process of state formation. The new regionalism
causes a retreat of national states and a re-orientation of regional policy
towards a more competitive approach between regions, and
consequently leads to more active regions within Europe. Europe is
however not an exclusive economic space, but is firstly a community of
shared values, which is being forced to revisit itself as a result of the
current globalisation debate.
This globalisation trend is increasing the tension with culture. Next
to its economic and political dimension, globalisation is also a cultural
phenomenon with consequences for cultures, peoples and persons. The
intensification of communication systems and international mobility
flows leads towards the kind of global culture that the French sociologist
Pierre Bourdieu has warned of. Globalising cultural industries isolates
men from their historically developed local, religious, moral and societal
reference frames and leads to a further individualisation and
commodification of values and human relations.
The homogenisation of cultural production and consumption patterns
goes hand in hand with an increase in cultural assertivity and a growing
consciousness of cultural differences. A kind of paradoxical process
takes place. While in some, globalisation strengthens cultural assertivity
Globalisation vs Europeanisation: a Human-centric Interaction
78
and participation to global culture, a lack of comprehension of and
respect for cultural differences has led others to develop a distrust of
other cultures, and has increased the possibility of a clash between
cultures and civilisations (Huntington). But it has certainly strengthened
the clash of ignorance and increased stereotypical behaviour.
The impact of globalisation on cultures, societies, human relations
and persons should be understood from a polycentric and pluricultural
perspective. It implies that cultural differences are accepted and
respected within a certain pattern of values without the domination of a-
priori superiority by any one culture. This requires a more
compassionate globalisation or a cosmopolitan humanism.1
The greatest challenge is to look for governance structures that both
create zones of common interests and shared values, as structures for
civilised confrontation. Such structures should offer economic, social
and cultural wellbeing, with a guarantee of internal and external
solidarity and accessibility for all to the opportunities and advantages of
globalisation. Certainly in a period when extra-national and extra-
territorial transfrontier concepts and governance structures are gaining in
importance, this represents a real challenge to global political
governance. Currently the international community is lacking global
political institutions and common values, which could replace a culture
of competition, distrust and fear with a culture of cooperation, peace and
mutual respect.
A second important impact of globalisation is the accelerated
development towards an informed and knowledge-driven society. The
accelerated use of new technologies during recent years has produced
enormous productivity increases, as well as a progressive replacement of
labour by capital. There is a real danger that these changes could lead to
a further fragmentation and duality of the labour market if technological
innovations are not complemented with social innovations. The
rethinking and revalorisation of labour and education as a fundamental
condition to full integration of the citizen into society is underway. The
conclusions of the Lisbon Special European Council of 23-24 March
2000, for making Europe the most knowledge-driven economy by 2010,
or the objectives of the Bologna process, for realising a European
university space, are obvious indications of this.
Another important development in the globalisation context is the
revival of the civil society in institutionalised and non-institutionalised
1 Falk, R., The Decline of Citizenship in an Era of Globalization, in Citizenship
Studies, Vol. 4, no. 1, 2000.
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forms.2 The civil society is a mixture of social forces with diverging
agenda, means, scope and power. It is being perceived more and more as
the place for answers to the challenges of economic globalisation and is
becoming increasingly more involved in local, regional, national and
international decision-making processes. The civil society supports the
construction of social capital. The realisation of social common goods
creates confidence and results in solidarity, which binds people and
communities. People and citizens become more active and responsible
at the grass roots level and are inspired by mobilising projects within
formal and informal groups and communities. Although defining and
protecting the common good is the responsibility of the state, from the
local to the global action field, the active civil society has become, next
to the market and the state, the third pillar of societal development at all
governance levels.
2. Europeanisation
As well from the globalisation process, the Europeanisation process
also shows clear internal and external tensions, which endangers the
specificity of the European integration process, and European unity in
diversity. The important challenge today is how the EU as a sui generis
integration process, based on a common cultural heritage, common
historical experiences and common and shared values, can maintain its
specificity and particularity.
Firstly, there is the large societal debate concerning the values and
vision of how the individual is related to his surroundings. The
functional integration of thinking and acting, based on the principles of
rationality, specialisation, competition, etc., has led to economic welfare
within the European Community; but its underlying value patterns are
increasingly coming under more pressure, because of the lack of person-
driven answers in its complex institutional structure. Furthermore, the
globalisation process undermines the European model and shakes its
values of solidarity, good citizenship, tolerances and respect for
diversity. The lack of direction, underpinned by political leadership, is
leading to indifference and frustration and fundamental uncertainty as to
how a rich Europe is to be further developed.
Within this general societal debate, the European model of unity in
diversity is threatened by a number of specific challenges at the social,
financial and political level: The European social model, i.e. the
cohesion between economic and social objectives and between
economic growth and social justice, is threatened. The danger of a
2 Mascia, M., Participatory Democracy for Global Governance, Civil society
Organisations in the European Union, Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2012, 170 p.
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reduction of the individual life world and of cultural identity is real; The
further development of the European integration process is undermined
by modest financial support for carrying out European policies in some
specific fields; There is a democratic distrust from the citizen towards
society and the state and a clear lack of enthusiasm for the European
Union. Europe is no longer inspiring as an ideal in the globalisation
context. Enthusiasm for the largest single enlargement in terms of
people and number of countries, may have been genuine in the 10 new
member states on and around May 1st 2004, when it was celebrated with
some festivities, but has since cooled down rather quickly. According to
the recent Euro barometer, the confidence of the new Central and
Eastern European member states has decreased to a mere 40%. In the
old member states it is a bit less than 50 %.
3. Identity and specificity
The debate concerning the concept of identity in Europe and of a
European identity is crucial for further direction of the European
integration process. To what extent is Europe part of our identity? The
answer to this question is linked to the definition of European, national
and regional identity in relation to nation, state and citizenship.
As stated in Chapter 2, identity refers to a particular value-sharing, a
community of values which are decisive in the construction of an
identity. This is formed at different levels by a process that changes over
time according to criteria such as birth, family, language, religion,
territory, etc. Nowadays this identity-building has become more
complex and is now contextualised as multiple identity-building, as a
result of people’s heightened mobility and the trespassing of visual and
virtual borders. It has also become more disturbed by the growing
individualisation and vagueness of the moral norms/ethics within
society.
In focussing on the European dimension of identity, we have
recognised the presence of a whole range of peoples, expressing a great
diversity of languages, cultures and religions throughout Europe.
Therefore we insist on a departure from a unilateral determination of
identity on the basis of birth, language, religion or territory because such
a reduced interpretation often implies intolerance and distrust against
other peoples. We have referred to this European dimension as a
community of shared values that is part of our collective memory.
However, for many, even more today, this is only a vague part of their
historic memory.
Still we should embrace the idea of “Europe” as an added (enriched)
value to our multiple identities. Identity does not have exclusive
characteristics; multiplicity is the key characteristic of the European
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identity: multiple identities, containing compatible partial identities.
This is certainly true for cultural identity, which binds and unifies
countries, regions and groups of persons. They are the shared memories
and shared expectations (the common subjective interpretation) of each
group’s own history and determines their future cultural identity.
The political meaning of the importance of identity lies in the fact
that mutual respect for uniqueness can constitute the basis for more and
certainly better collaboration and solidarity, both within and outside of
the EU. Cultural and regional identity is therefore an important factor
for further integration and a source of inspiration for the strengthening
of the European model of society. It implies that the development of a
European identity depends on the influence of common European
institutions (i.e. the community structure) on daily life as well as on the
commitment of the citizen to the European project. This is not only the
task and responsibility of politics, but mainly of education. (See Chapter
13.)
4. Culture
A fourth challenge to the European societal model is presented by
the role of culture. We start from an anthropological definition of culture
as heritage, creativity and way of life. This point of departure is clearly
applicable to European culture, which is not a mythical story or
untouchable concept, but a dynamic interaction of historic, spiritual,
intellectual, material and artistic characteristics and attitudes. These
characteristics illustrate the multiplicity and wealth of European
cultures, cultural expressions and traditions.
Culture is firstly a source of inspiration for further integration and
socio-economic development. It certainly can encourage greater
commitment in the citizen to the European project. Culture can be
integrated in the economy and polity, not as a marginal factor, but as an
intrinsic added value in societal development. Culture unfolds itself
within society as a dynamic combination of spiritual, moral and
intellectual elements, which are offered through education and formed
through lifelong learning. Cultural multiplicity is also a source of wealth
and strength. No culture can be missed out in the European cultural
mosaic. Europe is pre-eminently a space of cultural diversity, but respect
for cultural diversity does not mean a mere nationalistic or regional
reflex/behaviour. The respect and stimulation of cultural diversity are a
guarantee for further European integration and a renewed cooperation
with other cultures.
Within the European context, culture is permanently placed in a
tense relation between further market integration and the maintenance of
cultural diversity (e.g. the book, film, audiovisual sector, etc.). The
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history of EU intervention in the cultural sector is characterised by a
number of phases; from a political-rhetoric discourse, via a formalistic
discourse, to finally a pragmatic discourse of cultural cooperation
programmes; from negative to positive integration and to a
communitarian integrism of the decisions of the Court of Justice; and
from a focus on European cultural identity and unity, to a focus on
cultural diversity.
Within this context, intercultural dialogue is of great importance.
Intercultural dialogue can be instrumental in softening and avoiding the
(negative) consequences of the globalisation process (i.e. the issue of
minorities, migration, poverty, etc.). A dialogue between peoples and
cultures can be constructive if we accept a number of common and
moral values as points of departure (i.e. human dignity, respect for
differences and diversity, solidarity, etc.). In the current framework of
the tension between (economic) globalisation and internal and external
solidarity, and between different religions, such a dialogue can be a
vehicle for conviviality and multiculturalism in which cultures influence
each other without destroying each other or clashing with each other.
Europe as a global player has an important voice in this dialogue,
primarily from the value of its socio-economic model. The EU has made
the first vital institutional steps under former president Romano Prodi to
favour such an intercultural dialogue in the framework of the European-
Mediterranean partnership, with its overall good neighbourhood policy.
5. Perception
Our final challenge is related to the perception of Europe and its
reality in practice. Europe is being confronted with a general orientation
crisis. There exists a stereotypical perception of the EU as a slow, non-
transparent administration, with complex decision-making procedures,
which shows a lack of determination and vigour at the vital moments of
political decision-making. Recent statistics tell us that less than half of
the population of the member states participated in the last European
elections of June 2009. That this image is rather negative also comes
from ignorance. Few people realise that the European Parliament is a
fully-grown legislator, with European laws and regulations in many
policy fields, which determine national policies in many fields.
This faulty perception reveals a clear problem of communication.
The European jargon and language in the discipline of European studies
doesn’t always lead to a clear and simple message. For the media,
Europe remains an isolated subject; what is no longer true in the daily
reality. There is a growing interconnection between regional, national
and European dossiers and European issues/problems are becoming
more complex for the non-specialist journalist. For many politicians
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Europe remains a distant subject, sometimes a scapegoat for unpopular
measures but mainly an important financial source for national dossiers.
However, most of the time one is kept in ignorance of Europe’s positive
contribution in many domains. And often the (national) rhetoric of the
member states is transparent and neglects the European common good.
Europe is not selling itself very well; it communicates insufficiently
with a rather technical and hermetic language and a complex
bureaucracy.
In short, only a correct perception and the delivery of a positive
image can lead to respect from the population and European partners.
They are important for the legitimacy of and the involvement of the
citizen to Europe.
III. Europe’s Task and Responsibility in the Globalising
World
This third section outlines the three major tasks for Europe in the
globalising world.
1. Quest for meaning
We have to continue working towards a better Europe, one that is
more democratic and social, which has respect for its multiple cultures.
The European dream must be inspired by a purpose that goes beyond the
existing economic, political and social frontiers. The question remains to
what extent can a common vision, founded on global common goods, be
developed in a context of economic globalisation and cultural
relativism. Problems of social inequality and poverty, as well as non-
accessibility to the advantages of globalisation, take important forms
from an economic and cultural perspective at the global level.
In short, the present situation refers to the need for an inspiring
vision and a strategy that embodies such a vision. Europe cannot be sold
as a technical project, but requires purpose and mobilisation. Structures
and institutions don’t constitute aims in themselves, and are only a
means to achieving a sustainable model of society, based on the rule of
law and opportunities, which can serve as an example.
Europe is tasked with being an actor for change and has a
responsibility to revitalise its original project, and therefore has to
mobilise the citizen, and particularly young people. How? By investing
in knowledge, by creating a European industrial policy, by guaranteeing
social protection, by stimulating a European democratic space and
mainly by favouring the involvement of citizens and young people in the
European political project. That is what the European and international
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information and training centre of Ryckevelde has been doing for nearly
50 years. In general, it is the mobilising task of genuine education.
2. Favouring European citizenship
Karel Verleye, one of the founders of the College of Europe in
Bruges, wrote:
It is excluded that a European citizenship or a European commitment will be
stimulated with the population, when no ample consideration will be given
to a number of forgotten or undervalued factors in the construction of the
new Europe, such as the cultural, regional, ethical, historical and spiritual
dimensions.
There is a need for a large societal basis to support further European
integration – the signs of which are not always hopeful. (European)
Politics and the (European) administration do not always make an
inspiring example. An overt support for more extreme tendencies in
Europe may lead to intolerance and an undermining of the European
societal model. Therefore, a drastic increase in the commitment of
citizens and young people to the European project is necessary if Europe
wants to be truthful to its destiny.
It is essential that with a bigger EU and greater political cooperation
in fields such as social policy, employment, asylum, immigration, policy
and justice, foreign policy and general security and defence policy,
citizens are capable of expressing their cultural/regional identity within
this changing environment. A further integration of the European
continent requires continuous attention being attracted to traditional
social, regional and cultural identities. The fundamental wealth of its
diversity is not only geographic, but also institutional. Therefore, it is
important that respect for diversity is encouraged and reflected in the
institutions, the democratic processes and the policies of the EU.
Furthermore the future of Europe is not the exclusive responsibility of
its governments, but is also the responsibility of its citizens and their
organisations. In order to valorise different dimensions of the cultural
diversity and diverse forms of civil participation in Europe, various
associations need to promote active European citizenship.
In short, the reference terms for a European citizenship require an
inspiration that exceeds the existing economic, political and social
boundaries. This insertion can give sense to a vision in which Europe
may evolve to a multiple citizenship. New concepts and multi-level
political structures are being developed that can give form to the
complex European governance structure and make it transparent for the
citizen.
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3. Europe’s responsibility at global level
The globalisation of our increasingly unipolar world means Europe
needs to claim a bigger role in global governance structures and needs to
start speaking with one single voice. Europe has a responsibility to
conduct a more daring and coherent common security and foreign policy
and, subsequently, needs to actually favour a culture of peace, genuine
dialogue, solidarity and sustainable development. This may not appear
to be easy, given the present international developments and diverging
viewpoints. Yet a modest institutional step towards this has made by the
Treaty of Lisbon, which created the role of High Representative of
Foreign affairs of the Union, who is also the vice-president of the
European Commission.
With a courageous foreign policy Europe can grow to be a strong
and trustful partner in a multilateral world order. The strategy of the
European Commission of a good neighbourhood policy (i.e. “a ring of
friends”) is seen as an impulse towards such a broad international policy
framework. This strategy should avoid the enlargement of the Union
creating new divisions between the Union and its neighbouring
countries. The European neighbourhood policy proposes to actually and
financially strengthen the links of the Union with these partner
countries, through a series of new cooperation structures.
Conclusion
We can now draw some conclusions. Europe is confronted with both
the need and moral responsibility to maintain its own model of
integration and diversity, within a strongly changing world system. This
implies that Europe should defend its values and principles of solidarity,
tolerance, democracy in the limited but open dialogue between cultures
and peoples both within and outside of Europe. This requires a change
in mentality, a broad imagination and proactive thought and action from
the outset, but also political leadership and particularly an education that
focuses on learning responsibility. However, the question has to be
raised (even though the answer is unclear) whether Europe within a
further unifying European economic space can guarantee an acceptable
common institutional basis in which states, regions and communities
can live diversely (with a guarantee of internal solidarity) and whether
Europe can offer an open societal model within the process of further
globalisation (a guarantee of external solidarity versus the European
fortress).
The challenge facing further European integration is the search for a
new equilibrium, between diversity and unity, in a globalising world.
The European model should take into account the economic, historic,
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social and political changes which are taking place at the international
level, but must still be faithful to its principles of internal and external
solidarity. “Repenser l’Europe” implies recognition of a radical increase
in the level of complexity within our societies, a further development of
a multiple citizenship within multiple identities and the elaboration of
multi-level governance. There is also the need for an enlarging and
mobilising vision, which has the capacity to raise new spirit and
regained enthusiasm in the citizen. Furthermore we must recall and
build upon the enthusiasm and faith in the European project that was
first embodied by the Founding Fathers of Europe.
In short, Europe needs bridge builders who can concretely complete
the rhetoric of the European story, promote the European ideals of
peace, unity in diversity, freedom and solidarity and mobilise young
people towards the European model of society. The role of education is
herein fundamental. In this model, new forms and places of dialogue,
active citizenship and cooperation can develop outside of the existing
institutionalised structures of representative representation. The
European civil society becomes emancipated and develops opportunities
in the globalising society through which persons, peoples and cultures,
within and outside Europe can meet peacefully and respectfully.
PART II





Sustainable Statehood: a Human-centric and
Multi-level Governance of Europe’s
Transformation
Introduction
This fifth chapter introduces a new conceptual reading of the
globalisation versus Europeanisation debate. In the first section, an
analysis is given of the state of affairs of EU/Europe’s role in the world,
focusing on the European dimension of the globalisation process,
particularly on the European integration process in managing
institutional, political, societal and cultural diversity. It tries to detect
some major characteristics and trends of the transformation of European
societies within the growing complexities of the broad field of
international relations. The second section focuses on the conceptual
content of sustainable statehood in a human-centric perspective.
I. The Changing International Context: EU as a Regional
and Global Power
Long-term global trends are likely to affect the EU’s ambition to be a
global actor. Being or becoming a global power is not only determined
by the internal and voluntary policy of that actor. Two ongoing
transformations of the world are together weakening the position of the
EU as an aspiring global power. The first trend is a shift in economic
gravity from the East to the West. The second trend is a demographic
decline in Europe. Both trends make it increasingly difficult for the EU
to be a global power. But at the same time one can also identify a
number of developments with regard to multilateralism that bear in them
opportunities for the EU to increase its influence as a global actor. We
are focussing on three major overlapping issues: the changing
international setting, characterised by a globalisation process that is
characterised by a multilateral and multipolar world; the weakening
position of the EU/Europe as a global actor; and the EU as a reference
model.
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1. Changing setting: multilateralism and multipolar world
order: characteristics and trends1
Various dimensions of the Union’s role as a global and regional actor
exist. In the emerging multilateral world-order, states, international and
regional organisations, transnational policy networks and non-
governmental actors are the building blocks of the multilateral system.2
In other words, states are no longer the “star players” but only players.
Moreover, it is no longer possible to make a clear distinction between
states and international organisations as some of the latter have
statehood properties as well! Furthermore, the interactions between all
these actors are not organised in a hierarchical way but in a networked
way. This implies that there is no single “centre of the universe” in
terms of governance. It also implies that there are sufficient “theatres” of
multilateral relations.
A multilateralism that operates in a multipolar world could offer
good prospects for generating a non-hegemonic world-order. Instead
one can expect a fluid web of multi-stakeholder partnerships between
different types of actors at different levels of governance including the
regional level. According to Newman and Thakur, many multilateral
processes work most effectively at the regional level, based upon their
shared values, identity and regional leadership,3 So regions can become
major nodes in the system. On the one hand they are to be considered as
sub-global entities characterised by a dense intensity of economic and
political relations that can be relatively autonomous of the rest of the
world. On the other hand they have a centre of gravity that can act as a
pole in the multipolar world.
The trend towards multipolarity is more than just a re-distribution of
power at the global level. It is also about a change in who the players are
and how the playing field is organised. A first characteristic of
multilateralism is the diversification of multilateral organisations. In
recent years there has been a dramatic rise in all kinds of international
organisations and regimes. The number of intergovernmental
organisations has grown from 37 to well over 400 in the period between
1 See Telò, M., The EU and global Governance, Routledge/Garnet series: Europe in
the World, 2009, 354 p.
2 Van Langenhove, L., The EU as a global actor in a Multipolar World and
Multilateral 2.0 Environment, Egmont Paper 36, March 2010.
3 Newman, T. and R. Thakur, Multilateralism under Challenge? Power, International
Order and Structural Change, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2006, p. 539.
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1990 and 2000.4 They often operate on a network base. In line with a
transnationalisation of policies,5 the emerging multilateral system
implies the rise of transnational policy networks.6
Secondly, there is the growing importance of non-state actors in the
international system. States have by now created a large number of
global and regional institutions that have themselves become players in
the international order. Some of these new players, although not states,
do resemble states. An international organisation like the EU
exemplifies this trend (e.g. its presence as observer in the UN, its voting
rights at the IMF and its membership at the G8, etc.). Other regional
organisations – although not to the same extent as the EU – are
following suit. Van Langenhove argues that we are witnessing a
transition from a world of states to a world of regions.7 This trend is
further reinforced by the phenomenon of devolution, whereby state
powers are in some states transferred to subnational regions. Both supra-
and subnational governance entities are created by states and can
therefore be regarded as dependent agencies of those states. The sub-
and supra entities have a tendency to behave “as if” they were states. All
of this challenges sovereignty, as both the supranational and subnational
regions have indeed to some extent statehood properties. The EU is
exemplary as it is the only international organisation that grants
citizenship to the citizens of its member states. Together this has
weakened the Westphalian relation between state and sovereignty.
Thirdly, next to the increased relations between vertical levels of
governance, there is a growing horizontal interconnectivity between
policy domains. Finance cannot be divorced from trade, security,
climate, etc. The boundaries between policy domains (and the
organisations dealing with them) are becoming more and more blurred.
Instead of clearly separated areas of policy concerns and separated
institutions to deal with them, there are now communities of different
4 Schiavone, G., A Dictionary and Director, New York: Palgrave, 2001; Higgott, R.,
International Organisation, in R. Rhodes, S. Binder and B. Rockman (eds.), The
Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
5 Stone, D., Transfer Agents and Global Networks in the “Transnationalisation” of
Policy, in Journal of European Public Policy, 11, 2004, pp. 545-566.
6 Djelic, M.L. and S. Quach, Globalisations and Institutions, Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar, 2003.
7 Van Langenhove, L. and D. Marchesi, The Lisbon Treaty and the Emergence of
Third Generation Regional Integration, in European Journal of Law Reform, X (4),
2008, pp. 477-496.
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actors and layers that together form a global gathering place of multiple
publics and plural institutions.8
Finally, the involvement of citizens in the old multilateral system is
largely limited to democratic representation at the state-level. The
supranational governance layer does not foresee direct involvement of
civil society or any other nongovernmental actors. There is increased
room for nongovernmental actors at all levels. Organising
multilateralism in a state-centric way has only been possible through the
postulate of all states being treated as equal. This means that irrespective
of the differences in territorial size, the size of population, military
power or economic strength, all states have the same legal personality.
Or in other words, the Westphalian principle of sovereign equality
means that one state equals one vote. This postulate no longer
corresponds with reality, therefore a more flexible form of
multilateralism is needed, one which could eventually also lead to a
more just system with a more equal balance of powers.
The reality is much more complex than a single bottom-up
hierarchical line of governance. First of all, there is no single top level in
the emerging new multilateralism. The UN and the Bretton Woods
institutions, together with new fora such as the G20, stand for a plurality
of top-levels. Secondly, at the regional level there is no perfect match
between a regional territory and a regional organisation. On the contrary
one can identify in most cases many different regional organisations that
cover more or less the same territory. Thirdly, there is no fixed set of
poles, but there are diverse and shifting poles at the level of continents,
regions or states. Fourthly, as the multilateral system is no longer
uniquely the playing-ground of states, the possibility is opened up for
increased civil society participation in global governance. And finally,
states are not necessarily the lowest level, as in some cases subnational
entities can have their own direct relations with the regional or global
level without passing through the state level.
Assessment
The changed global setting has moved a multipolar world towards a
complex web of relations between four types of actors with statehood
properties (i.e. global institutions, regional organisations, states and
subnational regional entities) together with non-state actors such as
NGOs or transnational policy networks. This new conceptualisation of
governance, citizenship and dialogue in international/global relations
requires therefore a multiplicity of citizenships as a political-legal status
8 Stone, D., Global Public Policy, Transnational Policy Communities and their
Networks, in Journal of Policy Sciences, 2008, 36(10), pp. 19-38.
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(i.e. post-nationalism), a recognition of diverse and multiple identities
(i.e. multiculturalism vs interculturalism) and a citizens’ participation on
all levels of sovereignty (i.e. transnationalism). Furthermore, the
growing awareness of the need for global knowledge and global
planning to realise global goods and the recognition of a shared future,
favours an interest in universal values of belonging and institutional
expressions of global norms.
This current multidimensional process of globalisation also has a
paradoxical impact on external and internal relations of states. The
dominant spatial paradigm of territoriality and identity-building is being
undermined by globalising forces. This paradigm has placed boundaries
between some of the most fundamental characteristics of the modern
world, notably community, nationality, identity and citizenship. Still the
power of the territorial narrative remains strong through the re-
emergence of communal, nationalist and ethnic identities, the
misconceived interpretation of sovereignty and the exclusive focus of
locally-based communities for sustaining social solidarity. In summary,
the globalising world is characterised by a partial asymmetry between
the growing extra-territorial nature of its huge power and the continuing
territoriality of the ways in which people live their everyday lives. Its
seemingly contradictory nature reveals new opportunities for
institutional structures along with new forms of politics and civility and
broader perspectives on the process of European integration.
2. A weakened position of the EU as a global actor
For a long time the EU has had the ambition and capacity to play a
global role, especially in first pillar domains such as trade, development,
environment and social issues.9 More recently, the EU has also been
increasingly developing its security strategy and architecture with a
focus on global ambitions.10 With the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has made
an even more important step forward in realising its global aspirations.11
This can be called the process of Europeanisation, as a response to the
globalisation process. Indeed, ever since the birth of the Industrial
Revolution, Europe, and by extension “the West”, has been the centre of
the world. Along with the scientific and technological inventions that
gave rise to unprecedented boosts in productivity, new institutional and
political inventions arose in Europe, such as the birth of the liberal state
9 See for an overview Orbie, J., Europe’s Global Role. External Policies of the EU.
London: Ashgate, 2008.
10 See for an overview Tardy, T., European Security in a Global Context. Internal and
External Dynamics, London: Routledge, 2009.
11 Van Langenhove, L. and D. Marchesi, op. cit.
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and the idea that peace and trade were interlinked. Combined with new
ideas about sovereignty, legitimacy of state power and nationalism, this
resulted in a system of interstate competition with dramatic economic
and geopolitical consequences. Meanwhile, Western values and
assumptions have been internalised to a great extent in almost every
other major culture.12 Today, the international system is more complex,
more interdependent and more and diverse actors are now involved.
Although the EU is still the world’s leading exporter of goods,
largest trader of services and biggest donor of development and
humanitarian aid, the second largest foreign investor and the second
largest destination for foreign migrants, there is now more competition
in those areas. But, with the current global economic and financial
crisis, one can easily speak of a European malaise and a decline of its
economic and political power, even a systemic crisis. This can be related
to a combination of various factors, which existed before the crisis:
external factors of increasing competition at the global level and
management of complexity and internal factors of demographic
developments and EU governance deficit, in particular the lack of
economic or fiscal governance.
In carefully managing the global crisis the EU is slowly taking
measures for greater economic, fiscal and financial convergent policies,
first in the framework of the previous Stability and Growth Pact and
now, since January 1st 2013, with the Fiscal Compact (formally the
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and
Monetary Union; or more plainly the Fiscal Stability Treaty). Much
greater fiscal union, at least in the eurozone, is seen as a necessary
solution to the current European sovereign debt crisis, as well as a
natural next step in European integration.
3. The EU as an international reference or a “model of society”
Two essential and distinctive dimensions of the EU’s contribution to
global governance can be distinguished: the EU’s internal/external
influence as a model of national and supranational democracy and its
impact on international democratisation.13 Since its creation in the
1950s, the European Community and now the EU has played a key role
in underpinning and strengthening democratic processes throughout its
several enlargements, from the Mediterranean to the Central and Eastern
enlargements. Furthermore, the EU as a regional democratic political
12 Roberts, J.M., The Triumph of the West. The Origin, Rise and Legacy of Western
Civilisation, London: Phoenix Press, 1985, p. 278.
13 Magnette, P. and K. Nicoalaïdis, The European Union’s Democratic Agenda, in M.
Télo, op. cit., p. 43-63.
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system in the making is a reference for its near and far international
environment. The EU is not only an intergovernmental association of
democratic states but also a new kind of non-state supranational political
system at the macro-regional level, illustrating a unique process of
integration sui generis. Its regional democratic polity is already offering
a twofold international reference of democratic practise: for democracy
within the state and for democracy between states.
Finally, for centuries the global implications of European
contribution towards peacebuilding has been addressed by political
thought, from Immanuel Kant to Jürgen Habermas. Jean-Marc Ferry
analyses the modern cosmopolitan perspective in light of the European
structural peace and democratic transnationalism.14 Even for realist
scholars, such as Christopher Hill, the EU is already a regional form of
international society,15 marked by reconciliation, recognition and deep
cooperation among former enemies. Some idealist social scientists, such
as Ulrich Beck, have professed the EU to be a cosmopolitan Empire
within a Westphalian world16 (see Chapter 6). All these views imply
new challenges in terms of the distinctive, international European
identity, its external policy-making, and its innovative notions of power.
4. The way forward for the EU
There is overwhelming evidence that the world is going through a
process of change that is unprecedented and that has resulted in an
acceleration of all kinds of uncertainties. Not only are we thus
witnessing tremendous societal changes, there is also a growing
awareness of the need for changes at the political level. The scientific
community has seemed to respond to the challenge. During its four year
mandate, the European Research Area Board (ERAB), established in
2008,17 has provided independent and authoritative advice to the
European Commission on research and science policy, with a view to
creating the European Research Area. In May 2012 it published its third
and final strategic report, “The new Renaissance: will it happen?
Innovating out of the crisis”.18 Central to its thinking has been
addressing the “Grand Challenges” such as climate change, energy
14 Ferry, J.-M., Europe, La Voie kantienne: Essai sur l’identité post-nationale, Paris:
Cerf, 2005.
15 Télo, M., op. cit., p.11.
16 Beck, U. and E. Grande, op. cit..
17 http://ec.europa.eu/research/erab/pdf
18 http://ec.europa.eu/research/erab/pdf/3rd-erab-final-report_en.pdf
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supply, water resources, ageing societies, healthcare and sustainable
prosperity for all.19
In short, if Europe wants to respond adequately to the global
challenges and to the newly emerging world order, it needs a
strengthened vision and a new storyline.20 One can point to many
possible issues that could become part of such a new storyline. Given
the working hypotheses of this first section, one can think of two (inter-
related) tracks that could further strengthen Europe’s position in the
multipolar world of tomorrow: (1) deepening Western integration and
(2) acting as a change-agent within the multilateral system.
1) Deepening Integration: the road to European federalism
Europe and the EU in particular, has a serious handicap to its
ambition of being a global actor. As size matters, both for economic and
political power, being divided into a multiplicity of small actors does
not help. Of course, it has come a long way since the start of the
integration process, after the First World War. But much more needs to
be done. Notwithstanding the Euro as common currency, economic
policy is still, to a large extent, the national policy of the member states.
The same holds for security policy. Although there are EU-wide security
policy documents, the major member states still have their own national
security strategies.
Increased European integration seems therefore to be the only way
forward. Only then will the national interest of all member states
become part of the overall European interest. But perhaps an increased
European integration will not be enough to counterbalance the fact that
Europe’s relevance in the world is shrinking. Perhaps even a fully
integrated Europe will not be enough to allow the realisation of its
global ambitions. In this context, transatlantic relations gain importance.
2) Acting as a change-agent in the international system
In the emerging new international system world order, states,
international and regional organisations, transnational policy networks
and non-governmental actors are the building blocks of the multilateral
19 See also Preparing Europe for a New Renaissance. A Strategic View of the European
Research Area, First Report of the European Research Area Board, 2009, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/research/erab/pdf/erab-first-annual-report-06102009_en.pdf;
Realising the New Renaissance, Second Report ERAB, 2010, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/research/erab/pdf/erab-2nd-final-report_en.pdf); See also EU
2020 Strategy and Report Reflection Group Europe 2030, May 2010, available at
http://www.consilium.europa. eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/en_web.pdf.
20 Fritz-Vannahme, J., Europe’s Bold New Story, Spotlight Europe, Bertelsmann
Stiftung, no. 4, 2009, p.1-8.
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system. In other words, states are merely players amongst others.
Moreover, it is no longer possible to make a clear distinction between
states and international organisations as some of the latter have
statehood properties as well. Furthermore, the interactions between all
these actors are not organised in a hierarchical way but in a networked
way. This implies that there is no single “centre of the universe” in
terms of governance. It also implies that there are no sufficient “spaces
of multilateral relations”. Instead one can expect a fluid web of multi-
stakeholder partnerships between different types of actors at different
levels of governance including the regional level.
As Europe is the most regionalised region in the world, with a
regional organisation (EU) that aspires to be a global power, it could
play a central role in transforming the current multilateral system.
Actually, it might also be that Europe needs to play that role in order to
safeguard its own position and not to be reduced to a mere spectator in
global affairs.21 The EU’s plea for a more “effective multilateralism” is
heading towards that direction and can be seen as a (timid) attempt to
influence the multilateral playing field. But there is still a long way to
go. At the level of the WTO, the EU is talking with one voice: it is the
EU Commissioner for Trade who negotiated at the Doha Development
Round on behalf of all EU member states. But at the IMF or the World
Bank, Europe is not yet at that point. Giving a bigger role to regional
organisations in the multilateral system might be the innovation to
pursue.
II. Conceptual Content: Sustainable Statehood
of a Human-centric EU Governance
In this second section, we propose a number of concepts and
approaches that might help to better understand the changing statehood
being built within Europe. This is done in view of European governance
building, in particular Europe’s contribution to good multi-level
governance.
1. Sustainable statehood
1) Point of departure
The social sciences’ debate on governance implicitly or explicitly
remains connected to a specific type of modern statehood, exhibiting
full domestic sovereignty and the capacity to make, implement and
21 Renard, T., A BRIC in the World: Emerging Powers, Europe and the Coming Order.
Brussels: Academic Press for the Royal Institute of International Relations, 2009,
p. 7.
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enforce decisions. This traditional statehood consists of five
monopolistic dimensions, i.e. security, territory/borders, (national)
citizenship, the practice of democracy and cultural identity. However,
the traditional monopoly of statehood exhibited by the national
sovereign state has historically been broken down into de facto e de jure,
as shown in the first section of this chapter.
The new statehood dimensions are the international legal recognition
of human rights, the development of intergovernmental and
nongovernmental international organisations, the era of planetary
interdependence and plural citizenship. These properties seem to have a
greater governance capacity, both on a macro and a micro level of the
multipolar system. Yet the available conceptual apparatus, i.e. referred
to as “methodological nationalism”, is not adequately equipped to deal
with governance issues in the rapidly changing international system.
Although the Western governance discourse assumes modern statehood
and a fully functioning state as a background condition, the
contemporary international political system introduces multiple
sovereignties with changing statehood. The nation-state is no longer the
place for coping with global and transnational problems. Governance in
areas of changing statehood refers to multi-level governance, which
links inter- and transnational actors to local ones in a variety of rule and
authority structures.
The European Union, as previously stated, proposes itself as a new
form of statehood at the international level, in which the adaptation
process seems ongoing. Still the architecture of new global and
European governance can only be structured according to a scheme of
multi-level and supranational governance, linking the territorial and
vertical dimension of subsidiarity with its functional and horizontal
dimension. In this sense, the EU can be conceived as a container of
sustainable statehood, exhibiting a double responsibility, i.e. an internal
responsibility to guiding the member states in the process of adaptation
and an external responsibility to being a civil actor promoting global
governance.
The multi-directional building process of formal and informal
governance building in the European and international system assumes
various levels of governance (up, down, across and beyond) with
institutional, political, educational, sociological and legal consequences.
In Europe a four-fold process of cooperation/integration can be
observed: the building up of a joint management of pooled sovereignty;
the building down to regions within Europe, including some border
regions; the building across, that is the fostering and consolidating of
ties between groups on a transnational basis, often with an important
functional and thematic connotation; and finally the building beyond, in
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the form of a variety of cooperation agreements in the European and
global landscape. These interlinkages have an impact on changing
statehood and governance.
2) Conceptual framework
The nucleus of the conceptual framework of the sustainable
statehood refers to the theories of federalism, human development,
public goods and multi-level governance. The driving forces in societal
development, shaped by seemingly contradictory globalising and
localising trends, challenge the characteristics of traditional statehood.
Hence, they induce new paradoxes which, due to their magnitude of
scale and intensity, are unprecedented and require new insights and
innovative approaches to deal with complex issues such as territorial
sovereignty vs responsibility of the international community, the need
for global rules vs the need of local enforcement, global world culture
vs local identity, the universality of human rights vs the particularity of
their application, etc. It is clear that these manifestations all have an
implicit tendency to generate conflict and constitute driving forces for
change.
The reconversion of the nationally defined and border-based
statehood passes through the structural reform of the modern state. The
principles and structural conditions which make up the constitutive
elements of a sustainable state are: (1) the recognition of the primacy of
International Law of human rights over Internal Law; (2) the
strengthening of the principles of the rule of law in view of their
interdependence with the requirements of the welfare state: all human
rights (i.e. civil, political, economic, social and cultural) are in fact
interdependent and indivisible; (3) the realisation of forms of large
functional autonomy, which implies the application of the principle of
pluralism in the case of political parties and trade unions, as well as in
the case of other legitimate formations of civil society (non-
governmental associations, voluntary groups, ethical banks, etc.); (4) the
realisation of pronounced and diffused forms of territorial autonomy:
more functions and powers to communities, provinces, regions, Länder,
etc. based on the principle that local autonomy is originating, not
derived from above; (5) the application of the principle of pluralism
beyond the market economy principles; (6) the active belonging to
supranational systems of collective security: strengthening the UN
system; and (7) the protection and valorisation of the natural
environment and cultural goods as a transversal objective of various
public policies.
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2. A Human-centric approach to sustainable statehood
1) Diagnosis of departure
The underlying paradigm of a human-centric approach to
international relations is the qualitative inadequacy or capacity deficit of
the state-centric structure of the international system, and the reference
to the human rights paradigm as a parameter for a human-centric
transformation of the system. This approach focuses on the forms of
humanly sustainable statehood.
The old national, sovereign-armed, border form of the state is no
longer capable of exclusively covering and managing the contents of
statehood. This criticism is based on the fact that law-enforcing power is
no longer an exclusive sovereign function of the state. Other law-
making structures of authority exist beyond and above the state, which
makes laws, even containing constitutional norms and adopts law-
binding decisions. As a consequence, the current status of traditional
statehood, also concerning its territorial dimension, presents
characteristics of pronounced porosity in respect to variables that are
external to the traditional domain reserved to the state.
The diagnosis of departure also invests a crisis of democracy, the
main cause of which is linked to the limits of the space in which its
experience has been previously circumscribed, i.e. domestic jurisdiction
of a space reserved to a single state. A democracy that is only internally
defined is therefore an insufficient democracy, and in the end useless,
because it runs senseless in the presence of the undeniable fact that big
decisions are often made beyond a single state. It is to these enlarged
international and transnational frameworks that the democratic
experience has to be taken. Of particular relevance in this respect are the
political and normative implications that derive from the recognition of
the international legal subjectivity of the human person.
Starting from the vital needs of persons and human communities,
legal obligation and rational convenience seem to complement each
other to realise a new division of politics, going from the micro-local
context to the macro-planetary level. The functional space of sustainable
statehood finally coincides with the constitutional space of human
rights. In virtue of the international recognition of fundamental rights,
the operational space is widened from the internal legal sphere to the
global legal sphere.
In short, the International Law of Human Rights, with the applied
support of subsidiarity, is the compass that guides the transfer and
distribution of functions and structures of democratic statehood along
the scale of sustainable statehood, moving from the city, the village, the
region, the state, Europe and finally to the supranational institutions.
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Human rights need therefore to be situation-specific. In other words,
they have to be localised or as locally relevant as possible. The
contribution of local communities to the interpretation and further
normative development of human rights is therefore conceived as
essential.
2) Basic fundamentals
The mutually reinforcing conceptual building blocks of a human-
centric approach to sustainable statehood building, applied to the
European setting, are the universality and indivisibility of the human
rights and the cosmopolitan perspective of multi-level governance in
relation to its local relevance and the importance of global public goods
in relation to transnational democratic practices.
(a) Human rights paradigm
The universality of human rights rests on the recognition of the equal
importance and interdependence of civil, political, economic, social and
cultural rights. Within the current globalisation debate this implies
localising human rights as much as developing a common responsibility
across borders of states. The human rights paradigm is conceived as a
powerful and universal transcultural and transnational facilitator for
human-centric governance and sustainable statehood. This recognition
will favour a move from the (increasingly) conflicting stage of multi-
culturality to the dialogic stage of inter-culturality in globalising
societies.
Anchored to the paradigm of human rights are human security and
human development.22 They are the new frontiers of global multi-level
governance. Both hold the human being as their primary subject. In
broad terms, human security shifts our focus from traditional territorial
security to that of the person. Human security recognises that an
individual’s personal protection and preservation comes not just from
the safeguarding of the state as a political unit, but also from the
individual’s access to welfare and quality of life. The security policies of
states should be instrumental to the objectives of human security and
human development.
22 Papisca, A., International law and human rights as a legal basis for the international
involvement of local governments, in V. Musch, Van Der Valk, Sizoo, Tajbakhsh
(eds.), City Diplomacy. Conflict Prevention, Peace-building, Post-conflict
Reconstruction, The Hague, 2008.
Globalisation vs Europeanisation: a Human-centric Interaction
102
(b) Cosmopolitan perspective of multilevel governance in Europe23
The globalising world is characterised by some asymmetry between
the growing extra-territorial nature of abundant power and the
continuing territoriality of the ways in which people live their everyday
lives. This seemingly contradictory nature reveals new opportunities for
institutional structures along with new forms of management of politics
and dialogue at various levels of the globalising landscape This
perspective refers to a cosmopolitan shaping and understanding of the
emerging European polity of multi-level governance structures. Point of
departure is the weakening of the spatial paradigm of territoriality and
identity-building by globalisation forces. The next chapter goes deeper
into the cosmopolitan perspective of multi-level governance in Europe.
European integration has developed into a much more complex and
mixed political project, evolving into a “common citizenship” and a
transnational democracy. It is characterised by a flexible spatial
structure, composed of vertical and horizontal links between models of
sovereignty in a transformative interdependence. The European
integration process presents an asymmetrical integrative order based on
a mixture of intergovernmental and supranational forms of cooperation,
in which civil society is becoming a shaping factor and a meeting place
of social and political aggregations.
(c) Global public goods and transnational democracy24
A global public goods approach takes into account the core systemic
features of globalisation, being spatial extension and compression,
increasing interconnectedness, temporal acceleration and a growing
awareness. It recognises multiple locations of governance, multiple
dimensions of integration, multiple modes of interaction and an
increasing institutionalisation of the process of globalisation. Such an
approach contributes to a better analysis of global policy challenges,
including sustainable statehood for good human governance and may
recommend strategies for true global policy-making. New opportunities
23 Useful references are Archibugi, D. and D. Held (eds.), Cosmopolitan Democracy:
An Agenda for a New World Order, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995; Archibugi, D.,
The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009; U. Beck and E. Grande, op. cit.; Held,
D., Democracy and the Global Order: From Modern State to Cosmopolitan
Governance, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995.
24 See research undertaken by Inge Kaul, UNDP and Global Studies Centre; Reference
publications are: Kaul, I. and Grunberg, M.A. Stern, Global Public Goods:
International Cooperation in the 21st Century, New York, Oxford: University Press,
1999; Kaul, I., P. Conceicao, K. Le Goulven and R.U. Mendoza (eds.), Providing
Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, New York, Oxford: University
Press, 2003.
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for enhanced networked governance have been created among states,
regions and civil society actors.
The public goods perspective departs from the need of international
democracy for internal democracy in a deterritorialised (global) space.
Therefore, today’s open and interdependent world requires a principle of
responsible sovereignty that encompasses both the internal and the
external dimensions of governance responsibility. This implies a
remodelling of the role of the state that encompasses collective self-
interest. A research consequence of this perspective is a focus on the
creation, protection and management of global public goods, the
subsequent dimensions of global democracy and global democratic
community or society, the institutional diversity to promote the common
good; and the importance of regional and international organisations as
the building blocks of a global community, i.e. a re-inventing of
democracy in a global context. This is further elaborated in Chapter 7.
Conclusions
1. State-centric vs human-centric development
The changing political landscape is now occupied by more local
actors significant in both domestic and international politics. States are
no longer the exclusive actors in international politics. But are local
governments legally entitled to act in the system of international
relations on dramatic issues like peace and security? These issues
traditionally pertain to state foreign policies. The question can be
answered with strong arguments. The first of these is that the legal field
has undergone a genetic mutation. The international legal recognition of
human rights has changed the driving force, the rationale of
international law, from state-centric to human-centric. This has many
implications. The process is the outcome of a long historic movement
marked by peoples’ suffering and reacting, intellectual endeavour, mass
mobilisations, and political commitment, which has brought democratic
processes inside states. With the UN Charter and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights the constitutional rationale has been
extended to the world level, overreaching the borders of state
sovereignty. For the first time in the history of humanity, the human
being as a person has been recognised as the subject, and not as merely
the object, of international law. So the human-centric rationale is
constantly being reinforced by the new international law, or pan-human
law, which is developing as a coherent body of principles and norms
that both complement and update the first part of the UN Charter.
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2. States as derived entities
The next argument is that the human-centric position means that
states and international organisations are simply derived entities,
instrumental to pursuing the primary aims of human rights and
fundamental freedoms. To underline the primacy of the human being
over derived systems, Article 28 of the Universal Declaration proclaims
the right to positive peace as a fundamental right. If we extend the
argument on state-centric and human-centric law, a revolutionary
implication follows. The “right to war” and the “right to peace” are the
strongest claims of state sovereignty. But if peace is a human right, the
right to war cannot help but disappear from the dictionary of state
claims, endowments and inter-state relationships. And to positively
confirm this position, the right of states to peace must be complemented
by a duty to peace. When a legal system is founded on human rights, it
enters a new stage of human-centric maturation. We are passing beyond
the phase of international relations as a primary system; we are no
longer in the Westphalian era that was formally based upon nation-
based sovereignty.
3. Renewing citizenship
A last concluding remark refers to the impact on sovereignty,
citizenship and democracy.25 States have borders. This involves an
exclusionist territorial rationale of sovereignty and domestic
jurisdiction. Conversely, local governments run territories that are not
surrounded by borders, but they do minister to people in them. Local
governments are closer to the source of sovereignty – people – than the
state. Sovereignty belongs to the people because each of its members
has inherent rights, and fundamental rights should be respected and
protected where people live. National citizenship, based on the principle
of exclusion, is consistent with the philosophy of states. Universal
citizenship, based on the principle of inclusion, is consistent with the
natural identity of local government. The international legal recognition
of human rights obliges us to re-construct citizenship starting not from
state institutions (traditional top down citizenship), but from its original
holder, the human being, with his/her inherent rights internationally
recognised (bottom-up citizenship).
25 Papisca, A., International law and human rights as a legal basis for the international
involvement of local governments, in V. Musch, Van Der Valk, Sizoo, Tajbakhsh
(eds.), op. cit..
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1) Citizenship from below
A useful way of addressing this situation is to reconceptualise
citizenship starting from below. That is from the roots of the political
community up to the institutions of governance. The latter must then be
seen in the light of their purpose and democratic legitimacy before
considering them as sources of authority, power and capability. Such a
bottom-up view is even more urgent if we consider the conflicts in many
territories (regions, cities, streets) where different ethnic, religious and
cultural groups live, where xenophobia and discrimination may be
growing, and where migrant people of different cultures rightly advocate
the same citizenship rights as nationals.
Sovereignty based on the nation-state has proven to be insufficient in
protecting the true elements of democracy. Nation-states were the fertile
kindergarten of democracy, but they do not suffice today when faced
with worldwide interdependence and globalisation. The practice of
democracy, in its twofold articulation of representative and participatory
democracy, should be extended and deepened: upward for international
and cosmopolitan democracy and downward in local direct democracy.
By extending democratic practice beyond its historical territorial space,
the local territory becomes a new frontier. Being so close to and
involved with democracy, local governments are the primary
stakeholders in good global multi-level governance.
A relatively recent and promising perspective regarding the legal
development of the role of local governments in international politics is
the European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC).26 The EGTC
as established in 2006 by the EU can be considered not only an
advanced achievement but also a good starting point for further formal
and substantive progress in recognising the international role of local
governments. It could be envisaged that, within the framework of the
UN, an international framework convention be adopted to establish the
“International” Grouping of Territorial Cooperation.
2) International-transnational democracy
Today’s passionate and creative reality of civil society organisations
and social movements, and of local governments acting across and
beyond state borders, demonstrate that civic and political roles, that is
active citizenship, are no longer limited to the intra-state space, and the
geometry of democracy is extending and growing in the world space.
The traditional inter-state system has always been an exclusive club of
“rulers for rulers”. Now it is citizens, especially through their
26 See special issue on Territorial Cooperation, in Pace Diritti Umani - Peace Human
Rights, 3/2010. This is further elaborated in Chapter 14.
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transnational organisations and movements, who are claiming a
legitimate role, and showing their visibility in the world’s constitutional
space. Democratising international institutions and politics in the true
sense of democracy – this does not mean “one country, one vote” (a
procedural translation of the old principle of state sovereign equality),
but more direct legitimacy of the relevant multilateral bodies and more
effective political participation in their functioning – has become the
new frontier for any significant human-centric and peaceful
development of governance. Advocating an international-transnational
democracy is already putting new citizenship into practice.
3) A new concept of citizenship
This mobilisation is further being legitimised in a specific and
innovative way by the UN Declaration “on the right and responsibility
of individuals, groups and organs of society to promote and protect
universally recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms”. By
virtue of this instrument, known as the “Magna Carta of Human Rights
Defenders”, “everyone has the right, individually and in association
with others, to promote and to strive for the protection and realization
of human rights and fundamental freedoms at national and international
levels” (Article 1). Emphasis is put on the right to overfly domestic
borders. Article 7 further states; “everyone has the right, individually
and in association with others, to develop and discuss new human rights
ideas and principles and to advocate their acceptance”. Article 18,
points 2 and 3, continues:
Individuals, groups, institutions and non-governmental organizations have
an important role to play and a responsibility in safeguarding democracy,
promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms and contributing to the
promotion and advancement of democratic societies, institutions and
processes. Individuals, groups, institutions and non-governmental
organizations also have an important role and a responsibility in
contributing, as appropriate, to the promotion of the right of everyone to a
social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other human rights
instruments can be fully realized.
The new concept of citizenship implies huge changes in legal
systems at all levels. In fact, internationally recognised human rights are
the rights of every human being, not of the human being as a simple
citizen of a given state. The big challenge that lies ahead is for politics
and education to help change culture, harmonise national legal systems
with the international law of human rights, carry out proper national and
international social policies, and foster the inclusion of all in the
framework of a multi-level architecture of governance.
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In the meantime, a new frontier for human promotion and democracy
development has been launched. Since “the recognition of the inherent
dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the
world” (Universal Declaration), respect for human dignity and human
rights should be guaranteed where people live. New citizenship, in
tandem with the impact of the necessary intercultural dialogue aimed at
democratic inclusion, can revitalise the public sphere in a perspective of
multi-level and supranational governance. And it is in fact the
phenomenology “in the plural” of citizenship, dialogue and inclusion
that obliges institutions to redefine themselves and therefore to open up
and develop multiple channels of representation and democratic
participation.
Finally, in order to further contextualise the debate on the new
concept of citizenship, it might be helpful to briefly identify various
models and processes of citizenship that can be observed in current
international and national affairs: (1) Ideological Monolithic
Citizenship: there is an ideology of a monolithic national identity and
static public values with no place for diversity and no intermediate level
between the citizen and the state: a melting pot process; (2) Humanistic
Citizenship: there is a holistic understanding of humanity with respect
for individual uniqueness, but there is no intermediate level between the
citizen and the state: a glocal identification process; (3) Communitarian
Citizenship: only one culture is recognised as reference for the public
sphere with no chance for real intercultural relations and contribution to
public life; citizenship and political participation are understood in an
antagonistic approach: a communitarian – discrimination process; (4)
Multicultural Citizenship: a recognition of the cultural dimension of the
citizen’s identity with respect for cultural diversity and tolerance from
the mainstream national community towards minorities, but without
much possibility for participation: at risk of a ghettoisation and
communitarian process and the tyranny of a minority over its followers;
(5) Intercultural Citizenship: a recognition of the cultural dimension of
the citizen’s identity, beyond tolerance with a recognition of the
contribution of each culture to the society: the citizenship culture is built





A Cosmopolitan Perspective of Multi-level
Governance in Europe
Introduction
The European integration process is, to date, the world’s most
advanced post-national constellation of states. As such, it has become a
laboratory for scholars and philosophers of political theory and
international relations interested in studying and developing workable
models of supranational and/or global and multi-level governance.
Prominent among these scholars are those who view the European
Union from a cosmopolitan perspective, analysing integration for its
potential to realise a cosmopolitan Europe in which the concept of
citizenship is crucial.
The new post-modern conceptualisation of governance, citizenship
and dialogue in international/global relations requires a multiplicity of
citizenship (i.e. post-nationalism), the recognition of diverse and
multiple identities (i.e. multiculturalism and interculturalism) and
citizens’ participation at all levels of sovereignty (i.e. transnationalism).
On the other hand, the growing awareness of the need for global
knowledge and global management to realise global goods and the
recognition of a shared future favours an interest in universal values and
the institutional expression of global norms.
The current multidimensional process of globalisation has a
paradoxical impact on the external and internal relations of states. The
dominant spatial paradigm of territoriality and identity-building is being
undermined by globalising forces. This paradigm has placed boundaries
around some of the most fundamental characteristics of the modern
world, notably community, nationality, identity and citizenship. Still the
power of the territorial narrative remains strong through the re-
emergence of communal, nationalist and ethnic identities, the
misconceived interpretation of sovereignty and the exclusive focus of
locally-based communities for sustaining social solidarity. In summary,
the globalising world is characterised by a partial asymmetry between
the growing extra-territorial nature of power and the continuing
territoriality of the ways in which people live their everyday lives. Its
seemingly contradictory nature reveals new opportunities for
institutional structures along with new forms of politics and civility and,
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as a consequence, offers a reading of the process of European
integration from a cosmopolitan perspective.
Chapter 1 described the history of the European integration process
as a development from a (neo-) functional, utilitarian and largely
economic project to a more complex and mixed political undertaking,
set in a globalising context and now based on the institutional structure
of the Treaty of Lisbon. The first decades of the European integration
process functioned on the political paradigm of the Westphalian system.
A democratic approach to international life outside of the national
borders was not at all required. There was equality between nationality,
identity and citizenship. The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) breaks down
that linear perspective and establishes a political framework for a
broader and deeper integration of European states and regions. In
addition to consolidating the single market and opening the way for
greater cooperation on internal and external affairs, it introduced the
concept of European citizenship, i.e. a common citizenship applied to
many nationalities and covering a multiplicity of identities.1
Such a broadly defined European citizenship does, however, not
replace national citizenship but rather complements it. Moreover, it
enhances the legitimacy of the process and promotes a stronger
European identity. It is claimed that European citizenship provides equal
access to the individually-based legal status of union citizenship to all
nationals, and universal civic protection to all nationals and residents, to
be translated into a transcendent European identity. It also means that an
active citizenship can develop within a new framework, not that of a
closed state on a limited territory, but open beyond national borders and
respecting diversities. Europe is therefore evolving towards a social and
political body in which one will be able to distinguish a common
European citizenship, multiple state and regional citizenships and
governance structures, within which there exists a growing awareness of
multiple and different cultural identities.
Europe is indeed involved in favouring the development of a
“transnational democracy”. The process of European integration
strongly contributes to changing the mentality and conception of the
state system. The role of the state becomes less essential in many sectors
of economic life through the “supranational” transfer of decision-
making powers to common authorities; similar developments affect its
role regionally through the need to adapt to multiple demands of
autonomy, identity recognition, and decentralisation. In short, it seems
obvious that with the process of globalisation, demands for the
recognition of particular identities and minority rights will strongly
1 This is further elaborated in Chapter 12.
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develop within national and regional structures, while at the same time
requests for more citizen participation at the supranational or
transnational levels will become more evident, in the name of new
European citizens’ rights.
This chapter argues that a cosmopolitan shaping of the European
Union using a complexity of multi-level governance structures is
conducive to its underlying objective of legitimating the emerging
European polity. The major working hypothesis is that the concept of
cosmopolitanism can contribute to the understanding of the
transformation of modern societies and of Europeanisation, in particular,
by creating an integrated European public and European space. A
cosmopolitan reading of Europeanisation and, in particular, of the
process of European integration is proposed, to understand and assess
the viability of a “cosmopolite” Europe and its policy implications as an
idea and reality within a European and global context.
I. Cosmopolitanism and Post-modernity in the Context of
Globalisation
By globalisation we mean the phenomenon and process of the
growing concrete interdependence of economic, political, social and
cultural relations and of a greater consciousness of the world.
Globalising processes involve variable but usually significant shifts in
the spatial ordering of personal and social relationships, as well as in
organisational political forms and functions. It is an enacted process, in
which the transformative capacity of globalisation reshapes the contours
of social action and redefines the political and identity spaces of
individuals and collective actors.
In the extensive literature on globalisation studies2 three conceptual
stages can be distinguished. In the first stage, the impact of globalisation
on national economies was investigated, and concluded that a neo-
liberal world economy government and homogenous world society were
on the rise and the national state was in demise. In the second stage the
cultural aspects of globalisation were studied, with criticism on the
convergence thesis and arguments for a fragmented and
multidimensional worldview. National communities were seen as one of
2 See amongst others Beck, U., What is Globalization?, Malden (Mass.): Polity Press,
2000; Brodie, J., Introduction: Globalization and Citizenship Beyond the National
State, in Citizenship Studies, Vol. 8, no. 4, 2004; Stiglitz, J., Making Globalization
Work, London: Penguin, 2006; Giddens, A., Runaway World: How Globalization Is
Reshaping Our Lives, op. cit.; Bauman, Z., Globalization: The Human
Consequences, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998; Held, D., Governare la
Globalizzazione, Bologna: il Mulino, 2005.
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the multiple places of human organisation. The current third phase
brings together a multidisciplinary and multidimensional analysis of
globalisation, with particular focus on its political manifestation. It
concludes that globality and globalism represent the dual character of
globalisation, in that they simultaneously generate the conditions of
universalism and particularism.
In the following, we first briefly identify the major characteristics
and developments of contemporary cosmopolitanism; next we focus on
an analysis of a major contribution to the universalist interpretation of
cosmopolitanism, i.e. the cosmopolite democracy and, finally we
conclude with an assessment of the critique presented by constitutional
patriotism.
1. Multifaceted cosmopolitanism
In the first place we want to clarify the concept of cosmopolitanism,
which is often used as a synonym for globalisation, globality, glocalism,
globalism, universalism, multiculturalism, pluralism and imperialism.
The term goes back to the Cynics and Stoics of antiquity. It acquired
central importance in the philosophy of the Enlightenment and has
regained conceptual strength in the current debates on globalisation
against the organising power of the market and the nation-state. In
summary, the concept of cosmopolitanism has a very old meaning that
points to the future; it is both pre-national and post national.
Its core premises are the recognition and appreciation of difference
of thought, social life and practice, both internally and towards other
societies. It rests on the “both/and” principle of regarding others as both
equal and different and, consequently calls for new concepts of
integration and identity that affirm coexistence across borders without
requiring that difference be sacrificed by supposed national equality. It
therefore relies on a framework of uniting and universally binding
norms that should prevent deviation into postmodern particularism.
Ulrich Beck uses the concept as a social scientific concept to deal
socially with cultural differences, distinguished from hierarchical
subordination, universalistic and nationalistic sameness and postmodern
particularism.3 It is important to recognise that cosmopolitanism aims to
overcome the dualities of the global and the local, the national and the
international. It is not specified in spatial terms and can therefore be
applied to regional geographical units such as Europe. Viewed in this
way, cosmopolitanism should not only integrate different national
traditions and norms, it should at the same time balance various ways of
3 Beck U. and E. Grande, op. cit., p. 12.
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dealing with cultural differences, determined by the “both/and”
principle. As such, it is both a theoretical and empirical concept.
2. Contemporary cosmopolitanism
From the above definition it is clear that contemporary
cosmopolitanism provides a suitable ideological framework to respond
to the conditions developed in the third phase of globalisation.4 It
represents a way of dealing with the differences and similarities within
the changing societies of a globalised world. Scholars concerned with
the impact of globalisation have come to a common understanding that
the modernist premises of the national state have been eroded. The
Westphalian state is no longer a singular unit of political power with
absolute sovereignty. There is now the emergence of regional and local
democratic entities and communities. Moreover, in multicultural Europe
the nation is neither culturally homogenous nor the primary expression
of collective identity; national and regional communities are diverse and
identities are multiple.
The contemporary expressions of cosmopolitanism seem to represent
a logical accommodation of the postmodern challenges to citizenship
and dialogue. They represent post-national, multi- and inter-cultural
models of political community that preserve identities and facilitate
global, regional, local and municipal loci of legal status and political
membership. Moreover, they are transnationalist, in that they promote
an active citizenry that is empowered within an emerging global civil
society and enabled to shape political, social and cultural developments.
A common reference point for contemporary cosmopolitan theory is
Immanuel Kant’s cosmopolitan theorem, built around the vision of
world peace and a global ethical regime.5 In his 1795 essay Perpetual
Peace Kant puts forward an ius cosmopoliticum as a universal guiding
principle to protect people from war. It is evident that Kant’s theorem
was grounded in the modernist understanding of citizenship. In the
absence of inter- and supranational legal and institutional frameworks
4 Archibugi, D., D. Held and M. Kohler (eds.), Re-imaging Political Community-
Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998;
B. Axford, Globalization and the Prospects for Cosmopolitan Society, in V. Gennaro
Lerda (ed.), Which “Global Village”? Societies, Cultures and Political-Economic
Systems in a Euro-Atlantic Perspective, Westport: Praeger, 2002, Ch. 18; D.
Archibugi, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward Cosmopolitan
Democracy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.
5 Kant, I., Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in M. Forsyth, M. Keens-Soper
and P. Savigaer (eds.), The Theory of International Relations, London: Allen &
Unwin, 1970; I. Kant, Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Purpose, in H.
Reiss (ed.), Kant’s Political Writings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
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for citizenship, it falls short of post-nationalism. As it is focused on
universal awareness it does not recognise the notion of cultural
diversity.
In the current globalised context, cosmopolitan thought has flowed
out into several directions, one of which is universalism. The
universalist position promotes the expression of global morality in the
form of supranational legal systems and political institutions, implying
an extension of the modern national state-based theory of citizenship. In
the Kantian tradition of universal, trans-cultural authority, Martha
Nussbaum6 pleads for a humanistic cosmopolitanism, insisting that
rights, obligations and commitments do not stop at national borders. She
suggests a primary allegiance to the worldwide community of human
beings, in which educative processes gradually narrow the gap between
particular and broader loyalties, and between the local and humanity as a
whole.
3. Cosmopolitan democracy
One major contribution to the universalist stream is the theory of
cosmopolitan democracy centred on David Held’s idea of global
governance.7 Held argues that the realisation of the cosmopolitan vision,
that of lasting world peace and universal equality of individuals, cannot
rely on the states’ democratic capacity only. As a result of globalisation,
the idea of a political community can no longer be exclusively located
within the boundaries of the territorial nation-state and secondly, the
locus of effective political power has shifted from national governments
to international regimes and forums, international and regional
organisations, and a variety of transnational corporations. Consequently,
it is argued that democracy must be strengthened within and beyond
borders and effective democratic law internationalised. An
institutionalisation of cosmopolitan principles based on cosmopolitan
democratic law is therefore more than welcome. Moreover, in resolving
conflict situations between national sovereignty and international law,
he very much advocates a democratisation of the intergovernmental
international organisations, in particular granting operational power to
the UN. In his version of a cosmopolitan democracy, in addition to the
existence of overlapping and spatially variable sovereignties, there
exists a multitude of political communities with multiple citizenships
and different agendas.
6 Nussbaum, M., Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, in Boston Review, October-
November 1994.
7 Held, D., Democracy and Globalization, in Global Governance, Vol. 3, no. 3, 1997.
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Daniele Archibugi8 elaborates on Held’s new democratic condition
and examines the prospects for cosmopolitan democracy as a viable and
humane response to the challenges of globalisation. He argues that
democracy has to function simultaneously on domestic, international
and global levels of political authority in order to generate a lasting
normative framework. He therefore proposes a renewed model for
global citizenship, i.e. institutional cosmopolitanism. He argues that
democracy can be extended to the global political arena by
strengthening and reforming existing international organisations and
creating new ones. Furthermore he calls for dramatic changes in the
foreign policies of nations to make them compatible with global public
interests and, consequently, advocates giving a voice to new global
players such as social movements, cultural communities, and minorities.
Finally, he proposes building institutional channels across borders to
address common problems and encourages democratic governance at the
local, national, regional, and global levels.
In short, Archibugi’s vision of the cosmopolitan world order is one
of a multi-level system of democratic governance, i.e. a cosmopolitan
democracy in which democratic participation by citizens is not
constrained by national borders and where democracy spreads through
dialogue and incentives.9 He applies the cosmopolitan logic to concrete
issues such as humanitarian intervention, institutional reform at the UN
and democratic transitions.
For both scholars, the linkage of democratic institutions outside the
boundaries of the state is indeed necessary in order to complement the
inadequate democratic capacities of the postmodern state and to monitor
the internal state affairs.10 Andrew Linklater talks about the necessity to
create a post-Westphalian community, in which citizens have the right
to participate in the decision-making processes of international
organisations.11 The cosmopolitan argument for a federative
development of the global landscape and a global legislative institution
should therefore be conceived above all as a framework-setting
institution.12
8 Archibugi, D., D. Held and M. Kohler (eds.), op. cit.
9 Archibugi, D., Principles of Cosmopolitan Democracy, in ibid. (eds.), pp. 207-209;
ibid., Cosmopolitan Democracy and Its Critics: A Review, in European Journal of
International Relations, Vol. 10, no. 3, 2004.
10 Archibugi, D. and D. Held (eds.), op. cit..
11 Linklater, A., The Transformation of Political Community, Cambridge: Polity Press,
1998; ibid., Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian European State, in
D. Archibugi, D. Held and M. Kohler (eds.), op. cit., pp. 113-137.
12 Held, D., Democracy and the Global Order: From Modern State to Cosmopolitan
Governance, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995.
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Such a cosmopolitan approach to democracy of course has policy
consequences.13 Firstly, it implies an active membership of individuals
in the global community. Global issues, such as human rights, the
environment and poverty have a universal impact on all individuals and
as such transcend regional, national and international frameworks of
cooperation. If global challenges are to be addressed in line with basic
democratic principles, citizens should therefore have political
representation at various levels of decision-making, from the local
neighbourhood up to the international level. Secondly, it involves the
institutionalisation of a universal and global citizenship status, which
contains a mandatory core of rights, laid down in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Finally, the expression of cosmopolitan
citizenship as the empowerment of a nascent global civil society denotes
the transnational dimension of the cosmopolitan democracy theory. All
these policy consequences require the management of global public
goods14 and the establishment of global bodies that are designed to
manage global issues and individual interests in multi-level and multi-
actor governance structures.
In short, global citizenship means the transfer of specific elements of
national citizenship into the global domain, so that specific global issues
can be tackled. The cosmopolitan democracy thesis focuses on the
institutional establishment of the cosmopolitan ideal and on the multi-
level nature of the emerging system of governance by subscribing to the
condition of multiple post-nationalism. The introduction of a global
cosmopolitan citizenship status complements national as well as
regional and local loci of citizenship and complies with the multiple de-
national and de-territorial conditions of citizenship.
Richard Falk offers a pertinent and interesting account of the impact
of globalisation on democracy.15 He argues that the growing importance
of transnational relations is weakening national citizenship and reducing
the importance of social capital at the level of the nation-state. Because
of the fact that the logic of market opportunity no longer coincides with
the logic of territorial loyalty, the tendency is likely to create links and
solidarities across borders rather than within them. Falk proposes a
polity of a globalisation from below for offsetting the tendency for
13 Archibugi, D., Cosmopolitan Democracy and Its Critics, op. cit., p.456; ibid.,
Principles of Cosmopolitan Democracy, op. cit., pp. 216-217. See also N. Dower and
J. Williams (eds.), Global Citizenship - A Critical Introduction, New York:
Routledge, 2002; D. Held, Democracy and Globalization, op. cit.
14 For the literature on global public goods see I. Kaul, I. Grunberg and M.A. Stern,
Global Public Goods, op. cit. and I. Kaul et al. (eds.), Providing Global Public
Goods: Managing Globalization, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.
15 Falk, R., The Decline of Citizenship in an Era of Globalization, op. cit.
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national governments to be shaped by market-oriented forces pressing
globalisation from above. In his human governance approach16 Falk
therefore focuses on the realisation of a system of human government,
based on a globalisation from below and beyond national borders, which
is rooted in civil society and developed in a practice of transnational
democracy. He believes in the creation of a normative global democratic
structure, but constructed from below and rooted in the global civil
society. As a consequence, the task of transnational social movements is
to disseminate a global ethics that surpasses the identity of state
sovereignty. Marco Mascia shows that the growing importance of civil
society in Europe exemplifies integration from below and supports the
hypothesis that this participative dimension provides a new democratic
horizon for the EU.17 This is very important for understanding the
practice of a multi-level governance of intercultural dialogue and the
role of civil society.
4. Constitutional patriotism
A comprehensive critique of the cosmopolitan democracy thesis is
provided by Jürgen Habermas.18 He endorses the requirement of
supranational democratic institutions and transnational civic activity but
criticises the premises of the theory. First, Habermas rejects the
prospects of a world state, away from a multilayered post-national
system of governance. Instead he envisions a dynamic picture of
interferences and interactions between political processes at national,
international and global levels.
Second, he claims that cosmopolitan democracy ignores the
multicultural dimension and favours an all-inclusive and a priori
sameness at the cost of multicultural particularism.19 In short, he asserts
that cosmopolitan democracy cannot reconcile universalism and
particularism20 and therefore re-establishes the competitive relationship
between the national and cosmopolitan domains of collective belonging.
Habermas stresses the importance of a new community-building logic in
16 Ibid., On Human Governance, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995. See also UNDP,
Human Development Report 1999. Globalization with a Human Face, at http:
//hdr.undp.org/reports/global.
17 Mascia, M., Participatory Democracy for Global Governance, op. cit.
18 Habermas, J., The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays, in T. McCarthy (ed.),
Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001.
19 Ibid., Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State, in A.
Guttman (ed.), Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1994.
20 While universalism refers to the individuals’ commitment to abstract principles and
rights, particularism refers to the context of a historically specific political culture.
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national and global domains. He argues that the cohesiveness of a
community cannot be guaranteed by fostering an exclusionary ethno-
cultural identity. Instead, he pleads for the building of a civic form of
identity, i.e. “constitutional patriotism”. He reasons that rationally
chosen commitments to a common set of constitutional principles,
fundamental rights and democratic institutions, can provide a common
normative framework that is culturally neutral and therefore sufficiently
inclusive for binding a multicultural society together.
Habermas’ third critique regards the democratic character of the
cosmopolitan democracy thesis.21 He criticises the so-called pre-existing
global morality that holds humans together in a global community. In
this context, cosmopolitan rights are understood as pre-defined and
universal. Democracy, according to Habermas, is the self-defined and
self-legislated power of the public. That is, identity, rights and their
institutional expressions are organic and negotiated categories.
In order to overcome the democratic deficiency of the cosmopolitan
democracy theory, Habermas suggests moving away from a
representative and towards a deliberative notion of democracy,
internally and externally, domestically and globally. In particular, he
asserts that deliberative democracy promotes channels of interactive and
discourse-based civic activity in addition to the formalised institutional
representation and participation of the citizen.22 Such a deliberative
democracy further facilitates a comprehensive notion of the public
sphere as a space where individuals can engage in rational critical
discourse about common political interests. This might create a socially
constructed collective identity that is constantly reproduced and
generates legitimacy from below.
Habermas’s final criticism of the cosmopolitan democracy thesis
refers to its empirical foundations. According to Habermas, it is
mistaken to base a cosmopolitan view on the developments of the
international domain, the evolution of an international human rights
regime and the UN system. He posits the European Union as a viable
model of democracy beyond the nation-state.23 Despite this positive
outlook, Habermas admits that the European Union is not yet adequately
equipped to deliver this promise. He insists that the integration must
incorporate the vehicles of constitutional patriotism and deliberative
21 Habermas, J., The Postnational Constellation, op. cit.
22 Ibid., The European Nation State - Its Achievements and Its Limits. On the Past and
Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship, in G. Balakrishnan (ed.), Mapping the Nation,
London: Verso, 1996; Ibid., The Postnational Constellation, op. cit., p. 76.
23 Ibid., Making Sense of the EU: Toward a Cosmopolitan Europe, in Journal of
Democracy, Vol. 14, no. 4, 2003, p. 94.
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democracy so that the EU’s democratic capacity can be strengthened
while the multilayered nature of the European polity is maintained.
Producing a common ethical framework of shared political values,
moral norms and legal rights should transcend but not erode national
and cultural particularism, in order to provide a viable and meaningful
basis of solidarity for the public.24 In this perspective, the Treaty of
Lisbon offers a modest step forward to creating a “European public
space” in advancing deliberative capacity of the supranational
institutions of democracy, simplifying decision-making and favouring
active citizenship.25
II. A Cosmopolitan Perspective of Europeanisation
The second part of this chapter applies the cosmopolitan perspective
to the process of Europeanisation. The analysis relies on Ulrich Beck’s
interpretation on cosmopolitanism, as it was developed in
“Cosmopolitan Vision”,26 in which Beck develops the concepts of
second modernity, risk society and reflexive sociology into a radical
new sociological analysis of the cosmopolitan implications of
globalisation. The application of this vision is then further assessed
within a “Cosmopolite Europe”,27 mainly focussing on the content,
policy implications and global setting of the European integration
process.
1. Beck’s political and sociological cosmopolitanism
Understanding Europe in cosmopolitan terms means defining the
European concept of society as a regionally and historically particular
case of global interdependence, i.e. a Europe of accepted, recognised
and regulated difference, in a new era of border transcending and border
effacing cooperation. This historically unique and distinctive mixed
form of inter-governmental, supranational and inter-societal community,
escapes the traditional categories and concepts. The development of the
EU exemplifies particularly how political and theoretical concepts of the
social sciences have become trapped in what Beck calls the conceptual
straight jacket of methodological nationalism.28 Societies can no longer
24 Ibid., Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe,
in R. Beiner (ed.), Theorizing Citizenship, Albany: University of New York Press,
1995.
25 See the declaration by J. Habermas, J. Derrida, After the War: The Rebirth of
Europe, in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 31 May 2003.
26 Beck, U., Cosmopolitan Vision, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006.
27 Beck, U. and E. Grande, op. cit.
28 Ibid., p. 17.
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be conceived in exclusively territorial terms in which cosmopolite
relations are reduced to mere international relations while the reality
develops beyond borders in a framework of plural belongings.
In Power in the Global Age29 Beck explores the legitimacy of
political authority under conditions of global interdependence. The
major answer to a redefinition of concepts such as power, dominance
and authority from a cosmopolitan perspective is to include
globalisation in the analysis of politics, society and identity-building.
Nationalism is about exclusive distinctions and loyalties;
cosmopolitanism is about inclusive distinctions and loyalties, being
citizens of the cosmos and the polis. It is therefore possible to develop
meaningful affiliations without renouncing one’s origins.
As previously stated, globalisation processes signal a rupture with
past developments with profound internal and external consequences. In
Cosmopolitan Vision30 Beck recognises the need to gear national (and
regional) objectives towards global ends and acknowledges the global
civil society as an advocatory movement that generates global values
and norms with a self-legitimating power. He proposes a critical
democratic cosmopolitanism achieved through reforms that include new
transnational organisations and normative frameworks as well as
remodelled multilateral institutions, the democratisation of human rights
and enforcing of citizens’ rights in the globalising context. According to
Beck, the cosmopolitan state is both a political answer and a useful tool
for managing political identities and ethnic fragmentation in the era of
globalisation and pluralism.
Applied to the European context, Europe is then seen as a new kind
of transnational, cosmopolitan, quasi-state structure, which draws its
political strength precisely from the affirmation and management of
diversities. In other words, he conceives Europe as a cosmopolitan state
that cooperatively domesticates economic globalisation and guarantees
the otherness of the others. In reality, this requires a political Europe
that seeks to reconstitute its power at the intersection of global, national,
regional and local systems of governance.
His new concept of cosmopolitan critical theory is placed in direct
opposition to traditional nation-state politics. His political and
sociological cosmopolitanism acknowledges the otherness of those who
are culturally different, the otherness of the future and the otherness of
nature. In that sense, cosmopolitanism shares some aspects of
universalism, namely the globally acceptable notion of human dignity,
29 Beck, U., Power in the Global Age, Malden (Mass.): Polity Press, 2005.
30 Beck, U., Cosmopolitan Vision, op. cit.
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which must be protected and enshrined in international law. Thus, if we
are to understand cosmopolitan Europe we must radically rethink the
conventional categories of social and political analysis.
2. Cosmopolite Europe
1) Content
In Cosmopolitan Europe31 Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande further
elaborate the cosmopolitan vision in a global age, as it was presented in
Beck’s two previous books. They propose an analytical and political
vision for rethinking Europe, based on the narrative of Europeanisation,
defined as a permanent process of transformation which goes beyond
the conceptual horizon of national societies and states. Beck calls
Europe the last politically effective utopia,32 i.e. both an idea and a
reality. Europe is neither a state nor a nation; hence it cannot be thought
of in terms of the nation-state. Beck criticises the methodological
nationalism practiced by social sciences in the usual national conceptual
horizon, which neglects Europe’s complex realities. As a consequence, a
sociological cosmopolitanism33 is proposed, with a positive definition of
Europe based on the “both/and” principle: expansion of power at the
supranational level is not equated with loss of power at the lower level;
rather the opposite holds, namely power as a whole increases and, as a
consequence, nationality, transnationality and supranationality reinforce
and complement each other.
A cosmopolitan Europe means simultaneously both difference and
integration. It offers an alternative to the existing concepts of European
integration, which either locate Europe above the states and combat
national particularities as obstacles to European integration, or want to
subordinate Europe to the nation-states and national interests. This also
calls for expanding the concept of the public beyond its national borders
and opening it up to an emerging European space. However, such
cosmopolitanism also needs political mechanisms for institutionally
producing and stabilising collective difference within given spaces. The
novel concept of multi-level governance offers support for this
cosmopolitan perspective.
The concept of multi-level governance, introduced by Gary Marks34
more than a decade ago, refers to “the existence of overlapping
31 Beck, U. and E. Grande, op. cit.
32 Ibid., p. 2.
33 Ibid., pp. 17-21.
34 Marks, G., Structural Policy and Multi-level Governance in the EC, in A. Cafruny
and G. Rosenthal (eds.), The State of the European Community: The Maastricht
Debate and Beyond, Boulder (Co.): Lynne Rienner, 1993, pp. 391-410.
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competencies among multiple levels of governments and the interaction
of political actors across those levels”. Its application to the practice of
European governance suggests that the EU is considered a multilayered
system of decision-making in dealing with complex societal problems
where the institutional redistribution of competences is not based on a
territorial dimension but on functional and issue related criteria.35
Following this line of thought, the idea of a cosmopolitan Europe is
at once radically new and yet forms part of the continuity of European
thought and politics. Beck defines Europe both as a social construct and
an open political project, guided by vision and political principles as
well as by the logic of side effects.36 The principle of cosmopolitanism
offers a new perspective for understanding Europe and opens up new
possibilities of social organisation and political participation, though not
based on a homogeneous and uniform model of European demos or
European polis, but characterised by an institutionalised process of
permanent change instead.
This does not imply that Europe has to be completely reinvented. On
the contrary, the European process of integration involved a
cosmopolitan momentum from its beginning, in that it transcends the
idea of the nation and transforms national sovereignty. Cosmopolitanism
has been formalised in Europe by a step-by-step approach to the
simultaneous institutionalisation of two seemingly competing and
conflicting principles, i.e. supranationalism and inter-governmentalism.
This process has proceeded in two directions: inwards, through constant
extensions of the power of the EU and the resulting structural
adaptations in the member states; and outwards, through the constant
enlargements and the export of its norms and rules in the exercise of
mainly soft power politics.
We agree with Beck’s thesis that the process of Europeanisation has
reached a critical threshold.37 Internally the EU has been confronted with
intensifying criticism from its citizens for its lack of transparency,
credibility and accountability. Externally there is much talk of the
Balkanisation of Europe within the international political landscape. The
real European crisis, as Beck argues, may be the inability to see the
contradictory events as part of a common European undertaking. Both
the internal and external contexts of European politics and governance
are being fundamentally shaped by the opportunities and threats of
35 A short analysis of the concept is given by F. Delmartino, The Paradigm of Multi-
level Governance, in Committee of the Regions, Towards a Multi-level Governance
in Europe?, Cahiers of the CoR, Vol. 1, 2009, pp. 33-36.
36 Beck, U. and E. Grande, op. cit., p. 30.
37 Ibid., p. 4.
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globalisation. Under these conditions, the institutional reforms in the
Treaty of Lisbon alone do not go far enough. Much more is called for to
rethink Europe.
2) Policy implications of a cosmopolite Europe
What is European can be termed by forms of identity, ways of life,
means of production and types of interaction that go beyond national or
regional frontiers. It is about continuous border-crossing. Horizontal
Europeanisation has taken place in all sectors of human life. Science,
polity and economy are becoming globalised and Europeanised at the
same time. This intertwining has various policy consequences and
produce different lines of thought and action.
– The dismantling of national borders in Europe has an impact on the
European dynamic of socio-economic inequalities. One thing is sure, the
nation-based limits to people’s perceptions of social inequality have
slowly begun to dissolve as Europeanisation moves forward. The
recognition of the importance of the social dimension for the European
integration process has policy implications within and beyond European
borders, in particular in relation to internal and external solidarity and a
sense of belongingness.
– Europeanisation is initiating an historically new positive sum
game: joint solutions serve the national interest. In some occasions and
policies, the EU is better placed to solve problems than nations or
regions could possibly be by acting alone. In other words, the EU is an
arena where formal sovereignty can be exchanged for real power,
cultures nurtured and economic success improved. A cosmopolitan
Europe is first and foremost a Europe of difference and of recognised
particularity. From a cosmopolitan perspective, this diversity (whether
in languages, economic systems, political cultures, or forms of
democracy) appears primarily as an inexhaustible source of Europe’s
cosmopolitan self-concept and not as an obstacle to integration. If we
understand Europe’s actual distress mainly as an inability to grasp and
understand the historically new kind of reality that Europeanisation
represents, different “both/and” policy alternatives may be envisaged.
– A third line of thought and action is that Europeanisation requires a
collective memory culture that spans borders. Beck calls it a
Europeanisation of perspective. A cosmopolitan approach to the opening
up of communications, the acceptance of interdependence through
inclusion of “the other” for the sake of common interests and to the
management of cultural diversity, goes beyond tolerance or
multiculturalism. It may lead to genuine intercultural dialogue and
mutual learning, conceived as an enrichment of one’s own integral
human development. Such cosmopolitanism is intended to rest on
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cohesive and reciprocally binding norms, moving away from
postmodern particularism and closer to Europe’s true identity of an
open, dynamic, diversified, multicultural and democratic entity.
– The fourth line is the understanding of European society as a
regional world risk society.38 To avoid the danger caused by a European
replica of methodological nationalism, Europeanisation should not be
defined and analysed purely in endogenous terms, but in exogenous
terms in relation to the frame of reference determined by world society.
In this context, Becks refers to the theory of reflexive modernisation39 in
which the experience and dynamics of modernity bears risks in the sense
that along with its success modernity also contains negative
consequences. This requires policy coordination and rule setting of both
obstacles and opportunities in the European and global context.
– The fifth concluding line concerns the understanding and shaping
of new forms of political authority that have emerged in Europe beyond
the nation-state. The management of globalisation effects, specifically
the problems related to the flows and crises of global finance and the
neglected European dimension of current socio-political developments,
requires a more courageous approach, in respect of the various levels
and actors involved in the process.
3) Cosmopolite Europe in a world risk society
In the development of modern societies, Beck distinguishes a first
and a second modernity and applies this distinction to the process of
Europeanisation: the “either/or” model of society and politics of the first
modernity is being replaced by the”both/and” model of society and
politics of the second modernity. The relation between the two is
conceived in inclusive, rather than in exclusive terms. Beck defines
Europe as a society of societies, an “empire” composed of states and
finally as a product of the secondary modernisation.40 The transition
from first to second modernity is then perceived as a self-transformative
meta-change. As such, Europeanisation is understood and analysed as
part of a comprehensive process of reflexive social modernisation, a
structural and epochal break in the development of modern societies,
often as the result of the success of primary modernisation and internal
dynamics.
In agreement with this line of argument, cosmopolite Europe cannot
be reduced to a territorial expression of a “fortress” Europe, but is a
38 Beck, U., World at Risk, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008.
39 Beck, U., A. Giddens and L. Scott, Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and
Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994.
40 Beck, U. and E. Grande, op. cit., p. 53.
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component of the second modernity that is embedded in the world risk
society.41 The conceptual link is clarified by the theory of reflexive
modernisation,42 which is characterised by three constitutive elements,
namely, the theorem of risk society, the theorem of forced
individualisation and the theorem of multidimensional globalisation.
It is argued that the dynamics of reflexive modernisation poses
numerous challenges for the nation-state. The nation-state as one of the
basic institutions of the first modernity is being transformed by the
emergence of a plurality of diverse new forms of transnational
governance beyond the nation-state, but remains an integral component
of the creation of post-national Europe. In other words, states become
integrated in a variety of ways into new international regimes and
organisations, new supra national institutions, new forms of regionalism,
etc.
The result of this development is new complex systems of (global)
governance and policy networks. In addition there is the increasing role
of private actors in solving collective problems and providing public
goods.43 The new basic institutions of the second modernity manifest
themselves in these emerging transnational political regimes, of which
Europe is at once the result and the driving force of this process. The
theory highlights the fact that the different regions in the world are
affected unequally not only by the consequences of failed processes of
modernisation, but also by the consequences of successful processes of
modernisation.
In this context, Beck refers to the interesting notion of a regime of
side effects.44 He argues that an inner globalisation of European societies
has gradually and largely been taking hold through side effects
independently of the political agenda, in the form of a self-propelling
meta-change in European social, cultural and individual life worlds.
Although the process of Europeanisation, i.e. “the realisation of an ever
closer union of peoples of Europe” was intended as the result of the
political decisions of the founding fathers, its institutional and material
consequences were often unintended. This is well explained by the
thesis of institutionalised cosmopolitanism.45
41 Ibid., pp.197-218.
42 Ibid., pp. 28-49.
43 Baudot, J., Building a World Community, Globalisation and the Common Good,
Seattle-London: Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen and
University of Washington Press, 2001; A. Héritier, Common Goods: Reinventing
European Integration Governance, Lanham (MD): Rowman & Littlefield, 2002.
44 Beck, U. and E. Grande, op. cit., pp. 35-40.
45 Ibid., pp. 19-20.
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3. Cosmopolitan perspective of the European integration
process: a European “empire”
Reality is becoming cosmopolitan. As previously stated, de facto
Europeanisation has already developed over the past fifty years. The real
process of becoming cosmopolitan is taking place through secondary
effects that are often undesired, unseen and usually occuring by default.
Scholarly literature agrees that the EU is not a “state” or a “superstate”
that has assimilated the sovereignty rights of the member states, nor is it
a federal state with a clear division of powers, or a confederation, an
international organisation or an international regime. In the context of
recent research on Europe in political science, the EU has been defined a
network, set of networks, network form of governance, a multi-level
system, a multi-level system of governance or as a multi-level state.46
Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande have proposed a redefinition of the
term empire for an appropriate analysis of the political rule in Europe.47
It is argued that the cosmopolitisation of the state in Europe has created
a new political system; they call it a post imperial empire. This
European empire is not based on national demarcation and conquest, but
on overcoming national borders, voluntarism, consensus, transnational
interdependence and on the political added value accruing from
cooperation.
The cosmopolitan empire of Europe is notable for its open and
cooperative character at home and abroad. Its real power lies in the
socio-economic model of a cooperative future and in its special form of
soft world power. It is characterised by the following constitutive
features:48 an asymmetrical political order subdivided into power zones
according to the intensity of cooperation and the number of countries
involved; an open variable spatial structure; a multinational societal
structure; an integration through law; a consensus and cooperation
behaviour; a welfare vs security objective; a horizontal and vertical
institutional multi-level system of governance; a network power marked
by non hierarchical forms of decision-making and participation of a
large number of societal actors in integrated negotiating systems and
political decision-making processes; a complex cosmopolitan (internal
and external) sovereignty; an ambivalence of delimitation and
limitation; and finally an emancipatory vs repressive cosmopolitanism.
The impact of a cosmopolitan perspective on European integration
should be clear by now. For a long time, the key concept of the
46 Ibid., pp. 50-52 and pp. 69-70.
47 Ibid., pp. 50-92.
48 Ibid., pp. 62-72.
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integration process consisted primarily of the abolition of national and
local differences. This policy confused unity with uniformity or
assumed that uniformity is required for unity. In this sense, uniformity
became the supreme regulatory principle of modern Europe. By
contrast, cosmopolitan integration is based on a paradigm shift in which
diversity is not the problem but rather the solution. Europe’s further
integration should therefore not be oriented to the traditional notions of
uniformity inherent in a European federal state. On the contrary,
integration should instead take Europe’s inherent diversity as its starting
point, in order to link the call for recognition of differences with the call
for the integration of divergences. Understood as a historically tested
political model for a post-imperial empire of consensus and law, Jeremy
Rifkin’s European Dream49 of a soft world power is a fascinating
alternative of a forward-looking vision of a state structure firmly based
on recognition of the culturally different other.
In this context, nationalist and regionalist ideas are unsuitable for
unifying Europe. A large European super-state frightens people. Beck’s
cosmopolitan Europe offers the idea of uniting European citizens today
because it quietens Europeans’ fears of losing identity, makes
interaction, dialogue and mutual learning tolerant among the many
European nations, regions and peoples enshrined in the treaties and
opens up new political spaces and options for action in a globalised
world. However, the persistence of nations and regions remains an
important condition of a cosmopolitan Europe. The more secure and
confirmed Europeans feel in their national, regional and local dignity,
the less they will shut themselves off in their territories and the more
they will stand up for European values and take responsibility in the
world.
Conclusion
By proposing multi-level governance structures and applying
dialogue’s frameworks and mutual learning for managing differences, a
cosmopolitan perspective outlines a new post national model of
democracy for Europe that no longer marginalises citizens but gives
them an active role in European decision-making processes.50 Europe
can be understood through the concept of cosmopolitanism because it
fully reflects its nature, history and future possibilities. A cosmopolitan
Europe guarantees the coexistence of different ethnic, religious and
political forms of life across borders, based on the principle of
cosmopolitan tolerance and dialogue. Throughout different eras of
49 Rifkin, J., The European Dream, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004.
50 Mascia, M., Participatory Democracy for Global Governance, op. cit.
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European history, this concept has been transformed from an ethical-
normative ideal of community and open mindedness into the hybrid
patterns of integration. In summary, cosmopolitanism is evolving from a
categorical imperative and a rational project into a new modality of
practice-oriented awareness. In this way, it acquires an empirical and
analytical value inside a reality that seems to become structurally
cosmopolitan. This allows a broad applied thinking about the
democratic transformation of the EU and its role in view of the present
and future challenges.
The cosmopolitan perspective also implies a fading of physical,
mental and disciplinary borders. It is shaped by fluxes of capital,
information and persons and by processes of spatial-temporal
compression, de-territorialisation and de-nationalisation. The new fluxes
go beyond traditional borders and refer to the concept of a network of
interconnections. Cosmopolitanism becomes the possibility to recognise
diversity as a constitutional element of multiple identities. At the
practical level, this new consciousness determines the creation of a
civilised confrontation sphere where identities are built in dialogue, in
relation to a reality of (global) risks that requires collective solutions.
For many sociologists, the EU represents the result and the challenge
of social transformation. It is said to be characterised by a flexible
spatial structure, composed of vertical and horizontal links between
models of sovereignty in a transformative interdependence. It presents
an asymmetrical integrative order, based on a mixture of
intergovernmental and supranational forms of cooperation, in which
civil society is becoming a shaping actor and meeting place of social
and political aggregations. This might lead to a new model of the
supranational and transcend democracy which, of course, poses the
problem of searching for new forms of management of politics and
dialogue at various levels of the globalising landscape.
To think and act Europe along a cosmopolitan perspective means
recognising the EU as a laboratory of plural democratic forms and
analysing the European integration process as a dimension of
cosmopolitisation and transformative cooperation. It is therefore
necessary, on the one hand, to consider nation-states in relation to the
transnationalisation of their interests and, on the other hand, to
understand various forms of governance and dialogue within a context
of risk interdependence.51 The EU is then conceived as a new space in
which federalism, intergovernmentalism and neo functionalism are
interconnected through a multi-level governance structure that opens up
to a participative process and plurality of decision centres. Apparently,
51 Beck, U., Power in the Global Age, op. cit.
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the paradigm of multi-level governance contributes to the understanding
of the complex political reality in the European and global context.52
Following this policy line, Europeanisation as cosmopolitisation is
analysed in the discursive interaction between segmented publics, which
favours integrative dynamics and transformative efficient solutions. In a
transnational deliberative democracy, the form of multi-level
governance emerges with the realisation of a public sphere that is open
to the discursive process and diverging expressions. The legitimacy of
subsequent political decisions comes then from the inclusion of
knowledge, interests and actors at the various levels of the participative
process.
This is not an easy discourse.53 The multiplicity of links and cultural
perceptions stresses the premises of a valorial community. Europe
should not only find its democratic form through the principle of
responsibility in managing (global) risks, but should also apply the
principle of reflexivity to the dynamics it puts to work. It is important
that the recognition of universal rights remains the point of departure for
democratic politics in multi-level and multi-actor governance.
Next to a societal reflection, a meta-reflexive person is also therefore
needed to valorise the transformation of society in a European and
global context. The capacity of transformation and realisation depends
on the historical experience of the society as well as on the level of
social practices of persons. The reflexivity of persons applies to
memory, knowledge and action, and links the individual’s prospects
with that of society’s. Therefore it is necessary to re-conquer a space of
recognised and accepted differences, which is not limited to cultural
relativism but favours a community of cultures and makes intercultural
dialogue possible. The fundamental question relates to the objective of
the integral human development of a person who is conscious of his/her
universal rights. Europe should therefore present itself as an open public
space, where institutional and non-institutional actors, formal and
informal, meet, recognising their proper rights and obligations. Such a
European perspective transforms demands and identity in a constructive
way, but requires a respect of personal and collective identities and
memories.
52 Examples of European multi-level governance are offered by European Commission,
White Paper on European Governance, 25 July 2001, COM (2001), 428 (final);
Committee of the Regions, Whiter Paper on Multi-level Governance, 17-18 June
2009, CoR 89/2009, final and Committee of the Regions, Towards Multi-level
Governance in Europe?, op. cit.
53 Taglioli, A., Il volto cosmopolita dell’Europa, in Società Mutamento Politica, Vol. 1,
no. 1, 2010, pp. 189-201.
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Cosmopolitanism is thus not an external credo or an ideological
slogan of a normative and political universalism, but more an internal
dimension of reflexive action, which stretches beyond a nostalgic
defence of territorial sovereignty as well as beyond a utopia of
universalistic centralism. Cosmopolitanism is mirrored in the diversified
and similar history of Europe, a permanently changing multi-faceted
Europe, situated at a crossroads between past, present and future. A
cosmopolitan vision of the process of European integration may
contribute to identifying and clarifying the conceptual and empirical
characteristics of a multi-level governance of intercultural dialogue,
bridging the gap between past and present contradictions in international
democratic politics and strengthening the process of Europeanisation.
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CHAPTER 7
Global Public Goods and Human Development
Introduction
We all increasingly live in one world, so that individuals, groups,
nations and continents become interdependent in a so-called “global
village”. Various political, economic, cultural and social factors are
shaping this process of globalisation, with drastic consequences on the
human development relations between nations, peoples and persons.
However, globalisation means different things to different people and its
meaning has changed over time from mere technological progress and
economic dynamism to a more mixed approach about pervasive and
complex global policy challenges such as poverty, climate change,
equity and justice, peace and security, etc. This is mainly due to the
increasing importance of cross-border spill over from country to country
and from countries to the global commons. Many of these global
challenges and threats result from the under-provision of global public
goods such as international financial stability, equity, health,
environmental sustainability, respect for human rights, etc. This chapter
explores the possibilities of applying the idea of public goods to human
development, human security1 and human rights,2 seen from within a
global context.
Not only is the list of common global policy challenges growing in
current international relations, but many domestic policy objectives are
increasingly beyond the reach of individual governments. The openness
of today’s global economy has changed the traditional scope of national
sovereignty and is requiring increased international cooperation, multi-
1 For a very interesting discussion on the concept of human security as a global public
good see Altvater, E., Public goods for human security, in Papeles del Este 14, 2007,
p. 1-19; Des, G., The Idea of Human Security, Institute for Social Studies, The
Hague, Garnett Working Paper, no 28, Jan. 2008, 36 p.; Grayson K.A., Human
security in the global era, in Drache D. (ed.), The Market or the Public Domain?
Global Governance and the Asymmetry of Power, New York: Routledge, 2001,
p. 229-252; and Reich, S., Human Security as a global public goods, in The Courier
ACP-EU, Dossier n° 202, January-February-March 2004.
2 Andersen, E.A. and B. Lindsnaes, Towards New Global Strategies: Public Goods
and Human Rights, Martinus Nijhof Publishers, 2007. The book presents a very
timely and comprehensive publication on global public goods and human rights, seen
as two mutually supporting concepts.
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level governance mechanisms and new policy tools to cope with the
challenges of globalisation.
Globalisation is defined as a phenomenon and a process, which
presents many faces, multiple voices and different interpretations with
diversifying, often dramatic impacts on persons, cultures and societies.3
It cannot be reduced to a mere economic expression of growing
interdependence and international agreements in an exclusively market-
oriented and competitive environment. It is to be understood and
analysed as a multidimensional phenomenon involving private and
public domains of activity and interaction across borders and across
continents, including the economic, political, socio-cultural,
technological, ethical, environmental and personal domains. The UNDP
has developed a Human Development Index (HDI), reflecting
achievements in the most basic human capabilities (i.e. life expectancy,
educational attainment and income), to measure the impact of
globalisation on countries and peoples.4
Therefore our analysis of a global public goods approach to human
development and human rights takes into account the core (systemic)
features of globalisation, being spatial extension and compression,
increasing interconnectedness, temporal acceleration and a growing
awareness.5 The proposed global public goods approach recognises
multiple locations of governance, multiple dimensions of integration,
multiple modes of interaction and an increasing institutionalisation of
the process of globalisation. It is argued that a vision and policy strategy
based on global public goods may contribute to a better analysis of
global policy challenges, including human development and may
recommend strategies for true global policy-making.
In the first part of the chapter we redefine the concept of public
goods and set it in a wider conceptual context. In the second part, this
analysis is further applied to the case of global public goods. The final
part deals with the policy relevance of global public goods in describing
and analysing global challenges and policy responses.
3 From the very extensive literature on globalisation we mainly rely on following
authors: Bauman, Z., Globalization: The Human Consequences, op. cit.; Beck, U.,
What is globalisation?, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000. Giddens, A., Runaway
World: How Globalization Is Reshaping Our Lives, op. cit.; and Stiglitz, J., Making
Globalization Work, op. cit.
4 UNDP, Human Development Report 1999, available at http://hdr.undp.org/
reports/global
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I. Conceptual Context: Rethinking the Definition of Public
Goods
In the first part of the chapter we explain the conceptual framework
of our analysis. Following recent works on public goods theory an
expanded and more realistic notion of public goods is suggested. The
second section presents a brief policy assessment concerning this
conceptual shift.
1. A widened concept of public good
Although the literature on public goods is extensive and diverse,
there is a standard definition of public goods based on Samuelson’s
conditions of non-rivalry and non-excludability.6 Figure 1 presents the
traditional approach to public goods. In the literature, goods with rival
and excludable benefits are often automatically defined private goods
(Quadrant 1). Goods that are non-rival and non-excludable in
consumption, possibly supplied in variable quantities, are often called
pure public goods (Quadrant 4).
In reality, however, the properties of goods do not always correspond
to this standard definition. The main reason is that society can modify
the (non) rivalry and (non) excludability of a goods’ benefits. Goods
often become private or public as a result of deliberate policy choices.
That is why Kaul and Mendoza7 propose an expansion of the definition:
they recognise that in many if not most cases, goods exist not in their
original forms but as social constructs, largely determined by policies
and other collective human actions. According to this revised definition,
public goods are non-exclusive or, put differently, de facto public in
consumption. The expanded concept of public good is illustrated in
Figure 2.
6 Samuelson (1954).
7 Kaul, I. and R. Mendoza, Advancing the Concept of Global Public Goods, in Kaul, I.,
P. Conceição, K. Le Goulven and R. Mendoza (eds.), Providing Global Public
Goods: Managing Globalization, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 78-
111.
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This enlarged definition requires some further explanation. Society
can choose to make non-rival goods more public (non-exclusive) by
policy design (quadrant 2B). In some cases it may even be compulsory
to consume such goods. For example, people are usually required to
respect property rights. Similarly, growing policy attention is being paid
to encouraging respect for human rights, including gender equality. Still,
many countries have some way to go in making respect for human rights
fully non-exclusive, ensured for all groups. In other cases (e.g.
universalising technical norms and standards, certain traffic rules, etc.)
results have been much easier to achieve.
Rival goods can also be kept or made non-exclusive (quadrant 4B).
Public parks and nature reserves are examples. Another is to make rival
goods available in such plentiful quantities that there need not be any
competition over who gets to use them. Many societies have chosen this
policy route for basic education and health services. This approach is
usually taken for two reasons. First, goods such as education and health
are often seen as human rights and as having intrinsic value. Second, an
educated and healthy population generates important private and public
benefits. Educated people tend to be more productive and to contribute
more to economic growth and development. Thus many countries have
made basic education not just free and universal but compulsory as well.
The goods in quadrant 3 are technically non-excludable and therefore
exist de facto in a non-exclusive form. The main goods are policy
outcomes or overall conditions such as peace, law and order, financial
stability, efficient markets, and communicable disease control and
eradication. Once these conditions exist, all people can – and sometimes
must – consume them. The goods’ benefits are indivisible, so they exist
for all in the same amount and with the same characteristics. These
goods are often more evident when undersupplied. For example, conflict
is more noticeable than peace, which is often taken for granted.
Some policy consequences are connected to this redefined concept of
goods. It often takes a long time and a lot of effort to anchor a good
firmly in the public domain. This is for example the case with equity or
respect for human rights. Similarly, it often takes a policy decision to
make a good private. And it takes an elaborate institutional and
organisational framework to define, assign, and monitor private property
rights, and update and enforce them. In short, societal norms and
decisions of what is and is not private often reach deeply into what
many perceive as the private sphere of people’s lives. On a much
broader level, state borders can no longer be used as shields behind
which to curtail human rights, practice corruption, cause air pollution,
etc.
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2. A policy assessment
The previous section has suggested a rethinking of the main notions
underpinning the theory of public goods. First, it has shown that
properties of (non) rivalry in consumption and (non) excludability of
benefits do not automatically determine whether a good is public or
private. “Public” and “private” are in many – perhaps most – cases, a
matter of policy choice: a social construct. Some goods lend themselves
more easily to being either public or private. Nevertheless, it is
important to distinguish between a good having the potential of being
public (i.e. having non-rival and non-excludable properties) and being
de facto public (non-exclusive and available for all to consume).
Second, public goods do not necessarily have to be provided by the
state. All actors can, and increasingly do, contribute to their provision.
And third, a growing number of public goods are no longer just national
in scope, having assumed cross-border dimensions. Many have become
global and require international cooperation to be adequately provided.
Rethinking the concept of public goods along these lines has a
number of implications for the theory of public goods and opens up an
important new research agenda. This includes the question of how in
various cases publicness in consumption is matched with publicness in
decision-making and with equity in the distribution of a goods’ benefits.
Kaul and Mendoza call that the triangle of publicness.8 Furthermore,
recognising the provision of public goods as a multi-actor activity calls
for a reconsideration of the current concept of optimal provision as well
as for a renewed analysis of the provision process of public goods.
The standard definition of public goods has illuminated many
important issues in the provision of such goods, including free riding
and the prisoner’s dilemma. But that definition does not fully capture
the policy approach needed when dealing with the novel nature of many
of these goods. As a result, many public goods are still analysed in an
almost passive manner. Too often it is assumed that a non-rival and non-
excludable good must be public or that a rival and excludable good must
be private and is best left to the market. That approach ignores the
changing context and the new realities caused by increasing
globalisation. Before goods appear in the market or are part of state
competences, policy choices have been made or norms established to
make the goods private in the sense of being exclusive, or public in the
sense of being non-exclusive.
The excludability or non-excludability of goods often facilitates or
hampers such public policy choices. In any event, the defining
8 Kaul and Mendoza (2003), p. 92.
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characteristics of many public goods are not inherent and are often
socially endogenous. Public goods are therefore goods that are in the
public domain: they are there for all to consume. Goods are in the public
domain because: they cannot be made excludable (i.e. benefits cannot be
withheld from the public), because doing so would be too expensive or
technically impossible (the sun rays); they have been made public by
design (e.g. a country’s justice system, street signs, basic education for
all); and finally; they are public by default, due to policy neglect (e.g. air
pollution, crime and violence) or due to lack of relevant information
(e.g. on food security). However, in most instances it is a matter of
policy choice whether and to what extent goods have either public or
private properties. In summary, the expanded definition of a public good
can be formulated in a two-tier way: 1) goods have a special potential
for being public if they have non-excludable benefits, non-rival benefits
or both; and 2) goods are de facto public if they are non-exclusive and
available for all to consume.
A further policy consequence of public goods is that they are not
only public in consumption, but often also public in provision. Their
supply may depend on collective action, i.e. cooperation among a
number of individual actors. Different reasons can be given for such
joint action: the provision of the good may require concerted action by
all (e.g. all have to stop smoking in order to achieve a smoke-free
environment), necessitating some sort of voluntary agreement, an
enforceable form of regulation or the provision of financial incentives
(e.g. subsidies or taxes) to encourage private actors to align their private
interests with those of society; or no one person may be interested in
providing services (such as birth or death registration) that offers few, if
any, readily appropriable private benefits, making tax collection or
another form of burden-sharing necessary to finance its state provision
in the longer-term interest of all; or finally, no one person can enjoy the
legitimacy to play a particular role (e.g. dispensing justice), so that again
state provision and joint financing is called for.
Thus, the state often plays an important role in the supply of public
goods by fostering collective action. However, private initiative and
markets are also important. In recent years, more and more public goods
are being provided through public-private partnerships of different
types. Clearly, the balance between private goods and public goods
cannot be equated with that between markets and states. Private goods
can be provided through the state; and firms and markets can play a
major role in public goods provision, in particular where both markets
and state institutions are well developed.
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II. The Case of Global Public Goods
So far, public goods have been discussed without specifying the
geographic or jurisdictional reach of their benefits, i.e. local, national,
regional, or global. The second part of this chapter focuses on global
public goods.9 We explore whether and to what extent the concept of
global public good is useful in describing and analysing global
challenges such as human development, human security and human
rights. In the current process of globalisation, the public domain has
been expanded and a diversity of actors at various levels of decision-
making are now active on the international scene, being the state, civil
society, business and households.
Global public goods are in a dual sense public: they are public as
opposed to private; and they are global as opposed to national. An
interesting issue is the extent to which some goods are global naturally
and others have become global by policy choice. For example, capital
controls or trade barriers are often being removed based on
governmental and/or intergovernmental decisions. Or, greenhouse gases
must not rise and burden the atmosphere to the extent they do. In the
process of globalisation two main findings have emerged: first,
globalised national public goods are an important class of global public
goods and secondly global public goods require and create commonality
in a world of extreme disparities.
1. Understanding global public goods: definitions and typologies
The discussion here builds on the definition of global public goods
proposed by Kaul, Grunberg and Stern:10 Global public goods are goods
whose benefits extend to all countries, people, and generations. Goods
can be potentially public as well as potentially global. That is, many
goods can be made public or global (or both) through human actions or
public policies (or both). Global public goods are nothing new. Many,
9 For relevant studies on global public goods see, among others, Andersen, E.A. and
Lindsnaes, B., Towards New Global Strategies, op. cit.; Ferroni, M. and A. Mody
(eds.), International Public Goods: Incentives, Measurement, and Financing,
Washington, D.C.: Kluwer Academic Publishers and World Bank, 2002; Kaul, I., I.
Grunberg and M. Stern (eds.), Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in
the 21st Century, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999; Kaul, I.,. P. Conceição,
K. Le Goulven and R. Mendoza (eds.), Providing Global Public Goods: Managing
Globalization, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003; Kaul, I., Global Public
Goods: A Key To Achieving The Millennium Development Goals, Office of
Development Studies, UNDP, January 2005; Stiglitz, J., The Theory of International
Public Goods and the Architecture of International Organizations, Helsinki: United
Nations University and World Institute for Development Economics Research, 1995.
10 Kaul, Grunberg and Stern, op. cit.
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notably the global natural commons, predate human activity. They
include the atmosphere, the geostationary orbit, the electromagnetic
spectrum, and the high seas. And as long as human beings have existed,
there have been externalities.
With the running process of globalisation the volume of externalities
and intentionally created goods of global reach has been growing
exponentially: new technologies increasingly enhance human mobility
as well as movement of goods, services, and information around the
world; economic and political openness has stimulated cross-border and
transnational activity; systemic risks, including global climate change;
integrated financial markets, environmental degradation and poverty
eradication require collective action on an international level, etc.
In other words, growing socio-economic inequities call into question
the legitimacy of the global system. International regimes are becoming
more influential, although often formulated by small groups of powerful
nations yet often claiming universal applicability. Nations and groups
see their public domains become interlocked and their living conditions
become interdependent. The current global financial crisis well
illustrates the domino effect of global risks. Lax food safety standards in
one area can create health problems in many distant places through
international travel or trade. And new global public platforms, such as
the Internet, blunt many conventional public policy tools, including
those for controlling such public “bads” as tax evasion, money
laundering, drug trafficking, commercial fraud, and child abuse. The
public and policymakers all over the world increasingly find that public
goods they would prefer to have locally – or for “bads” not to have –
cannot be produced solely through domestic action. As a consequence, a
growing number of national public goods have gone global.
Figure 3 classifies global public goods primarily according to their
human-made (social) properties. As already said in part 1 of this paper,
various goods have moved or are moving within or across quadrants.
These changes in status show that global public goods are public
because they are not private and global because they are not national.
However, the impact of globalisation trends in economics, politics,
social and cultural affairs makes international collective decisions on
whether and to what extent to make certain goods public or private,
more than necessary. Still, agreeing on policies at the global level can be
difficult, as indicated by the discussions of the World Trade
Organisation’s agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) or the debate on climate changes in the
Copenhagen Conference.
This mixture of national goods and global public goods implies
policy action at the international and global level. The goods in
Global Public Goods and Human Development
141
quadrants 2 and 4 of Figure 3 require harmonisation of national policies.
Policy harmonisation is often intended to encourage countries to
internalise cross-border externalities, i.e. to help generate positive ones
and to reduce negative ones. Several goods in quadrant 2B involve such
efforts. Efforts to increase the inclusiveness of such goods as
international communication and transport systems are aimed at
improving the worldwide availability of network externalities. The same
intention usually drives initiatives to increase adherence to norms and
standards, including respect for human rights. Most of the goods in
quadrant 2B involve transnational policies that aim at providing global
benefits. By contrast, many of the goods in quadrant 4 involve the
internalisation of negative cross-border externalities. The promotion of
basic human rights, shown in quadrant 2B, is an example.
Quadrant 4A lists goods that require policy responses that involve
defining and assigning new (national) property rights, such as national
pollution allowances or the exclusive economic zones created by the
1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Quadrant 4B includes
goods involving measures similar to those in the national context; they
are aimed at making certain crucial goods, such as basic education,
health care, eradication from poverty, universally available. Moral and
ethical concerns often motivate the international community to
undertake such measures.
A further policy message relates to the pure public goods listed in
quadrant 3. Many of the goods in this quadrant are the same as those in
Figures 1 and 2. As national borders become open and cross-border
economic activity increases, these goods become indivisible across
borders, or transnational. In other words, all nations face the same
international economic conditions, the same conditions in international
financial markets and the same risk of global climate change. In the case
of environmental sustainability, fundamental changes are needed in
global provision and consumption patterns to avoid irreversible
environmental damage, and hence require global governance action.
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Figure 3.






















































- National biodiversity and
wildlife
- Languages and cultural
tradition
- National public education
programs




2A Non-rival goods made
exclusive
- Commercial knowledge





- Norms and standards
- Respect for human rights




- Harmonisation of language
- Globalisation of
advertisements of lifestyles
and other social norms and
institutions
QUADRANT 4




- Ozone layer: targets for
reducing emissions of
ozone-depleting substances
- Atmosphere: targets or
quotas for reducing















4B Rival goods kept or
made non-exclusive
- Atmosphere
- Global gene pool to
promote food security
- High seas
- Basic education and
health care for all
- Freedom from extreme
poverty
Source: Kaul and Mendoza (2003), p. 98
The considerations in Figure 3 make it possible to develop a
typology of global public goods (Table 1). This typology differentiates
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between goods based on the nature of their benefits and the degree of
their publicness. By examining global public goods through the triangle
of publicness (i.e. public dimension of consumption, decision-making
and distribution of benefits) Kaul and others11 have shed new light on
some of the political tensions accompanying globalisation. For example,
in the case of multilateral trade regime, the distribution of benefits is not
completely public, but consumption and formal decision-making are. Or
in the case of the international financial architecture, distribution of
benefits and decision-making are not completely public but
consumption is. These cases show that understanding the nature of the
publicness of global public goods requires assessing globalisation not
just for cross-border private economic activity but also for what is
happening to goods in the public domain.
Table 1
A typology of global public goods by the nature of their publicness
Class of good Nature of publicness
Global natural commons
(e.g. the atmosphere or
the high seas)
Free (managed) access: In their
original state these goods are typically
rival and non-excludable. Some global
natural commons (e.g. the ozone layer)
have taken on the social form of a
managed access resource. They are
usually still available for all to








knowledge, for example, is often
accessible to all. It is non-rival and
difficult to exclude. It typically has
limited (if any) commercial value but
can be important to people’s daily lives
or to economic and political
governance.
Limited access: Patented knowledge,
for example, may be in the public
domain but its use is restricted, at least
for a period. The rationale is that
11 Kaul, I., P. Conceição, K. Le Goulven and R. Mendoza, (2003), op. cit.
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providing incentives to private
producers of knowledge will enhance
the economy’s growth and its dynamic
efficiency.
Inclusiveness being promoted:
Many efforts are under way to enhance
the inclusiveness of goods with
network characteristics and whose
expansion promises “additional user”
benefits or positive network
externalities.
Examples include international
regimes (multilateral trade regime,
Universal Declaration of Human
Rights), global communication and
transport systems, and informal norms.
Efforts to increase the inclusiveness of
these goods will widen the range of
users, globalising the benefits and
costs. Globalisation of public goods
includes both top-down (from









Examples include (global (national
and international) efforts aimed at “for
all” goals: basic education, health care,
and food security.
Indivisibility of benefits and costs:
Goods in this category have indivisible
benefits that form the core of the
interdependencies among countries and
people. These goods tend to be
technically non-excludable and so de
facto inclusive and public.
Source: Kaul and Mendoza (2003), p.100.
An important conclusion from this expanded understanding of global
public goods is the recognition of a new class of global public goods,
which have been called “global policy outcomes”. Kaul argues that the
emergence and growing importance of these goods requires that
international cooperation moves from dealing just with between or at-
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the-border issues to also managing a growing number of issues of
behind-the-border convergence in national public policy. This requires a
strengthened role of the UN in better managing the provision of global
public goods.12 It presents a selective but very useful typology of global
concerns as global public goods.13
Such a public goods typology has consequences for collective action.
International cooperation seems essential for global policy outcomes or
conditions. For global human-made commons, the international
community has more flexibility in pursuing international cooperation. In
addition, international cooperation can often take the form of more
concerted national policy action to supply human-made global public
goods. Yet for global policy outcomes or conditions and the shaping of
their indivisible benefits there is often a need for truly common action at
the global level.
2. Provision of global public goods: politics and provision
If so many global public goods are human-made, key questions need
to be asked to determine how well the three dimensions of publicness
are met for global public goods. That global public goods are largely
national public goods that have gone global has important implications
for the social aggregation strategies used to provide them.
1) Politics
Although the world is globalising, states still exhibit many political,
economic, social and cultural differences. The impact of the systemic
features of the globalisation process on peoples’ developments varies
very much from country to country as to scope, pace, timing and
intensity of the global public goods. The question is whether the global
scope of these goods’ benefits and costs has been accompanied by a
corresponding publicness in national and international policymaking.
This question is urgent because publicness in consumption is often a
requirement, not an option.
A stronger voice for the provision of global public goods, such as
human development, human security and human rights, is often sought
in the interest of democracy and pluralism. When international
cooperation is required to curtail costly, inefficient global public “bads”,
an effective voice for all is also critical. This is particularly evident in
cases where international institutions are assigned to implement
12 Kaul, I., The Changing Role of the United Nations: lessons for multi-level
governance, in H. Enderlein, S. Wälts and M. Zűrn, Handbook on Multi-level
Governance , Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2010, p. 323-342.
13 Kaul, I., I. Grunberg and M. Stern (1999), op. cit., p. 454.
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international standards to promote certain public goods (such as
international security and international financial stability), often
resulting in incursions on domestic policymaking and lawmaking. The
legitimacy of such interventions depends on more participatory
decision-making. Hence it is important to assess the main global public
goods, notably those involving high interdependence, against the ideal
triangle of publicness. Here an important role is set for global civil
societies, which might serve as global consciousness.
2) Provision
Few global public goods are “readymade”. Even the natural global
commons often require international management regimes for their
sustainable use. Most global public goods follow a complex,
multidimensional, multilayered and multi-actor provision path of
cooperation. Notwithstanding the importance of international
cooperation, the issue of subsidiarity needs to be raised in view of
choosing national policy harmonisation or joint provision at the
international level. There is a diversified vision and a differentiated
impact of globalisation across the globe on countries’ and people’s
visions and conditions.14 As a consequence, increasing the provision of a
global public good often requires a community of shared values and a
respect for diversity. Therefore policy pluralism should be more
acceptable than the centralisation and standardisation of policy making,
conditioned to debate on the best approach to providing certain goods.
However, policy pluralism increases the transaction costs involved in
providing global public goods because it may entail more management
support, monitoring, and reporting. In summary, given the complexity of
providing global public goods, there is no easy or standard formula for
ensuring their adequate provision.
As argued in the case for public goods provision on a national scale,
similarly on the global scale the actors most likely to ensure that the
process moves beyond narrow national self-interests are no longer only
governments, because they are territorially bound. Actors include more
and more transnational businesses, civil society organisations, and
members of the public. As Sen15 points out, these actors often pursue
interests and concerns independent of their nationalities. The growing
de-territorialisation of national public goods makes concerted public
goods provision on the international level (or global policy-making) a
policy priority in the global era.
14 ILO, A fair globalization: creating opportunities for all, World Commission on the
Social Dimension of Globalization, February 2004, p. 1-128.
15 Sen, A., Development as Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
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3. A policy assessment
The issues mentioned in our first part are even more urgent at the
international level, particularly when one considers international
cooperation in support of global public goods. The reasons are that at
the international level there is no real equivalent to the institution of the
state and that the global public has far more diverse interests and
preferences than any national public. Furthermore, many people –
indeed, entire countries – often find themselves in “no exit” situations.
Under these conditions, a decision-making and provision process for
global public goods that is more participatory and “bottom up” is
perhaps most ideal. Therefore, the debate on global public goods cannot
simply build on the existing theory of public goods. It should be updated
to reflect current realities following the suggestions of Kaul and others.
Global public goods provision is today more than ever a matter of
policy choice. First, few global public goods are global and public by
nature. The ozone layer is one of these few naturally global and public
goods. Most other global public goods are national public goods that
have become interlinked in the wake of increasing openness of borders
and as a result of increasing international regime formation and policy
harmonisation behind national borders. In summary, the wellbeing of
people within the globalising context depends on private goods and
public goods. Together, the available public goods create an enabling
framework for economic growth as well as for human development.
Secondly it is argued that, in the wake of global trends and threats,
the importance of global public goods has grown. Significant advances
have been achieved in terms of openness of national borders and behind-
the-border policy harmonisation. Coupled with progress in
transportation and communication technologies as well as enhanced
political openness, these trends have not only encouraged a high volume
of transborder economic activities but they have also led to an
interlocking of national public domains. The result has been the
globalisation of a growing number of public goods. Financial stability,
public health, the control of crime and violence, including terrorism, or
food safety, are examples.
Thirdly, some global public goods remain today severely
underprovided, such as international financial architecture or the
international regime for knowledge management, and others are ill
shaped, such as some dimensions of the multilateral trade regime. Still,
the provision of global public goods has become crucial in the
management of international relations and the survival of our planet.
Many public goods can today no longer be adequately provided for
national or local consumption through domestic policy actions alone.
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These goods now require international cooperation as an integral part of
their provision path.16
III. Policy Options and Strategies
The third part of the chapter deals with feasible policy options and
strategies that would guarantee a more reliable supply of global public
goods from market efficiency to equity, health, environmental
sustainability and peace. Without these global goods, genuine human
development will be elusive.
1. Global public goods and development: current trends and
patterns
The response of the international community to the rising importance
of cross-border issues and activities has so far been primarily to forge a
rapidly rising number of international regimes. However, these regimes
have two critical shortcomings: they are often still incomplete, leaving
important dimensions unsettled; and they more reflect the interests and
concerns of the richer countries than those of the poorer. This is
certainly true for the existing multilateral trade regime, the present
international arrangements for knowledge management, the international
financial architecture and the international arrangements for managing
the natural global commons.
In today’s complex reality, the international community is
confronted with an expanded agenda of international cooperation. And
even in the more conventional areas, such as peace and security, it faces
new challenges, such as the problem of ethnic tensions, regional
conflicts within nations, respect for human rights, etc. These challenges
require new policy approaches but also new, additional resources for
international cooperation. So far, the world has been rather hesitant to
recognise this fact, despite the urgency of the matter. Often large sums
of money are being spent on controlling the ill effects of the
underprovision of certain global public goods. A plea can be made for
better international governance capacities and patterns to provide some
of today’s global public goods. Moreover the international community
at present lacks an effective forum for participatory global priority
setting and policy oversight. Issues are mostly being addressed on an
issue-by-issue basis, ignoring the various preferences for public goods
in the global public domain.
Although the literature on global public goods points to many
weaknesses, it also provides encouraging and constructive policy
16 See http://www.globalpublicgoods.org
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messages. Analyses suggest that it is desirable and feasible to correct
many current problems. In particular, four main ways of improving the
provision of global public goods and making globalisation more
manageable are proposed. These are: refining the conceptual framework
of the public goods approach to better reflect current realities in public
goods provision; promoting collaboration between stakeholders and
decision-makers to favour participation in global public goods debates;
systematising the financing of global public goods to guarantee adequate
private and public resources for these goods; and bridging borders,
sectors, and groups of actors to foster institutional interaction and create
space for strategic issue management.
2. Global public goods and policy-making: policy options
The analyses confirm that the reform of public policy-making is a
key factor to managing globalisation better. In many global issue areas,
countries increasingly find cooperation necessary to achieve national
goals. Indeed, the fate of many nations has become increasingly
intertwined, transforming what were once national policy issues into
regional issues and regional issues into global ones. As issues such as
financial stability, human development, peace and security bring nations
into a shared fate, they should also bring them together in appropriately
global public policy-making.
In order to identify policy options for global public goods provision
three categories can be distinguished: global public goods can be
overused, underused and undersupplied. The atmosphere and ozone
layer are two overused global public goods. Information and knowledge
are in adequate supply, but are underused. Peace, health, financial
stability, human development and equity are all undersupplied. Kaul and
others17 identify three major weaknesses in international cooperation
that undermine the provision of the redefined concept of global public
goods: a jurisdictional gap (i.e. the discrepancy between a globalised
world and national, separate units of policy-making, i.e. the divide
between foreign and domestic affairs); a participation gap (i.e. the gap
between traditional intergovernmental cooperation and the emergence of
new global actors, i.e. civil society and the private sector); and an
incentive gap (i.e. the difference between various types of agreements
and possible policy options). All three impede international cooperation
and cause the under-provision of global public goods.
They argue that closing the three identified policy gaps requires a
review of the fundamental principles of policy making in order to move
beyond mere crisis prevention and management. A new approach is
17 Kaul and others (1999).
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therefore required, which recognises that the dividing line between
internal and external affairs has become blurred with globalisation.
Some policy options are recommended. As to the closing of the
jurisdictional gap it is suggested that governments should assume full
responsibility for the cross-border effects their citizens generate. In other
words, the principle of “internalising externalities” should be applied to
international spill over. This would strengthen the capacity of states to
cope with global interdependence. National policy must therefore be
closely linked to international cooperation. This can be done through
strengthening regional cooperation, establishing national externality
profiles and facilitating externality exchanges. The sharing of
responsibility is important for the provision of global public goods
across local, regional, national and global levels. This calls for actual
multi-level governance.18
The closing of the participation gap concerns the horizontal
distribution of opportunities among various actors, i.e. governments,
people, civil society and business, to contribute to the provision,
consumption and priority setting of public goods. Effective cooperation
requires the equitable representation of all affected parties to obtain a
fair provision of global public goods. Fairness and legitimacy can be
built into the process by creating tripartite forums including
governments, civil society and business that foster global multi-actor
governance in international organisations. The world is already moving
towards the fuller involvement of civil society and business in
intergovernmental processes and international organisations. Still a
more systematic approach to the representation of civil society and
business in intergovernmental forums is urgently needed. In summary,
enhancing participation in the decision-making, the provision and
consumption of global public goods is critical to ensuring equity in
international policy-making. Of particular importance is the building of
new mechanisms to close the incentive gap by helping states to
internalise the externalities they produce.
18 Marks, G., Structural policy and Multi-level governance in the EC, in A. Cafruny and
G. Rosenthal (ed.), The State of the European Community: The Maastricht Debate
and Beyond, Boulder, 1993, p. 391-411; Hooghe, L. and G.Marks, Unraveling the
Central State, but how? Types of Multi-Level Governance, in Political Sciences
Series 87, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria, March 2003; H.
Enderlein, S. Wälts and M. Zűrn, Handbook on Multi-level Governance, Cheltenham,
UK: Edward Elgar, 2010.
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3. Global public goods and the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs)
In this perspective, the MDGs are an ambitious, international
initiative. Their attainment calls for the focusing of our efforts and the
using of available resources as efficiently as possible. This requires an
adequate mix of national goods and global public goods as well as a fair
structure of the public domain that offers human development
opportunities to all (See Figure 3). However, as previously stated, some
global public goods are either severely underprovided or badly
provided, with distorted results on the global scene. The under-provision
of global public goods is not an abstract problem. The security of states,
the prosperity of economies, human development and the health of
people and the planet all depend on the effective supply of global public
goods. Enhancing the provision of these goods could be a decisive, cost-
effective and politically attractive step towards meeting the MDGs.
Global public goods whose provision is critical to the realisation of
the MDGs are: preventing the emergence and spread of infectious
disease; tackling climate change; establishing international financial
stability; developing a fair and just international trading system;
achieving peace and security; and the generation and dissemination of
knowledge. Clearly, there is ample scope for reshaping and
complementing the present international regimes in order to better align
them with the intentions of the MDGs and avoiding a zero-sum game.
Various incentives to initiate corrective action have been proposed.
Global and international inequity has assumed increasingly explosive
dimensions. The MDGs themselves are an expression of the fact that the
world now realises that the current policy course is in many respects
unsustainable and needs correction. This is not only because extreme
poverty is perceived as unethical or immoral but because it generates
direct externalities such as the risk of failing states, exacerbated political
turmoil and conflict, the spread of communicable diseases, or the
interruption of commerce and investment flows. Although all nations
and many actors would benefit from achieving the MDGs, the problem
of freeriding, or at least easyriding, in the needed collective action and
their financing is very present. In fact, enhancing the provision of the
global public goods could have important redistributive effects and
significantly improve economic growth and human development
prospects. It certainly would be an important step towards the realisation
of the MDGs.
Against this background, the Office of Development Studies has
proposed a number of specific policy options to enhance the current
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provision status of some global public goods.19 Among the priority
actions to be considered are the following: eliminating agricultural price
and trade distortion in industrial countries; creating an independent
Advisory Council for efficient knowledge management; streamlining
and complementing the current international financial structure;
differentiating systematically between the various international
cooperation agendas, devising an efficient and fair international system
to address global environment challenges; creating a body within the
context of the United Nations to reflect on global trends and to suggest a
balancing of global priorities; and strengthening the voice and
negotiating capacity of developing countries. Many of the suggested
corrective steps are of a regulatory, non-financial type: they would not
require high investments; in fact, they would be relatively low-cost. It is
said that such a rechannelling of resources might be more politically
feasible than a direct transferring of resources.
An examination of the MDGs through the lens of a public goods
approach reflects the embeddedness of the goals in the Millennium
Declaration. It shows the links between peace, the environment, trade
and finance, governance and human development. Ultimately, it is only
through policy coherence across these various issue areas, nationally and
internationally, that the development aspirations of the international
community can be realised: attainment of the MDGs within the context
of participatory, sustainable development, as well as peace and security
for all. Achieving human development and human security requires both
building on and going beyond the MDGs, by undertaking efforts to
address the full range of critical and pervasive threats facing people.
Conclusion
This chapter explored the possibilities of applying the widened
concept of public goods to human development, human security and
human rights. It takes into account the globalising reality and the
inherent global challenges. Global policy challenges are growing in
current international relations and many domestic policy issues cannot
be solved by individual states. This has changed the traditional scope of
national sovereignty and requires more international cooperation, multi-
level governance mechanisms and new policy tools. We argued that a
global public goods approach contributes to a better analysis of global
policy challenges, including human development, and may recommend
strategies for true global policy-making.
19 Office of Development Studies, Global Public Goods: A Key to Achieving the
Millennium Development Goals, New York, October 2003, 19 p.
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The expanded definition of public goods (i.e. public goods have a
special potential for being public if they have non-excludable benefits,
non-rival benefits or both; goods are de facto public if they are non-
exclusive and available for all to consume) recognises the changing
context and the new realities caused by increasing globalisation. It was
said that the novel nature of many of these goods implies different
policy choices and approaches to make the goods private in the sense of
being exclusive, or public in the sense of being non-exclusive. These
conclusions are even more urgent with the expansion in scope and actors
of the international public domain, requiring policy choice and
international cooperation in support of global public goods provision. A
decision-making and provision process for global public goods should
therefore be more participatory and “bottom up” in nature. The typology
of global public goods according to the nature of publicness (i.e. global
natural commons, global human-made commons and global policy
outcomes) illustrates the need for an increasing international cooperation
as an integral part of their provision path.
The response of the international community to the rising importance
of cross-border issues and activities has so far been rather limited,
incomplete and biased. The expanded agenda of international
cooperation faces new challenges, which require new policy approaches
and additional resources for international cooperation. We distinguished
three categories of global public goods provision (i.e. public goods can
be overused, underused and undersupplied) and identified three major
policy weaknesses in international cooperation that undermine the
provision of the redefined concept of global public goods (i.e. a
jurisdictional gap, a participation gap and an incentive gap). It was
argued that the closing of these policy gaps requires a review of the
fundamental principles of policy-making and an approach that
recognises that the dividing line between internal and external affairs
has become blurred with globalisation. In this perspective, the
realisation of the MDGs is an ambitious embedded international
initiative, illustrating the interconnection between peace, the
environment, trade and finance, governance and human development.
Ultimately, it is only through policy coherence across these various
issue areas, nationally and internationally, that human development and





The Changing Content of European Studies:
an Interdisciplinary Perspective and Practice
Introduction
The European integration process is, to date, the world’s most
advanced post-national constellation of states. As such, it has become a
laboratory for scholars from various disciplines in studying and
developing workable models of supranational and/or global and multi-
level governance from an economic, legal, political or historical
perspective.
The Study of the European integration process shows a development
from a (neo) functional, utilitarian and largely economic project to a
more complex, mixed and unique political undertaking, set in a
globalising context, today based on the institutional structure of the
Treaty of Lisbon and characterised by an emerging European citizenship
(i.e. a common citizenship applying to many nationalities and covering a
multiplicity of identities) and the development of a transnational
democracy. The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) has broken down the linear
perspective between nationality, identity and citizenship and has
established an economic, political and legal framework for a broader
and deeper study and research of the European integration process. The
contents, opportunities and challenges of this process have been studied
from various disciplinary approaches, illustrated by the Jean Monnet
Programme in the development of European integration Studies.1
1 The Jean Monnet programme aims to stimulate teaching, research and reflection in
the field of European integration studies at the level of higher education institutions
within and outside of the European Community. Launched in 1989, the programme is
now present in 72 countries throughout the world. Between 1990 and 2011, the Jean
Monnet Programme has helped to set up approximately 3,700 projects in the field of
European integration studies, including 165 Jean Monnet European Centres of
Excellence, 879 Chairs and 2,139 permanent courses and European modules. Since
2007 the Jean Monnet Programme has formed part of the new Lifelong Learning
Programme 2007-2013; further information available at http://eacea.ec.europa.
eu/llp/jean_monnet/jean_monnet_en.php
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I. Contextual Points of Departure
Trends and developments in European studies are set and should be
understood within the current framework of interlocking crises and
radical transformation of European societies. These crises cover various
sectors and dimensions of society and challenge the place, role, content
and future of European studies.
– Globalised economics: The present economic crisis, linked to a
seemingly irreversible globalisation, threatens livelihoods and welfare
state models, and undermines both internal and external solidarity as
states struggle to protect themselves. Social inequalities widen between
and within states, as unemployment rises sharply in some countries, and
as youth unemployment becomes so devastating as to threaten the
wellbeing of an entire generation. In this way, the financial and
economic crisis has become a social and societal crisis.
– The environment: Many European regions and cities encourage
environmental protection such as recycling and waste-management
schemes, reclamation projects for polluted land and waters, the
promotion of long-life electrical appliances, the inclusion of
environmental studies in school curricula, etc. Yet despite its urgency
and its potentially massive impact, the general crisis of the environment,
and the specific crisis of climate change, receives far less political
emphasis than the economic and financial crisis. Growth is proclaimed
everywhere as the primary remedy for the economic crisis: but growth,
even “sustainable growth” is a problematic objective in the face of the
environmental crisis.
– Citizenship and belonging: The governments of single states are
struggling to meet global challenges that far surpass their capacity for
governance. People move across state borders, creating a truly
multicultural society. Yet trust is not readily transferred from national to
transnational bodies. Euroscepticism has expanded beyond supposed
“nationalist” groups to touch large numbers of ordinary people, who are
unconvinced of the value of the European project
– Focus on rights and responsibilities: The defence and promotion of
human rights lies at the heart of our sense of citizenship. By definition,
authentic human rights (civil and political, social and economic) can
never legitimately be set aside. Yet the existence of rights in no way
assures the quality of political participation. An exclusively rights-based
approach would fail to recognise the realities and the demands of
affiliation, communal loyalties and solidarity. From the European
perspective, a narrowly rights-driven approach to citizenship has
sometimes conceived the EU primarily as a tool to realise individual and
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national rights claims, whilst scarcely contributing to the European
project.
– Education: Education systems transmit and shape the value
systems of the societies in which they are embedded. European
education, at all levels from primary schools to institutions of lifelong
learning, now faces the critical challenge of reflecting and guiding the
manifest plurality present among European cultures. Education should
prepare people of different backgrounds and of varying talents for a life
together. Yet many European education systems, at all levels, have
increasingly embodied an overriding concern with specifically economic
performance. This emphasis affects both the objects of study (a
preference for scientific, legal, and economic subjects rather than for the
traditional “humanities”) and the methods of pedagogy and assessment.
These intersecting challenges require a response from all spheres of
European society, and also from the field of European studies. The
ongoing and radical process of transformation of European societies
needs a proper contextualisation of European studies within the
globalising, europeanising, regionalising and localising aspects of
transformation. Questions about identity, citizenship, borders, economic,
financial and fiscal governance, interconnecting institutional and legal
levels, foreign relations, and human security, are in need of proper
teaching, reflection and analysis.
Reasons for revisiting the role of European studies concern: 1) The
EU’s role in the world is rooted in its very existence, as an emerging
form of multilateral governance of national and local diversities within
an interconnecting legal framework. This implies a focus on the state of
affairs of EU/Europe’s role in the world, on the European dimension of
the globalisation process, more particularly on the European integration
process in managing institutional, political, legal, societal and cultural
diversity; and 2) The intersecting challenges shape the learning content,
levels and competences of European studies in a globalising context.
In Chapter 5 we identified three major overlapping characteristics
and trends of the changing international context and the growing
complexities of the broad field of international relations, particularly
European studies. These contextual issues (i.e. a changing international
setting shaped by a globalisation process characterised by a multilateral
and multipolar world, a weakening position of the EU/Europe as a
global actor and the EU as a reference model) have an important impact
on the changing content of European studies in relation to its
programmes, competences, methodologies, pedagogies, etc., in
summary, in relation to its curriculum building in context and content.
In short, the place of European studies in international relations has
changed throughout the years from a separate study area to a more
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integral cross-cutting thematic area approach, recognising different
levels and methods of learning about European specificity.
II. Conceptual Guidelines for Strengthening, Deepening
and Widening European Studies
European studies should be based on a certain idea of Europe that is
beyond mere information. Europe is a multi-faceted and multi-
dimensional space exhibiting multiple characteristics. They have to be
understood and translated within the globalisation context that often
produces changing and paradoxical realities. These realities have an
impact on current European identity, citizenship and solidarity building,
the relations between Eastern, Central and Western European countries
as well as on the widening gap between North and South. Therefore it is
important for the future of European studies to clearly affirm the value
premises of Europe as a community in dealing with the welfare and
wellbeing (current and future) of its citizens.
1) Europe as a Community of Destiny: The process of European
civilisation has led to an increasing interdependence between and
complexity of the interactions and relations that shape our common
destiny in a globalising world. The maintenance of peace, the
conservation of the environment, and the means of enabling people to
live their lives with dignity all demand common policies. Unifying
Europe in diversity is the response to past sufferings and the challenges
faced by history. All Europeans are called upon to work responsibly
together to build a peaceful European order. The concrete realities of
every day life however, illustrate a growing tension and differentiation
amongst member and non-member states as to the role, responsibility
and finality of Europe within the global context.
2) Europe as a Community of Values: The aim of European
integration and inclusion is to carry out, test, develop and safeguard the
community of shared values. These are rooted in common legal
principles, acknowledging the freedom of individuals and social
responsibility. Fundamental European values are based on human
dignity, tolerance, humanity and fraternity. Building on its historical
roots in classical antiquity and Christianity, Europe further developed
these values during the course of history, which finally led to the
development of democracy, the recognition of fundamental and human
rights and the rule of law, which is now enshrined in binding legal
frameworks. The great currents of culture and art, scientific discoveries
and their application for the common good, as well as the critical
analysis of accepted views and perceptions created an area of freedom,
justice and democracy.
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These principles for international relations have opened the way to a
free and peaceful future. However, Europe has repeatedly called these
values into question, causing conflicts and wars. Therefore, in the name
of preserving collective memory, intellectual, cultural and artistic built
and non-built heritages need to be cherished and protected in treaties,
programmes and projects. Potential conflicts can then be overcome
through the European dialogues framework, peace-building and non-
conflict initiatives, reciprocal understanding and mutual learning
processes, thereby stimulating a sense of common purpose and an
awareness of a shared European identity. European identity requires the
free exchange of persons and ideas, and finds its expression in the
common protection of our values. The 1950 Convention for Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the EC Charter of Fundamental
Social Rights of 1989, the creation of European Union citizenship by the
Treaty of Maastricht and the European Charter of Human Rights,
constitute important steps towards consolidating a European community
of shared values. The promotion of European citizenship, however,
should be conceived as part of global citizenship. A truly good
European citizen, assimilating multiple identities, is therefore a good
global citizen within cosmopolitan thought.
3) Europe as a Community of Life: In order for the European Union
to become a citizens’ Europe it must develop into a tangible, living
community. To that end, citizens must be given the opportunity to
participate more fully in the process of European integration. A unified
Europe implies further developing European citizenship to the point at
which all citizens in all member states have the same rights and duties.
The democratic and federal structures must therefore be strengthened
and individual decision-making procedures and policies made more
transparent. All citizens must be informed of important proposals for
reforms at an early stage, and be involved in the public debate.
Therefore, a cultural and education policy-fostering European
identity is necessary for the Union and its member states. While drawing
attention to common roots and values, as well as to Europe’s diversity,
the aims must be to develop a spirit of tolerance, dialogue and mutual
learning towards other people and cultures, to convince all citizens of
the European idea, and to enable them to play their part in the process of
European integration. This should be favoured at formal, informal and
non-formal levels of learning,
4) Europe as an Economic and Social Community: The first steps
towards this were taken when six countries founded the European Coal
and Steel Community, in which basic industries important for the
conduct of war were placed under a common authority. This neo-
functional approach resulted in the European Economic Community,
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and eventually the European Union, in a process that led to peace
between the member states and a higher standard of living.
The driving force behind European integration was economic,
though it has become clear that achievement in this field alone is
insufficient for the development of a European identity. It implies that
the social objectives of the economy must be identifiable. Therefore, a
social community is an essential aspect of European identity and would
lead – for reasons of internal and external solidarity – to sustainably
cohesive societies. European governance on economic, fiscal, and
environmental issues has become central to Europe’s responsibilities in
the present confusing times.
5) Europe as a Community of Purpose and Responsibility: In today’s
globalising and individualising world, the European Union carries a
particular responsibility. The European continent has close economic,
political and cultural ties with many regions of the world, set in various
cooperation agreements. Conflicts and crises, whether within or beyond
our continent, threaten all European states and citizens alike. Only
through cooperation, solidarity and unity can Europe effectively help to
solve world problems. Discord in European policies would be
irresponsible and can only lead to chaos.
Global responsibility has various dimensions. It means responsible
cooperation in conflict prevention and mediation within the scope of the
common foreign and security policy, neighbourhood and development
policy. However, it also includes conducting trade and ecological
negotiations with other regions of the world in a fair and helpful
manner. In accordance with its values and its policy of peaceful
integration, the European Union should set an example, in particular in
relation to upholding human rights and the protection of minorities. By
this means, Europe can remain true to its own heritage.
6) Europe as a Community and Meeting Place of Multiple Identities:
Freedom, peace, human dignity, equality and social justice are Europe’s
greatest common goods. To protect and further develop these aims,
Europe needs a morally acceptable political structure and policies which
strengthen the sense of common purpose while establishing the
credibility of the European Union and making its citizens proud to be
Europeans through the building of meeting places and the recognition of
the wealth of its multiple identities. When that point has been reached,
then a stronger, added European identity will also exist. In this
perspective, the city dimension becomes more and more a space of
recognition and true citizenship building. Reality shows how individuals
are bound to territorial places to define and contextualise their identity,
within the combined global-local aspects of globalisation. Cities have
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become laboratories of conviviality and living together with all the
problems and opportunities multicultural societies offer.
7) Europe as a Community of Multicultural Learning: In order to
build up a common European identity as an added value, a common
background and future is needed, which takes into account the specific
multilayered and diversified institutional and cultural European context.
This however implies enough sharing to create a multicultural learning
space that supports integration and human integral development.
Although a legal framework exists in which education/learning is set in
the European context, there is still the problem of a lack of information
about the principles and practices of Europe, as well as there being only
limited, basic knowledge of the European space and environment. These
problems seem paradoxical when the living reality of daily experience
refers to an unaware Europeanness, which could increase awareness of a
European citizenship and the multi-faceted identity of Europe.
III. Curriculum Impact in Teaching and Research: Good
Practice
1. The Jean Monnet Programme of the EU
The contribution of the European Jean Monnet Programme to the
development of European integration studies can be considered a very
interesting case study of curriculum building in European teaching and
research. Still its potential importance lacks visibility and content
impact in European decision-making processes. The Jean Monnet
Action was launched in 1989 to stimulate teaching, research and
reflection in the field of European integration studies at the level of
higher education institutions within and outside of the European
Community. In 2007 it has been turned into a Programme and became
part of the Lifelong Learning Programme (2007-2013).2 It developed
from a strict, limited and disciplinary focus (law, economics, history and
politics) to a much more open and multiple focus that now covers a wide
geographical reach and targets various groups. Today the programme
illustrates a greater diversity and innovation in teaching, research and
reflection on European studies.
The Jean Monnet Programme is now present in 72 countries and five
continents. Between 1990 and 2011, it has helped to set up
approximately 3,700 projects in the field of European integration
studies, including 165 Jean Monnet European Centres of Excellence,
879 Chairs and 2,139 permanent courses and European modules. The
Programme brings together a network of more than 1,500 professors,
2 http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/llp/jean_monnet/jean_monnet_en.php
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reaching audiences of 250,000 students every year. In short, the overall
Jean Monnet programme is a successful practice in teaching, researching
and reflecting on European integration, involving a wide variety of
topics and target groups. An excellent example of applied academic and
interdisciplinary work are the different Jean Monnet activities which
have been developed within the Interdepartmental Centre on Human
Rights and the Rights of people of the University of Padua for more than
a decade.
2. The Interdepartmental Centre on Human Rights and the
Rights of People of the University of Padua
The Interdepartmental Centre on Human Rights and the Rights of
Peoples, established in 1982, is the structure of the University of Padua
devoted to carrying out educational, training and research activities in
the field of human rights. Within its existing pluridisciplinary structure
and interdisciplinary approach (political science, economics,
international law, international relations, philosophy and education
sciences) the centre offers various teaching and research activities
within the University and in collaboration with local, regional, national
and international partners. Many of these activities focus on human
rights, democratic citizenship, cultural diversity and intercultural
dialogue in a European and international perspective. It has at its
disposal a good regional, national and European network in the
interdisciplinary area of intercultural dialogue, human rights and
governance. Recent developments and events in Europe and the world
have intensified the policy-oriented debate and necessitated an extended
and deepened analysis of the relation between multi-level governance,
intercultural dialogue and human rights within a European and global
perspective.
The centre operates in an interdisciplinary and proactive synergy,
within and outside university, and possesses a wide-ranging expertise in
international relations, human rights, political sciences, intercultural
dialogue and interdisciplinary studies with a focus on policy-oriented
research programmes. Since 2000 the centre has been a Jean Monnet
Centre of Excellence, which organises many teaching and research
activities as well as conferences in the area of intercultural dialogue,
human rights and multi-level governance. Its various activities benefit
today from the international networking of three Jean Monnet Chairs
and a pluridisciplinary staff, able to relate to the multidisciplinary and
multidimensional programme of the centre. On 11 April 2013 the
Interdepartmental Centre on Human Rights and the Rights of Peoples of
the University of Padua became (the) “University Centre for Human
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Rights”, implying an important added quality dimension to its academic
and international profile.
1) A Jean Monnet Transnational Research Project
In 2006-2007 the centre successfully undertook the action-oriented
interuniversity research project: “The role of intercultural dialogue in
the development of a new, plural and democratic citizenship in Europe”.
The research lasted for eighteen months, involved four universities and
more than forty researchers. The research work was carried out by four
transnational teams respectively, at the Universities of Lodz dealing
with “Intercultural dialogue and Democracy”, Panteion Athens, dealing
with “Governing a Multicultural Europe: a new Republican Approach”,
Malta, dealing with “Intercultural dialogue and EU-Mediterranean
Partnership” and Padua dealing with “Intercultural dialogue and
Human Rights, civil society and world order issues”. It was promoted by
a network of Jean Monnet Chairs, Centres of Excellence and European
Community Studies Associations, and co-financed by the European
Commission and the Region of Veneto.
This transnational research project resulted in a major publication3
that provided an important academic contribution to the European Year
of Intercultural Dialogue, 2008. It resulted in some policy
recommendations for further policy research in the specific field:
– The subject of intercultural dialogue is multi, inter and
transdisciplinary by nature and affects many themes and issues in
European societies. The current decade has witnessed a growing
enlargement of the European Union and an increasing diversity in an era
of opportunities and challenges. The EU represents more than ever an
immense richness of cultural, social and linguistic diversity. In such a
context, the shared values that hold together European societies, such as
freedom, fairness, democracy, human rights, rule of law, tolerance and
solidarity, become crucial for Europe’s future.
– Authentic intercultural dialogue in Europe has an external and
internal dimension. It is seen as a vehicle, a concrete space and place for
conviviality between citizens, based on some economic and social
prerequisites. It is also seen as a laboratory for innovative practices and
new (formal and informal) forms of democracy from the local level
upwards. Moreover, it is an actual space for building European
citizenship and for accepting multiple identities in a European context
3 Bekemans, L., M. Karasinska-Fendler, M. Mascia, A. Papisca, C. Stephanou and
P.G. Xuereb (eds.), Intercultural Dialogue and Citizenship. Translating Values into
Actions. A Common Project for Europeans and their partners, Venice: Marsilio,
March 2007, 665 p.
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that is against ignorance, intolerance and indifference. As a
consequence, the management of intercultural dialogue should be done
at all levels. Such a multi-layer approach includes trust-building
activities (and not only institutional interventions) at the school, the city,
the regional, European and international levels.
– But at the same time there was an urgent plea from the academic
world to the EU for some serious investment in applied, long term and
structured intellectual effort and research in intercultural dialogue,
intercultural communication, intercultural knowledge and intercultural
commitment, beyond rhetoric and single academic disciplines. A formal
declaration was the outcome. Its purpose was the expression of a
commitment from the academics involved in the research project to keep
the Europe of ambitions, ideas and hearts alive. That’s a political project
beyond mere economics!
As a structured follow-up to this research, in 2007 the University of
Padua created a Jean Monnet Chair on “Globalisation, Intercultural
dialogue and Inclusiveness in the EU”. It was initiated as part of the
2008 European Year of Intercultural Dialogue celebrations and has
allowed the introduction of new degree and post-degree courses at the
University and has contributed to extra-curricular training courses
outside of the University.
2) The Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence
In 2009, the University of Padua, in particular its Interdepartmental
Centre on Human Rights and the Rights of Peoples, set up the Jean
Monnet Centre “Intercultural Dialogue, Human Rights and Multi-level
Governance”. It was launched, with the support of the European
Union’s Jean Monnet Programme in light of the broad political priorities
of connecting Europe to its citizens and, in particular, following up on
the policy suggestions of the transnational research project mentioned
above. Its purpose was to strengthen and consolidate the European and
international profile of the existing curriculum of teaching and research
activities with a specific focus on capacity building and curriculum
development in the area of intercultural dialogue, human rights and
multi-level governance. It was argued that the confusing times
necessitated an extended and deepened policy-oriented analysis of the
relation between intercultural dialogue and human rights within a
European and global perspective.
The vision, mission and workings of the centre are rooted in the
“acquis” which has been gained from ongoing participation in various
Jean Monnet activities, from contributions to structural reflection on the
dialogue between cultures and peoples, activities in lifelong learning
programmes in the territory of north east Italy, as well as from the
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existing network of international cooperation. The activities and events
cover specific teaching modules, public lectures by international experts
on policy-related topics and an action-oriented research programme
focussed on the interconnecting fields of intercultural dialogue, human
rights and multi-level governance.4
Multi-level Governance and Intercultural Dialogue
In 2009 the Jean Monnet Centre launched a three-year research
project on the relation between intercultural dialogue and multi-level
governance seen from a human rights based perspective. Various
workshops were organised in the period 2010-2011. Contributions all
dealt with the broad framework of the concept, the policy approach and
the linkage between multi-level governance and intercultural dialogue,
in particular dealing with governance of intercultural dialogue,
education about intercultural dialogue and civil society participation in
intercultural dialogue. It proposed approaches to the understanding of
the complexities of current realities and of managing diversities,
oriented towards a common destiny and future. It presented, analysed
and assessed various aspects and dimensions of internal and external
political, legal and institutional dimensions of intercultural dialogue,
conceived as a fundamental and integral component of a human rights
based approach to social cohesion and human security. Finally, the
action-oriented research produced general and specific policy
recommendations and illustrated good practices.
In short, the research offered a general applied reading to policy-
oriented academics, international relations and human rights scholars,
regional, national and European institutions as well as civil society
organisations dealing with human rights, governance, education and
civil society issues. Its innovative, interdisciplinary and interconnecting
approach dealt with crucial issues and challenges that address the
European future from a human rights point of departure. In all its
diversity of contributions, ranging from scientific reflections to policy
papers and case studies, the main message of the research was clear: the
fundamental importance of governance of institutional, political and
societal diversity. This is rooted in respect for human rights, being a
cross-cutting and cross-border building block for the Europe of the
future.
A Value-driven European Future
Within the same period 2010-2011 the Jean Monnet Centre also
initiated a structured and interdisciplinary indepth analysis of culturally
4 Bekemans, L. (ed.), Intercultural Dialogue and Multi-level Governance in Europe. A
Human Rights based Approach, op. cit.
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oriented and value driven applied reflections on Europe’s future. The
research focussed on the current debate on the future of Europe, in
particular on the complexities of transforming realities, oriented towards
a common destiny of sustainable and cohesive societies in a globalised
world, i.e. the building of a European future.5
The research first provided a conceptual framework for
understanding and contextualising intercultural and interreligious
dialogue, with a focus on an indepth institutional and international law
approach. Secondly, it offered the value driven foundations of Europe,
ranging from historical, value and human rights perspectives. Thirdly, it
proposed applied reflections on the (future) perspectives of a value-
oriented Europe in the world. Its interdisciplinary and interconnecting
approach addressed crucial issues and challenges to a value based
European future. The differing contributions all referred to the
fundamental importance of a human-centric development, being the
cross-cutting and cross-border compass for the Europe of the future.
Conclusion
1. Policy impact
The knowledge society requires an indepth development of lifelong
learning, benefitting from a variety of interconnecting learning
resources. However, today’s policy towards a learning society implies a
more innovative capacity to (re) design (new) institutions of political,
economic, social and educational governance, which can respond
properly to the challenges of the multi-faceted process of globalisation.
As was said in Chapter 3 and 4, what is European can be termed by
forms of identity, practices, ways of life, means of production and types
of interaction that go beyond national, regional or disciplinary frontiers.
It is about continuous border-crossing. The intertwining of globalisation
and Europeanisation has various policy consequences and produces
different lines of thought and action that need to be taken into account in
European studies:
– The dismantling of national borders in Europe has an impact on the
European dynamic of socio-economic inequalities. The social dimension
for the European integration process has policy implications within and
beyond European borders, in particular in relation to internal and
external solidarity and a sense of belongingness.
– The Europeanisation process is initiating a historically new
positive sum game: joint solutions serve the national interest. On some
5 Bekemans, L. (ed.), A Value-Driven European Future, Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang,
2012, 242 p.
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occasions and policies the EU is sometimes better placed to solve
problems than nations or regions could possibly be by acting alone.
From a cosmopolitan perspective, this diversity (whether in languages,
economic systems, political cultures, or forms of democracy) appears
primarily as an inexhaustible source of Europe’s cosmopolitan self-
concept and not as an obstacle to integration. A cosmopolitan Europe is
first and foremost the Europe of difference of recognised particularity.
– A third line of thought and action is that Europeanisation requires a
collective memory culture that spans borders, an “Europeanisation of
perspective”. This might lead to genuine intercultural dialogue and
mutual learning, conceived as an enrichment of one’s own integral
human development.
– The fourth line is the understanding of European society as a
regional world risk society. Reference is made to the theory of reflexive
modernisation, which is characterised by three constitutive elements,
namely, the theorem of risk society, the theorem of forced
individualisation and the theorem of multidimensional globalisation.
This means that the experience and dynamics of modernity bear risks in
the sense that along with its success, modernity also contains negative
consequences. This requires policy coordination and rule setting of both
obstacles and opportunities in European and global contexts.
– The fifth concluding line concerns the understanding and shaping
of new forms of political authority that have emerged in Europe beyond
the nation-state. The management of globalisation effects, specifically
the problems related to the flows and crises of global finance and the
neglected European dimension of current socio-political developments,
requires a more courageous approach, in respect of the various levels
and actors involved in the process.
2. Renewing European Studies
How can we renew, deepen and widen European studies without in
any way abandoning the acquired excellence of the current approaches
to European studies? It is our conviction that: education institutions
should accept European lifelong learning as their collective
responsibility; governments should invest in a broad European studies
curriculum for all stages of informal, non-formal as well as formal
education; and finally that Europe should strengthen its lifelong learning
agenda to active and responsible citizenship.
Support for such a European oriented education about responsible
citizenship and multiple identities would need to consider the following
three elements: a differentiated and multi-leveled discourse; curriculum
content; and a social and cultural relevance.
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– Discourse refers to people’s internalised values and the way they
behave. A deeper understanding of how people build up a self-image
will help educators provide effective and adequate learning programmes
for those most excluded from the mainstream. Educational inclusion for
a responsible citizenship also means that different and alternative ways
of knowing and doing within our mainstream learning programmes
should be recognised.
– The development of a curriculum content in a European context
would need: i) to contextualise the curriculum building in critical,
reflexive learning experiences with the objective of understanding the
role of the self is critical to learning how to contribute actively to a
changing world; and ii) to introduce the idea of an alternative
curriculum, alongside the conventional mode of disciplinarity, as a new
mode of knowledge that is context specific, transdisciplinary, and
created and transmitted largely outside of formal learning.
– The most common method proposed for democratising the
selection and control of knowledge is through discussion and dialogue.
There is need for a critical dialogic approach to learning, which
recognises community experience as a contribution to knowledge and as
a means of understanding its social and cultural relevance to the
curriculum. This also implies recognising values outside the dominant
perspective of the education system, in particular an education on
intercultural dialogue, human rights and democratic citizenship.
Consequently, the promotion of a European oriented education on
responsible citizenship and multiple identities needs to be understood
and realised in a wider societal context of the knowledge triangle.
3. Possible trajectories
In view of Europe’s priorities within the globalising context (i.e.
connecting Europe to the citizens; increasing the EU’s visibility in the
world; pursuing reflection on intercultural dialogue; providing analysis
and guidance on economic, social and financial integration) European
studies with the support of the Jean Monnet programme, could engage
in following trajectories for deepening and widening European studies at
various learning levels.
A balanced support for launching new projects and strengthening
existing ones within a broader scope should become a priority of the
Jean Monnet Programme’s contribution to the field of European studies.
The programme has been moving from a successful phase of
introducing the European dimension to traditional university curricula to
a phase where a consolidation, strengthening and deepening of the
European dimension in teaching, research and disseminating activities
within and beyond universities has become a quality label. This would
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imply granting continuous support (financial & structural) on the basis
of content and technical criteria of good practice, distinguishing short
and long term perspectives and differentiating deepening and widening
European issues. Such an approach will certainly strengthen the
sustainability of a platform of competences and excellences in the field
of European studies. It would also mean the adoption of a more
horizontal approach for supporting transversal programmes and
cooperation networks with a focus on the added (European) value in
disciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches. Moreover, the creation of
learning and research spaces within and beyond the traditional
university landscape might be opened up to the society at large through
curricular and extra-curricular activities embedded and rooted in the
territory.
We are also convinced that a focus on a committed, balanced,
diversified and plural structure of thematic networks will certainly
strengthen the identity of the Jean Monnet brand. Recognising the
diversity of approaches but searching for synergies between chairs and
centres would imply a good mixture between: informative and formative
tasks, disciplinary and interdisciplinary networks; broad areas and
specific issues, traditional and innovative themes and approaches;
local/regional embeddedness and European dimension. In short, the Jean
Monnet Centres of Excellence are platforms and laboratories for issue-
related collaboration with different disciplines in the university and
between universities.
Possible supportive tools range from: the development of Jean
Monnet fellowships, joint degrees and Ph.D/Post-Ph.D support; the
search for synergy with other EU programmes; benefitting from the
mobilising capacity of individual Jean Monnet professors through the
national associations of professors and researchers in European
integration (ECSA); increasing internal and external visibility by using
the Jean Monnet web space as an interactive tool; setting up strategic
thematic knowledge clusters of transnational transdisciplinary
transversal research networks, involving scholars from political science,
economics, environmental studies, international affairs, international
and EU law, sociology, and history (e.g. thematic networks on
multilevel governance and international democracy, climate change,









European Security and Foreign Relations
Introduction
Since its birth in the 1950s, the European Union has been developing
its relationship with the rest of the world through a common policy on
trade, development assistance, and formal trade and cooperation
agreements with individual countries and regional groups. It has become
a global player in the changing international economic and political
landscape. Its main strategic foreign policy objectives are the building of
a stable Europe with a strong(er) voice in the world, securing its
international competitiveness through promoting global commerce and
consolidating its socio-economic model of society. In order to conduct
its external relations the EU has a complex institutional and decision-
making framework, now fully embedded in the Lisbon Treaty.
In the first section of this chapter, the EU foreign policy is
contextualised in a European and global setting, focussing on the
characteristics of its external relations, in particular the phased
development of the EU common foreign and security policy. Secondly
we assess the changes, perspectives and major elements of the EU
foreign policy in view of the Lisbon Treaty. The last section proposes an
assessment of the EU’s external relations from the human-centric
perspective, referring to the basic fundamentals of the human rights
paradigm, the cosmopolitan perspective of multi-level governance and
the global public goods approach.
I. Context: EU Foreign Policy: a European and Global
Commitment
1. Key characteristics of EU external relations
1) Developments of the acquis
The EU promotes prosperity and supports democratic values around
the world; at the same time it helps to consolidate stability and
wellbeing for the citizens within its frontiers. The process of further
integration has challenged its role on the international scene. The main
traditional components of EU external activities have been trade,
development cooperation humanitarian aid, foreign and security policy.
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The EU is a globally important trade power, still accounting for
nearly 20 % of global exports and imports and generating one quarter of
global wealth. Open trade among members of the EU has led to the
single European market with freedom of movement for people, goods,
services and capital. The Union has always taken the lead in pushing for
further trade liberalisation at the world level. Therefore trade sanctions
(e.g. removing trade preferences or limiting or freezing trade with a
partner in breach of human rights or other international standards of
behaviour) have always been tools of European foreign policy.
The EU has always been a generous provider of aid to developing
countries in various ways. Development assistance and cooperation,
originally concentrated in Africa, was extended to Asia, Latin America
and the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries in the mid-1970s.
The special trade and aid relationship between the EU and the 79
countries of the African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) group dates from the
Lomé Agreements of 1975. This relationship is being further developed
through the “economic partnership agreements” (EPA), combining EU
trade and aid in a new way. The ACP countries are encouraged to foster
economic integration with their regional neighbours as a step towards
their global integration, while more aid is focused on institution-
building and good governance. Under the EPA the development
dimension has become the cornerstone of the EU-ACP relationship.
Through its external aid programmes, managed by Europe Aid, the EU
and its member states still provide more than half of all official
development assistance and two thirds of grant aid. The primary
objective of EU development cooperation is the eradication of poverty
in the context of sustainable development, including the pursuit of The
Millennium Development Goals.
The EU began providing humanitarian aid to those in need around
the world in the 1970s. Assistance is unconditional: it does not matter
whether the disaster is natural or man-made. The aim is to get help to
the victims as quickly as possible, irrespective of their race, religion or
the political convictions of their government. The EU channels
emergency relief funding through the European Community
Humanitarian Office, its humanitarian aid department (ECHO). Since it
was set up in 1992, ECHO has been active in more than 100 countries
around the world, getting essential equipment and emergency supplies
to disaster victims as soon as possible. From its budget of more than
€700 million a year, ECHO also funds medical teams, mine-clearance
experts, transport and communications, food aid and logistical support.
As a mixture of intergovernmental and supranational institutional
cooperation and decision-making, the EU serves as a model for
cooperation and integration between countries in other regions. It tries to
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develop its internal and external relations in a dialogues framework,
focussing on a strategy of soft power. It is now a world partner in a
globalising context, engaged in various regional areas, regional
groupings and partnerships and multilateral relations.1 With the latest
treaties the Union has created a more pro-active foreign and security
policy with the capacity to carry out crisis-management and
peacekeeping missions within Europe and far beyond. In today’s
complex world, the EU has now added new tools to the traditional
instruments of foreign policy in responding to global challenges that are
in need of governance of global solutions.2
2) A dynamic management of the EU’s external relations
The Union’s external relations have developed slowly over the years
from a trade and development-oriented (economic dominated) external
policy to an emerging, more integrated common foreign and security
policy. It has widened its scope within a limited institutional framework.
Various aspects of an emerging EU external policy can be distinguished.
The need to develop its external relations sprang essentially from
two sources. Firstly, as the original six EC countries removed internal
trade barriers between them, they had to handle their trade relations with
outside countries as a shared responsibility. This gave rise to the
common commercial policy, being the key component of the EU’s
relations with the rest of the world. The EU’s common trade policy has
operated at two levels: within the World Trade Organisation (WTO), it
is actively involved in setting the rules for the multilateral system of
international trade and secondly, the Union negotiates its own bilateral
trade agreements with countries and regions. Secondly, the EU’s
agreements with its partners around the globe go beyond trade and
traditional development assistance. They cover support for economic
reforms, health and education, infrastructure programmes and in some
cases cooperation in areas like research and development and
environmental policy. They also provide a framework for discussing
political issues like democracy and human rights.
Another element of the strengthening of the EU’s external relations
has been the development of a coherent neighbourhood policy by
moving to consolidate relations with neighbouring countries to the east
and south. Under the driving force of the former EC president, Romano
Prodi, the EU launched its European neighbourhood policy (ENP) in
1 The EU is now advisory or full member of the UN, OECD, Council of Europe,
WEU, NATO, WTO, G7/G8, G10, G20, IMF, World Bank, European Bank for
Reconstruction & Development.
2 See Chapter 7 on Global Public Goods and Human Development.
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2004. This covers all the Mediterranean and East European countries
plus the Caucasus, but not Russia. The ENP aims to bring about
privileged economic and political relationships between the Union and
each neighbouring country. The ENP underwent major changes in 2010-
2011 due to the creation of the European External Action Service
(EEAS), which was focused more on promoting deep and sustainable
democratic practices, accompanied by inclusive economic development.
Prior to the EEAS’s creation, DG Relex in the commission dealt with
the EU’s neighbourhood policy from a non-political and technical
perspective. Recently, the ENP is becoming more “political” as
illustrated by the European Commission’s regular progress reports
covering all sixteen ENP countries. The shift to the EEAS can be seen
as one explanation for a stronger political emphasis. The recent reports
reflect a European agenda for good governance and democratic reform
in its neighbourhood. They are therefore inherently politicised as the
agenda reflects European values and interests.
However it was the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 that gave a major new
dimension to the EU’s external relations, by developing a more
structured common foreign and security policy (CFSP). It established
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European
Union.
2. Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
1) A phased development from political cooperation to a CFSP
Progress over the years has been slow, but steady. For most of the
post Second World War period, Europe’s security was guaranteed in
close cooperation with the US, and NATO was the predominant self-
defence institution. With the end of the Cold War, the picture has
changed.
The first step was an ambitious but unsuccessful attempt in the early
1950s to create a European Defence Community among the six
founding members of the EU. Then came a process called “European
political cooperation”, launched in 1970, which sought to coordinate the
positions of member states on foreign policy issues. EU countries
produced joint statements whenever they could. But on particularly
sensitive issues, it was not always possible to reach the required
unanimous decision. In the last 20 years, the Union has intensified
efforts to play an international political and security role more in line
with its economic status. The conflicts that erupted in Europe after the
fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 convinced EU leaders of the need for
effective joint action. The fight against international terrorism has
strengthened this conviction. The present global and financial crisis has
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put these action-driven common goals under continuous and severe
tension.
The principle of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was
formalised in 1992 with the Treaty of Maastricht. It defined the types of
diplomatic and political activities the EU could undertake in conflict
prevention and resolution. Five main objectives were identified: to
safeguard the common values and fundamental interests of the EU; to
strengthen the security of the Union; to preserve peace and international
security in accordance with the UN Charter; to promote international
cooperation; and the development of democracy and the rule of law, and
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Only a few months
later, war broke out in former Yugoslavia. The EU tried unsuccessfully
to broker a political solution to the crisis. As the EU had no military
force of its own, its member countries could only intervene as part of
UN and NATO forces.
2) European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)
In the light of the Balkan wars, and of conflicts in Africa in the
1990s, the EU launched its European Security and Defence Policy
(ESDP) within the overall framework of the CFSP. The Treaty of
Amsterdam (1997) provided a limited upgrading of the CFSP. It spells
out the objective “to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways” as
one of the five fundamental objectives of the CFSP. This treaty
incorporated the Western European Union’s “Petersberg tasks”
(humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat
forces in crisis management, including peacemaking) into the treaty on
the EU. This laid the treaty basis for the operative development of the
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).
The ESDP completed and thus strengthened the EU’s external ability
to act through the development of civilian and military capabilities for
international conflict prevention and crisis management. As regards
military capabilities, the EU set up a force of up to 60,000 personnel,
deployed within 60 days, to sustain it on the ground for at least one year,
for the purposes of humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, and
crisis management, including peacemaking. At the European Council in
Lisbon in June 2000, the EU member states launched the civilian
dimension of the ESDP. They established four priority fields of civilian
action: police, strengthening the rule of law, strengthening civilian
administration and civil protection. In 2003, the EU deployed its first
external mission under the ESDP with a military force to the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Since then, it has instigated more
than 20 civilian and military missions and operations on three
continents.
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An important decision in terms of improving the effectiveness and
profile of the CFSP was the creation of the office of High
Representative for CFSP (1999) whose role it was to coordinate EU
foreign policy and, in conjunction with the rotating presidency, speak on
behalf of the EU in agreed foreign policy matters. This post combines
three functions: the EU’s representative for the CFSP, the President of
the Foreign Affairs Council and a Vice-President of the Commission. At
the moment, this post is held by Catherine Ashton.
3) European Security Strategy: a doctrine for Europe
At a summit meeting in December 2003, EU leaders adopted the EU
Security Strategy (2003) and the subsequent report on implementation
(2008). The EU established a strategic approach and set clear objectives
for advancing its security interests based on core European values. The
strategy takes into account key concerns such as: proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, regional conflicts and problems
related to state failure, including organised crime. It recognised that
citizens in Europe and elsewhere face potential threats from terrorism,
the spread of weapons of mass destruction and illegal immigration. It
was said that each kind of threat needs an appropriate response, often
requiring international cooperation. The European Security Strategy was
set in a document entitled “A more secure Europe in a better world”.3 It
assesses the security environment in which the EU operates in terms of
global challenges and key threats; it sets out the EU’s strategic
objectives through a policy of conflict prevention and responding to
complex problems with various solutions: response to challenges;
security at its borders and an international order based on
multilateralism; and draws up the policy implications for a Europe that
has to become more active, more capable and more coherent.
4) Assessment
A common security and defence policy has been a European
ambition ever since the aborted 1954 plan for a European Defence
Community. However, the legal basis for such a policy was only laid
down with the adoption in 1993 of the Treaty on European Union,
which first established a common foreign and security policy, and
speaks of “the progressive framing of a common defence policy which
might lead to a common defence”. Since the ratification of the
Amsterdam Treaty, and spurred by external events such as the Kosovo
crisis, an ESDP has developed rapidly. Following decisions taken by the
EU leaders at the Helsinki and Nice European Councils in December
1999 and in December 2000, new and tailor-made structures in the
3 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/QC780 9568EN C.pdf
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military and political areas have been set up in Brussels to enable
decision-making in crisis situations. Attempts have been made over the
years to streamline the way CFSP decisions are taken. But key decisions
still require a unanimous vote, which was hard when there were 15 EU
members and is even more difficult with 27. Despite their commitment
to the CFSP, member governments sometimes find it hard to change
their own national policy in the name of EU solidarity. Still a few first
conclusions can be made assessing the past security and foreign
relations aspects of the EU within the globalising context.
Firstly, the EU has adopted a wider concept of security. The fact that
security is becoming a wider concept reflects developments underway
since at least the energy crisis of the early 1970s. This evolution clearly
accelerated after the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, traditionally,
security has been analysed and managed from state and alliance
perspectives. Now, the geographical relevance of security issues has
widened to include both subnational and global levels. Similarly, the
scope has widened from the purely military to include broader political,
economic, social and environmental aspects. In 2004, the study group on
Europe’s security capabilities proposed A Human Security Doctrine for
Europe.4 This calls for a comprehensive understanding and (new) legal
framework of the internal/external security landscape from an EU
perspective, implying a conception of the EU as a norms-promoter.
Secondly, global and regional coordination efforts have increased
during the last decade. The awareness of an increasing fragmentation of
security efforts has resulted in a series of efforts to a large extent
undertaken by the international community to achieve coordination on a
global level, through the United Nations, on a transatlantic level through
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and in Eurasia, through the
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
Thirdly, the very existence of the EU has its origins in a peace
project seeking to overcome historical divisions between France and
Germany. Particularly after the Cold War, enlargement, both for the EU,
the candidate countries and their neighbours, has been viewed as being
part of an overall security endeavour on the European continent.
Fourthly, the institutional and legal framework for the governance of
all the various programmes in the Union varies considerably. Within the
EU the main focus for overall coordination is the European
Council, which gives strategic direction to EU security policy on the
basis of proposals from both the Council and Commission.
4 A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, Barcelona Report of the Study Group on
Europe’s Security Capabilities, September 2004.
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Finally, the link between EU internal and external aspects of security
is becoming more and more obvious. There are many security-related
components developed in several EU programmes. They may not relate
specifically to CFSP/ESDP, but are relevant to the internal security of
the Union and for cooperation with partners outside the EU. Relevant
policy areas in this field include: security of supply and energy stock
reserves, the Single European Sky, protection of critical infrastructure,
air transport and aircraft security.
II. The Lisbon Treaty and the EU Foreign Policy: Changes
and Perspectives
1. Global context
The complexities of the globalising world and various acute policy
dilemmas challenge the pursuit of the five EU foreign policy objectives
(the encouragement of regional cooperation, the advancement of human
rights, the promotion of democracy and good governance, the
prevention of violent conflicts and the fight against international crime,
including terrorism). The world has increasingly become globalised and
interdependent. There is a permanent tense interaction between the
global trends (i.e. global politics, global economy and global culture)
and global threats (i.e. economic and social inequality,5 environmental
degradation, climate change and global warming6 and organised crime
and terrorism). A new multi-polar world is emerging, where power is
more diffuse, international dynamics more complex and management of
global goods and bads the major challenge. It is within this context that
the EU has to face up the world’s dramatic transformations and develop
its foreign policy. The thematic priorities refer to enhanced EU
credibility in conflict prevention, crisis management and peacebuilding,
a broad comprehensive policy of fighting against terrorism, a structured
support for the International Criminal Court, a normative human rights
policy, credible security guarantees for non-proliferation and stronger
controls against arms export.
2. Institutional reforms
The Treaty of Lisbon (2008) has introduced some changes to the EU
foreign policy as to the institutional structure, the actors involved,
instruments and decision-making. One of the main objectives of the
Lisbon Treaty is to increase the coherence and the efficiency of the EU’s
5 See Human Development Reports.
6 See Human Development Report 2007/2008: Fighting climate change: human
solidarity in a divided world.
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external action. It brings the external community policies together in a
more comprehensive manner. All elements of the EU’s external action
are now covered by the same principles and objectives. These include
inter alia human rights, good governance, environmental protection and
sustainable development. What are the main provisions?
A Single Union
The Union is given a single legal personality. Before Lisbon, the
European Community and the European Union had different statutes
and did not operate using the same decision-making rules. This is one of
the main simplifications introduced by the new treaty. This innovation
has a significant impact on the Union’s external action. The Lisbon
Treaty allows the Union to act more effectively, coherently and credibly
in its relations with the rest of the world. A Union with a single legal
personality allows it to conclude international agreements and become a
member of international organisations in its own right.
The EU’s institutional framework has been adapted to the now 27
member states in general and external relations-specific terms. The
Lisbon Treaty creates an enhanced institutional architecture and offers
better opportunities for strengthened collective action. The innovations
however do not challenge the essential inter-governmental nature of
foreign and security policy decision-making. It remains a distinctive
intergovernmental regime. It proposes a reorganising of the existing
institutional framework and rationalises the EU actor competences in the
field of external affairs. The following are the main institutional
changes:
A more unitary European Union replaces the former three-pillar
structure. Under the previous approach, the European Community was
responsible mainly for the internal market and external trade relations
(the “first pillar”) while common foreign and security policy (the
“second pillar”) and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters
(the “third pillar”) were dealt with by intergovernmental cooperation
between EU member states. New provisions added to the former EC
Treaty enumerate the policy areas in which the EU has exclusive, shared
or supporting competence, together with its member states. The EU is
responsible both internally and externally for all of these areas of EU
policy, within the limits of its degree of competence, and has a single
legal personality.
A decision-making process
Although the essential intergovernmental nature of decision-making
in relation to CFSP and CSDP prevails, there are new provisions to
facilitate that process in a Union of now 28 member states. By granting
the Union a legal personality for the first time, the Lisbon Treaty
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enables it to sign treaties or international agreements. Nonetheless, the
CFSP is still governed by specific decision-making procedures.
However, it facilitates decision-making procedures by allowing for a
qualified majority in some CFSP-related issues (e.g. the “passerelle”
provision, constructive abstention).
The procedure has been simplified and made more democratic in
order to enhance the EU’s ability to act. Qualified majority voting in the
Council of the EU has been extended to many new areas of policy. The
general use of the co-decision procedure with the European Parliament
makes decisions even more legitimate. Qualified majority voting, which
is becoming the rule, has been redefined. It is based on the principle of
double majority: in order to be adopted, Council decisions need the
support of 55% of the member states, representing 65% of the European
population. At least four member states are needed to form a blocking
minority. This system will enter into force in November 2014. The
number of areas in which the Council of the European Union decides by
qualified majority has been extended to around 40 new policy fields,
including police and judicial cooperation. The risk of stalemates is thus
to be decreased.
The current system for the weighting of votes continues to apply
until 1 November 2014. During a transitional period until 31 March
2017, it is still be possible for a member state to request that the system
of weighting under the current treaty be applied. Lastly, these
arrangements are complemented by a mechanism that allows a group of
member states with less than the required blocking minority to suspend
decision-making for a limited period. In certain cases, decisions
continue to be taken unanimously. This is the case for defence and tax
matters in particular.
The Lisbon Treaty also brings the co-decision procedure into general
use, thus giving the European Parliament the power to legislate jointly
on an equal footing with the European Council. By way of this
procedure, the decision-making of the European Union is based on the
double legitimacy of citizens and member states.
Strengthening the role of the European Parliament and National
Parliaments
The European Parliament and the national parliaments see their roles
reinforced in the context of European decision-making. The European
Parliament becomes the co-equal legislator with the European Council
in almost all policy areas. Thus, the legislative process of co-decision is
substantially extended and becomes the standard legislative procedure.
It is extended to new policy fields, such as the areas of freedom, security
and justice. This innovation reinforces the legislative power of the
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European Parliament. The European Parliament’s powers are also
stepped up in the area of the budget (i.e. approval of the multiannual
financial framework, co-decision arrangement for laying down all
obligatory and non-obligatory expenditure) and in the adoption of
international agreements. The Lisbon Treaty creates a direct link
between the results of elections to the European Parliament and the
choice by the European Council of the candidate for President of the
Commission. The voting system in the council will become simpler and
better reflect the relative size of a member state’s population within the
EU. After a phase-in period from 2014 to 2017, a decision can be
approved if voted for by council members representing 55% of member
states, accounting for 65% of the EU’s population, i.e. a double majority
rule is introduced.
For the first time in the history of the European treaties, the national
parliaments are directly involved in the European decision-making
process. This reinforces the democratic legitimacy of the Union’s
decision-making. The Lisbon Treaty clearly lays down the rights and
obligations of the national parliaments in the context of the European
Union, including those relating to information, the monitoring of
subsidiarity, the evaluation mechanisms in the area of freedom, security
and justice, and the revision of the treaties.
The national parliaments will check whether European legislative
proposals are in line with the subsidiarity principle. Using an early
warning system, any national parliament is able to send reasoned
opinion to the European institutions within eight weeks of
communication of a European legislative proposal, explaining the
reasons why it considers that the proposal is not in line with the
principle of subsidiarity. If this reasoned opinion represents at least a
third of the votes attributed to the national parliaments, the drafter of the
proposal (usually the European Commission) will have to re-examine
the text, and will then have to decide whether to retain, amend or
withdraw it. If the legislative proposal is contested by a simple majority
of votes attributed to the national parliaments and the European
Commission decides to retain it nevertheless, a specific procedure will
be launched. The European Commission has to argue, in a reasoned
opinion, why it considers that the principle of subsidiarity has been
respected. This will be brought to the attention of the legislator together
with the reasoned opinions of the national parliaments. The legislator
may then decide not to pursue the legislative procedure.
An expanded jurisdiction of the European Courts is also important.
The European Court of Justice now has jurisdiction over all areas of EU
activity, with the exception of foreign and security policy. Notably, this
extends the European Court’s jurisdiction to the police and judicial
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cooperation in criminal matters. National courts and tribunals will be
able to refer questions relating to immigration, asylum, internal security
and criminal law to the European Court. Acting unanimously, the
European Council can further expand the European Court’s jurisdiction
to disputes arising under treaties that establish European intellectual
property rights.
Institutional changes
The European Council has become a separate institution, headed by a
president who is elected for two and a half years, renewable once. This
permanent Presidency of the European Council is intended to lend
greater consistency and continuity to the Union’s actions and to increase
its visibility. The President is responsible for ensuring the preparation
and continuity of work, and for achieving a consensus. The European
Council President also represents the Union on the world stage in
matters relating to the common foreign and security policy (CFSP). This
replaces the current system of a rotating presidency every six months
among the EU Heads of State. Former Belgian Prime Minister Herman
Van Rompuy was appointed the first President of the European Council,
for a two and a half year term, renewable once; his second mandate
expires at the end of 2014. This new position has given better visibility
and stability in “the preparation and the continuity of the work of the
European Council” and the external representation of the Union on the
CFSP, certainly in the management of the ongoing financial and
economic crisis.
The creation of the post of High Representative of the Union for
Foreign and Security Policy is one of the major institutional innovations
of the Lisbon Treaty. The combined post of High Representative of the
EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and External Relations
Commissioner, currently held by Catherine Ashton, reinforces the
visibility of the institutional actors involved in EU foreign affairs.
Essentially, the purpose is to achieve greater coherence across the first
and second pillars within the EU, combining the roles of the High
Representative for CFSP in the Council and the Commissioner for
External Relations in the Commission. This new expanded role for the
High Representative has not only an increased role within the European
Council, but also becomes a Vice-President of the Commission. It chairs
the new External Relations Council, represents the EU externally,
ensures consistency of the EU external policies, and is responsible for
coordination of all external relations policies. The High Representative
is assisted by the creation of a European External Action Service
(EEAS), a diplomatic corps that has the objective of developing a
genuinely European foreign policy. It was launched on December 1st
2010. The EEAS comprises of staff from the European Commission,
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European Council secretariat and from EU member states. In short, it
seeks to streamline the EU external services by combining all those
involved in foreign affairs. Article 27(3) TEU constitutes the legal basis
for the European Council decision on the organisation and functioning
of the EEAS.
Clarification of competences
A complex institutional design is set up to confine powers and
competences for the European Commission and the European
Parliament in the sensitive area of CSFP: “the provisions covering the
Common Foreign and Security Policy do not give new powers to the
Commission to initiate decisions nor do they increase the role of the
European Parliament”. Whereas the rotating presidency-in-office
chaired all meetings of the General Affairs and External Relations
Council, under the Lisbon Treaty, the council is split up into an External
Relations Council chaired by the new High Representative, and the
General Affairs Council, which continues to be chaired by the rotating
presidency-in-office. Nevertheless, the European Parliament acquires a
degree of additional democratic control over the new High
Representative in her role as a commissioner. Through its creation of a
new High Representative, the Lisbon Treaty has elevated the European
Commission’s voice in CFSP. However, the European Commission no
longer has the right to submit proposals to the European Council.
The definition of the European Union’s competences clarifies its
relations with its member states. The European Union has at its disposal
only those competences expressly conferred on it by its member states
(the principle of conferral of competences). The Lisbon Treaty clarifies
and categorises them as described below.
– Exclusive competences. In the following fields in particular, the
Union is the only party with the power to act on behalf of all its member
states: the customs union, the establishment of competition rules
necessary for the functioning of the internal market, the monetary policy
of the Euro area, the common commercial policy and the conservation
of fishery resources.
– Shared competences. Here, the Union intervenes to support the
action of its member states in the following areas in particular: the
internal market, social policy, agriculture, consumer protection, the
environment, transport, energy, and the area of freedom, security and
justice.
– Competence to take supporting, coordinating or complementary
action. Here, member states have a wide freedom of action and have
primary responsibility. The Union acts only to coordinate or
complement the action undertaken by member states. This is the case,
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for example, in the fields of health, sport, civil protection, industry,
tourism, education and culture. It should be noted that the European
Council takes decisions unanimously in the fields of culture, social
services, education and health.
The Lisbon Treaty maintains a certain degree of flexibility, which is
one of the keys of the Union’s success. It allows the Union to take
action where this is necessary to achieve one of its objectives, even if
the treaties have not specifically provided for powers to that effect. In
such cases, the European Council has to make decisions unanimously
with the approval of the European Parliament.
Enhanced cooperation
Enhanced cooperation allows a group of member states to act
together in the context of the Union. The Union is able to act without all
member states necessarily participating. This mechanism allows the
interests of all member states to be respected. The Lisbon Treaty retains
the possibility of enhanced cooperation in specific policy fields and
facilitates the implementation of this mechanism. This form of
cooperation improves the Union’s ability to act by permitting at least
nine member states to move forward without the others, while leaving
open the possibility for others to join in at a later stage. In this way, the
EU can act without all 27 member states having to participate. At the
same time, it allows member states to remain outside any enhanced
cooperation initiative which they do not wish to join, without stopping
other member states from acting together.
3. The Common Security and Defence Policy
The Lisbon Treaty stipulates more clearly that the EU’s competence
in matters of common foreign and security policy covers all areas of
foreign policy. Member states can make available to the Union the civil
and military capability necessary to implement the common security and
defence policy. Unanimity remains the rule as far as decisions on
defence issues are concerned. If a member state is the victim of armed
aggression on its territory, other member states have the obligation to
provide it with aid and assistance using all the means in their power, in
accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This does not
prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of
certain member states.
Member states have developed their defence policies and instruments
outside the EU treaties, and defence remains a very sensitive topic –
touching on national sovereignty and opening up questions about
transatlantic relations, for example. Although the Lisbon Treaty does not
address these fundamental issues, it does nonetheless attempt to align
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the law with the practices in those areas where member states can agree.
Hence, the Lisbon Treaty now better reflects the nature of ESDP
missions, by extending the scope of the so-called Petersberg tasks to:
“joint disarmament operations; military advice and assistance task,
peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation; conflict prevention and
post-conflict stabilization missions”. It also contributes to combating
terrorism “in supporting third countries in their territories”. The
European Defence Agency (EDA), created in July 2004, is inserted
within the legal framework of the CSDP, thereby seemingly reinforcing
the leading role that member states want to assign it in pushing forward
the development of EU operational capabilities and the EU as a military
actor on the international scene. The Lisbon Treaty also institutionalises
the implementation of a mission by a group of member states that are
“willing and have the necessary capability for such a task” on behalf of
the Union and “entrusted” by the European Council.
The mutual defence clause and the solidarity clause are important
innovations that promote the principles on which the EU is based i.e.
solidarity with, and assistance to, other member states. It binds all
member states to provide aid and assistance “by all means in their
power” in the event of another member state becoming a victim of
armed aggression, without prejudicing the neutrality or relationship to
NATO that some member states may enjoy. The solidarity clause
represents a new legal mechanism of assistance between member states
when one of them is the victim of a terrorist attack, natural or man-made
disaster. The EU will mobilise all the instruments at its disposal,
including military resources made available by member states, to assist.
This is in addition to the new provision on civil protection.
In order to allow Europe to fully play its role in the interests of
peace, the new treaty extends the Union’s powers in the area of defence
to include among its tasks those of humanitarian and evacuation
missions, peacekeeping operations and the stabilisation of post-conflict
zones. The Lisbon Treaty creates the possibility of enhanced
cooperation between those Member States with the necessary military
capacity and that wish to cooperate more fully in the area of defence.
These member states can establish a permanent structured system of
cooperation in the context of the Union. The Lisbon Treaty extends the
scope of “enhanced cooperation” to the defence and security field by
encouraging permanent structured cooperation among willing and
capable states. The introduction of such flexibility measures provides
alternatives to the intergovernmental system and is a major innovation.
However, one of the points against this new mechanism is that it might
create a two-speed Europe excluding the smaller countries that may
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have the will but not the human or financial resources to achieve the
stated objectives.
All questions relating to the Union’s security might lead to a
European vision of collective defence and a new European Security
Model, in which internal and external security is perceived as a
transnational public good. It presents key innovations specific to the
defence field. CSDP (formerly called ESDP) has its own section within
the Lisbon Treaty and is symbolically upgraded from an European to a
Common Security and Defence Policy (while still being within CFSP).
If this change indicates a greater willingness by member states to
develop a military arm of the EU, it does not push it towards a more
integrationist approach.
4. The EU External Trade Policy
The Lisbon Treaty introduces three main changes to its external trade
policy or what is usually termed as Common Commercial Policy. First,
the EU trade policy becomes an integral part of overall EU external
action and its relations with third countries. This implies that the EU in
formulating its trade policy not only considers the economic
liberalisation agenda, but has to take into account other objectives. The
treaty may therefore provide a basis for the use of conditionality in trade
policy, and lead to a politicisation of trade policy, something that is not
always welcomed by EU’s trading partners.
Secondly, to increase the democratic accountability of the EU trade
policy, the Lisbon Treaty gives more power to the European Parliament
in scrutinising trade policy. The EU legislation for implementing trade
policies now has co-decision power by the European Council and the
European Parliament; the European Commission has to report regularly
to the Special Committee of the European Parliament on the progress of
trade negotiations, and more importantly, the European Parliament must
now give consent before a trade agreement can be adopted. However,
the power to engage in trade negotiations still belongs exclusively to the
European Council. This implies that the EU’s trading partners have to
watch the European Parliament more closely when dealing with the EU
on trade issues. It is also important that the enhanced role of the
European Parliament increases the possibility of having non-economic
objectives such as human rights and social standards issues being
included in trade agreements. The increased role given to the European
Parliament in the EU trade policy may therefore contribute to increased
politicisation of future trade negotiations leading to uncertainties and
possible delays in getting a trade agreement through.
Finally, the system of allocation of competences in the area of EU
trade policy is clarified and contributes to a streamlining of the trade
European Security and Foreign Relations
189
policy. Before the Lisbon Treaty, the allocation of competences between
the European Community and member states was complex and difficult
to comprehend. Trade in goods was an exclusive European competence.
With the Lisbon Treaty, trade in goods and services, commercial aspects
of intellectual property and foreign direct investment will now all fall
under the exclusive competence of the European Union.
5. Development cooperation
The treaty identifies development cooperation as an independent
policy area with EU competency providing the principal framework for
the EU’s relations with all developing countries. (Art 208 TEU). It sets
out the eradication of poverty as the principal objective of this policy.
Humanitarian affairs is included in the treaty for the first time (Art. 214
TEU). This requires ensuring the integrity of EU development policy.
Such an integration in general EU external action favours the
management of development cooperation as a public good at the
European and global level. This of course has some institutional
consequences.
Currently the EU’s development cooperation with developing
countries is managed by three directorates (i.e. DG Development
covering development policy and relations with countries from the
Africa Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group; DG External Affairs
responsible for cooperation with developing countries in Asia and Latin
America, as well as those covered by the European Neighbourhood
Partnership Instrument; and Europe Aid that is charged with
implementation of the EU’s development assistance). The treaty clearly
makes development policy the principal framework for the EU’s
cooperation with all developing countries, and it is important that the
single development service is given the capacity and status to pursue
these interests.
6. Humanitarian Aid
One innovative aspect of the Lisbon Treaty is the specific legal basis
given to humanitarian assistance and the possibility of creating a
European voluntary humanitarian aid corps. Sustainable development
becomes one of the main objectives of the Union in its relations with the
rest of the world. The EU’s humanitarian assistance is based on the
principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, made
explicit in the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. As such, the
Commission’s European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO)
distributes humanitarian aid without political agenda, and seeks to help
those in the greatest need, irrespective of their nationality, religion,
gender, ethnic origin or political affiliation.
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As such, ECHO is a clear expression of European solidarity with
people in need all around the world. In its 20 year existence it has
provided €14 billion of humanitarian assistance to victims of conflict
and disasters in 140 countries around the globe. Over the last five years
ECHO’s annual budget has averaged €1 billion. In 2011 alone these
funds reached nearly 150 million of the world’s most vulnerable people
in over 80 countries. In 2004 ECHO became the Directorate-General for
Humanitarian Aid before integrating Civil Protection in 2010 for a
better coordination and disaster response inside and outside Europe.
Humanitarian intervention is always controversial, especially if it
involves the use of repressive measures, be it through military means or
sanctions. The human security approach undoubtedly provides an
interesting blueprint for the EU to improve coherence in its external
action, as it is better suited to translate the Union’s founding principles
(and its inherent emphasis on non-military conflict resolution) into
policy practice. At the same time though, political considerations remain
relevant, as demonstrated by the analysis of the EU’s involvement in
four human rights crises (Darfur, Zimbabwe, Gaza and Lebanon). In
order to strengthen its credibility and consistency as a humanitarian
actor, the EU should prioritise the protection of civilians, avoid double
standards at all costs, and favour genuine multilateralism, which
requires a real involvement of all parties. In this regard, therefore, the
EU should refrain from posing “take it or leave it” conditions and
recognise that real multilateralism might well lead to non-optimal
outcomes for the EU’s interests. Very close to the EU’s humanitarian
assistance is the EU’s concern for human rights.
III. A Human-centric Assessment
The impact of the Treaty of Lisbon provisions on the EU foreign and
security policy can be assessed, using the building blocks of the human-
centric approach to sustainable statehood, i.e. the human rights
paradigm, the cosmopolitan perspective and the public goods focus7 as
reference points. The Lisbon Treaty strengthens citizen’s rights from the
human rights perspective, renews the democratic fundamentals of the
European Union in a globalising world and introduces a greater concern
for the public good.
1. Human rights and citizenship
The European Union sees human rights as universal and indivisible.
It actively promotes and defends them both within its borders and when
engaging in relations with non-EU countries. Human rights, democracy
7 See Chapter 5.
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and the rule of law are the core values of the European Union.
Embedded in its founding treaty, they were reinforced when the EU
adopted the Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2000, and strengthened
still further when the charter became legally binding with the entry into
force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. Article 21 of the Treaty on European
Union reaffirmed the EU’s determination to promote human rights and
democracy through all its external actions. It implies that countries
seeking to join the EU must respect human rights. Furthermore, all trade
and cooperation agreements with third countries contain a clause
stipulating that human rights are an essential element in relations
between the parties. In other words, human rights have become an
explicit EU foreign policy objective.
The Union’s human rights policy encompasses civil, political,
economic, social and cultural rights. It also seeks to promote the rights
of women, of children, of those persons belonging to minorities, and of
displaced persons. With a budget of €1.1 billion between 2007 and
2013, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights8
supports non-governmental organisations. In particular it supports those
promoting human rights, democracy and the rule of law; abolishing the
death penalty; combating torture; and fighting racism and other forms of
discrimination.
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
The Treaty of Lisbon recognises the rights, freedoms and principles
set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights.9 Whilst signifying
progress in the defence of the fundamental rights of European citizens,
the charter gives no new powers to the Union. Even though the Charter
of Fundamental Rights is not part of the current European treaties, the
Lisbon Treaty makes it legally binding. It is a highly symbolic
document with a list of rights that every person should enjoy. In the
context of the Union’s law and competences, the charter provides
further guarantees and rights as well as additional freedoms to European
citizens.
The charter provides for new rights in addition to those enshrined by
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR):10 the protection of
personal data, the right to asylum, equality before the law and non-
discrimination, equality between men and women, the rights of children
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and elderly people and important social rights, such as protection against
unfair dismissal, access to social security and social assistance. Other
rights, already provided for in the ECHR, see their scope extended: the
right to education, the right to a fair trial. The Court of Justice of the
European Union enforces compliance with the charter where it is legally
binding. However, a protocol restricts its application in the United
Kingdom and Poland.
Citizens’ rights: freedom, security and justice
The Lisbon Treaty represents a step forward in protecting citizens’
rights. It confirms existing ones and introduces new rights, as well as
mechanisms to ensure that these rights are respected within the Union.
The principle of the democratic equality of its citizens is enshrined,
which means that all citizens enjoy the same degree of attention from
the institutions, bodies and organisations of the Union. The principle of
participatory democracy complements the principle of representative
democracy. This means that dialogue with the representative
associations and civil society, churches and philosophical and secular
organisations is regular, open and transparent. The Lisbon Treaty
establishes the principle of citizens’ initiatives. This allows at least one
million people from a significant number of member states to petition
the European Commission to submit to the European Parliament and to
the European Council a legislative proposal which they consider to be
necessary for the implementation of the objectives of the treaties. In the
context of the right of access to information, citizens and national
parliaments are able to see the decisions taken by their government.
The aim of the Lisbon Treaty is to establish an area of freedom,
security and justice with respect for the fundamental rights and
freedoms of its citizens. It ensures the free movement of citizens whilst
guaranteeing a high level of security. It strengthens the means of
preventing and combating crime and terrorism. The concept of an area
of freedom, security and justice is present in the current treaties.
However, the Lisbon Treaty moves this area forward in that virtually all
important issues are subject to qualified majority voting and co-decision
between the European Parliament and the European Council. The
Union’s undertaking to develop a joint immigration policy is confirmed.
A consistent approach to immigration allows migration flows to be
effectively managed, taking into account the economic and demographic
development taking place in Europe. A common asylum system will be
developed, with a standard asylum status and standard procedures for
persons from third world countries needing international protection.
Whilst ensuring that persons are allowed to cross its internal borders
without checks, the Union puts in place an integrated system for the
management of its external borders.
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2. Cosmopolitan perspective of EU foreign relations
The EU in the world
The EU has to defend its interests in a changing world order.
Defending responsible interdependence requires in turn a world where
the major players support and agree to work within a system of
multilateral governance. Therefore, the Union needs to become a much
more assertive player on the international scene. From increasing
Europe’s economic competitiveness to advancing in the knowledge
society and providing its citizens with freedom and security, the
challenges at stake are global. It needs to become a driving force in
shaping new rules of global governance. The Lisbon Treaty reinforces
the principles on which the Union’s action is based: democracy, the rule
of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human
dignity and the principles of equality and solidarity.
The reinforcement of actors involved in EU foreign affairs might
help to develop an EU approach to global governance reform. The
creation of the position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign
and Security Policy might lend greater consistency to the Union’s
external action and increase its visibility worldwide. The High
Representative has access to an external action service. This service
makes for a more effective implementation of the policies of the Union
and its member states. The President of the European Council represents
the Union at the international level on issues associated with the
common foreign and security policy.
European citizenship
The Lisbon Treaty reinforces the principle according to which any
person holding the nationality of a member state is a citizen of the
European Union. Citizenship of the Union complements and does not
replace national citizenship. The Lisbon Treaty clearly states the rights
arising from citizenship of the Union: the right to move and reside
freely; the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the
European Parliament and in municipal elections; the right to diplomatic
and consular protection; the right to submit a petition to the European
Parliament and to appeal to the Ombudsman; and the right to write to
the institutions in one of the languages of the Union and to receive a
reply in the same language. The formalised European dimension to
citizenship favours a more cosmopolitan perspective on the
globalisation vs Europeanisation debate. This will be further explored in
Chapter 12.
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3. Global/European public goods and social democracy
Democratic values
The Lisbon Treaty defines explicitly and clearly the values on which
the Union is founded. These values must be respected by all member
states. The Treaty of Lisbon lists the values on which the Union is
founded: respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the
rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons
belonging to minorities. These values are common to all member states
in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice,
solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.
These common values must be respected by all member states.
Respect for them is a condition sine qua non for any European country
wishing to join the European Union. As in the previous treaties,
sanctions may be imposed on any member state which persistently
commits serious infringements of these values. The Union respects the
equality of member states and their national identities, including local
and regional autonomy. It also establishes the principle of protecting
Europe’s cultural and linguistic diversity. Any member state may decide
to withdraw from the European Union in accordance with its own
constitutional requirements. This is an important innovation.
Renewing Europe’s economic and social model
The Lisbon Treaty steps up the Union’s social objectives and
introduces new social concepts in European law. At the heart of the
European Community is a distinctive economic and social model,
referred to as a highly competitive social market economy. The Union
has to work towards the social dimension of sustainable development,
based on balanced economic growth, price stability and a highly
competitive social market economy, with the aim of achieving economic
and social progress. The treaty has a horizontal social clause stipulating
that, in all its policies and actions, the Union will take into account the
promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate
social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of
education, training and health protection.
The Union should therefore promote the role of the social partner at
the European level, whilst respecting their autonomy and the diversity of
the national systems. The tripartite social summit should contribute to
the dialogue on growth and employment. Although the key role of
economic services of general interest (e.g. public transport,
telecommunications, postal services, gas and electricity supply, etc.) is
recognised, the Union’s powers in this area are limited. A great deal of
room for manoeuvre is granted to the national authorities to supply,
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operate and organise services so as to respond as effectively as possible
to the needs of users. The diversity of these services, depending on
different geographical, social or cultural situations, is affirmed, and the
need to ensure a universal, high-quality service is guaranteed. However,
the Union has to refrain from any action detracting from the competence
of member states in the provision, operation and organisation of non-
commercial services of general interest (health, social services, police
and security forces, state schools, etc.).
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU expressly recognises
the right to information and consultation within firms, the right to
negotiate collective agreements and the right to strike, the right of access
to a free job placement service and protection against unfair dismissal,
the right to faired equitable working conditions, and access to social
security and social assistance. Remuneration, the right of association
and the rules for taking strike action and implementing lock-outs remain
a matter for member states.
New challenges
The EU is also facing new challenges. Global warming is one of the
main environmental, social and economic challenges facing humanity.
The Lisbon Treaty identifies measures to tackle these problems. One of
the Union’s objectives is to promote sustainable development in Europe,
based on a high-level of environmental protection and enhancement. An
innovative aspect of the treaty is the promotion, at international level, of
measures to tackle regional or global environmental problems, in
particular climate change.
Europe also has to guarantee secure, competitive and clean sources
of energy. The Lisbon Treaty clarifies and complements the rules
governing energy policy in the current treaties with a new section on
energy. There is a consensus in Europe among governments, citizens
and the business community that global warming, linked mainly to
emissions of carbon dioxide from the use of fossil fuels (i.e. coal, oil
and gas), needs immediate action on the part of the EU. The EU has
taken the international lead in seeking to limit the effects of global
warming by cutting its carbon emissions and greenhouse gas emissions.
In this area, the Union’s objective is to ensure that the energy market
functions well, in particular as regards energy supply, and to ensure
energy efficiency and energy savings as well as the development of new
and renewable energy sources. The Lisbon Treaty also establishes the
principle of solidarity in the event of difficulties in energy provision in
one or more member states. In such an event, other member states
should offer assistance, in particular if one or more countries have to
deal with a major stoppage in the provision of energy from outside the
Union.
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Conclusion
The Lisbon Treaty, through its rationalisation of the EU institutional
architecture, has dismantled the three pillar structure in order to create
more policy coherence, effectiveness and visibility. However, the
Lisbon Treaty does not challenge the essential inter-governmental nature
of foreign and security policy decision-making. The divergences
between the national policies of the now 28 member states on how best
to manage common security concerns, and their reticence in seeing their
sovereignty challenged by a supranational EU institution, are sufficient
explanations for the gradualist approach adopted in the Lisbon Treaty. It
represents an attempt by the member states to overcome the impasse
caused by the failure of the Constitutional Treaty. It is hardly
revolutionary. Instead it aims to create an enhanced institutional
architecture and to offer better opportunities for strengthened collective
action – leaving the door open for the member states to go further if they
so wish.
Last but not least, the Lisbon Treaty provides a partial answer to the
question long attributed to former U.S. Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger: “Who do I call if I want to talk to Europe?” As of December
1st 2009, the answer is that the Secretary of State of the U.S. can phone
the High Representative of the EU – Baroness Ashton. However, if U.S.
President Barack Obama asks a similar question, the answer is not as
straightforward. In a statement following their appointment, President
Obama indicated he looked forward to working with European Council
President Van Rompuy, EU foreign policy chief Ashton and
Commission President Barroso, just illustrating that the Lisbon Treaty
has not yet eliminated difficulties in identifying the leader of the EU.
In line with the report to the European Council by the Reflection
Group on the Future of the EU 203011 (May 2010) globalisation and re-
balancing of power in the world provide an important new rationale for
joint EU action on the global scene. This requires political courage,
collective ambition, solid pragmatism and a clear sense of a community
of shared values and ideals. The Lisbon Treaty has introduced some
political and legal changes, which may be further steps towards the
developments of the EU as a global, responsible and cosmopolitan
player in the rapidly changing international political landscape.
11 Project Europe 2030, Challenges and Opportunities, A Report to the European




Globalisation vs Culture in Europe
Introduction
In this chapter, the human-centric perspective is applied to the tense
interaction between the process of globalisation and the various cultural
expressions, developments and practices in Europe. Globalisation has
brought the world closer together: distances between places have
seemingly become shorter. As a result, people interact with cultural
differences on a daily basis. In order to address some of the pressing
issues of modern day life, it is vital to be able to navigate global
networks. Therefore the importance of culture as a source of difference
and demarcation should be examined within the context of globalisation.
In the first part, the concepts and policy implications of the ongoing
globalisation vs culture debate are briefly explained.1 The second part




Globalisation is a phenomenon and a process, which presents many
faces, multiple voices and different interpretations with diversifying,
often dramatic impacts on persons, cultures and societies.2 It cannot be
reduced to a mere economic expression of growing interdependence and
international agreements in an exclusively market-oriented and
competitive environment. It is to be understood and analysed as a
multidimensional phenomenon involving diverse domains of activity
and interaction across borders and across continents, including the
1 Bekemans, L., Culture vs globalisation in Europe: actual tension or possible
dialogue?, in L. Anckaert, D. Cassimon and H. Opdebeeck (eds.), Building Towers.
Perspectives on Globalisation, Leuven: Peeters, Oct. 2002, pp. 191-211; and ibid.,
Globalisation and Solidarity: Europe’s duty in intercultural dialogue, in Intercultural
Dialogue, European Commission DG EAC/ Jean Monnet Action, March 2002,
pp. 152-168.
2 Anckaert, L., D. Cassimon and H. Opdebeeck (eds.), op. cit.; Beck, U., What is
globalisation?, op. cit.; Giddens, A., Europe in the global Age, op. cit.; Stiglitz, J.,
Making Globalisation Work, op. cit.
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economic, political, socio-cultural, technological, ethical, environmental
and personal domains.
Globalisation is a complex and selective phenomenon with varying
effects. Globalisation offers opportunities and dangers. The world at
large is experiencing the effects of multi-faceted globalisation with
varying degrees of impact on cultures and peoples. In Western and non-
Western societies, seemingly contradictory tensions appear (modernisa-
tion vs indigenisation, universalism vs particularism, homogeneity
vs heterogeneity, unity vs diversity).
Globalisation is also a cultural phenomenon with profound
implications on the daily life of society. If there is economic
globalisation there is also cultural globalisation, often implying a
cultural imperialism of the West. It manifests a double paradoxical
reality: on the one hand, it favours a greater capacity for
communication, mobility and exchange on the international scale,
whereas on the other hand, it creates a real danger of homogenisation
and commodification, flat individualisation and increasing seculari-
sation. Dangers are related to the globalising culture industries which
are detaching people from their historically developed local, religious
moral and societal reference frameworks and to the individualisation
and commodification of values and human relations which lead to a
creative destruction of solidarity ties and to societies only unified by
commercial or contractual agreements.
In other words, the driving forces of the ongoing globalisation
process (i.e. technological progress and liberalising of cross-border
capital flows, the dominance of market forces) produce challenges,
threats and social drawbacks, strain solidarity ties between and within
countries and create a cultural (anti-global) backlash. Phenomena such
as religious fanaticism, ethnic nationalism/cleansing, racism, terrorism,
economic, social and cultural poverty, hunger, immigration, social
exclusion, underdevelopment, ignorance, environment, etc. shape
international relations and dominate the international policy agenda.
In short, globalisation is a selective phenomenon and process with
varying interpretations as to its impact on culture (optimistic vs
pessimistic view). While globalisation has increased cultural assertivity
and participation for some, the lack of understanding or respect for
cultural differences by others has however led to distrust and
confrontation between cultures and reinforced tensions in multi-ethnic
societies.
2. Culture
The question of how to define what we mean exactly when we talk
about “culture” is not easy. There are so many different approaches and
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convictions that the answer does not appear to be a question of concept
and knowledge, but rather a question of feeling and belonging. It is
therefore proposed that culture should be considered as that mixture of
values, norms and traditions that affects as much the moral dimension of
life as the taste and vision of things. This follows the consensus
embodied in UNESCO’s 1982 Mexico City Declaration on Cultural
Policies.3 It defined culture as the “whole complex of distinctive
spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that characterise
a society or social group including not only the arts and letters, but also
modes of life, the fundamental rights of the human being, value systems,
traditions and beliefs”. This has the merit of neither adopting an
excessively restrictive definition of culture nor focusing on a particular
aspect (e.g. religion) in order to define a culture.
In today’s globalising world, most human societies no longer live in
isolated territories, so their cultures are no longer the specificity of a
given society limited by closed boundaries. We live in contact with each
other, more or less intensively, and therefore other cultures are part of
our daily life. This is the result not only of increased migration flows,
but also of modern technologies, which have transformed
communication systems and rebuilt relationships. Various cultural
interactions have become a way of living in today’s world. Indeed, it
becomes important in order to avoid conflict and even war to understand
that others do not see their world as we see our own, do not follow the
same values when judging similar situations, or do not use the same
criteria as our own to identify themselves as different. The Council of
Europe’s White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue (2008)4 claimed two
distinct approaches to defining the way that different cultures relate to
each other and manage cultural diversity: multiculturalism and
interculturalism.
Multiculturalism relates to a policy approach which recognises
various and diverse cultures within a society: it indicates that different
cultures exist and may interact within a given space and social
organisation. A multitude of expressions always implies diversity but is
still perceived as a unity. Multiculturalism suggests therefore that
human beings are able to merge diversity of cultures within one society
on the same territory and that the remaining existing differences can be
considered as a richness for all without being denied or eliminated.
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what we are and what we believe, but also what individual human
beings are able to build together.
Interculturalism, on the other hand, presents itself as a dynamic
policy approach that believes and affirms that cultures should be
recognised for what they are, as different and separated as the social
groups to which they belong. It endorses and encourages respectful and
open interaction between and among individuals and groups from
different cultural backgrounds, and it recognises the opportunities of
various cultures within a given society and space. The important goal is
to mutually benefit from intercultural encounters, while respecting each
other’s diversity, which in turn can help to promote tolerance and
understanding, prevent conflicts and enhance social cohesion.
Regardless of the academic debate on this distinction, it is obvious
that these two approaches are not the result of factual observations of
reality, but rather modes of defining what could be the most desirable
attitudes and policies to face the “fact of multiplicity”. However, it is
argued here that it is the way people approach and define the diversity of
cultures in a given society which determines the nature of that diversity,
and not the reality itself. It implies that the existing multiplicity needs to
be understood from an “intercultural” point of view, recognising that we
should move from a multicultural to an intercultural reality.
Therefore we propose an anthropological definition of culture along
the line of the Mexican anthropologist Rodolfo Stavenhagen,5
distinguishing culture as heritage, creativity and way of life. In this
perspective he makes a very useful distinction between culture as
capital, as creativity and as a total way of life: culture as capital is made
up of the accumulated manifestations of intellectual and artistic
creativity, past and present; culture as creativity is the process of artistic,
intellectual and scientific creation; and culture as way of life is a source
of values, social energy, inspiration and ways of living together.
In other words, culture is defined as a system of shared beliefs,
values, customs, behaviour and artefacts that members of society use to
cope with their world and with one another and that are transmitted from
generation to generation through learning. Culture, then, in its broadest
sense is cultivated behaviour, i.e. the totality of a person’s learned and
5 Stavenhagen, R., Cultural rights: a social science perspective, in Culture rights and
wrongs, Paris, UNESCO, 1998. Rodolfo Stavenhagen is a Mexican sociologist. He is
a professor-researcher at El Colegio de México and former Deputy Director General
of UNESCO. In 2001 he was appointed by the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights the first United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of the
human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people.
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accumulated experience, which is socially transmitted – or more briefly
behaviour through social learning.
In policy-driven terms, it means that we need to distinguish three
aspects of culture in the globalising context: i) conservation: culture as
an asset, tangible or intangible and a carrier of local identity; ii)
production: culture as a commodity which needs to be re-produced not
only to reconstitute cultural capital but also as a source of economic
development insofar it is embedded in production processes; and iii)
valorisation: culture as a set of norms and capacities which enrich
communities and are used as bridge builders and carriers of good
relations for social and economic exchange. A dynamic and interactive
process between these three aspects of culture implies not only a
peaceful co-existence of different cultures within society but also a
mutually influencing and open dialogue between cultures. Moreover,
such a conceptual shift from multicultural co-existence to intercultural
dialogue may avoid the trap of cultural relativism and provide the basis
for true living together.
This also applies to European culture, which is not a mythical or
untouchable concept but rather an ongoing interaction of distinctive
historical, spiritual, intellectual, material and emotional features and
attitudes. These features are expressed in language, images, sounds,
symbols, lifestyles, etc. illustrating the pluriformity and richness of
European societies. These diversified but shared cultural expressions
finally make up Europe’s social, cultural and human capital. Therefore,
the embeddedness of culture in society implies introducing historical,
social and ethical considerations into our analysis.6
Culture is in the first place a source of inspiration for social
integration and socio-economic development. It certainly can give an
impulse to greater commitment of the citizen to the European project.
Culture can be integrated in the economy and polity, not as a marginal
factor, but as an intrinsic added value in the societal development.
Cultural multiplicity and diversity is also a source of wealth and
strength. No culture is left out in the European cultural mosaic. Europe
is pre-eminently a space of cultural diversity, but respect for cultural
diversity does not justify a mere nationalistic or regional
reflex/behaviour. The respect and stimulation of cultural diversity may
guarantee further European integration and a renewed cooperation with
other cultures.
It is only very recently that this cultural and paradigmatic divide
between economy, society and culture has been questioned in relation to
6 Bekemans, L. (ed.), Culture Building Stone for Europe 2002, Brussels: European
Interuniversity Press, 1994, 331 p.
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its underlying assumptions as well as to policy relevance. Certainly in
present times the Atlantic (Western) tradition seems to be increasingly
criticised for its a-historical and purely analytical and monetised focus.
However, our value systems are increasingly confronted with specific
cultural expressions of society that escape rational and quantifiable
analysis. Culture, also in business economics, becomes again a shaping
factor and added value in the societal process of creativity, institution-
building and market exchange. We sense a change from culture as mere
material artefacts to culture as a process of shaping values, patterns and
expressions of the human spirit.
Within the European context, culture has been the permanent thorn
between increasing market integration and maintenance of cultural
diversity. Cultural diversity is also applied to the external dimension of
common European action. This is seen as a contribution to a world order
based on sustainable development, peaceful co-existence and dialogue
between cultures.
We are also experiencing a progressive confirmation of cultural
diversity at the international level7 (e.g. G8, the Council of Europe with
its Declaration on cultural diversity of December 2000, the UNESCO
Universal Declaration and Action Plan dealing with the protection of
cultural diversity, etc.) They all illustrate a growing concern for the
maintenance of cultural diversity as a common heritage, promotion of
living cultures and creative capacity. Often this concern is integrated
with global strategies on sustainable development.
In today’s world, the present situation illustrates the need for new
approaches and new types of understanding and managing cultural
diversity. Cultural differences are more and more seen as a treat for
economic and social stability, although they are often an enrichment of
one’s own culture. The fundamental question here is how we can solve
these opportunities and contradictions peacefully and humanly.
3. Policy implication of the globalisation vs culture debate
In order to deal responsively with this double impact, cultural
differences should be accepted and respected on the basis of a common
pattern of values without the domination of a-priori superiority of a
certain culture and with a mutual respect for differences. Such a
common horizon should be based on universalistic values, but with
respect for applied diversification. This requires a more “compassionate
7 UNDP, Human Development Report 2004: Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse
World, New York, Oxford University Press, 2005; World Commission on Culture
and Development, Our Creative Diversity, Paris, UNESCO Publishing, 1996.
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globalisation”8 or “un humanisme cosmopolite”9 against any cultural
relativism.
There is a need for governance structures (policies, mechanisms and
resources), which create zones of common interest and commonality as
well as civilised frameworks of disagreement. These structures should
provide the common good (of economic, social and cultural welfare)
that favours solidarity and makes the opportunities and benefits of
globalisation accessible to everyone. However, the question remains: to
what extent can a common world vision based on global common goods
be developed against the twin processes of globalisation and cultural
relativism? In any case, problems of social inequalities and poverty as
well as non-accessibility to the benefits of globalisation, have taken on
dramatic proportions, not only in the economic sense, but also in the
cultural perspective. The Copenhagen seminars for social progress,
which took place between 1996 and 1999 following the UN World
Summit for Social Development in March 1995, tried to spell out an
ideology for the pursuit of the common good in a globalising world.10
We also are convinced that different cultures need to re-examine
their own realities in the context of globalisation in order to re-locate
themselves in this new reality. This implies the emergence of a global
consciousness and the acceptance of multiple identities and multiple
modernities. It implies that we take into account the existence of
different “modernities” with their own histories and stories, which need
not respond to the criteria and principles of Western modernity.
In order to re-direct the asymmetrical, unequal and contradictory
character of globalisation as regards cultural diversity, various
international organisations (UN, UNESCO, EU, etc.) on the
international scene propose a constructive dialogue between cultures and
peoples, in order to counteract the economic and political dominance
manifest in current global processes. In this context, intercultural
dialogue becomes a necessity not only for overcoming conflict but also
for rethinking and responding to the global challenges faced by
humanity.11 Henceforth, ethical discourse implies devising dialogues
between cultures able to balance unity and solidarity with tolerance and
diversity, whereby the person as individual and social being is the
guiding norm.
8 Falk, R., Realizing the Copenhagen Vision: The Political Imperative, in J. Baudot,
op. cit..
9 Plenel, E., La découverte du monde, Folio Actuel, Gallimard, 2004.
10 Baudot, J., op. cit.
11 See Chapter 12 for a further elaboration.
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Thus, between the universalistic (euphoric) rhetoric of the Western
cultural model (i.e. autonomy of the individual, mechanistic concept of
society) and the post-modern discourse of cultural relativism, some
forms of cross-cultural judgements are appropriate worldwide. In this
sense, cross-cultural moral claims are part of the intercultural dialogue,
which is, as Amitai Etzioni12 argues, a point of departure radically
different from that of the cultural relativist.
In summary, the area of culture has grown in salience in global
development issues on account of the rising share of cultural goods,
services and intellectual property in world trade as well as the threats to
cultural diversities and identities associated with contemporary
globalisation. Also there is increasing awareness that the protection and
promotion of cultural diversity is vital to universal human rights,
fundamental freedoms along with securing ecological diversity. This
standpoint is premised on the view that sustainable development is only
achievable if there is harmony and alignment between the objectives of
cultural diversity and social equity, environmental responsibility and
economic viability. In the globalising context the notion of culture
becomes the fourth pillar of sustainable development along with the
social, economic and environmental dimensions, trespassing existing
borders. As a consequence, culture should be viewed as part of the
whole social order.
II. European Cultural Practice
At the time of its foundation, the European Community was not
competent in the field of culture. Economic (and eventually political)
integration was to be achieved without standardisation or
homogenisation of cultures. The uniqueness of the European model
implied economic and political integration with the maintenance of
cultural diversity.
1. Legal aspects
With the formation of the Treaty of Maastricht, culture was for the
first time integrated into the formal competencies of the European
Community. Articles 128 (art. 151 in the Treaty of Amsterdam) and 92
(art. 87) provide the legal basis for EU support in the cultural sector.
In 1993, the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht marked the
member states’ desire to “mark a new stage in the process of European
integration”, that of “an ever closer union between the peoples of
Europe”, expressed in particular via the creation of a European
12 Etzioni, A., The new golden rule: community and morality in a democratic society,
New York: Basic Books, 1998.
Globalisation vs Culture in Europe
205
citizenship and by the granting of new powers to the European
Community, including new powers in the field of culture, with the
Treaty introducing a new article devoted to it. Cultural cooperation thus
became a recognised aim of European Community action, with an
appropriate legal basis (Article 128).
This article was included in its entirety in the Treaty of Amsterdam
(1997) (article 151), apart from paragraph 4 which was amended to read
as follows: “the Community shall take cultural aspects into account in
its actions under other provisions of this Treaty, in particular in order to
respect and to promote the diversity of its cultures”. This paragraph
calls for culture to be taken into account and for cultural diversity to be
respected in all European Community policies, in compliance with
European Community law. This is a legal obligation, and the European
Community institutions must take on board the cultural implications of
all European Community policies.
2. Programmes
1) Ad-hoc programmes
In July 1990, the European Commission published the selection
criteria and conditions for participation in the “Platform Europe”, which
became in 1991 the first Kaleidoscope programme for supporting artistic
and cultural events involving at least three member states. The
programme was reorganised from 1994 in order to support cultural
events more effectively, encourage artistic creation and cooperation in
the form of a network, to promote better public access to European
heritage and to improve artistic and cultural cooperation between
professionals. Between 1990 and 1995, more than 500 cultural projects
received European Community support.
Between 1996 and 1999, the EU launched three cultural
programmes: Kaleidoscope (1996-1999), which aimed to encourage
artistic and cultural creation and cooperation with a European
dimension; Ariane (1997-1999), which supported the field of books and
reading, including translation; and Raphaël (1997-1999), the aim of
which was to complement member states’ policies in the area of the
cultural heritage of European significance.
2) The first framework programme (2000-2006) in support of
culture
The objective of Culture 2000 was to promote a common cultural
area characterised by its cultural diversity and shared cultural heritage. It
combines the old “Raphaël”, “Kaleidoscope” and “Ariane” programmes,
and is an opportunity to implement a new approach to European
Community cultural action, by clarifying the role and the place of
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culture in meeting the great challenges now facing the European Union.
The programme identifies the broad scope of the European project,
extending it to the entirety of European society and its citizens; it
integrates the cultural dimension into other European Community
policies and recognises the role of culture as an economic factor but also
as a factor in social integration and citizenship.
The programme’s objectives are achieved by specific innovative
and/or experimental actions, integrated actions covered by structured,
multi-annual cultural cooperation agreements and special cultural events
with a European and/or international dimension. It is a single
programming and financing instrument for European Community
measures in the field of culture; only 167 million Euros have been
assigned for a five-year period. The budget clearly illustrates a
discrepancy between the plurality of policy objectives and the modest
means available on the European Community level and subsequently the
still rather symbolic value of European Community action in the cultural
field. It seeks to encourage cultural creation and mobility, access to
culture for all, the dissemination of art and culture, intercultural dialogue
and knowledge of the history of the European peoples. It also accords
culture a social integration and socio-economic development role. Three
main categories are eligible: specific annual activities, multiannual
activities forming the subject of cooperation agreements and special
cultural events such as the European Capitals of Culture. The Culture
2000 programme already presents a more structured, integrated and
outward looking approach anticipating a potentially more powerful role
of Europe in the ongoing globalisation/culture debate.
3) The new culture programme (2007-2013):“Crossing borders
connecting cultures”13
The general objective of the programme is to enhance the cultural
area common to Europeans through the development of cultural
cooperation between the creators, cultural players and cultural
institutions of the countries taking part in the programme, with a view to
encouraging the emergence of European citizenship. The specific
objectives of the programme are: to promote the transnational mobility
of people working in the cultural sector; to encourage the transnational
circulation of works and cultural and artistic products; and to encourage
intercultural dialogue.
13 http://ec.europa.eu/culture/documents/publications/doc1165_en.pdf
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3. Assessment
A certain development can be distinguished in the form of European
cultural practice. The early years of European integration were
dominated by a mainly political-rhetoric discourse. The preamble of The
Rome Treaty refers to a closer union between the European peoples,
quality of life and a guarantee of freedom and peace.
From the end of the 1960s, the plea to go beyond the mere economic
dimension was made explicit in many solemn declarations of European
summits (The Hague 1969, Paris 1972, Copenhagen 1973 and Stuttgart,
1983). This finally led to the concept of a truly European Union, which
contained not only an economic, but also a political, social and cultural
dimension and found its legal context in the Treaties of Maastricht,
Amsterdam and Nice. Terms such as “European identity and
consciousness”, “Community cultural heritage”, and “Europe of the
citizen and culture”, entered into European Community language. Still
the actual result was meagre: the adoption of a rather minimalist
approach with modest European Community action in the cultural sector
and an even smaller budget.
In reality, between the rather utopian political-rhetoric discourse and
the very limitative formalistic discourse, EU interventions in the cultural
sector did follow a more pragmatic, fragmented ad hoc policy, applying
a subtle mixture of cultural, economic and legal arguments (e.g. the
Year of Music or Film, conservation of architectural heritage, cultural
action programmes such as Ariane, Kaleidoscope and Raphaël, the
European cultural cities, etc.).
Also, a content shift in the cultural programmes of the EU can be
distinguished. The predominant objective of the cultural programme of
the EC has been focussed on the elimination of (national) obstacles
against the free flow of cultural goods and services and on the
stimulation of the free movement of “cultural operators” within the
European Community’s territory. The formal interaction of culture was
set within an economic framework, with an emphasis on the economic
dimension of the creation of a European cultural space, i.e. a common
market for cultural goods, activities and persons. Within this perspective
national and regional cultural policies were governed by market
integration rules. Possible conflicts between the open border economic
objectives and cultural policy priorities were understood in view of the
impact of integration policies on the cultural sector.
From this originally negative integration intervention by the EU, a
move was made to more positive integration activities, referring to the
economic benefits of the cultural sector through harmonisation of
legislation or the launching of European Community action
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programmes. The expansion of the legal competence of the EU in the
cultural sector was also favoured by European Community integrism in
the Court of Justice, by adjudging exceptions on the basis of cultural
considerations such as common interest, language, and cultural identity.
In fact, actual European cultural practice has always been confronted
with the ambiguous task of combining economic competence with
cultural ambitions in a strict legal framework.
The EU also changed the discourse on the legitimisation of its
cultural activities, less focus on European cultural identity and unity and
more on cultural diversity. Cultural diversity was set in an institutional
and legal context, stressing subsidiarity, autonomy of cultural policy as
well as integration with European Community policies.
In other words, the cultural objective has been formally recognised
as a European Community preoccupation, although with strong legal
procedures, a weak legal instrument and a very modest budget. In short,
a new synthesis between economic and political integration on the one
hand, and preservation of cultural diversity on the other hand is being
developed, whereby the EU will attempt to preserve the specificity of
the European model with a formal and legal anchorage of European
Community action in the cultural field. The actual challenge is therefore
the creation of a more genuine link between culture and integration in a
broader and more open context.
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CHAPTER 11
Intercultural Dialogue for Cultural Diversity
Introduction
Dialogue is a vital tool for understanding and managing diversity.
This chapter explores the opportunities and challenges of intercultural
dialogue for understanding and managing cultural diversity. It should be
clear that the prior goal of intercultural dialogue is not integration or
assimilation of individuals and groups of different cultures within a
given society, but an incentive to share universal values by/for living
and doing together whilst respecting the other. Political and civic
participation are fundamental features of inclusiveness at all levels; they
may even give rise to a new civic identity, referring to the European-
constitutional motto “united in diversity”.
In short, the EU can form the model framework for unity in diversity
within and outside the Union, so that a common sense of citizenship
based on shared responsibility for the achievement of the common good
can be elaborated through joint decision-making and joint
implementation of shared policies. Moreover, such a conceived civic
transcendent identity is perfectly consistent with the space-specific
developments of Europe, in which persons can interact peacefully in a
given territory, unhindered by physical or mental borders.
We have structured this chapter in two main parts. In the first part we
identify the general context by trying to define what we mean by
cultural diversity and what we understand by intercultural dialogue as to
its usages, practices, content, national and sector approaches. The
second part focuses on institution-building in the area of intercultural
dialogue; the intercultural dialogue practices of UNESCO/UN, the




Our cultural environment is changing quickly and becoming more
and more diversified. New cultural influences pervade virtually every
society, not only in Europe, but everywhere on the planet. Cultural
diversity is an essential condition of human society. It is caused and
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fostered by many factors such as cross-border migration; the claim of
national and other minorities to a distinct cultural identity; the cultural
effects of globalisation and the growing interdependence between all
world regions; and the advances of information and communication
media. More and more individuals are living in a “multicultural”
normality, i.e. facing the influences of different cultures in their daily
life, and have to manage their own multiple cultural affiliations.
Cultural diversity is not only a fact and a right to be protected, but
also an economic, social and political added value, which needs to be
developed and adequately managed. Protection, promotion and
maintenance of cultural diversity are factors of human development and
a manifestation of human liberty, and they are an essential requirement
for sustainable development for the benefit of present and future
generations. In summary, cultural diversity is a rich asset for individuals
and societies, which needs careful and gentle management attention.
On the other hand, increasing cultural diversity brings about new
social and political challenges. Cultural diversity often triggers fear and
rejection. Negative reactions – from stereotyping, racism, xenophobia
and intolerance to discrimination and violence – can threaten peace and
the very fabric of local and national communities. International
conflicts, the socio-economic vulnerability and marginalisation of entire
groups, and widespread cultural ignorance – including the lack of
knowledge about one’s own culture and heritage – provide fertile
ground for rejection, social exclusion, extremist reactions and conflict.
The most fundamental challenge, therefore, is that of combining
social cohesion and cultural diversity. So far, Europe has discussed this
challenge under categories like “multiculturalism” and “assimilation”.
However, there is no consensus yet on the best long-term vision for
living together peacefully in multicultural societies. It seems obvious
that the right balance between social cohesion and cultural diversity
cannot be achieved by compromising the core values that are at the very
heart of the fabric of our societies – the universal human rights and
fundamental freedoms, democracy, and the rule of law.
There are various ways to manage cultural diversity. Galtung, a
Norwegian professor of peace studies, distinguishes four ways to deal
with cultural diversity:1 Intolerance: “You are different from me, you are
dangerous”; Tolerance: “You are different from me, that is your
problem, live and let live”. Human rights have their place here; Respect
and Dialogue: “You are different from me, how fascinating! Let us sit
down and talk it over”. The other exists in its own right and is part and
1 Galtung, J., Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and
Civilization, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1996.
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source of my own enrichment. Dialogue means asking questions; and
Mutual learning: “You are different, let us learn from each other”.
2. Intercultural dialogue: an inventory of usages and practices
There is no lexicon of accepted usages surrounding the notion of
intercultural dialogue. In effect, we observe a range of practices and a
multiplicity of (coded) terms almost as diverse as the notion of culture
itself. We distinguish between current usages of the notion and
categories of intercultural practice. Both uses and categories of
intercultural dialogue are manifold and diversified.
1) Usages
“In our increasingly diverse societies, it is essential to ensure
harmonious interaction among peoples and groups with plural, varied
and dynamic cultural identities as well as their willingness to live
together”. This affirmation, drawn from the Universal Declaration on
Cultural Diversity adopted by UNESCO in 2001, is relatively
unambiguous and broadly accepted by all concerned organisations and
individuals. However, the practice and implementation thereof is plural.
The term tends to be used mainly by philosophers, cultural activists and
public officials. It is strongly normative, as a pathway towards the goal
of attaining ways of living together. It is used in at least the following
ways:
At one extreme of generality, intercultural dialogue is
interchangeable with the notion of dialogue among civilisations, the
inverse of the clash of civilisations predicted by the American political
scientist Samuel Huntington.2 Intercultural dialogue is also sometimes
simply a new term for international cooperation in general, cultural
cooperation in particular. This very general usage merges into that of a
“politically correct” euphemism for traditional cultural diplomacy on the
part of states, intergovernmental and supranational organisations.
In some current usages, intercultural dialogue is coterminous with
inter-religious dialogue. Sometimes the term is used as an alternative to
multiculturalism, in other words the recognition on the part of the public
authority (as well as society at large) of the different values, practices
and interpretative frameworks that characterise culturally diverse
societies.
Increasingly, however, intercultural dialogue is advocated as an
inherently normative and voluntaristic practice, an intercultural
2 Huntington, S., The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, A
Touchstone Book, New York: Siman & Schuster Inc, 1996.
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deontology. This has been nicely expressed by the Delors Commission3
as “learning to live together”, a process whereby developing an
understanding of others and their history, traditions and spiritual value
and, on this basis, creating a new spirit which, guided by recognition of
our growing interdependence and a common analysis of the risks and
challenges of the future, would induce people to implement common
projects or to manage inevitable conflicts in an intelligent and peaceful
way.
A final meaning of the term “intercultural dialogue” is associated
with a business-driven field of academic research, teaching and
vocational training, and refers to intercultural communication. The term
refers principally to the exchange inherent in international business,
including such diverse concerns as negotiations and communications
within multicultural organisations. It has long been part of the toolkit of
multinational corporations, who were quick to understand the challenge
of selling effectively across cultures.
2) Categories of practice
The varieties of intercultural dialogue are carried out in a number of
different frameworks. A preliminary typology of possible models can be
determined as follows: A dignitary model brings together heads of state
or governments who tend to deliberate in terms of broad abstractions (in
particular in reference to a dialogue among civilisations) and adhere to
diplomatic norms; An inter-religious dialogue model brings together
religious leaders whose subject matter is self-evident. (e.g. Assisi
meetings); A representative intellectual figure model brings together
leading academicians, journalists and opinion-leaders from different
cultures in encounters based on rational debate, inspired by the liberal
values of a shared commitment to an intercultural ethic; A transactional
model (essentially in the business world) is based on the negotiation of
diverging stakes against a backdrop of different cultural assumptions;
An epistemic community model brings together specialists in a shared
field, e.g. scientists, artists, the media, or a common age-set or category,
e.g. young people, women; A local dialogue model brings together
neighbours in a geographically defined location that is not yet
characterised by intercultural tensions; A mediation or conflict-
prevention model brings together neighbours in situations of overt
intercultural tension.
3 UNESCO, International Commission on Education for the 21st Century, Learning:
The Treasure Within, Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 1996.
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3. Intercultural dialogue: content
Definition
“Intercultural dialogue is an open and respectful exchange of views
between individuals and groups belonging to different cultures that
leads to a deeper understanding of the other’s world perception”.4 In
this definition, “open and respectful” means based on the equal value of
the partners; “exchange of views” stands for every type of interaction
that reveals cultural characteristics; “groups” stands for every type of
collective that can act through its representatives (family, community,
associations, peoples); “culture” includes everything relating to ways of
life, customs, beliefs and other things that have been passed on to us for
generations, as well as the various forms of artistic creation; “world
perception” stands for values and ways of thinking.
Dialogue between cultures is the oldest and most fundamental mode
of democratic conversation, and is an antidote to rejection and violence.
The cost of “non-dialogue” may therefore be high. Continued non-
communication, ignorance and mutual cultural isolation will lead to ever
more dangerous degrees of misunderstanding, mutual seclusion, fear,
marginalisation, and violent conflict.
Objective
In a very general sense, the objective of intercultural dialogue is to
learn to live together peacefully and constructively in a multicultural
world and to develop a sense of community and belonging. Intercultural
dialogue can also be a tool for the prevention and resolution of conflicts
through enhancing the respect for human rights, democracy and the rule
of law.
More specifically, the following goals are mentioned: to share
visions of the world, to understand and learn from those who do not see
the world in the same way as we do; to identify the differences and
similarities between different cultural traditions and perceptions; to
achieve a consensus that disputes should not be settled by violence; to
help managing cultural diversity in a democratic manner, by making the
necessary adjustments to the existing social and political arrangements
of all kinds; to bridge the divide between those who perceive diversity
as a threat, and those who see it as an enrichment; to share best practice,
particularly in the areas of intercultural dialogue, the democratic
management of social diversity and the promotion of social cohesion;
and to develop jointly new projects.
4 Council of Europe, White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue. Living together as Equals
in Dignity, 2008.
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Enabling factors
Easier than a definition is a description of the conditions – the
“enabling factors” – that characterise a true, meaningful intercultural
dialogue. Based on existing experience, one can propose at least six
crucial conditions that must be fulfilled from the very outset, or
achieved during the process: equal dignity of all participants; voluntary
engagement in dialogue; a mindset (on both sides) characterised by
openness, curiosity and commitment, and the absence of a desire to
“win” the dialogue; a readiness to look at both cultural similarities and
differences; a minimum degree of knowledge about the distinguishing
features of one’s own and the “other” culture; and the ability to find a
common language for understanding and respecting cultural differences.
In the international debate, intercultural and interreligious dialogue
are sometimes seen as two separate, though interrelated issues; whereas
others, like the Council of Europe, stress that religious beliefs and
traditions – like agnostic, atheist or secularist convictions – are one
dimension of culture. In the past, the Council of Europe has essentially
dealt with religious beliefs under two aspects: the protection of the
freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and of the freedom of
expression as laid down in the Council of Europe Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Articles 9 and
10); and the role of religious beliefs as an important cultural fact, similar
to other identity sources such as languages, history or cultural heritage.
Over recent years, religious issues have gained in importance in the
Council of Europe activities. Since 2000, the Commissioner for Human
Rights has developed a dialogue with religious communities on various
practical issues related to human rights. At the same time, the role of
religions in the context of social cohesion and mutual understanding has
been increasingly acknowledged, which has led to initiatives e.g. on the
relationship between religious diversity and intercultural education
(including the teaching of religious facts in schools), and to a general
encouragement – addressed to religious communities – to engage in
inter-religious dialogue.
Parameters
The promotion of intercultural dialogue is characterised by three
basic parameters: its value basis, its transversal nature and its different
geographical dimensions. Intercultural dialogue is neither an expression
of, nor does it lead to, cultural relativism. Dialogue must be based on the
principles of the universality and indivisibility of human rights,
democracy and the rule of law. It implies a rejection of the idea of a
clash of civilisations and expresses its conviction that, on the contrary,
increased commitment to cultural cooperation – in the broad sense of the
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term – and intercultural dialogue will benefit peace and international
stability in the long term. It is conceived as an important pillar for
sustainable development across the globe.
Secondly, the promotion of intercultural dialogue is not simply
another theme, added to the list of other existing policies. Instead, it is
conceived as a cross-sectoral, transversal approach, which influences the
agenda of virtually all other policy domains and institutions.
Finally, we distinguish three levels that are important for a coherent
policy of promoting intercultural dialogue: intercultural dialogue within
European societies, such as dialogue between majority and minority
cultures living within the same community (e.g. with a focus on
immigrant communities, various religious beliefs, national minorities);
intercultural dialogue between different cultures across national borders,
e.g. dialogue activities in international cultural policy programmes, in
cross-border exchange schemes, through international media; and
intercultural dialogue between Europe and its neighbouring regions.
4. National approaches to intercultural dialogue
Two major policy approaches are used to promote intercultural
dialogue at the national level:
1) The instrumentally integrative approach
In many EU member states, the social cohesion approach has gained
ground. It aims at a more unified society with political stability, internal
security, economic growth, and equal opportunities for all individuals
and groups, regardless of their origin, to participate in both the work
environment and social spheres. To this end, a common national
identity, related values and the use of a main national language are being
promoted and concepts or requirements in immigration/citizenship laws
and policies are developed or tightened. On the other hand, some
intercultural dialogue-related programmes or events are also part of this
approach; they often aim at supporting the socio-cultural integration of
groups or individuals with a migrant background.
This approach is found in countries, which: have ethnically diverse
communities, which are often a result of their colonial past, such as
Belgium, France or the Netherlands; have attracted, mainly during the
last decades, large numbers of migrant workers from both in and outside
of the EU, such as Austria, Denmark, Greece, Germany, Luxembourg or
Spain; or used to be part of the former Soviet Union or Yugoslavia
where certain groups with unclear legal status remain in the population,
for example: stateless people (in some of the Baltic States) or so-called
“erased people” (Slovenia).
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With reference to refugees and asylum-seekers, whose number has
been on the rise above all around the Mediterranean; social fringe
groups in the suburbs of large cities in Western Europe; or specific
minorities such as the Roma in Central, Southern and Eastern Europe,
priority is placed more on improving their basic socio-economic
conditions than on intercultural dialogue. In fact, experts or speakers
from these communities often argue that intercultural dialogue should
not be seen as a replacement for policies related to basic social needs in
housing, employment, education, health care, etc.
2) The cultural equity oriented approach
The second important approach focuses on the legal or political
recognition of defined minority cultures and identities that coexist
within a territorially defined area, be it that of a nation, region or
locality. Minorities are provided with specific rights, some of which are
accompanied by affirmative action measures in the fields of culture,
education and the media. This approach has been traditionally prevalent
in most of the Nordic countries and in the United Kingdom; it seems to
gain ground in Belgium (FL), Ireland, Lithuania, Macedonia (FYROM)
and Slovenia. For example, in Slovenia, a law defining the scope of
special rights for the Roma community was passed in 2007.
5. Sector approaches
National approaches to intercultural dialogue are to be understood in
a broader context and as a policy issue in the sectors of education,
culture, youth and sport.
1) Education: basis for understanding and respecting diversity
National policy approaches to intercultural dialogue in the education
sector range from a focus on civic education (throughout Europe) to
intercultural education (in some countries). Intercultural dialogue
activities are also found in higher education be it in specific courses or
in the context of international academic exchanges. Still, the
development of intercultural competencies and skills as part of an
overall political vision or national strategy on life-long learning
processes – starting from pre-schooling, extending into primary and
secondary education and reaching far into the different areas of
professional training and lifelong learning programmes – has yet to be
achieved.
Acquiring civic competence through education means equipping
individuals to fully participate in civic life based on knowledge of
democracy, citizenship, and civil rights. There is no common approach
to civic education across Europe or even within one country. One of the
main issues of civic education from the point of view of intercultural
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dialogue is the content of educational materials, whether for social
studies or history teaching.
Across Europe, one of the main objectives of educational policy to
promote dialogue is by providing resources for language learning. This
takes many forms. Informal intercultural learning activities are also
pursued independently of educational institutions through media
programmes, exhibitions of culture and heritage institutions, training
and employment schemes, etc., which aim at providing multiple
perspectives of the past, an understanding of the present and a
diversified vision of a common future.
2) Interculture: policies, institutional strategies and artist-led
approaches
Intercultural dialogue in the arts and related fields can take on many
different meanings, ranging from promoting formal cultural
relationships across national boundaries (i.e. cultural diplomacy) or
artist-led partnerships within Europe or internationally (i.e. cross border
cultural cooperation).
One of the main cultural policy approaches adopted to promote
intercultural dialogue within countries has been to showcase different
cultures and cultural expressions through support for one-off projects,
events and media programmes. The objective is to give visibility to
artists who are not part of the mainstream cultural landscape and as an
educative strategy to inform the public about different cultures. On the
other hand, there are many artists who reference their own cultural roots
in their work, yet want to be recognised for their artistic talents
irrespective of their ethnic background.
3) Promoting integration through sports
National approaches to promoting intercultural dialogue in the field
of sports are often challenge oriented and/or target group oriented. As
reflected in the 2007 EU White Paper on Sports,5 the major challenges
are often identified with social inclusion and empowerment of excluded
or marginalised individuals and groups; combating racism and
xenophobia; or post war reconciliation.
While it is true that sport and its informal settings can provide shared
spaces which are more interactive and face fewer barriers than in other
parts of society, there is a heavy burden placed on local and voluntary
associations to promote the social inclusion of specific target groups
such as immigrants (cultural focus), children (age group focus), Muslim
5 European Commission, White Paper on Sports, 2007. http://ec.europa.eu/sport/white-
paper/the-2007-white-paper-on-sport_en.htm
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female teenagers (gender focus). Despite all these caveats, such
approaches are prevalent in most countries.
4) Youths: a challenging generation to target
New generations of third culture kids (second and third generation
immigrants) have been growing, and youths are reported to be the
fastest growing group of mixed race in Europe; some of them feel
alienated in their present home country and are looking to a return to
their cultural roots. Multiple, hybrid identities and complexities are the
norm and will determine the process of dialogue and communication in
the future. This can be seen through many new hybrid forms of
(inter)cultural expressions being created by youths with a migration
background, particularly in pop music (e.g. hip hop in Paris or Turkish
rap in Berlin). They have also created new forms of dialogue and
intercultural links through the Internet, which is also displayed in the
escalating number of youth blogs.
II. Institutional Practices of Intercultural Dialogue
1. UN/UNESCO
The United Nations (UN) has launched many formal initiatives in the
last few decades to promote a culture of peace and a dialogue among
civilisations. It declared 2001 the United Nations Year of Dialogue
among Civilizations. In November 2001, the General Assembly adopted
the UN Global Agenda for dialogue among civilisations. Since the
adoption of the resolution, the need to promote dialogue has been
underlined by UN members and by the UN itself. “Dialogue seeks to
enable and promote the best in humanity”.6
The Alliance of Civilizations was established in 2005, at the
initiative of the Governments of Spain and Turkey, under the auspices
of the United Nations. The UN Secretary General launched the Alliance
of Civilizations initiative to improve understanding and cooperative
relations among nations and peoples across cultures and religions and to
counter the forces that fuel polarisation and extremism. A high level
group of experts was formed by former Secretary-General Kofi Annan
to explore the roots of polarisation between societies and cultures and to
6 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan wrote in 2001: “Dialogue is the oldest and most
fundamental mode of democratic conversation. It is both a specific working method
and an integral part of all other policies to manage cultural diversity today. It is an
antidote to rejection and violence. It is a tool that can be used by everybody, by every
local and regional authority, every government, every religious community, by
migrants and host societies, minorities and majorities, civil society organisations and
international bodies like the Council of Europe, in order to improve the situation”.
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recommend a practical programme of action. The group’s report
provided analysis and put forward practical recommendations that have
formed the basis for the implementation plan of the United Nations
Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC).
On April 26th, 2007, former President of Portugal, Jorge Sampaio,
was appointed High Representative for the UNAOC by Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon to lead the implementation phase of the alliance.
The UNAOC Secretariat, which is based in New York, works with a
global network of partners with states, international and regional
organisations, civil society groups, foundations, and the private sector to
improve cross-cultural relations between diverse nations and
communities. It also works at the grassroots level, promoting innovative
projects that build trust, reconciliation and mutual respect. The alliance
works in four program areas to support such projects. These areas are:
youth, media, education, and migration.
In 2011 the UNAOC launched the regional initiative “Reconciling
diversity and cohesion: a human rights model to build inclusive and
participatory societies in European countries”. It recognised that
migration and the growing mobility of people results in increased
diversity in societies, thus leading to new challenges but also to
untapped resources. Changing the narrative that most European societies
have constructed around diversity seems a necessary move in order to
start thinking of cultural diversity as an asset rather than a liability and
to make it a full advantage for democracies in the 21st century.
A wide process of consultations and hearings of a broad array of
experts, policy and opinion-makers, local actors, academics,
associations, faith-led organisations, corporations and community
leaders was started. In the first meeting, members reflected on how best
to construct optimal transformative policies that respond to 21st century
complexities. While stressing the positive value of pluralistic societies,
the panel identified gaps and priority issues that need to be addressed to
provide people with a modern sense of belonging. Thinking deeper
about social cohesion, it drafted a number of practical recommendations
that were further developed on the occasion of the UNAOC annual
Forum in Qatar, in December 2011.
The most recent global initiative is the World Forum on Intercultural
Dialogue. It is an initiative of the Government of Azerbaijan, supported
by the Council of Europe, its North-South Centre, UNESCO and the UN
Alliance of Civilizations. The Forum has taken responsibility for
delivering the global agenda of the Dialogue Among Civilisations,
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (November 2001), the
UNESCO Convention on Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of
Cultural Expressions (2005), the Islamic Declaration on Cultural
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Diversity (2004), the Declaration and Action Plan of the Third Summit
of the Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe
Member States, and the Council of Europe’s White Paper on
Intercultural Dialogue (May 2008).
The first World Forum on “Intercultural Dialogue - United through
Common Values, Enriched by Cultural Diversity”, took place in Baku
(Azerbaijan, 7-9 April 2011). Representatives from many countries from
all continents, many international organisations, NGOs, media
representatives, scholars and experts participated in the forum. It
addressed the universal governance and practical aspects of intercultural
dialogue on a global scale7 and offered a platform for discussion and
interaction between different ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic
backgrounds. The Baku Forum addressed challenges of intercultural
dialogue in its various aspects regarding conceptual frameworks,
governance, policy and practice. It tackled the barriers to dialogue and
faced concretely how dialogue can best be pursued in diverse contexts.
Moreover, it provided an opportunity for the sharing of good practices
such as the Council of Europe’s Intercultural Cities Programme, Artists
for Dialogue Initiative, CultureWatchEurope and work on national
cultural and youth policies. Two key commitments were made at the
first Baku Forum: to turn the world forum into a regular event, and to
use appropriate means to place cultural diversity and intercultural
dialogue higher on the international agenda.
The 2nd World Forum on Intercultural Dialogue8 was held from May
29th to June 1st 2013 in Baku. The programme implied several plenary
sessions such as “How to build the world future together?”, “How to
build the popular support for cultural diversity?” and “The New Era of
Globalization: hybridity in culture in a changing world” and “How to
build public support for cultural diversity”. There were also some
parallel roundtables and workshops as well as a ministerial conference.
The insight-foresight approach of the 2nd World Forum retained the
strong commitment to intercultural dialogue as a tool, a process and as a
destination. It showed an applied reflection on how global awareness
about the importance of cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue has
become both a necessary and desirable characteristic of the
contemporary world. The Baku Process is now understood as a process
that comprises an open and respectful exchange of views between
individuals and groups with different ethnic, cultural, religious and
linguistic backgrounds and heritage, living in different continents, on the
7 Wilson, R., World Forum on Intercultural Dialogue, Concept Note, April 2011,
Baku.
8 http://www.bakuforum-icd.az/
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basis of mutual understanding and respect. Still it remains a challenge
for the promotion of intercultural dialogue to move from ideas to
practice and to establish a platform in which today’s challenges can be
discussed in the spirit of intercultural dialogue and universal values.
The United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) is a specialised agency of the United Nations that was
founded on 16th November 1945. It has 195 members and 8 associate
members with more than 50 field offices around the world. Using its
specialised competencies, UNESCO works to create the conditions
necessary for open dialogue among civilisations, cultures and peoples,
all based upon a respect for commonly shared values and global visions
of sustainable development. The organisation’s mission is to contribute
to the building of peace, the eradication of poverty, sustainable
development and intercultural dialogue through education, the sciences,
culture, communication and information. The internationally agreed-
upon development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals,
underpin all of UNESCO’s strategies and activities. The overarching
objectives of the organisation are: attaining quality education for all and
lifelong learning; mobilising science knowledge and policy for
sustainable development; addressing emerging social and ethical
challenges; fostering cultural diversity, intercultural dialogue and a
culture of peace; and building inclusive knowledge societies through
information and communication.
In the new, turbulent international globalised landscape, UNESCO is
taking greater account of the close links between cultural diversity,
dialogue, development, security and peace. From that perspective, the
culture of peace imposes itself as the main strategic focus of UNESCO,
along with sustainable development. Today, sustainable development
calls for a rethink of our relationship to the economy, to society and the
environment, bearing in mind that the emerging and future challenges of
humankind do require collective responses, which implies the kind of
solidarity that can result only from a culture of peace, non-violence and
dialogue to bind cultures and societies to each other. In turn, a culture of
peace fosters sustainable development since it is aimed at helping
people cope resiliently and creatively with ethical, cultural, political,
environmental and other social transformations.
Various recommendations, initiatives, actions and projects have been
taken on by UNESCO since its creation, to promote intercultural
practices within the broad view of culture, peace-building, human rights
and sustainable development. The Declaration of the principles of
international cultural cooperation in 19669 clearly recognised mutual
9 http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php
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knowledge of cultures as a key to peace. Various medium term plans
have been launched to respond to time specific needs; they were
focusing on specific characteristics of cultures.10 The World Decade for
Cultural Development (1988-1997)11 combined the specificity and
universality of cultural values. Placing culture at the heart of
development policy constitutes an essential investment in the world’s
future and a pre-condition to successful globalisation processes that take
into account the principles of cultural diversity.
In 1966 The World Commission on Culture and Development
produced the report “Our Creative Diversity”.12 The report considered a
commitment to pluralism to be of fundamental importance. Its message
was that cultural pluralism is an all-pervasive, enduring characteristic of
societies, and that ethnic identification is a normal and healthy response
to the pressures of globalisation. Its central argument is that
development embraces not only access to goods and services, but also
the opportunity to choose a full, satisfying, valuable and valued way of
living together, thus encouraging the flourishing of human existence in
all its forms and as a whole. “Development divorced from its human or
cultural context is growth without a soul. Economic development in its
full flowering is part of a people’s culture”. This implies a clear shift
from the purely instrumental role of culture to awarding it a
constructive, constitutive and creative role. In line with the conclusions
of “Our Creative Diversity”, a thematic programme “Mainstreaming
Cultural Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue in Education for
Sustainable Development”13 was established in 2007 as a contribution to
the UNESCO Decade of Education for Sustainable Development (2005-
2014).
10 The Medium Term Plan 1977-1982 viewed culture at the service of development so
that intercultural dialogue could be realised with respect to the value of cultural
endogeneity; the Medium Term Plan 1990-1995 was concerned about the
development of pluricultural societies and the complexity of cultural identities; it
favoured the sense of belonging to a universal culture by stressing the
interdependence of cultures and economies; the Medium Term Strategy 1996-2001
focused on the interlinkages of culture with development, democracy, peace and
security by evidencing the need for active tolerance and creative diversity.
11 http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/culture-and-development/
12 http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0010/001055/105586e.pdf
13 http://www.iemed.org/publicacions/quaderns/10/q10_185.pdf; Tilbury, D & Mulà, I.,
Review of Education for Sustainable Development Policies from a Cultural Diversity
and Intercultural Dialogue: Gaps and Opportunities for Future Action, Paris:
UNESCO, 2009.
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The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity14 (2001)
presents a very important step towards the institutional building of
intercultural dialogue. This is a legal instrument, which recognises, for
the first time, cultural diversity as a “common heritage of humanity” and
considers it’s safeguarding to be a concrete and ethical imperative,
inseparable from respect for human dignity. It affirmed the position that
“no one may invoke cultural diversity to infringe upon human rights
guaranteed by international law, nor to limit their scope”.15 The
connection between human rights and intercultural dialogue became
crucial because of their mutually reinforcing of the creation of inclusive
societies. And a global culture of human rights requires competence in
holding intercultural dialogues.
In 2005, UNESCO provided a new international framework for the
governance and management of culture with the Convention on the
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions.16 It is
a legally-binding international agreement that ensures that artists,
cultural professionals, practitioners and citizens worldwide can create,
produce, disseminate and enjoy a broad range of cultural goods, services
and activities, including their own. The focus was on the
implementation of international law that would recognises the
distinctive nature of cultural goods, services and activities as vehicles of
identity, values and meaning; and that, while cultural goods, services
and activities have important economic value, they are not mere
commodities or consumer goods that can only be regarded as objects of
trade. The convention recognised that culture can no longer be just a by-
product of development, but rather the mainspring for sustainable
development. The 2009 UNESCO World Report on “Investing in
Cultural Diversity and Intercultural dialogue”,17 further elaborated on
the importance of cultural diversity in different areas (languages,
education, communication and creativity). This diversity is perceived as
an essential dimension of intercultural dialogue for strengthening
sustainable development, ensuring the effective exercising of universally
recognised human rights and freedoms, and favouring social cohesion
and democratic governance. It makes clear how crucial it is to acquire a
cultural literacy to understand cultures in their creative diversity.
14 http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
15 UNESCO, 2001, Art. 4.
16 http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/cultural-diversity/diversity-of-cultural-
expressions/the-convention/convention-text/
17 The UNESCO World Report, Investing in Cultural Diversity and Intercultural
Dialogue, UNAOC, Paris, 2009; available through http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/
0018/001847/184755e.pdf
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2. Council of Europe
The Council of Europe, founded on May 5th 1949, is an
intergovernmental organisation currently comprising of 47 member
states. It seeks to develop common and democratic principles
throughout Europe, and is marked by its resolute commitment to the
promotion of the universally recognised human rights and fundamental
freedoms. Numerous international conventions and other legal
instruments, policy statements and programme documents have guided
its policy. This basis has evolved over more than 60 years and will
undoubtedly shape its future policy for the promotion of intercultural
dialogue.
According to the European Cultural Convention, signed in 1954 in
Paris, the Council of Europe action in the field aims at an intercultural
approach based on the principles of equal dignity and promotion of
universal values of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. The
purpose of this convention is to develop mutual understanding among
the peoples of Europe and a reciprocal appreciation of their cultural
diversity, to safeguard European culture, to promote national
contributions to Europe’s common cultural heritage respecting the same
fundamental values and to encourage in particular the study of the
languages, history and civilisation of the Parties to the Convention. It
organises activities in peacebuilding and intercultural dialogue with
training programmes for professionals and volunteers in NGOs dealing
with conflict themes. A current 3-year programme focuses on conflict
prevention and dialogue between civilisations (including the religious
dimension).
1) European legal framework for Intercultural dialogue18
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)19 (formally
The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms) is an international treaty to protect human rights and
fundamental freedoms in Europe. It was drafted in 1950 by the then
newly formed Council of Europe and entered into force on September
3rd 1953. It established the European Court of Human Rights which
interprets and applies the convention and deals with complaints. The
court’s views on the governance principles and preconditions of
18 Wiater, P., Report Intercultural Dialogue in the Framework of European Human
Rights Protection, White Paper Series, Volume 1, 2010. This report analyses the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in terms of the promotion of
cultural diversity, as championed by the Council of Europe particularly through its
White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue (2008).
19 http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm
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intercultural dialogue – and particularly the case law on freedom of
thought, conscience and religion, freedom of expression and freedom of
association and assembly – provide guidelines for politicians, academics
and practitioners alike.
The basic conditions of intercultural dialogue for authentic
intercultural dialogue relate to: Democracy: the democratic governance
of cultural diversity is one of the main policy approaches for the
promotion of intercultural dialogue. Democracy is the foundation of the
political system, and citizens are valued also as political actors and not
only as social beings, contributors to or beneficiaries of the wellbeing of
the nation; Rule of law: a main feature of democracy and a further
condition for intercultural dialogue; Equal dignity and equal enjoyment
of rights: general principles, ethnic equality and gender equality.
Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the ECHR relate to intercultural dialogue.
We will briefly refer to the significance and key principles of these
articles.
Article 9 – Freedom of thought, conscience and religion
Significance
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;
this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom,
either alone or in community with others and in public or private, and to
manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and
observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order,
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Key principles related to intercultural dialogue deal with religious
pluralism, tolerance, mutual respect and the principle of non-
discrimination and neutrality and impartiality of state authorities.
Article 10 – Freedom of expression
Significance
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This
article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting,
television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions
or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public
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safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing
the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the
authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
Key principles related to intercultural dialogue concern pluralism of
views and opinions, neutrality of state authorities and tolerance and
mutual respect.
Article 11 – Freedom of association and assembly
Significance
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of
association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions
for the protection of his interests.
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than
such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection
of the rights and freedoms of others. This article shall not prevent the
imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members
of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.
The key principles related to intercultural dialogue concern the levels
of intercultural dialogue. European societies are socially and culturally
interconnected. They are embedded in a growing cultural diversification
because of migration, asylum seekers and globalisation and because of
the effects of revolutions in telecommunications and the media, Internet,
development of transport and tourism.
2) Intercultural dialogue as a political priority
Intercultural education, communication and understanding have been
themes of international cooperation for a long time, but the notions of
“dialogue of civilisations” and “intercultural dialogue” have only
recently begun to appear on the political agenda of international
institutions. The policy of the Council of Europe for the promotion of
intercultural dialogue has evolved through a long series of European
ministerial meetings and expert conferences.
The Third Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Council
of Europe (Warsaw, May 2005) in its Action Plan explicitly endorsed
intercultural dialogue – together with political and interreligious
dialogue – as a means of ensuring that the diversity of European cultures
becomes a source of mutual enrichment. The summit also committed
itself to a new dialogue between Europe and its neighbouring regions –
the southern Mediterranean, the Middle East and Central Asia. Since
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then, the promotion of intercultural dialogue has been a major political
priority of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.
The Conference of European Ministers responsible for Cultural
Affairs (Faro/Portugal, 27-28 October 2005) was an important milestone
for the implementation of this policy. The Faro Declaration was
adopted, which contained the Council of Europe’s strategy for
developing intercultural dialogue. The document placed the strategy for
the promotion of intercultural dialogue in the context of the overall
objectives to promote human rights, democracy and the rule of law, to
strengthen social cohesion, peace and stability. The Declaration thus
cleared the ground for the “mainstreaming” of intercultural dialogue in
all working areas of the Council of Europe.
Important agreements were signed and declarations issued by the
Council of Europe and different partners, charting future cooperation in
the field of intercultural dialogue.
– The “Faro Open Platform”, created with UNESCO, builds a flexible
mechanism of cooperation with international partners, in order to
support the development of a coordinated and efficient approach.
– The bilateral agreements signed by the Secretary General and the
“Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between
Cultures” and the Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific
Organization (ALECSO) provide the Council of Europe with the
possibility to engage in closer cooperation with the countries on the
southern shores of the Mediterranean and in other regions.
– Declaration on cultural diversity, adopted by the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe on 7 December 2000.
– Declaration on intercultural dialogue and conflict prevention, adopted
by the European ministers responsible for cultural affairs, Opatija
(Croatia), 22 October 2003.
– Declaration by the European Ministers of Education on intercultural
education in the new European context, Athens (Greece), 10-12
November 2003.
– Declaration on 50 years of cultural cooperation in Europe, adopted by
the ministers responsible for culture, education, youth and sport of the
signatory states of the European Cultural Convention, gathered at
Wroclaw (Poland), 10 December 2004.
– Declaration on the Council of Europe’s Strategy for Developing
Intercultural Dialogue, adopted by the ministers responsible for cultural
affairs in the States Party to the European Cultural Convention gathered
in Faro (Portugal), 27-28 October 2005 (“Faro Declaration”).
Globalisation vs Europeanisation: a Human-centric Interaction
228
In practice, all component parts of the Council of Europe contribute
to intercultural dialogue in various forms:
– As legal instruments that set certain standards for the interaction
between majority and minority cultures, such as the Framework
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities or the European
Charter for Regional or Minority Languages;
– As statutory activities, like the case law of the European Court of
Human Rights, or the reports of the European Commission against
Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), monitoring the quality of intercultural
interaction;
– As long-term action programmes, e.g. those focussing on education
for democratic citizenship, teacher training for intercultural learning and
history teaching, inter-community relations, the programme for the
development of monitoring and communication tools of national
programmes for Roma in South East Europe, or;
– As specific programmes run by the North-South Centre, the European
Centre for Modern Languages and the two European Youth Centres of
the Council of Europe;
– As distinct high-visibility initiatives like the ministerial conference in
Faro (2005), the 3rd Intercultural Forum (Bucharest, March 2006) or the
conference on “Dialogue of Cultures and Inter-Faith Cooperation”
(Nizhniy Novgorod, 2006);
– As individual activities that are part of other programmes of activities
but have a clear relevance for the promotion of intercultural dialogue,
such as the “European Language Portfolio”;
– Coherence was assured through the appointment of a “Coordinator for
Intercultural Dialogue” and the creation of an inter-service Task Force
on Intercultural Dialogue as a platform for the exchange of information.
– In 2006, the Committee of Ministers launched preparations for the
White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue20 of the Council of Europe, which
was published in May 2008, the first of its kind on this specific topic at
least at the international level. The White Paper is drawn into the
democratic management of cultural diversity at every level of
governance – from local to regional to national to international.
Generally speaking, “white papers” are policy documents containing
background information and proposals for action in a specific political
area. The White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue argues that intercultural
dialogue can help meet the challenges posed by cultural diversity.
20 White Paper on Intercultural dialogue: Living together as Equals in dignity:
Dialogue-A Key to Europe’s Future, CM (2008) 30, 2 May 2008.
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Dialogue will however only be effective if the dialogue partners share at
least some basic values and cultural references and if they are willing to
engage in dialogue on an equal basis; if the political environment is
supportive and aiming at greater social justice, and does not work
against intercultural dialogue; if there is coherence between the
initiatives at local, national and international levels; if civil society is
involved; and if the cultural industry supports dialogue.
– In 2011 the Council of Europe published the Report of the Group of
Eminent Persons “Living together. Combining diversity and freedom in
21st century Europe”.21 It identified various threats that Europe is facing
(such as rising intolerance, rising support for xenophobic and populist
parties, discrimination, the presence of a population virtually without
rights, parallel societies, Islamic extremism, the loss of democratic
freedoms, possible clashes between “religious freedom” and freedom of
expression). Reasons are related to insecurity, immigration, distorted
image of minorities in the media and harmful stereotypes and a crisis of
leadership. It offered guiding principles and strategic recommendations.
3) Assessment
The Council of Europe is committed to common values and
principles, which are rooted in Europe’s cultural, religious and
humanistic heritage – a heritage both shared and rich in its diversity.
The statutory mission of the organisation is the promotion and active
defence of pluralist democracy, universal human rights and the rule of
law. Values are important building materials for social cohesion.
However intercultural dialogue, as a tool for the promotion of cultural
diversity and social cohesion, can only be successful if the dialogue
partners – independent of all differences – are sharing certain common
values and cultural references.
The Council of Europe’s approach to intercultural dialogue brings
into focus all policy areas directly influencing the diversity of cultural
practices and cultural identities. It concerns, to name just the most
obvious, policies regarding citizenship and rights of participation,
education, social cohesion, minority rights, immigration, foreign affairs,
language, relations between the state and religions, the development of
civil society and gender equality. Education, in all its forms, arguably
plays the most important role of all, since the skills necessary for living
peacefully together in a culturally diverse environment need to be
acquired and can be taught; this includes for instance the important areas
of the teaching of foreign languages and of history.
21 Council of Europe, Report of the Group of Eminent Persons Living together.
Combining diversity and freedom in 21st century Europe, 2011.
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In a wider sense, however, coherence must be achieved also with
other policy areas, i.e. with those that influence the material living
conditions and the sustainability of cultural identities, such as social
services, housing, labour markets, urban planning, public health and
many more. A better integration of these policy areas is necessary for
addressing the negative consequences of social fragmentation and the
precarious social and economic positions of many individuals and
groups.
The diversity and scope of policy areas concerned with intercultural
dialogue presents a specific challenge, which cannot be addressed by ad
hoc or sectoral measures without running the risk of neutralising the
efforts in one domain by opposite or ill-conceived measures taken in
another. In order to be effective, the principle of promoting intercultural
dialogue must therefore become an integral part of policy-making and
policy implementation in practically all other areas. This is usually
called “mainstreaming”.
This brings into focus the role of the different stakeholders of
intercultural dialogue, who act in very different political and
institutional contexts. At the local level, initiatives by individuals and
civil society organisations, the activities of religious communities, the
policies and services of local and regional authorities as well as
neighbourhood media – they all play a very important role for the
promotion of intercultural dialogue. Issues faced by cultural and
religious minorities can often be best addressed at the local level.
Parliaments, governments, administrations and NGOs at national level
share this responsibility for fostering a culture of understanding. Also
international organisations can contribute in various ways. Of course, all
this works more effectively if they share the same priorities and
convictions. A particular role is set for cultural industries in promoting
intercultural dialogue (for example, through music, film, publishing,
cultural tourism) and reflecting on society’s diversity. This includes the
media, referring to printed and broadcast media and the growing




The European Union (EU) is now a Europe of 28 member states and
500 million citizens. It is a Europe at the crossroads of its past, present
and future. It is at a crucial point at the intersection of its history and a
decisive moment in the process of European integration. History
illustrates that Europe is a dynamic and evolving entity with many faces,
multiple identities and diversified cooperation forms.
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Today the European reality is confronted with the frontiers of its
pragmatic and functional integration process. The 21st century is
making new demands that call for a revision of the perspective of
Europe. Today, its model of society, based on fundamental human
rights, culture as a vehicle of emancipation, of sustainable development
and socio-economic cohesion, and on a multilateral vision of the world
order, is under stress. In other words, an intense conversation between
the confusing actual (political, economic, cultural and institutional)
European reality and Europe’s responsibility in the context of an ever-
increasing globalisation, is clearly taking place.
Moreover, the EU is made up of multicultural societies. Conflicts do
influence how people define their identities and how they perceive
themselves in relation to their own culture and to others. Manuel
Castell,22 the Spanish sociologist, sees economic, political, social or
cultural exclusion as the main cause for conflicts. He believes in the
power and necessity of communication to restore confidence and to
formulate common projects. This implies that conflict prevention,
building bridges between cultures and religions and extending the
multicultural context require new concepts, approaches and tools.
A final conceptual premise refers to the fact that dialogue supposes
equality. A healthy multicultural society can only be built on mutual
respect. This is not a sufficient but an absolutely necessary condition for
a successful policy of intercultural dialogue. For Edgar Morin, the
French philosopher and sociologist, dialogue is only possible between
individuals who recognise themselves as persons with the same dignity,
rights and obligations.23
2) EU legal framework for intercultural dialogue
a) Articles 2, 3 and 6 of the current Treaty of the European Union
provide the fundamental basis of the legal framework of the EU’s
activities in the field of intercultural dialogue. They read as follows:
Article 2, TEU: The Union is founded on the values of respect for human
dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for
human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These
values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism,
non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between
women and men prevail.
22 Castells, M., The Network Society: A Cross-Cultural Perspective. Cheltenham, UK,
Northampton, MA: Edward Edgar, 2004.
23 Talking to Edgar Morin, Dialogue assumes equality, interview by UNESCO, The
New Courier, January 2004.
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Article 2, TEU: 1. The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the
wellbeing of its peoples. [….] 3. The Union shall establish an internal
market. It shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on
balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social
market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high
level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. It
shall promote scientific and technological advance. It shall combat social
exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and
protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between
generations and protection of the rights of the child. It shall promote
economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member
States. It shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall
ensure that Europe’s cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced.
Article 6, TEU: 1. The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles
set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7
December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which
shall have the same legal value as the Treaties. 2. The Union shall accede to
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. [….]
b) The Preambule of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU
(annex of the Lisbon Treaty, 2009) reads as follows:
The peoples of Europe, in creating an ever closer union among them, are
resolved to share a peaceful future based on common values. Conscious of
its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible,
universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it is
based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law. It places the
individual at the heart of its activities, by establishing the citizenship of the
Union and by creating an area of freedom, security and justice. The Union
contributes to the preservation and to the development of these common
values while respecting the diversity of the cultures and traditions of the
peoples of Europe as well as the national identities of the Member States
and the organisation of their public authorities at national, regional and local
levels; it seeks to promote balanced and sustainable development and
ensures free movement of persons, services, goods and capital, and the
freedom of establishment. To this end, it is necessary to strengthen the
protection of fundamental rights in the light of changes in society, social
progress and scientific and technological developments by making those
rights more visible in a Charter.
Articles 10, 11 and 12 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights are
of particular importance to intercultural dialogue. They address equality
(e.g. non-discrimination and cultural, religious and linguistic diversity),
freedoms (e.g. freedom of expression, of thought, conscience and
religion), and citizen’s rights (e.g. of movement and residence, to vote).
Article 10: Freedom of thought, conscience and religion
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1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
This right includes freedom to change religion or belief and freedom, either
alone or in community with others and in public or in private, to manifest
religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 2. The right
to conscientious objection is recognised, in accordance with the national
laws governing the exercise of this right.
Article 11: Freedom of expression and information
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontier. 2. The
freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected.
Article 12: Freedom of assembly and of association
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of
association at all levels, in particular in political, trade union and civic
matters, which implies the right of everyone to form and to join trade unions
for the protection of his or her interests. 2. Political parties at Union level
contribute to expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union.
3) EU initiatives
The enlargement of the European Union, coupled with increasing
mobility linked to the common market, new and old migratory flows,
the new trade ties with the rest of the world, and education, leisure and
globalisation in general, have led to increased contact between cultures,
religions, ethnic groups and languages. Against this backdrop and in the
context of an increasingly multicultural EU, the development of
intercultural competences and the promotion of intercultural dialogue
have been a driving force for related EU initiatives.
The promotion of intercultural dialogue became high on the political
EU agenda after the attack on the Twin Towers of 9/11. Various EU
activities and conferences were organised in the aftermath to support the
importance of intercultural dialogue, often in collaboration with the
academic world and the Jean Monnet Programme of the EU.24 The
March 2002 Jean Monnet conference on “Intercultural dialogue”25
focused on the centrality of the human rights paradigm and its practical
implications as to the place of Europe in the world, interreligious
dialogue, democracy and globalisation. Its conclusions have given input
to the Euro-Mediterranean conference of the Ministers of Foreign
Affairs in Valencia, April 22nd-23rd 2002, in order to re-launch the
24 See Chapter 8.
25 European Commission, Intercultural Dialogue, Luxembourg: Office for Official
Publications of the European Communities, 267 p., 2002.
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Barcelona Process. An action program resulted from the conference with
an important section on the dialogue between cultures/civilisation. The
European Commission also supported an international conference in
Beyrouth in September 2002 on “Cultures, Religions and Conflicts” and
organised another Jean Monnet Conference in December 2002 on
“Peace, Security and Stability: an international dialogue and the role of
the EU”. In 2003, Romano Prodi, the then president of the European
Commission, created a high level advisory group, “The Dialogue
between peoples and cultures in the Euro-Mediterranean area”.26 Its
report finally led to the creation of the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean
Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures in Alexandria (Egypt).27
As mentioned in Chapter 8 the Jean Monnet programme financed the
Interuniversity European research project “Intercultural Dialogue for the
development of a new (plural, democratic) citizenship”28 in 2007-2008,
resulting in the launch of a Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence
“Intercultural Dialogue and Multi-level Governance” at the University
of Padua (I) in 2009.29
4) Assessment
Intercultural dialogue contributes to a number of strategic priorities
of the European Union, such as respecting and promoting cultural
diversity; favouring the European Union’s commitment to solidarity,
social justice and reinforced cohesion; allowing the European Union to
make its voice heard and realising new efficient partnerships with
neighbouring countries. Indeed, the European Union has for the last two
decades encouraged intercultural dialogue, both inside and outside of the
European Union, through various programmes and initiatives.
However, to realise this objective and to reinforce European
Community action, a first step is to identify, promote and exchange
experiences and best practices that would illustrate the possibility, value
and efficiency of intercultural dialogue. The European Commission has
initiated this process of valorisation via projects supported by European
Community programs. A second step is to treat intercultural dialogue as
a horizontal priority for all relevant European Community programs,
especially for those related to culture, education, youth and citizenship;
26 High-Level Advisory Group, European Commission, Dialogue between peoples and
cultures in the Euro-Mediterranean Region, 2003, 45 p.
27 See The Anna Lindh Report Euromed Intercultural Trends 2010;
http://www.euromedalex.org/sites/default/files/AnnaLindhReport2010.pdf
28 Bekemans, L., M. Karasinska-Fendler, M. Mascia, A. Papisca, C.A. Stephanou and
P.G. Xuereb (eds.), op. cit.
29 Bekemans, L. (ed.), Intercultural Dialogue and Multi-level Governance in Europe. A
Human Rights Based Approach, op. cit.
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Finally, 2008 was declared the Year of Intercultural Dialogue. Since
then, intercultural dialogue events have complemented existing
community programs and raised the awareness of citizens, especially the
youths, as to the importance of intercultural dialogue.30
4. Intercultural cities: a good practice towards a model for
intercultural integration31
One very interesting initiative is the Intercultural Cities project, a
joint initiative of the Council of Europe and the European Commission,
which was launched in 2008. It supports the conceptual development,
implementation and assessment of urban diversity strategies and has
introduced the model of intercultural integration, i.e. a new model of
local governance and policy in the age of diversity. It explains what
intercultural integration means in practice: how it affects policies,
governance and citizenship, public discourse, media relations, public
services and the urban environment. It reviews the processes that
facilitate the development of intercultural strategies and presents a wide
range of examples. Intercultural integration models are now being
applied in 60 cities across Europe as well as Mexico, Canada, and cities
in Japan and Korea.32
It has stimulated an inclusive debate and policy-making in pilot
cities, taking an intercultural approach to migration, integration and
social cohesion; encouraged pilot cities to develop comprehensive
intercultural strategies to manage urban diversity and acted as an
inspiration for other cities in Europe. It proposes practical policies and
methods to help cities review their policies through an “intercultural
lens”, including tools like expert reviews, study visits, city-to-city
mentoring, thematic workshops and public events.
In short, intercultural integration calls for a review and reshaping of
urban policies on education, spatial planning, safety, culture, economic
development, employment, etc. with a view to identifying the skills and
competences of migrants, giving them access and empowering them to
be full participants in city life. It presents a vision for the future by
identifying the characteristics of an intercultural city: diversity is a
source of dynamism, innovation, creativity and growth; diversity is
accepted as the norm and the heritage and identity of all people is
affirmed; public spaces, schools, homes, workplaces and cultural forums
30 Decision N° 1983/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
18 December 2006 concerning the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue in 2008.
31 Wood, Phil (ed.), Intercultural Cities. Towards a model for intercultural integration,
Council of Europe, 2010.
32 See www.coe.int/interculturalcities
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are designed to enable people from different cultural backgrounds to
mix, exchange and interact productively and creatively; public
consultation, debate and decision-making reflect the community’s
cultural mix. To make this vision a reality, cities must develop an
intercultural strategy to transform their policies, public spaces,
institutions and partnerships. As a consequence, politicians and the
media should therefore encourage citizens’ participation in creating a
shared identity.
The development of an Intercultural City Index is, in this
perspective, very interesting. It is based on a questionnaire involving 66
questions grouped in 14 indicators with three distinct types of data.
Indicators have been weighed for relative importance. For each
indicator, the participating cities can reach up to 100 points (which are
consolidated for the general ICC Index). These indicators comprise of:
intercultural commitment; education system; neighbourhoods; public
services; business and labour market; cultural and civil life policies;
public spaces; mediation and conflict resolution; language; media;
international outlook; intelligence/competence; the welcoming of new
arrivals and governance. Some of these indicators – education system;
neighbourhoods; public services; business and labour market; cultural
and civil life policies; and public spaces are grouped in a composite
indicator called “urban policies through the intercultural lens” or simply
“intercultural lens”.
In 2013 The Council of Europe published a Practical guide for
applying the urban model of intercultural integration.33 The guide is
designed for city leaders and practitioners wishing to learn from the
intercultural cities pilot project in developing an intercultural approach
to diversity management and integration. This approach has been built
on the basis of the experience of dozens of real-life cities in redesigning
their policies and reshaping their governance to ensure equal
opportunities and realise a diversity advantage. It recommends steps and
measures to help develop an intercultural strategy and monitor its
implementation.
III. Evaluation
An authentic EU intercultural dialogue calls for a conceptual
framework that deals with diversity on a European and global scale;
requires a socio-cultural setting that combines globalisation with
cultural assertivity and assumes a moral dimension that favours
commonly shared values worldwide. The proposition of such a
33 Council of Europe, The intercultural city step by step – Practical guide for applying
the urban model of intercultural integration, 2013.
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framework requires a few additional explanatory and voluntaristic
observations, which refer to some of the previous chapters.
1. Culture as a driving force for genuine intercultural dialogue
We recognise cultural pluriformity as the main character of European
civilisation. It is a source of wealth and strength. No culture can be
missed out in the European cultural mosaic. Protection of cultural
diversity, however, does not imply nationalistic or regionalist isolation
or a European fortress, inside or outside the EU.
We recognise a tension between culture and integration in European
developments. Therefore, we have to be careful not to turn Europe into a
global cultural area, which resembles a melting pot in which all
diversity would be lost. Different cultures should not be separated; but
enter into dialogue with and influence each other and transform
themselves while remaining diversified.
We favour mutual learning as an agenda for intercultural dialogue. It
would be a grave mistake to save the originality of particular cultures by
isolating them from dialogue with other cultures or to accept a cultural
relativist approach on the global scale. Moving away from the Western
sense of superiority and the rise of cross-cultural relativism, there is
indeed a growing recognition that some forms of cross-cultural
judgements can be appropriate worldwide. We assume that a dynamic
cultural sector helps to ensure real participative democracy and activates
democratic empowerment, by inspiring citizens to become active,
creative and responsible.
Intercultural dialogue is an important way of overcoming some of
the negative consequences of globalisation (i.e. minorities, migration,
poverty), condition to the recognition of common and moral values (i.e.
human dignity, respect for difference and diversity, solidarity, etc.). As
such, intercultural dialogue is an important instrument in governance
building, creating mutual understanding, trust and confidence. It is a
vehicle for a more active, consensus building citizens’ participation to
create tolerance and respect between different cultures and peoples and
to overcome ignorance, arrogance, fear and mistrust. Such a dialogue
should be perceived as a path to conviviality and interculturalism in
which cultures influence each other without destroying themselves or
entering into clashes or conflicts. It is therefore a crucial path for peace
and genuine sustainable development and may lead to a conversation
among equals with respect for the difference and the diversity of each
other.
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2. Europe’s responsibility to favour a dialogue between diverse
cultural discourses
Europe as a global actor has an important responsibility in
intercultural dialogue. It should take up its role as an enabler and
facilitator. Europe should be a communicative bridge builder and a
boundary breaker in such a dialogue. The EU has a valid socio-
economic foundation that is based on democracy, human rights,
solidarity and above all diversity, meaning respect for different cultures,
languages, religions, traditions, etc. This implies mutual understanding
and learning and an open dialogue.
Europe should play a proactive role in defusing the tension between
universalism and particularism in a globalising world, combining
difference and identity in novel ways of dialogue and cooperation.
Europe is called upon to meet the challenge of crossing its boundaries,
respecting the right to diversity and difference but preserving
fundamental values. The actual realisation of related programmes and
partnerships therefore requires an imaginative and courageous approach
to Europe’s destiny in the world.
In view of the process of globalisation and its consequences on
cultural exchanges and cooperation worldwide, Europe is required to
take up its moral responsibility to contribute to a strengthening of an
intercultural dialogue among equals in a globalising world, while firmly
supporting its commonly shared values at all possible policy levels. The
maintenance and promotion of the global common good of
economically, socially and culturally sustainable development
worldwide, the common practice of mutual learning and the centrality of
the individual citizen as a person within a community and a coherent
internal and external policy are to be Europe’s guiding principles in
promoting globalisation with a human and cultural face.
3. Human rights paradigm: the basic point of departure for
intercultural dialogue
Human rights are at the core of any suitable approach to intercultural
dialogue. The International Law of Human Rights has extended its
constitutional space from inside the nation state to the entire world. The
human rights paradigm is assumed as a powerful transcultural facilitator
in moving from the (increasingly) conflicting stage of multi-culturality
to the dialogic stage of inter-culturality.
Such a universal human rights approach to intercultural dialogue also
requires a European policy interpretation. Public policies are absolutely
necessary to pursue the strategic goal of the inclusion of all individuals
and groups living in the EU. A major coordination with the other
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European institutions engaged in this field, in particular with the
Council of Europe and the OECD, is desirable; also a major focus and
continuity to partnerships with other regions in the world and to
strengthen the support to the UN. The European Union should give an
example of how to apply (first of all within its territorial and
institutional space) universal human rights into its internal and external
policies. The challenge is to make the European space, marked by a
process of increasing multiculturalisation, a real yardstick for
interculturality and a policy environment responsible for the appeal of
shared responsibilities in the globalised world.
4. From policy to practice
Sources of good practice projects are multifold.34 Successful
intercultural dialogue projects are to be found in “shared spaces”; both
institutional spaces and non-institutional spaces. Moreover, diversity can
be fostered at all stages of cultural/artistic production, distribution and
participation. The educational challenges are to develop intercultural
competences and skills among all members of society and to stimulate
transnational cooperation activities. Finally, interactive communication
processes stimulate empowerment or development of self-confidence in
individuals, and a sense of collective responsibility.
A number of guidelines of intercultural practices can be identified
for sharing diversity within and between cultures: Recognise that
intercultural dialogue depends upon the full implementation of human,
civic, economic, social and cultural rights; Acknowledge intercultural
dialogue at the heart of citizenship and integration strategies; Approach
intercultural dialogue as a transversal issue which is part of a complex
system of governance based on diversity, equality and participation;
Develop strategies which view intercultural dialogue as a process of
interactive communication within and between cultures and; Open up
institutional structures and international cooperation for intercultural
dialogue. In summary, interculturality should become a practice of
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Conclusion
1. Intercultural dialogue and identity
Intercultural dialogue requires an open attitude towards “the other”, a
desire to listen to them and to induce comprehension. However, many
people are still afraid that intercultural encounters result in a loss of
identity and create insecurity. So, to overcome the perception of “the
other” as potential threat it is necessary to build the sense of belonging
as close as possible to the citizen, to create small and local communities
where “the other” can become an accepted neighbour. Subsequently, a
spill over effect can support the building up of identities, not defined in
a negative way as being opposed to something, but characterised as
belonging to a group differentiated but sharing a basic set of common
values and interests.
It should be clear that the prior goal of intercultural dialogue is not
integration or assimilation of individuals and groups of different
cultures, but an incentive to share universal values by/for “doing
together”. Political participation and laicality are fundamental features
of inclusiveness at all levels; they may give rise to a new civic identity,
referring to the European-constitutional motto “united in diversity”.
The following policy conclusions are proposed: The policy of local
authorities should encourage and provide the material basis for the
building up of local communities of civic society; Citizen participation
should be promoted locally where the basic needs are met to create a
sense of community between those sharing basic interests; Various fora
for intercultural dialogue other than those usually associated with
interculturalism and dialogue. In the case of infrastructure projects, the
integration of local community stakeholders in debates over the
common good may lead to intercultural “learning by doing” at the
regional and local level and in daily life; The cross-border cooperation
programmes and programmes addressed to the third countries with the
participation of EU member states should take into account the
intercultural element; and finally, a focus on educating about
intercultural dialogue is fundamental for sustainable results. However,
the coherence between school education, aimed at intercultural dialogue,
and home education, which sometimes propagates opposite attitudes vis-
à-vis “the others”, is not always present. It seems that a stronger
involvement of families with schools could result in a peaceful
coexistence, building up the environment for shaping open identities and
inclusive societies.
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2. Intercultural dialogue and citizenship: universal basis,
European dimension and plural character
The European integration process is aiming at the building of an
ever-closer Union between the peoples of Europe. The idea and
institution of European citizenship should therefore be the framework in
which the European peoples identify themselves as the European demos,
living in a broad cultural space and belonging to a large and
differentiated polity.35
Universal citizenship is the grant provided by the “new”
International Law, which is rooted in the United Nations Charter and in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In virtue of this Ius Novum
Universale, all human beings are endowed with the same legal statute in
the world constitutional space. The rationale of universal citizenship is
to include all, i.e. ad omnes includendos.
A new European citizenship appears as a model for democratic
community where all citizens are treated equally, exhibiting universal
rights as well as rights relevant to their group differences. European
citizenship also means plural and active citizenship, being the core of
any credible policing of intercultural dialogue. Its immediate implication
is that all residents in a given territory, as human beings having the same
legal status internationally recognised, should enjoy the same
fundamental political, civil, economic, social, cultural rights and
liberties. In this perspective, plural and active European citizenship is
strictly linked to democracy in its different political, economic and
social dimensions, in its various representatives, participatory and
deliberative forms and in its local, national and international
expressions.
The following policy recommendations are suggested: A new model
of European citizenship is needed which includes universal and
multicultural rights; European citizenship should be based not only on
nationality, but also on legal residence. This means that legal long-term
third country nationals should be recognised as Union citizens.
3. Intercultural dialogue and democracy: major challenges and
participatory characteristics
The challenge to current politics is the search for a coherent
combination of all dimensions of democracy and, at the same time, an
extension of democratic practices up to the international institutions.
Strengthening and democratising the United Nations should hopefully
become a fundamental common goal for the actors in dialogue. It is
35 The concept of citizenship is further elaborated in Chapter 12.
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assumed that an intensification of intercultural dialogue and a
reinforcement of deliberative democracy might contribute to the
development of a new European policy of greater inclusiveness,
rejecting a distinction between insiders and outsiders, and increasing a
sense of belonging. Such a dialogue constitutes a solid basis for the
European active citizenship, strengthens empowerment and contributes
to the deepening of the European identity.
I am convinced that intercultural dialogue may contribute to an
intercultural society that brings a new and advanced type of democracy
to the growing diversity of the European political, social and cultural
space. Preconditions for such an intercultural dialogue are: the
acceptance of the human rights paradigm as a solid basis for mutual
respect; an intensification of intercultural communication; a recognition
of cultural pluralism; greater citizens’ participation; inclusive policies at
all levels and within all sectors; and the development of a culture of
dialogue and an education of intercultural dialogue. Democracy needs
intercultural dialogue for the exploitation of its full potential as much as
intercultural dialogue needs democratic practices.
4. The structural/institutional setting for intercultural dialogue:
the European Dialogues’ framework
Structures for effective and sustainable intercultural dialogue are
important for the policy implementation of the key concepts of identity,
citizenship and democracy. A relevant question concerns the EU policy
for political dialogues, discussions, cooperation, and the human rights
clause in EU treaties with third countries. The purpose of sharing a
precise world order model is missing in this approach. Dialogues
provide a clear framework for EU policy-making and would increase the
democratic legitimacy that is needed to gain the vital support of the
European civil society and public opinion. Intercultural dialogue has
(still) not formally entered into the EU dialogues’ agenda, but
informally it is very present.
Indicators of an “inclusive Europe”, taking into account the principle
of subsidiarity, should include: a revision of the EU citizenship, in
accordance with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights; a human
security (and human rights) approach for the chapter on “Justice and
Home Affairs”; a legislation on asylum and immigration in accordance
with the International Law of Human Rights; welfare policies for
economic and social rights; a real and consistent commitment to
contribute to build up a world order based on the UN Charter and the
international law of human rights; and a larger and more substantive
space for the role of civil society organisations and local institutions in
the various forms of dialogue and communication.
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Intercultural dialogue is therefore of the utmost importance to
meeting the challenges of globalisation and living together peacefully in
a diverse world. It contributes to the recognition that difference exists
between peoples and societies, and addresses the need to encourage
mutual trust and understanding between diverse peoples. Moreover the
environment in which intercultural dialogue takes place is marked by
difference, proximity and interconnectedness.
Approaching cultural diversity requires that the broadest possible
range of competences be identified and promoted. Hence the growing
awareness that intercultural competences constitute a very relevant
resource and become a requisite response to help individuals negotiate
cultural boundaries throughout their personal encounters and
experiences. The UNESCO and the Council of Europe have been
addressing the growing interest in intercultural competences by
proposing strategies, guidelines and handbooks in view of the realisation
of true intercultural dialogue.36 Placing cultural diversity and
intercultural dialogue higher on the international agenda is therefore
critical for human security and a prime responsibility for the 21st
century to safeguard the survival, livelihood and dignity of individuals.
36 UNESCO, Intercultural Competences, Conceptual and Operational Framework,
44 p., 2013; Council of Europe, Intercultural competence for all: Preparation for







The notion of citizenship refers to an active and responsible
participation of individuals in the society in which they live. Without
going back to the Greek and Roman roots in our Western culture, we
should underline that it is only through the recognition of the status of
citizenship that our societies actually became “civil” societies and
authentic democracies. There is indeed no democracy without full, free
and active participation of citizens in the decisions that concern them.
Thus, one understands that the possession of the “nationality” of a state
does not by itself create a democratic system; this is why one should not
confuse the notions of citizenship and nationality.
Since the 1990s, citizenship has become one of the key issues of the
political debate. The notion of citizenship is changing at a great pace
because of the great economic, social and political changes that occurred
while the 20th century moved into the 21st century. In short, citizenship
refers to attitudes, awareness and behaviours based on civil, political,
social and cultural rights in a geographical space within a socio-political
framework (i.e. city, region, country, Europe and the world).
I. Process of European Citizenship-building
1. The classical concept of citizenship
The classical concept of citizenship relates to a legal and political
status that allows the citizen to acquire some (civil, political, social...)
rights as an individual and some duties (taxes, military service,
loyalty...) in relation to a political community, as well as the ability to
intervene in the collective life of a state. The latter right arises from the
democratic principle of the sovereignty of people. Citizens of a state
have a series of rights, granted by their constitutions, but also have
obligations, with regard to their national community. In a democratic
state, the citizen must fulfil those obligations since they were passed by
the representatives they voted in, using one of the main citizen political
rights – suffrage. Citizenship is restricted to people who have that
condition. People that live in a territory but lack the status of citizen are
deprived of the rights and duties that citizenship involves. Every state
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has laws to regulate the way an individual can acquire its nationality,
that is to say, their citizenship.
This concept of citizenship dates back to a historical period initiated
by the great liberal revolutions of the late 18th century, linked to the
granting of civil rights. The institutions most directly associated with
them are the Courts of Justice. Political rights mainly developed in the
19th century, and the corresponding institutions are parliament and local
councils. Social rights mainly developed in the 20th century, and the
institutions most closely connected with them are the education and
social public service systems.1
It is a notion characterised by the pre-eminence of the state-nation as
the political community that comprises the individuals. Citizenship is
tantamount to nationality. In fact, in the traditional thinking of the
nation-states which have dominated the political scene of Europe for the
last two centuries, and because of people’s ideological identification
with the idea of a nation, there existed a kind of intellectual confusion
between the three notions of identity, nationality and citizenship.
“People” were traditionally defined and identified by the nation-state
ruling over them; they were defined as “national” because they belonged
to their country. It was through this national status that they acquired
their citizen’s rights.
The dominant political paradigm was the so-called Westphalian
system, which originated in the 17th century. Five principles ruled the
relationship between states in that system: 1) Governments of nation-
states (kings in the past, parliament and executives in modern times) are
the exclusive owners and holders of sovereignty; 2) This sovereignty
covers a well-defined and limited territorial space; 3) Governments
(whatever their internal political system) are the only political actors on
the international and world levels, holders of all recognised rights
outside of their territory; 4) There is no pre-existing international order,
or legal order, outside of treaties signed by sovereign nations; and 5)
Wars between nations are a legitimate instrument to solving conflicts. In
other words, a democratic approach to international life, which would
have implied an active and direct participation of citizens outside of the
borders of their nation, was not at all required.
2. Challenges to the nation-state and the citizenship equivalent
to nationality
The concept of citizenship has evolved from the classical ages to the
present time. In the 21st century, we are witnessing a quite different
1 Heater, D., What is Citizenship?, London: Polity Press, 1999.
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kind of citizenship, in particular in the European context. Although the
nation-state continues to be the key element of the world political map,
changes are taking place that illustrate an evident challenge to this kind
of political organisation.
Two major transformations are questioning the role of the
contemporary nation-state and the concept of citizenship that it
embraces. Firstly, the process of globalisation implies that the central
and strategic economic activities are integrated on a world scale through
electronic webs of capitals, goods, and information exchange. A key
element of this globalisation is the development of the Internet and the
information society. This globalisation of markets is the decisive factor
that impelled further steps to be made towards European integration,
from the Economic and Monetary Union to a stricter Financial and
Budgetary Union. The nation-state is less and less able to cope with the
challenges of globalisation. Secondly, the existence of more
multicultural societies, which breaks up the theoretical homogeneity of
the nation-state. Regional or national diversity in many European
countries as well as multiculturalism and multi-ethnicity brought about
by growing immigration are key aspects of the new European society.
European citizenship departs from this new European society.
3. Historical development
The history of the European integration process shows a
development from a (neo) functional, utilitarian and largely economic
project to a more complex and mixed political undertaking. It is set in a
globalising context and is today based on the institutional structure of
the Treaty of Lisbon, characterised by an emerging European citizenship
and the development of a transnational democracy. The first decades of
the European integration process functioned on the political paradigm of
the Westphalian international system. A democratic approach to
international life outside of the national borders was not at all required.
There was equality between nationality, identity and citizenship. The
Treaty of Maastricht (1992) breaks down that linear perspective and
establishes a political framework for a broader and deeper integration of
European states and regions, built on a European dimension of
citizenship.
1) Road towards a European citizenship
The right to the free movement of persons inside the European
Community was introduced in the constituent treaty of the EEC, signed
in Rome in 1957. This freedom did not appear bound to any citizenship
concept but was closely linked to the conduct of an economic activity.
In consequence, the right of residence was accorded to workers and their
families, linked to the right to exercise a labour activity in another
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member state of the EEC. Although in a meeting of the European
Council, held in Paris in 1974, the necessity to grant special rights in the
EEC to the citizens of the member states was put forward.
It was only in 1976, however, when the Tindemans Report was
issued, that for the first time, the object of proceeding beyond a common
market and creating a community of citizens, was clearly proposed. This
report, edited by the Belgian prime minister at the request of the Summit
of Paris 1974, had no success with the governments, though it had an
important influence on later steps towards integration. In a chapter,
titled “Europe of the Citizens”, Tindemans proposed the enactment of
different measures that made perceptible, by means of outward signs,
the rise of a European awareness: unification of passports, the vanishing
of border controls, the common use of the benefits of the social security
systems, the accreditation of academic courses and degrees, etc.
In 1976 a second step took place, when elections to the European
Parliament by universal suffrage were conducted. Although
Parliament’s competences were meagre, for the first time, one of the key
elements of citizenship, democratic participation, appeared. Later on,
after the Fontainebleau European Council in 1984, a Committee of
Europe of the Citizens, presided over by the Italian Euro MP Adonnino,
was established. This committee approved a series of unambitious
proposals leading to the constitution of a European citizenship. More
audacious was the Project “Treaty of European Union”, passed by the
European Parliament in February 1984, and presented by the Euro MP
Alterio Spinelli (The Spinelli Project). In spite of its restraint, the Single
European Act (1986) hardly included any of the Spinelli project
proposals, although it adopted, and this is fundamental, the objective of
a political European Union. In this manner, a few years later, two
intergovernmental conferences were convened to reform the treaties.
One of them focused on the Economic and Monetary Union, the other
solely on the Political Union.
A meeting of the European Council, which took place in Rome in
October 1990, in the course of establishing the Intergovernmental
Conference (IGC) guidelines, introduced the notion of European
Citizenship as an essential element of treaty reform, and with some
characteristics and similar rights to those that were later included in the
Treaty of the European Union and the Treaty of Maastricht. In October
1990, it was the Spanish delegation that first presented a text on the
European citizenship to the IGCs. After diverse negotiations, and with
the enthusiastic support of the European Parliament that passed two
favourable resolutions in 1991, the Treaty of the European Union came
finally to institutionalise European citizenship.
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The first steps towards the construction of European institutions did
not make any changes to the political paradigm. The first decades of the
European unification functioned on that basis. The Treaty of Rome, for
instance, stipulates that its main purpose is the creation of a stronger
Union among European people, but these people remained abstract and
were in no way democratically involved in it. The real legal subjects of
the treaty, the members of the European economic community it created,
i.e. the legal personalities acting within the treaty, were the states and
“only” the states. The action of the citizen was accepted only within
their national boundaries, never outside, because citizens had neither an
identity nor a nationality outside of their dependence on a particular
state, and there could be no “citizenship” without the two other notions.
This is the origin of what has been rightly called the “democratic
deficit” of the Union.
The Treaty of Maastricht breaks down that perspective. In
establishing a European citizenship, it introduces the idea that it is no
longer necessary to establish an interdependence of the three notions as
in the past. Sure, it is specified that the new European citizenship should
be recognised exclusively for those individuals possessing the
nationality of one of the member states, but the fact that there is now a
common citizenship applying to many nationalities establishes a
fundamental shift between the two.
2) Implications
The Treaty of Maastricht represents a first step towards the end of
the necessary interdependence of these notions. But this also means that
an active citizenship will develop within a new framework – not of a
closed state on a limited territory, but open beyond the borders of
nations. Europe is definitely involved in favouring the development of a
transnational democracy, a completely new concept in the history of
human society. The scope of what is traditionally called the “civil
society” will therefore take on a completely new dimension. It seems
that the institutions of the nation-states as well as those of the European
Union are not yet fully adapted to that new reality. The very idea and
acceptance of a European citizenship is breaking new mental barriers.
Furthermore, a similar consequence will apply to the notion of
identity. If one imagines that the idea of citizenship can relate to a
multiplicity of nationalities, it is also feasible that a multiplicity of
identities could be envisaged under the traditional notion of nationality.
In spite of the fact that each nation inherited from history its own typical
political culture, this constituted only part of their national identities. In
fact, these are composed of many other aspects and internal differences
including languages, traditions, expressions of art and regional and local
originalities, which together constitute a larger internal diversity in each
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of the nations themselves. The unity of a nation is not necessarily
contradictory to the idea of a multiplicity of identities within it.
The further integration of Europe will indeed strongly contribute to
changing the mentality and conception of the state system as it has
developed over recent centuries. While its role becomes less essential in
many sectors of economic life through the supranational transfer of
decision-making powers to common authorities, similar developments
affect its role infra-nationally by the need to adapt to multiple demands
of autonomy, identity recognition, and decentralisation. In the coming
decades it is obvious − this being accentuated by migration and mobility 
of work forces within the Union − that demands for the recognition of 
particular identities and minority rights will strongly develop (founded
on languages, cultures, religions, ethnicity, gender, sexual behaviours,
etc.) within national structures, while at the same time requests for more
citizen participation at the supranational or transnational levels will
become current, in the name of new European citizen rights that the
traditional states can no longer master. This has been exacerbated
globally by the current financial and economic crisis.
In short, Europe is therefore evolving towards a social and political
body in which one will be able to distinguish a common European
citizenship, multiple state citizenships and political systems, within
which there will develop a growing awareness of multiple different
cultural identities. Of course, this path of destiny is interpreted
differently by different European member states.
4. European citizenship
1) Universal basis
Universal citizenship is the grant provided by the “new”
International Law, which is rooted in the United Nations Charter and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In virtue of this Ius Novum
Universale, all human beings are endowed with the same legal statute in
the world constitutional space. The rationale of universal citizenship is
to include all, i.e. ad omnes includendos.
2) European dimension of citizenship
The European integration process is aiming at the building of an ever
-closer Union between the peoples of Europe. The idea and institution of
European citizenship should therefore be the framework in which the
European peoples identify themselves as the European demos, living in
a broad cultural space and belonging to a large and differentiated polity.
A new European citizenship, combining the post-national and
multicultural form, appears as a model for democratic community where
all citizens are treated equally, exhibiting universal rights as well as
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rights relevant to their group differences. Therefore, the European Union
is required to quickly harmonise the present “EU Citizenship” rationale
with the correct citizenship rationale that stems from the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights.
European citizenship also means plural and active citizenship. Its
immediate implication is that all residents in a given territory, as human
beings having the same legal status internationally recognised, should
enjoy the same fundamental political, civil, economic, social, cultural
rights and liberties. In this perspective, plural and active European
citizenship is strictly linked to democracy in its different political,
economic and social dimensions, in its various representative,
participatory, deliberative forms and in its local, national and
international expressions.
The immediate implication is the building of a new model of
European citizenship, which includes universal and multicultural rights.
European citizenship is based not only on nationality, but also on legal
residence. It means that legal long-term third country nationals should
be recognised as Union citizens. It also implies that economically non-
active citizens of the EU member states should enjoy free movement
and residence rights, which are not conditioned by their possession of
the sufficient means for subsistence and health insurance. It should also
result in the abolishment of all transitional periods concerning the free
movement of workers for citizens of new member states of the EU.
3) Legal statute of the citizenship of the Union: citizens’ rights
The Treaty of the European Union or Treaty of Maastricht
established the citizenship of the European Union. The foremost
purpose of the institutionalisation of this new legal status was, according
to European Community institutions, to strengthen and enhance the
European identity and enable European citizens to participate in the
community integration process in a more intense way.
European citizens condition was reserved to every person that had
the nationality of a member state. The European citizenship did not
substitute but rather supplemented the citizenship of each state. In
consequence, the laws of each state – quite different in many cases –
were to regulate access to the Citizenship of the Union:
Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the
nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of
the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship (Treaty of
Amsterdam, 1997).
Member states citizens already enjoyed a series of rights on account
of the application of the laws that regulated the European common
market (free movement of goods and services, consumer protection,
Globalisation vs Europeanisation: a Human-centric Interaction
252
public health, equal opportunities...). The Citizenship of the Union
added some rights that are summarised in the following articles:
The right to free movement of persons in the member states territory.
Article 18 (ex Article 8a):
Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely
within the territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and
conditions laid down in this Treaty and by the measures adopted to give it
effect (Treaty of Nice, 2001).
The right to vote and stand in local government and European
Parliament elections in the country of residence. Article 19 (ex Article
8b):
(1) Every citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he is not
a national shall have the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at
municipal elections in the Member State in which he resides, under the same
conditions as nationals of that State.
This right shall be exercised subject to detailed arrangements
adopted by the European Council, acting unanimously on a proposal
from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament;
these arrangements may provide for derogations where warranted by
problems specific to a Member State;
(2) [...] every citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he is
not a national shall have the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in
elections to the European Parliament in the Member State in which he
resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State [...] (Treaty of
Amsterdam, 1997).
The right to have diplomatic and consular protection from the
authorities of any Member State where the country of which a person is
a national is not represented in a non-Union country; Article 20 (ex
Article 8c):
Every citizen of the Union shall, in the territory of a third country in which
the Member State of which he is a national is not represented, be entitled to
protection by the diplomatic or consular authorities of any Member State, on
the same conditions as the nationals of that State. Member States shall
establish the necessary rules among themselves and start the international
negotiations required to secure this protection (Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997).
The right of petition to the European Parliament and appeal to the
European Ombudsman. Article 21 (ex Article 8d):
Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to petition the European
Parliament [...]; Every citizen of the Union may apply to the Ombudsman
[...] (Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997).
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To these rights, the Treaty of Amsterdam added other two less
important new rights: (1) The right of writing to the European
institutions in one of the official languages (Spanish, Portuguese,
French, Italian, English, Gaelic Irish, Dutch, German, Danish, Swedish,
Finnish and Greek) and being answered in that same language; and (2)
The right to access European Parliament, Commission and Council
documents, except in the cases legally agreed. These last two rights, as
well as petition rights to the European Parliament and application rights
to the Ombudsman, are also applicable to every resident in the member
states, despite not being nationals of them.
So far, citizenship of the Union, contrary to national citizenship, does
not impose any duties on the citizens of the member states. Citizenship
of the Union is considered as a legal status to be developed. Every three
years, the European Commission’s reports on citizenship of the Union
assess the application of European Community rules on citizens’ rights
and propose concrete measures to further their complete and effective
implementation.2 One of the initiatives to improve this information on
European citizens’ rights has been the setting up of a web site for
citizens.3 This site provides practical information.
Next to the new legal statute of the Citizenship of the Union, the
Treaty of Amsterdam introduced some advances with regard to human
rights. Other rights guaranteed within the Union are: (i) equality of all
citizens to access the civil service in the institutions of the European
Union; (ii) the non-discrimination principle by reason of nationality.
Article 12 (ex Article 6): “Within the scope of application of this Treaty,
and without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any
discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited”. (Treaty of
Amsterdam, 1997); and (iii) the non-discrimination principle by reason
of sex, race or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual
orientation. Article 13 (ex Article 6a):
Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and within the limits
of the powers conferred by it upon the Community, the Council, acting
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the
European Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat discrimination
based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or
sexual orientation.
Finally, it is necessary to highlight that the European Commission
has emphasised the fact that education will be the key element for
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Maastricht and included in the Treaty of Amsterdam constitute the
beginnings of a process that, from a pro-Europe view, will lead to a
citizenship of the Union in which rights and duties will be connected to
daily life and will be the basis on which Europeans will support a
significant part of their identity.
In 1995, the European Commission set up a Group of Reflection on
Education and Formation, comprising of 25 independent experts of the
then fifteen member countries and presided over then by a French
member of the commission, Edith Cresson. In December 1996, this
panel subscribed a report titled “Building Europe by means of Education
and Training”. The following year, in December of 1998, the
commission approved a document titled “Learning for active
citizenship”.4 Edith Cresson claimed in the foreword:
The fostering of competencies and convictions capable of enhancing the
quality of social relations rests on the natural alliance of education and
training with equality and social justice. Citizenship with a European
dimension is anchored in the shared creation of a voluntary community of
peoples, of different cultures and of different traditions – the creation of a
democratic society which has learned to embrace diversity sincerely as a
positive opportunity, a society of openness and solidarity for each and every
one of us.
The future of the citizenship of the Union will depend on the
evolution of the public opinion of its members states regarding national
and European citizenship. For many, the rights included in the
citizenship statute are limited. The most significant is, with no doubt,
the free movement and residence of persons. Although there has been
remarkable progress since the Treaty of Rome, where free movement
was strictly bound to labour activity, there are still some serious
limitations that should be eliminated. Despite the different agreements
reached, any country can re-establish control of its border whenever its
security is considered threatened and residence freedom continues to
have different sorts of restrictions.
Also other rights only affect the daily life of European people in a
negligible way: the right of appeal to the European Ombudsman only
deals with matters under EU jurisdiction; the right of petition to the
European Parliament already existed and has to do with a parliament
with very scarce competences; the right to vote and stand in local
government and European Parliament elections in the country of
residence affects a minority of Europeans, the right to have diplomatic




concerns solely those Europeans who visit a country in which there are
no embassies or consulates from its own state.
In short, European citizenship lies still midway between the more
theoretical or soft conception of citizenship (exhibiting a sense of
belonging to a community with shared common goals and values) and
the practical or strong citizenship with real rights that can be claimed
from juridical institutions to protect the exercising of these rights. Still,
Europe is evolving towards a social and political body in which one will
be able to distinguish a common European citizenship, multiple state
citizenships and political systems, within which there will develop a
growing awareness of multiple and different cultural identities. An
important step in this direction was the inclusion of the European
Charter of Fundamental Rights in the Treaty of the European Union.
II. Connection between Identity, Nationality and
Citizenship
Citizenship of the Union is not a consolidated reality; rather, it is part
of a long process that will shape the European integration process by
interconnecting identity, nationality and citizenship. To fully develop a
meaningful European citizenship it is therefore necessary that a sort of
European identity emerges beyond nationality. Just like the compulsory
educational systems had the main task of building up national identities,
the role of schools and universities in fostering a sense of belonging and
European identity is of the utmost importance.
Nationality expresses how individuals are connected to a particular
political entity or state, based on a given and well determined territory,
and to the authority which governs that state. It expresses the
recognition by a state towards the individuals it considers as its own
members. This recognition is acquired by birth (i.e. natural nationhood)
or through a process of naturalisation given by a state according to its
own law of nationality.
Nationality is also a kind of belonging, but one that individuals do
not really master; they are more subjects, subjected to and depending on
a particular state. To have a nationality however, gives some rights and
guarantees of being protected by the state. But the fact of restricting the
right of nationality to state powers can be a source of discrimination and
exclusion, and often of intolerant attitudes. This could indeed become an
instrument of legalising certain prejudices of identity when migration
and asylum policies in the EU become stricter.
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1. Inclusion or exclusion
Since its birth in ancient Greece, the concept of citizenship has
experienced dramatic changes. But citizenship has always been based on
an exclusion rule of defining clearly who are and mainly who are not
citizens.
The only way to access citizenship of the Union is by having one of
the member state nationalities. This causes a paradoxical situation: the
same person coming from a third country with the same circumstances
will be treated in a very different way. In some states, this person would
acquire their nationality and, therefore, would become a European
citizen; whereas in other states, this individual would be excluded from
their nationality and European citizenship. This diverse treatment is
related to a different legal base for citizenship acquisition, i.e. “ius
sanguinis” or “ius soli”.
Citizenship of the Union excludes third country nationals that live
within its frontiers. In fact, the permeability of the interior frontiers
introduced by the Agreement and Convention of Schengen has been
accompanied by raising more barriers in the Union’s external frontiers
and by hardening the asylum right procedures. One great dilemma that
Europe currently faces is how to build a Union based on national
identities while excluding third country nationals who already make up
a conspicuous part of Europe’s human landscape. These peoples are a
significant element of Europe and, therefore, of the European identity,
which European citizenship is based on. Since the tragic events of
September 11th 2001 in New York, a more conservative and reductive
view on what is Europe has been adopted by most EU member states.
2. Democratic participation
After the signature of the Treaty of the European Union in 1992, the
democratic deficit became more manifest. Important competences have
been transferred from national institutions that are elected and
democratically legitimated, to European institutions that are not always
legitimised by people’s votes. Members of the European Commission
are named by their national governments. The Council of the European
Union, despite a growing number of decisions adopted by a majority,
continues to be an intergovernmental institution. Finally, the European
Parliament, the sole institution legitimated by suffrage, has scarce
competences and its decisions and debate are mostly ignored by public
opinion. All those institutions are quite distant from the European




The only way to build up a genuine European citizenship should be
based on solving this democratic deficit. Citizenship is not a passive
condition, based on an enjoyment of a series of rights and freedoms – it
should be an active citizenship, based on political and civic
participation. National citizenship has been constructed historically
through this kind of social participation. This involvement has often
adopted the shape of clashes and conflicts, which, in the long term, have
developed a set of civil, political and social rights and duties, and a
conscience of identity. The Lisbon Treaty has made some progress in
the European citizenship building process.
3. Emergence of a European identity
The concept of the European identity is, at the least, problematic. To
some extent, a great number of EU citizens feel themselves to be
Europeans, but the majority feel more intensely their belonging to
France, Portugal, Spain, or Catalonia, Scotland or Flanders.5 Identities
are not easily separated and often, different feelings of affinity to ethnic
or racial groups, genders, political ideas, cultural affinities, etc. are
mingled.
A genuine European Union requires an added European identity,
based on a community of shared values, rooted in legal texts and applied
with a European specificity to the challenges of today’s globalisation.
As explained in Chapter 3, a European identity will not arise from an
impossible cultural uniformity; neither should it be built against other
civilisations but it should be fully embedded in the conceptual driving
forces of the European process of integration as explained in Chapter 8.
One of the most suggestive theories in this field comes from Jürgen
Habermas. According to Habermas, citizens should not be identified
with a common cultural identity, but with some constitutional principles
that fully guarantee their rights and freedoms. This proposal is very
suggestive, because it comes from the best liberal and tolerant traditions
of Europe, and escapes from and fights against ethnic nationalism, the
great foe of peace and freedom in early 21st century Europe.
4. European Citizenship in a cosmopolitan perspective
In Chapter 6 the cosmopolitan perspective of multi-level governance in
Europe was analysed in general terms; here it is used to assess European
citizenship. European citizenship not only includes a set of rights and
responsibilities, but also contains an important symbolic value. Even if
the concept remains linked to national belongingness, the existence of a
common citizenship applying to many nationalities and covering
5 Flash Eurobarometer 217, Intercultural dialogue in Europe.
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multiple identities establishes a fundamental shift in the relation
between identity, nationality and citizenship. This innovative legal
status produces political implications as it favours transnational
democracy and the development of a European public sphere.6
Moreover, the recognition of a multiplicity of identities can be
simultaneously envisaged under the traditional notion of nationality as
well as under the notion of European citizenship. Amartya Sen’s
argument on the multiplicity of identities7 finds in this context a
possibility of implementation, even if European citizenship is only
addressed to member state nationals. However, if European identity
could be based on the principle of inclusiveness, EU citizenship should
also be obtained by legal long-term third country nationals. Antonio
Papisca argues that the sense of belongingness to a European political
community can be achieved if individuals and peoples will be its
principal actors.8 Sharing projects and participating in the decision-
making process is therefore the only way for Europeans to be inspired,
motivated and committed to Europe.
In the cosmopolitan view,9 European citizenship is a step towards a
global citizenship. Europe is conceived as a political laboratory for a
new supranational and transcendental democracy, but the outcome of
this process cannot be a mere translation of functions from the national
to the European level.
The horizon for active citizenship is the European and world space of
internationally recognised human rights. The EU provides the evolutionary
context and spatial horizon in which plural citizenship and inclusion
practices can be implemented. Citizenship rights therefore must be exercised
in a broader constitutional space, expressing both legitimisation of decision-
making and citizen’s participation in the formation of a global civil society.
With this approach, the universal human rights paradigm is the
fundamental point of departure for conceiving of a citizenship “ad
omnes includendos”.10 It is therefore worthwhile to focus both on the set
of values adopted in the treaties as constitutive of European identity and
on the process of codification of human rights.
6 Bekemans, L. and L. Morganti (eds.), The European Public Sphere. From critical
thinking to responsible action, Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 300 p., 2012.
7 Sen, A., Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny, op.cit.
8 Papisca, A., Riflessioni in tema di cittadinanza europea e diritti umani, Padova, in
Pace Diritti Umani, 1/2004, pp.39-58.
9 Beck, U. and E. Grande, op. cit.
10 Papisca, A., Citizenship and Citizenships Ad Omnes Includendos: A Human Rights
Approach, in L. Bekemans, M. Karasinska-Fendler, M. Mascia, A. Papisca, C.A.





What is European can be termed by forms of identity, ways of life,
means of production and types of interaction that go beyond national or
regional frontiers. It is about continuous border-crossing. The
intertwining of globalisation and Europeanisation has various policy
consequences and produce different lines of thought and action.
The dismantling of the national borders in Europe has an impact on
the European dynamic of socio-economic inequalities. The social
dimension of the European integration process has policy implications
within and beyond European borders, in particular in relation to internal
and external solidarity and the sense of belongingness.
Europeanisation is initiating a historically new positive sum game:
joint solutions serve the national interest. In some occasions and policies
the EU is sometimes better placed to solve problems than nations or
regions could possibly be by acting alone. From a cosmopolitan
perspective, this diversity (whether in languages, economic systems,
political cultures, or forms of democracy) appears primarily as an
inexhaustible source of Europe’s cosmopolitan self-concept and not as
an obstacle to integration. A cosmopolitan Europe is first and foremost a
Europe of difference of recognised particularity.
A third line of thought and action is that Europeanisation requires a
collective memory culture that spans borders, an “Europeanisation of
perspective”. This might lead to genuine intercultural dialogue and
mutual learning, conceived as an enrichment of one’s own integral
human development.
The fourth line is the understanding of European society as a
regional world risk society. Reference is made to the theory of reflexive
modernisation.11 Beck distinguishes three constitutive elements, namely,
the theorem of risk society, the theorem of forced individualisation and
the theorem of multidimensional globalisation. It means that the
experience and dynamics of modernity bear risks in the sense that along
with its success, modernity also contains negative consequences. This
requires policy coordination and the rule setting of both obstacles and
opportunities in European and global context.
The fifth concluding line concerns the understanding and shaping of
new forms of political authority that have emerged in Europe beyond the
nation-state. The management of the globalisation effects, specifically
11 Beck, U., The Theory of Reflexive Modernization: Problematic, Hypotheses and
Research Programme, in Theory, Culture & Society, April 2003 20: 1-33.
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the problems related to the flows and crises of global finance and the
neglected European dimension of current socio-political developments,
requires a more courageous approach, in respect of the various levels
and actors involved in the process.
So Europe is indeed involved in favouring the development of a
“transnational democracy”. The process of European integration
strongly contributes to changing the mentality and conception of the
state system. The role of the state becomes less essential in many sectors
of economic life through the supranational transfer of decision-making
powers to common authorities; similar developments affect its role
regionally through the need to adapt to multiple demands of autonomy,
identity recognition, and decentralisation. In short, it seems obvious that
with the process of globalisation, demands for the recognition of
particular identities and minority rights will strongly develop within
national and regional structures, while at the same time requests for
more citizen participation at the supranational or transnational levels
will become more evident, in the name of new European citizens’ rights.
2. Policy suggestions
In this perspective we may conclude that (1) European citizenship
provides the framework in which the European peoples identify
themselves as the European demos, living in a broad cultural space and
belonging to a large and differentiated polity; (2) the European
citizenship appears as a model for a democratic community where all
citizens are treated equally, exhibiting universal rights as well as rights
relevant to their group differences; and finally (3) that European
citizenship refers to a plural and active citizenship. Its immediate
implication is that all residents in a given territory should enjoy the
same fundamental political, civil, economic, social, cultural rights and
liberties.
In practice, this would mean a strengthening of the policy of local
authorities to encourage and provide the material basis for a building up
of local communities of civic society and supported with the subsidiarity
principle. The integration and participation of citizens in urban contexts
should be encouraged and supported with the exploitation of accessible
community programmes but also with the greater involvement of
local/regional authorities and actors of the territorial multi-level
governance system.
Citizen participation should be promoted locally where basic needs
are met to create a sense of community between those sharing basic
interests. A dialoguing element should not only be stressed in the areas
related to education and culture but in all areas where the common
interest in basic community needs may turn into common purpose, thus
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creating an integrating societal factor by setting common purposes
beyond ethnic, mental and cultural borders within local communities.
There exists more potential fora for citizenship building than those
usually associated with interculturalism and dialogue. In the case of
infrastructure projects, the integration of local community stakeholders
into debates over the common good may lead to intercultural “learning
by doing”. This potential should be reinforced horizontally among
various European Community action programmes beyond those
administered by DG Education and Culture. They may create added
value of promoting dialogue, tolerance and solidarity exactly where it
should happen, i.e. at the regional and local level and in daily life.
The cross-border cooperation programmes and programmes
addressed to the third countries with the participation of EU member
states should take into account the intercultural element while providing
for the transfer of knowledge and best practices in the fields not
necessarily directly linked to culture, education, media or social policy
issues. The sharing of common goals offers the first steps to
communication with others, while working together may lead to
increased understanding and mutual respect and trust.
In the next chapter the focus is on education of citizenship. This is
fundamental for peaceful coexistence and the building up a sustainable
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Introduction
In this chapter, the conceptual framework of human-centric
sustainable statehood is applied to the field of education, conceived as a
priority policy area of value-oriented European citizenship building. The
first section deals with the crucial role of education in citizenship-
building, focussing on the responsibility, objectives, competences and
aspects of education for integral human development. The second
section concerns education policies in Europe, with a focus on the
European lifelong learning agenda of citizenship building.
I. The Crucial Role of Education in EU Citizenship-
building
1. Points of departure
1) The right to education
Education is a fundamental human right and important for the
exercise of other human rights. It promotes individual freedom and
empowerment and yields important development benefits. Freedom of
education has been guaranteed in international and European law.
Following articles constitute the universal, international and European
legal framework for the right to education.
The right to education has been universally recognised in Article 26
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948):
(1) Everyone has the right to education: Education shall be free, at least in
the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be
compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally
available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis
of merit. (2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the
human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms.1
Article 2 Protocol 1 of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedom (Rome, 1950) says,
1 http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/
Globalisation vs Europeanisation: a Human-centric Interaction
264
that no person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any
functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, The
State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching
in conformity with their own religions and philosophical convictions.2
Article 13 paragraph 1 of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (1966) clearly states that education
shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and the
sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms [and] that education shall enable all persons to
participate effectively in a free society, promote understanding, tolerance
and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups,
and further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of
peace.3
Henceforth, rights, respect and participation are bound firmly
together. Education in this full sense embraces personal formation, not
merely the transmission of information, or professional training. It thus
enhances social, cultural and economic development, active citizenship
and fundamental moral values. The impact of the global economic
downturn on education systems if the right to education is not fully
protected has been dramatically illustrated by UNESCO, in its
“Education for all - Global Monitoring Report 2010. Reaching the
marginalized”.4
Article 14 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (2000)
defines the right to education as follows:
1. Everyone has the right to education and to have access to vocational and
continuing training; 2. This right includes the possibility to receive free
compulsory education; 3. The freedom to found educational establishments
with due respect for democratic principles and the right of parents to ensure
the education and teaching of their children in conformity with their
religious, philosophical and pedagogical convictions shall be respected, in
accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of such freedom
and right.5
As well as being a right in itself, the right to education is also an
enabling right. If people have access to education they can develop the
skills, capacity and confidence to secure other rights. Education gives
people the ability to access information and to grow in knowledge. It
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rights, the confidence to speak in a variety of forums, and the ability to
negotiate with a wide range of authorities and power holders. In other
words, some preconditions are needed to make education a meaningful
right. Katarina Tomasevski, the former UN Special Rapporteur on the
Right to Education developed the concept of the 4 A’s:6 education
should be available, accessible, acceptable and adaptable. Of course
these conditions are to be cherished, elaborated and strengthened, in
respect of the key objectives of education.
2) The key role of education in human integral development
Education plays a central role in the development of both human
beings and modern societies as it enhances social, cultural and economic
development, active citizenship and ethical values. Education is to build
peace, foster dialogue and enhance understanding in order “to build
peace in the minds of men” as enshrined in UNESCO’s Constitution
(1945) and further developed in its various recommendations,
declarations, resolutions and initiatives.7 To be educated is to learn and
to be able to feel free of any kind of dependence, submission or fear. It
is to be able to create, to think, to imagine, to dream – all distinctive and
decisive capacities of the human condition. This ideal is summarised in
the Delors Report, “Education for 21st Century. Learning: the Treasure
Within” (1996) which argues that the education process rests on four
pillars: learn to know; learn to do; learn to be; learn to live together.8
6 http://www.right-to-education.org/
7 It is useful to recall the major general UN contributions to education since 1990:
Education for All (1990); Agenda 21 for the Environment (1993); World Plan of
Action for Education on Human Rights and Democracy (1993); Vienna Conference
on Human Rights (1993); The Contribution by Religions to the Culture of Peace
(1994); Declaration of Principles on Tolerance (1995); Copenhagen Declaration on
Social Development (1995); Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing
Declaration (1995); International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-violence for
the Children of the World (1998); Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture
of Peace (1999); UN Millennium Declaration (2000); The Earth Charter of
Amsterdam (2000); Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (UNESCO, 2001);
Declaration on Dialogue among Civilizations (2003); Culture of Peace (UN
Recommendations A/Res/63/113, 26 February 2005); The Hague Agenda on City
Diplomacy (2008); Charter for a World without Violence (2009); etc.
8 Delors Report, Education for 21st Century Learning: the Treasure Within, Report to
UNESCO of the International Commission on Education for the Twenty-first
Century, Paris: Unesco Publishing, 1996. The report focuses on the relationship
between education and the six subject areas of development, science, citizenship,
culture, social cohesion, and work. The report focuses on the relationship between
education and the six subject areas of development, science, citizenship, culture,
social cohesion, and work.
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The current crisis of socialisation and value transmission has made
the task of education difficult but vital for society building.9 The crucial
role of education should therefore be reset within the dramatic
acceleration in the speed of social change brought about by the process
of globalisation. Reference can be made to the works of sociologists
such as Zygmunt Baumann, Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens, writing
about education in a liquid society, a risk society or a reflexive
modernity.10 In such a changing context of processes of transformation
at the global level, we are being urged to rethink the meaning of
education, as well as the uses and practices of teaching and learning, the
opportunities for communicating interaction offered by new
technologies and the dangers of commodification of human relations
caused by the new relation between culture and economy.
2. Objectives and competences
Education is a dynamic process of learning, which creates added
value and forms a person’s integral development. It should transmit
possibilities and opportunities with conviction, intuition and motivation.
It is always a meeting with the other: hence the role of teachers as key
agents for change and the need to accompany and respect their role in
the educational landscape. Also, Europe and the international context
are an integral part of the general educational project as well as of each
individual learning path. This implies the need to transmit in an open
and critical way ideals and principles that valorise the person at the
centre of education systems and national curricula, recognising the
European and international context.
Education’s first task is to form (young) people into responsible
citizens, and to provide them with information, knowledge,
competences, skills and an open-minded behaviour, in line with
fundamental values such as peace and tolerance of diversity. Key
competences refer to knowledge, skills and attitudes that serve personal
fulfilment, social inclusion and active citizenship. These include the
traditional competences but also the more transversal ones such as
9 See Education together in Catholic schools, published by the Congregation of
Catholic Education, Rome, September 2007.
10 Bauman, Z., Liquid Modernity, Cambridge: Polity, 2000; Ibid., Europe: An
Unfinished Adventure, Cambridge: Polity, 1994; Ibid., Liquid Times: Living in an
Age of Uncertainty, Cambridge: Polity, 2006; Giddens, A., Europe in the Global Age,
op. cit.; Habermas, J., Europe. The Faltering Project, Cambridge: Polity, 2009.
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learning to learn, social and civic competences, cultural awareness and
expressions.11
Intercultural competences are becoming an integral part of what the
UNESCO report directed by J. Delors (1996) had termed as “learning to
live together”. Intercultural competences are abilities to effectively and
appropriately interact in complex environments marked by growing
diversity of peoples, cultures and lifestyles.12 It implies that the scope of
intercultural competences goes beyond formal education and school
learning. The UNESCO World Report Investing in Cultural Diversity
and Intercultural Dialogue13 introduced the term of cultural literacy, i.e.
a fundamental resource for benefitting from multiple learning places
(from family and tradition to the media, and to informal groups and
activities) and an indispensable tool for transcending clashes of
ignorances. The Intersectoral Platform for a Culture of Peace and Non-
Violence of UNESCO published in 2013 a very useful conceptual and
operational framework for addressing intercultural competences.14
Therefore, intercultural competences empower participating groups
and individuals and enable them to interact with cultural others with a
view to bridging differences, defusing conflicts and setting the
foundations of peaceful conviviality. In this context, reference to Edgar
Morin, the French sociologist, is essential. He proposes four objectives
in the transmission of knowledge and the activities of teaching:15 (i) to
form a well-developed mind (better than a too full mind); (ii) to teach
the human condition; (iii) to educate to live (learning does not mean
only the acquisition of knowledge, techniques and productive modes,
but also an interest in the relations with the other and with oneself); and
(iv) to learn the dignity of the citizen.
11 The European dimension of such an education is well captured by Zani, A.V.,
Formare l’uoumo europeo: sfide educativie e politiche culturali, Roma: Città nuova,
2005.
12 Fantini, A. and A. Tirmizi, Exploring and assessing Intercultural Competence,
World Learning Publications, Paper 1, 2006.
13 UNESCO, Investing in Cultural diversity and Intercultural dialogue, 2009.
14 UNESCO, Intercultural Competences.Conceptual and Operational Framework,
Paris: UNESCO, 2013.
15 Morin, E., Réforme de la pensée et éducation au XXIe siècle, in Les Clés du
XXIe siècle, J. Bindé (ed.), Paris: UNESCO/Seuil, 2000, pp. 271-275.
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3. Citizenship education: education to active and responsible
citizenship in a plural Europe
1) Definition: a dynamic concept
If education has the priority task of transmitting knowledge and
competences that give scope and responsibility to the development of
each person,16 some fundamental questions need to be addressed
concerning citizenship education. These relate to (i) education of and for
all; (ii) education of humanity: this involves cross-cutting the dichotomy
between an “humanistic” education and a “professional” education; (iii)
education for change: this deals with the meaning of creativity and the
use of a critical mind; (iv) education to master a variety of languages;
and finally (v) permanent education in the search of values: this implies
surpassing the so-called contradiction between tradition and innovation.
In the education processes and transmission of knowledge it is not
sufficient to affirm the principle of the centrality of the person. The
educator and the teacher have to act within the socio-cultural context,
responding to the challenges of global interconnectedness and
complexity, cultural disintegration and the dispersion and fragmentation
of knowledge. This requires an integration of a diverse range of learning
sources and levels.
As stated above, Europe is part of such a learning process. The
question however remains open as to what extent a common vision,
founded on common goods, can survive in a context of economic
globalisation and cultural relativism. The problems of social inequality
and poverty, values of solidarity, responsibility and respect for
differences, as well as the non-accessibility of the benefits of
globalisation, have to be tackled by various forms of learning.
In short, the current situation requires an inspiring vision and a
strategy that embodies such a vision. Europe cannot be taught as a
technical project, but demands breadth of vision and engagement.
Education has the task of being an agent of change and has the
responsibility to revitalise Europe’s original project and consequently,
mobilise its citizens, particularly its youth. This can only be done
through (formal, informal and non-formal) education to active
citizenship which stimulates the commitment of (young) people to the
European project, a plural Europe, a Europe of dialogue and an
intercultural Europe.
16 Commission of the European Communities, Schools for the 21st century, Staff
Working Paper, Brussels, 11/07/07.
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The notion of responsible citizenship includes an awareness and
knowledge of rights and duties. It is closely related to civic values such
as democracy and human rights, equality, participation, partnership,
social cohesion, social justice as well as the knowledge and exercise of
rights and responsibilities. This goes beyond the legal status and judicial
relationship between citizen and state. A citizen is a person who coexists
in a society.
As was explained in Chapter 12, societies have changed in recent
decades and, with them, the theoretical conceptions and practical
implementation of citizenship. The concept is steadily broadening and
changing, as lifestyles and patterns in our relations with others become
more diversified. Far from being limited to the national context, the
notion of harmonious coexistence among citizens relates to the concept
of a community embracing all contexts – local, regional, national and
international – in which individuals live. Much work has been done in
this regard by the Council of Europe.17
The link between citizenship and education is very close. Today’s
challenge is to strengthen citizenship building in societies and develop
learning modes that respond to the citizens’ need for information,
knowledge, capacity and quality, to deal with the societal developments
of today’s world. This is the core of the pedagogical approach to
citizenship. However, the teaching of citizenship is not sufficient; it is
the learning of citizenship that is essential. This consists of the
development of intercultural skills in context, by acquiring operating,
social and communicative competences through practice, experience and
dialogue in formal and non-formal instruction. As a consequence, the
concept of citizenship could (and should) be integrated into the
educational process in a very integrated way with a horizontal focus
from different perspectives.
Moreover, active and responsible citizenship is a lifelong process.
Learning citizenship is interactive and deeply embedded in specific
formal, non-formal and informal contexts. Support should therefore also
be given to citizenship learning within civil society as well as within the
informal setting of the family. Teaching people to learn to become
active citizens implies giving them access to the capacities and skills
17 We refer to: Final Declaration Second Summit of Heads of State and Government of
the Council of Europe (Strasbourg, 10-11 October 1997); Committee of Ministers’
Declaration and Programme on Education for Democratic Citizenship, Based on the
Rights and the Responsibilities of the Citizens (Strasbourg, 1999); Recommendation
on Education for Democratic Citizenship (Strasbourg, 2002); Recommendation on
the Charter on Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education
(CM/Rec (2010)7), etc.
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they need to participate efficiently in economic, political and social life.
This also means the knowledge of languages.
In fact, the educational dimension of European citizenship has as
much to do with rights as with responsibilities and duties. Accordingly,
European citizenship cannot be merely reduced to forms of individual
participation in political life or to bilateral economic relations, but
should take into account the acquisition of skills that have been
previously acquired during the formal and non-formal process of
education. This process should be favoured from below by concrete
projects at the local and regional citizens’ level with exchanges between
schools, students and teachers. Extra-curricular opportunities for
citizenship learning should therefore also be encouraged through
international exchanges.18 In summary, the concept of citizenship
education relates to educating (young) people to become responsible
citizens, who are capable of contributing to the development and
wellbeing of the society in which they live.19
Education traditions and approaches to citizenship vary across
Europe. The basic idea of democratic citizenship in a modern society is
the active participation and engagement of each. Although the sense of
citizenship is embedded in each individual’s life history and their
relationships with others, no standard model for developing citizenship
can be applied.20 Until recently, the concept of citizenship was
conceived in mainly state and institutional terms.21 In today’s Europe the
concept of citizenship has become more fluid, dynamic and contextual,
linking it to the multiple identities of Europe. This means that learning
to live together positively with differences and diversity is becoming the
central dimension of practising citizenship in Europe. Therefore,
citizenship education is a modern and dynamic concept with a European
dimension.
18 See EU Citizens’ Programme.
19 See the definitions given in O’Shea, K., Developing a Shared Understanding. A
Glossary of Terms for Education for Democratic Citizenship, Strasbourg: Council of
Europe, 2003.
20 Holford, J. and R. van der Veen (eds.), Lifelong Learning, Governance and Active
Citizenship in Europe, ETGACE project, European Commission, EU Research on
Social Sciences and Humanities, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the
European Communities, 2006, 206 p.
21 Steele, T. and R. Taylor, Citizenship and global Chaos - Education, Culture and
Revolution, in Wildemeersch, D., V. Stroobants and M. Bron (eds.), Active
Citizenship and Multiple Identities in Europe. A Learning Outlook, Frankfurt am
Main: Peter Lang, 2005, pp. 88-97.
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2) Objectives of responsible citizenship
While its aims and content may be highly diversified, key objectives
of responsible citizenship education in today’s complex world should
relate to (1) political and (multi)cultural literacy, (2) critical thinking
and the development of certain attitudes and values and (3) active
participation.
(1) The development of political and cultural literacy may involve:
learning about social, political and civic institutions, as well as human
rights; the study of the conditions under which people may live
harmoniously together; teaching young people about national
constitutions so that they are better prepared to exercise their rights and
responsibilities; promoting the recognition of cultural and historical
heritage; and promoting recognition of the cultural and linguistic
diversity of society.
In this perspective, increased literacy should favour active
communication and participation in democratic societies, finally leading
to responsible citizenship building. Moreover, the impact of
globalisation on our lives necessitates a growing awareness of the
existence of different cultures, religions and political systems in order to
develop respect for the otherness. In other words, increasing the
diversity of peoples in European societies requires a re-
conceptualisation of literacy towards a political and multicultural
literacy, which might be a vehicle to mutual understanding and learning
in European multicultural societies and beyond. In summary, political
and cultural literacy requires a life-long and a life-wide education.
(2) The development of critical thinking and the adoption of certain
attitudes and values may entail: acquiring the skills needed to participate
actively in public life; developing recognition of and respect for oneself
and others with a view to achieving greater mutual understanding;
acquiring social and moral responsibility, including self-confidence, and
learning to behave responsibly towards others; strengthening a spirit of
solidarity; the construction of values, with due regard for differing social
perspectives and points of view; learning to listen and resolve conflicts
peacefully; learning to contribute to a safe environment; and developing
more effective strategies for fighting racism and xenophobia.
(3) Finally, the active participation of youngsters may be promoted
by: enabling them to become more involved in the community at large
(at international, national, local and school levels); offering them
practical experience of democracy at school; developing their capacity
to engage with each other; and encouraging pupils to develop project
initiatives in conjunction with other organisations (such as community
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associations, public bodies and international organisations), as well as
projects involving other communities.
In short, it should be clear that citizenship education is not just
concerned with imparting theoretical knowledge to enhance political and
(multicultural) literacy in issues such as democracy, human rights, the
functioning of political institutions, the cultural and historical heritage,
etc. It is crucial for integral human development that positive civic
attitudes and values are developed and active participation be promoted
– be it at school level or in society at large.
3) The European dimension of citizenship education22
Citizenship always has a territorial connotation, whatever its scale
and limits. However, education processes should take account the fact
that future citizens identify with different entities and dimensions,
whether local, regional, national, European, international or global. Four
aspects should be considered in developing the European dimension of
education: curriculum building, teacher education, and support for
teachers and teaching materials and extra-curricular activities involving
mobility and exchanges.
(1) Curriculum building: The European/international dimension of
citizenship should be part of the overarching general aims of various
levels and phases of education to stimulate a sense of involvement with
and belonging to Europe. Aspects which could be addressed in
education/learning paths are: the rights and obligations of EU citizens;
the contemporary history of European nations, the EU integration
process, the functioning of European/international institutions,
economic, political and social issues in European/international
cooperation, knowledge and promotion of socio-cultural diversity;
learning about European culture/literature/values guidelines, etc. From
the curricular standpoint, citizenship education can be offered as a
22 The European Commission has published various White Papers and studies on
European citizenship education such as: White Paper on “Teaching and Learning:
towards the Learning Society” (1995); Memorandum on Lifelong Learning (2000));
Resolution on Lifelong Learning (2002)); European Commission: Open Learning
Environment, Active Citizenship and Social Inclusion. Implementation of Education
and Training 2010 Work Programme: Progress Report, Brussels, November 2003;
European Commission: The Future of Education and Citizenship Policies: The
Commission adopts Guidelines for Future Programmes after 2006, Brussels, 2004;
Learning for Active citizenship. A significant Challenge in Building a Europe of
Knowledge: Education and Active Citizenship in the European Union (2006);
Programme in the field of lifelong learning 2007-2013. Interesting policy-oriented
studies were made by GHK, Study on Active Citizenship Education, commissioned
by DG Education and Culture, Feb. 2007, 151 p. and Eurydice, Citizenship
Education at School in Europe, May 2005, 91 p.
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separate stand-alone compulsory or optional subject, or integrated into
one or more other subjects (such as history, social studies, geography or
philosophy), or as a cross-curricular educational theme, so that the
principles of citizenship education might be present in all subjects of the
curriculum. These different approaches are not mutually exclusive.
(2) Teacher education: The European dimension of citizenship
education should be taken into account in the initial teacher education as
well as in the provision of in-service teacher training.
(3) Support for teachers and teaching materials: Teacher support
measures relevant to the European dimension of citizenship education
may exist in a wide variety of forms and bodies. They may be devised
by the education authorities of a particular country, public research
institutes, institutions for teacher education, associations and NGOs as
well as by a variety of European institutions, such as the European
Commission or the Council of Europe. They may involve materials or
facilities intended directly for teachers, or information materials on the
European Union for the general public.
(4) Activities in the wider school context: Learning about the
European dimension of citizenship means acquiring formal knowledge
and developing awareness about a set of societal and political issues.
However, this learning process also requires above all that students
should be able to gain experience of a practical nature from simulation
games or various exchange programmes. Many European, national and
regional education programmes and schemes exist for promoting the
European dimension and awareness.
If Europe wants to fulfil its destiny, a drastic increase in the
engagement of citizens and (young) people to the European project is
necessary. Strengthening a holistic and integral approach to the concept
and practice of citizenship enriches the possibility of promoting active
citizenship together with the European dimension. From the Tindemans
Report “Europe of Citizens and Peoples” (1976) onwards many
community action programmes have been launched to contribute to the
building of active citizenship, mainly in the fields of education, training
and youth (e.g. Socrates, Leonardo, Culture 2000, the Lifelong learning
programme, “Youth on the Move”).
In short, the European dimension of active citizenship goes beyond
economic, political, social and cultural boundaries. Such integration can
lead to the recognition and acceptance of a European citizenship
covering multiple identities and nationalities. This is not the exclusive
responsibility of governments, but also the responsibility of citizens and
their organisations. Consequently, diversified forms of civil society
participation emerge and develop in Europe, to concretise active
citizenship at local and regional levels. However, a certain level of
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common identity is needed to strengthen European citizenship. This
identity exists in different complimentary forms, creating a multilayered
identity. It is a process that should be enhanced, as long as it goes along
with the recognition of diversity. Intercultural learning could be key to
this strengthening.
4) The conditions for active citizenship learning in plural Europe
The conditions for such an integral human development in education
and learning can be summarised as follows: (1) The development, not
only of an analytical mind and understanding, but also of a synthetic and
creative capacity to applied learning in concrete training projects. There
is the need for capacity and skills to confront and go beyond isolated
subjects, disciplines and frontiers. This favours tolerance and avoids
stereotypical behaviour and prejudices; (2) The formation of general and
specific knowledge, particularly thinking and acting with respect for
diversity and differences within and outside Europe. This requires a
knowledge acquisition with an open and critical spirit in an historical
perspective; but conscious of basic values; (3) Education to listening,
tolerance, comprehension and respect for other cultures and other
peoples and education to responsibility. Therefore, knowledge of one’s
culture and language, of other cultures and languages is an important
key for actual communication; (4) A pedagogy is embedded in the
regional and educational specificity: it implies territorial inclusiveness
in order to create formal and informal spaces of learning, set within a
European context; and (5) The development of programmes for learning
to live together and life skills at the grass roots level, which stimulate
participation, respect and dialogue.
5) General education practices to European citizenship
Active citizenship in a European context should be applied to general
and specific education/learning processes by focussing on: (1) Attention
to European themes/topics in the educational project, not as a residual
factor but as a crucial and permanent reference with the help of
numerous European, national and regional programmes; (2) Building a
curriculum of formal and informal learning that includes
interdisciplinary learning, workshops, and exchanges of good practice in
a comparative perspective; (3) Transmission of collective memories,
confirmation of common values and the formation of an open mind and
tolerant, respectful, interested behaviour towards other cultures through
experience, examples and exchange programmes and permanent
learning; and (4) Financial support for concrete projects to develop
networks of regional, national, European and international collaboration
among schools and teachers.
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Various programmes of education for democratic citizenship are
organised by international organisations23 as well as by governmental
and non-governmental organisations. They all offer training, education
and learning activities targeted towards teachers, students or specific
groups such as minorities or handicapped persons, often with a focus on
the local implication. They all illustrate the importance of the societal
role of education for integration and inclusion purposes in democratic
and multicultural societies. The main challenge remains however the
implementation of these education activities in formal and non-formal
curriculum building at local and school levels.
II. Education Policies for Citizenship-building in Europe
1. The legal basis
At the European level, education in general and higher education in
particular are not subjects of a common European policy. With the
principle of subsidiarity each member state maintains full responsibility
for the content and the organisation of its education system. The
European Commission’s work in the field of education and training rests
on two pillars: (1) policy cooperation and work with the member states;
and (2) funding programmes, such as the Lifelong Learning Programme.
The basic principle is that member states are in charge of their education
and training, and the European Commission works together with the
member states to help achieve common goals.
Education was formally recognised for the first time in the treaty
establishing the European Community signed in Maastricht in 1992. The
Maastricht Treaty set the scene for education and vocational training in
the EU. The legal basis for citizenship education is now set in Articles
165 and 166 of the Lisbon Treaty.
Article 165
1. The Union shall contribute to the development of quality education by
encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by
supporting and supplementing their action, while fully respecting the
responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the
organisation of education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity.
The Union shall contribute to the promotion of European sporting issues,
while taking account of the specific nature of sport, its structures based on
voluntary activity and its social and educational function.
23 See the education programmes of the UN, UNESCO, Council of Europe, the
education, youth and citizens’ programmes of the EU, etc.
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2. Union action shall be aimed at:
– developing the European dimension in education, particularly through the
teaching and dissemination of the languages of the Member States,
– encouraging mobility of students and teachers, by encouraging inter alia,
the academic recognition of diplomas and periods of study,
– promoting cooperation between educational establishments,
– developing exchanges of information and experience on issues common to
the education systems of the Member States,
– encouraging the development of youth exchanges and of exchanges of
socio-educational instructors, and encouraging the participation of young
people in democratic life in Europe,
– encouraging the development of distance education,
– developing the European dimension in sport, by promoting fairness and
openness in sporting competitions and cooperation between bodies
responsible for sports, and by protecting the physical and moral integrity of
sportsmen and sportswomen, especially the youngest sportsmen and
sportswomen.
3. The Union and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third
countries and the competent international organisations in the field of
education and sport, in particular the Council of Europe.
4. In order to contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in
this Article:
– the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the
ordinary legislative procedure, after consulting the Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, shall adopt incentive
measures, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the
Member States,
– the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt
recommendations.
Article 166
1 The Union shall implement a vocational training policy which shall
support and supplement the action of the Member States, while fully
respecting the responsibility of the Member States for the content and
organisation of vocational training.
2. Union action shall aim to:
– facilitate adaptation to industrial changes, in particular through vocational
training and retraining,
Education for European Citizenship-building
277
– improve initial and continuing vocational training in order to facilitate
vocational integration and reintegration into the labour market
– facilitate access to vocational training and encourage mobility of
instructors and trainees and particularly young people,
– stimulate cooperation on training between educational or training
establishments and firms,
– develop exchanges of information and experience on issues common to
the training systems of the Member States.
3. The Union and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third
countries and the competent international organisations in the sphere of
vocational training.
4. The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the
ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, shall adopt measures to
contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in this Article,
excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member
States, and the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt
recommendations.
These two articles mean that the European Community may
contribute to the development of quality education and training by
encouraging cooperation between member states, through a wide range
of actions, such as promoting the mobility of citizens, designing joint
study programmes, establishing networks, exchanging information or
teaching the languages of the European Union. The treaty also contains
a commitment to promote life-long learning for all citizens of the Union.
Therefore, the European Community has a complementary role to play:
to add a European dimension to education and training, to help develop
quality education and training and to encourage life-long learning.
2. Overview of the European lifelong learning agenda in
relation to citizenship
1) The European Union24
In Chapter 12 we explained that the European Union introduced the
notion of European citizenship in 1992 and completed its understanding
in the updates of the Treaty on European Union. After having stressed
24 Lifelong Learning Programme of the EU covers the sectoral programmes of Erasmus
for higher education Leonardo da Vinci for vocational training, Comenius for school
education, Grundtvig for adult education, Transversal programme and the Jean
Monnet Programme for European integration. See more details at http://eacea.ec.
europa.eu/llp/index_en.php
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the representative and the participatory dimensions of the democratic
character of the EU, the concept of active citizenship was promoted,
especially by insisting on the “rights” linked to citizenship, neglecting
somehow the responsibilities attached to citizenship. It was said that the
concept of citizenship also entails responsibilities. In the European
context, this means becoming “actively involved [...] to develop a sense
of European identity, [thus] enhancing mutual understanding between
Europeans”.
However, there is no doubt that today’s citizen is much more
attached to rights than obligations, implying a sort of “clientelistic
citizenship”. If citizenship is only expressed in a legal/political
relationship between the citizen and his/her polity (as a community/
political system), then today’s citizen seems to be a consumer of the
rights, treating their obligations to the community as less important.
Therefore, today such responsibilities should be taught in a dynamic
process of formal, informal and non-formal learning. It is however
important to recall that citizenship building has become an integral part
of the EU education and training agenda.
Since the mid-1990s the EU and the member states have attached
great importance to lifelong learning in the knowledge society. Various
White Papers, Memoranda and Resolutions illustrate the impact of
lifelong learning on citizenship building:
– The White Paper of the European Commission on “Growth,
Competitiveness, and Employment” (1993)25 proposed for the first time
that: “Lifelong learning is, therefore, the overall objective to which the
national educational communities can make their own contributions”. It
further said that:
All measures must, therefore, necessarily be based on the concept of
developing, generalizing and systemizing lifelong learning and continuing
training. This means that education and training systems must be reworked
in order to take account of the need [...] for the permanent recomposition
and redevelopment of knowledge and know-how.
– In 1995, the European Commission published the White Paper on
“Teaching and Learning: towards the Learning Society”26 and declared
1996 the European Year on Lifelong Learning. The 1997 Amsterdam
Treaty officially adopted lifelong learning as the basic principle for its
education and training policies. The subsequent policy paper “Towards
25 White Paper, Growth, Competitiveness, Employment: The Challenges and Ways
Forward into the 21st Century, COM (93) 700 final, in Bulletin of the European
Communities, Supplement 6/93, December 1993.
26 http://ec.europa.eu/languages/documents/doc409_en.pdf
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a Europe of Knowledge” developed the principles of lifelong learning in
order “to promote the highest level of knowledge for its people through
broad access to education and its permanent updating”. It confirmed the
emergence of lifelong learning as the core policy strategy of the EU for
the 21st century. Institutional recognition of lifelong learning was
expressed in the creation of the Lifelong Learning Policy Unit within
Directorate XXII in Brussels.
– In 2000, the EC published the “Memorandum on Lifelong
Learning”27 which defined lifelong learning in terms of:
[…] all learning activities that are undertaken throughout life, with the aims
of improving knowledge, skills and competence, within a social, civic,
social and/or employment-related perspective.
It was finally published as a Commission Communication in
2001: “Making a European area of Lifelong Learning reality”,28 making
explicit its four broad objectives of active citizenship, personal
fulfillment, social inclusion and employability. The taking into
consideration of the full range of formal, non-formal and informal
learning was important.
– In June 2002, the European Council of Heads of State and
Governments adopted the Resolution on Lifelong Learning.29 It was to
be the guiding principle for the reform of education and training in the
member states. It contained a declaration that by 2010, 15% of the
working population must be engaged in educational activity. It argued
that
Education and training are indispensable means for promoting social
cohesion, active citizenship, personal and professional fulfilment,
adaptability and employability.
It further affirmed that:
Lifelong learning facilitates free mobility for European citizens and allows
the achievement of the goals and aspirations of the European Union
countries (i.e. to become prosperous, competitive, tolerant and democratic).
It should enable all persons to acquire the necessary knowledge to take part
as active citizens in the knowledge society and the labour market.
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[…] the actions and policies developed within the framework of the
European employment strategy, the action plans for skills and mobility, the
Socrates, Leonardo and Youth programmes, the e-learning initiative, and in
the research and innovation actions among others.
The previous developments and various policy documents finally
resulted in an integrated action programme in the field of lifelong
learning 2007-2013:30 the new programme replaced the existing four
sectoral programmes on school education (Comenius), higher education
(Erasmus), vocational training (Leonardo da Vinci) and adult
education (Grundtvig). The budget earmarked for this new integrated
programme was € 6.97 billion for the seven year period. They were
further concretised in September 2006 with a recommendation that
identified the key competences in lifelong learning and a
recommendation on the establishment of the European Qualifications
Framework for lifelong learning.31
The Lisbon Strategy: The development of lifelong learning as the
EC’s strategic policy for education and training does not stand alone.
Since 2000, lifelong learning policies have become increasingly
integrated as a core dimension within the broader economic and social
policies of the EU with regard to the knowledge economy, employment,
mobility and social inclusion. The Lisbon strategy was agreed in March
2000, when the European Council of Heads of State and Government
formulated the new strategic objective for the EU as follows:
The EU must become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based
economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more
and better jobs and greater social cohesion.
In order to achieve this ambitious goal, the European Council
demanded
[…] not only a radical transformation of the European economy, but also a
challenging programme for the modernization of social welfare and
education systems.32
For the first time, agreement was reached on shared targets to make
education and training policies central to the knowledge economy. A
ten-year work programme was adopted to be implemented through the
sharing of experiences, working towards common goals and learning
from what works best elsewhere through the open method of
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policy in education, where a common policy is not feasible but where
there is a real need for a European educational area.
This programme constituted the new and coherent Community
strategic framework of cooperation in the fields of education and
training. Three major goals were to be achieved by 2010: (i) to improve
the quality and effectiveness of EU education and training systems; (ii)
to ensure that they are accessible to all; and (iii) to open up education
and training to the wider world.
These ambitious goals were complemented by more specific
objectives covering various types and levels of education and training
(formal, non-formal and informal) aimed at making lifelong learning a
reality, including citizenship education. “Education and Training 2010”
integrated all actions in the fields of education and training at the
European level, including vocational education and training (the
“Copenhagen process”) as well as the development of the European
Higher Education Area (the “Bologna process”) implying the
introduction of the three cycles (Bachelor/Master/PhD), a quality
assurance and the recognition of qualifications and study periods.
However, the results of the Lisbon strategy and the achievement of the
targets set for 2010 were not totally successful and a more realistic
strategy for the current decade has been proposed.
The EU 2020 Strategy: The Lisbon Strategy has been replaced by the
EU 2020 Strategy.33 It is the EU’s growth strategy for the current
decade. In a changing world, the EU wants to become a smart,
sustainable and inclusive economy. These three mutually reinforcing
priorities are said to help the EU and its member states deliver high
levels of employment, productivity and social cohesion. Key priorities
are (i) creating value by basing growth on knowledge; (ii) empowering
people in inclusive societies; and (iii) creating a competitive, connected
and greener economy. The key tasks are a successful exit from the crisis
and an advanced strategy for convergence and integration within a
multi-level governance setting and global context.
Concretely, the Union has set five ambitious objectives – on
employment, innovation, education, social inclusion and climate/energy
– to be reached by 2020. Seven flagship initiatives were launched to
boost growth and jobs: Smart growth (i.e. Digital Agenda for Europe,
Innovation Union and Youth on the Move), Sustainable growth (i.e.
Resource Efficient Europe and an Industrial Policy for the globalisation
era) and Inclusive growth (i.e. the agenda for new skills and jobs and the
European Platform against Poverty).
33 http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_en.htm
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Specific challenges for education and training are addressed: to
achieve the target of a reduction in school drop-out rates to below 10%
and of at least 40% of 30-34 year-olds completing third level education;
to strengthen the social embodiment of education (i.e. rethinking the
role of university in knowledge and research generation in society); and
the development of competences and skills adapted to the needs of an
emerging new economy and society. The Church and Society
Commission of the Conference of European Churches adopted an
education strategy (Haguenau, 28th May-1st June 2010)34 for monitoring
and influencing the ET 2020 and for promoting education for
democratic citizenship.
A further boost to European citizenship building has been given by
the regulation on the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) (2012). With
the ECI, part of the Lisbon Treaty, EU citizens are being given the
opportunity to play a part in the democratic process for the very first
time. Although the ECI is not a legislative instrument, it can be a tool
for participative cross-border democracy and a vehicle to bring Europe a
little closer to its citizens. The proposed new “Europe for Citizens”
programme 2014-2020 aims to enhance remembrance and civic
participation in Europe.35
2) The Council of Europe
The Council of Europe is particularly active and productive in the
areas of education, citizenship and intercultural dialogue. It has been
dealing with these issues for several years, mainly through its
programme “Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights”
(EDC)36 and by formulating expert groups on education and democracy.
The EDC is a set of practices and activities designed to help young
people and adults play an active part in democratic life and exercise
their rights and responsibilities in society. It encompasses concepts such
as peace and intercultural education. Human rights education (HRE) is
the core and indivisible part of democratic citizenship education. It
introduces the conception of an international civism, being a new
concept of citizenship, based on a major consciousness and
responsibility.
In this context we refer to the Council of Europe’s “Charter on
Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education”
34 Conference of European Churches, Church and Society Commission, Education
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(May 2010).37 Article 2 of the charter defines education for democratic
citizenship as
education, training, awareness-raising, information, practices and activities
which aim, by equipping learners with knowledge, skills and understanding
and developing their attitudes and behaviour, to empower them to exercise
and defend their democratic rights and responsibilities in society, to value
diversity and to play an active part in democratic life, with a view to the
promotion and protection of democracy and the rule of law.
As to the relationship between education for democratic citizenship
and human rights education Article 3 states that
education for democratic citizenship focuses on democratic rights and
responsibilities and active participation, in relation to the civic, political,
social, economic, legal and cultural spheres of society, while human rights
education is concerned with the broader spectrum of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in every aspect of people’s lives.
Article 5 refers to its lifelong learning aspect:
learning in education for democratic citizenship and human rights education
is a lifelong process […], an essential element of the promotion of social
cohesion and intercultural dialogue and the valuing of diversity and
equality, including gender equality.
At the end of November 2012, a conference was held in Strasbourg
on “Human Rights and Democracy in Action - Looking Ahead”, to
discuss the implementation of the Council of Europe’s “Charter on
Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education”.
The focus on intercultural competences through education has been
further strengthened.38
The cultural dimension of citizenship was also very much
strengthened by the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue (2008).
The Council of Europe’s White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue39 has
been most relevant not only for its definitions in relation to inclusion,
integration and diversity, but also for its views on active promotion of
citizenship:
Citizenship enhances civic participation and so contributes to the added
value newcomers bring, which in turn cements social cohesion.
37 Recommendation CM/Rec (2010) of the Committee of Ministers to member states on
the Council of Europe Charter on Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human
Rights Education.
38 Council of Europe, Directorate of Democratic Citizenship and Participation,
Developing Intercultural Competence through Education, 2013.
39 White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue “Living Together As Equals in Dignity”,
Council of Europe, May 2008.
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A concrete follow-up to the Council of Europe’s White Paper
occurred with the development of the “Autobiography of Intercultural
Encounters”40 which provides a tool for teaching and learning
intercultural competences.
The White Paper looks at cultural diversity, national minorities and
intercultural dialogue with an emphasis on education for citizenship.
This also includes aspects of learning that facilitate the acquisition of
skills and the development of attitudes. Such learning may foster a
lifelong awareness of the citizens’ role in society, political life and the
locality to which they belong. The White Paper also connects
democratic values, the recognition of the dignity of every human being
and the concomitant equality of all. Moreover it is linked with the work
of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, the Anna
Lindh Foundation and the North South Centre, etc. A useful
contribution to education for democratic citizenship, human rights and
intercultural dialogue was made by the San Marino Conferences of 2008
and 2009; they focused on an exchange on teaching religion and beliefs
in education. In this context, education plays a key role in developing
the ability to conduct intercultural dialogue, which is an integral part of
developing democratic culture and building true citizenship.41
Conclusion
1. Conceptual guidelines
So far, the EU has concentrated much on the “output legitimacy” of
citizenship-building, whereas it is necessary to include the citizens on
the input side of such legitimacy, especially given the widening gap
between institutions and citizens and the decreasing sense of belonging
to the European project.42 Europe today is characterised by a seemingly
contradictory process of increasing diversity and supranational
governance, and is not equipped with the proper institutional
architecture to cope with the economic, political, social and cultural
challenges of today’s world. There is also the challenge of combining
the culturally different concepts of being a good citizen with the over-
arching concept of building an inclusive global but European oriented
citizen in the ongoing globalisation vs Europeanisation debate.
40 Byram, M., Barrett, M., Ipgrave, J., Jackson, R. and Méndez García, M.C.,
Autobiography of Intercultural Encounters, Strasbourg, France: Council of Europe
Publishing, 2009.
41 Council of Europe, Speaking across borders: the role of higher education in
furthering intercultural dialogue, in Higher education series no.16, 2010.
42 Eurobarometer, Intercultural dialogue in Europe, December 2007;
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_217_sum_en.pdf
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European citizenship should evolve to a flexible but equilibrating notion
of rights and responsibilities within a European and global space. It
should be embedded in a multi-level and multi-dimensional polity,
consisting of different levels and covering various social, economic,
ethical and political dimensions.
The following conceptual guidelines for true citizenship education
should be considered: The valorisation of the educational and cultural
dimension of citizenship building in Europe is crucial to find answers
for a morally robust engagement of the citizen in society at all levels of
sustainable statehood; The promotion of an education to responsible
citizenship and multiple identities needs to be understood and carried
out in a wider societal context of the knowledge triangle. A more
comprehensive, international and multi-perspective analysis of the
interconnection between education and society will make societies more
cohesive and sustainable, and; Education at various formal, informal and
non-formal levels of learning fosters a culture of peace, understanding
and dialogue which should lead to active and responsible citizenship in
the EU, rooted in a value-driven and citizen-centric European future.
2. Policy suggestions
The knowledge society requires an in-depth development of lifelong
learning benefitting from a variety of interconnecting learning resources
of citizenship building. However, today’s policy towards a learning
society implies a more innovative capacity to (re)design (new)
institutions of political, economic, social and educational governance
which can respond properly to the challenges of the multi-faceted
process of globalisation.
The learning society manifests fundamental structural trends towards
the individualisation of risk and the threat of social exclusion while
promoting social inclusion, personal fulfilment, and lifelong learning for
employability and adaptability. Learning new skills should therefore be
envisaged for citizenship as much as for employability. This includes
learning for personal, civic and social as well as for employment-related
purposes. It implies raising investment in people and knowledge and
broadening opportunities for innovative, more flexible forms of
learning, respecting multiple identities within the European meeting
place. The policy consequence is that education institutions should
accept lifelong learning as their collective responsibility, but that
governments should invest in training teachers and trainers for all stages
of learning, in informal, non-formal as well as in formal education and
that Europe should strengthen its lifelong learning agenda for active
citizenship.
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When referring to citizenship education, it seems therefore necessary
to broaden the term “citizenship” beyond its mere legal connotation and
adopt a more comprehensive approach. Citizenship education has to be
conceived as embracing all members of a given society, regardless of
their nationality, sex, or racial, social or educational background.
Responsible citizenship is therefore to be seen as an universal concept of
giving children and young people the knowledge, values and skills they
require to participate in society and contribute to their own and society’s
wellbeing.
It also implies that the European/international dimension should be
conceived as an integral part of citizenship education. While concerns
relevant to citizenship education are primarily related to a particular
national context and associated with the need to strengthen democracy
or the participation of certain social groups, membership of the
European Union also calls for its own form of civic awareness. The need
for knowledge regarding Europe is covered in school curricula by a very
wide variety of disparate elements. This is often limited to transmitting
basic knowledge of the European Union (i.e. the functioning of its
institutions, the various entitlements of its citizens, or important stages
in the process of integration). However, teaching should also focus on
matters more concerned with European identity (e.g. the foundations of
a common European culture, the position of one’s own country in the
EU), on subjects for discussion related to society (e.g. the main issues in
European cooperation), or on learning values (e.g. understanding and
promotion of present-day socio-cultural diversity), alongside traditional
education, extra-curricular activities and projects, such as travel
exchanges, school twinning, participation in EU competitions,
improving intercultural skills as well as language proficiency, directly
experimenting with the European dimension. Implementation of the
European dimension in courses and extra-curricular activities however,
very much depends on the skills of teachers, requiring professional
development as much as initial teacher education.
In order to respond to these contextual and societal developments,
the following broad guidelines of policy-oriented education activities
are suggested:
– Valorise the educational and cultural dimension of European
citizenship-building by promoting places of intercultural learning
through European exchange programmes, and by introducing innovative
learning methods and tools at the various educational levels;
– Develop a multilayered curriculum on integral human development.
This may enhance the understanding of the new reality of European
citizenship and the continuous socio-cultural and political
transformations of multicultural societies;
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– Launch creative incentives to learn active and responsible citizenship.
Formal, non-formal and informal learning, in an interdisciplinary
perspective, are all needed to preserve and enrich our European heritage
– political, cultural and economic;
– Launch an integrated strategy to foster education in human rights and
responsibilities. The European Commission could build on work of the
United Nations, the Council of Europe, and UNESCO, especially of two
key international instruments: the UN Declaration on Human Rights
Education and Training (2011) and the Council of Europe’s European





Territorial Cooperation and Multi-level
Governance. The Stimulating Role
of the Committee of the Regions
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the link between the need
for territorial cooperation and the (new) concept of multi-level
governance. In the first part we explore the concept of multi-level
governance in a conceptual, global and European perspective. We
further develop the principles, capabilities and perspectives of European
multi-actor governance and briefly refer in a final section to the
importance of urban realities in the multi-level governance approach.
The second part of the chapter deals with the role of the Committee of
Regions in the multi-level governance approach. It identifies its major
political lines of action, assesses the importance of the new legal
instrument of European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC) in
linking territorial cooperation with multi-level governance and briefly
comments on the CoR’s recent initiatives to strengthen the multi-level
governance approach in the EU context.
I. Multi-level Governance in European Perspective
1. The conceptual setting
The point of departure is a good understanding of the principles of
governance. The basis for good governance is a well-functioning
democratic political system that ensures representative and honest
governments responsive to citizens’ needs. This includes respect for
human rights and basic civil liberties such as freedom of expression and
of association. It encourages free and pluralistic media, worker and
employer organisations and civil society organisations. The foundations
of good governance are the rule of law and the effective administration
of justice. It implies transparent and accountable government institutions
and independent judiciaries. Good governance requires institutions for
the efficient, equitable and responsible functioning of a market
economy, a sound financial system, prevention of anti-competitive
behaviour, socially responsible corporate governance and a system for
property rights and contracts.
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The concept of multi-level governance is very much linked to the
study of European integration in the 1990s. The Treaty of Maastricht
relied on the subsidiarity principle and the concept of decentralisation.
The study of the European Union has been characterised by two
different theoretical development phases: the first phase was dominated
by studies from the field of international relations: the EU is seen as an
international organisation similar to others (e.g. NATO, OECD, UN); in
the second phase these studies were revised and public policies were
added: the EU is seen as a unique sui generis international organisation
both in its nature and to the extent of its development. The multi-level
governance approach belongs to the second phase.
In political science literature, varieties of multi-level governance are
distinguished. Decentralisation is the term we normally use to explain
the shift of (some) power from the central state toward multi-governance
levels. In recent years, interest in the policy concept of decentralisation
has increased, along with interest in the policy differences according to
particular cases (particularity vs generalisation).
If we focus on the general policy characteristics of multi-level
governance, the changing relationships between actors situated at
different territorial levels, both from the public and the private sectors
are put at the centre of analysis. This implies frequent and complex
interactions between governmental actors and the increasingly important
dimension of non-state actors. In particular, multi-level governance
crosses the traditionally separate domains of domestic and international
politics: it highlights the increasingly fading distinction between these
domains in the context of European integration; supranational, national,
regional, and local governments are interrelated in territorially
overarching policy networks.
As to the scientific development of the concept, amidst all the
diversity, there are two quite distinct and coherent approaches to
decentralisation, based on different concepts of governance. In their
ground-breaking article, political scientists Hooghe and Marks have
distinguished two types of multi-level governance:1 The defining
characteristics of Type I refer to multipurpose sub-central jurisdictions;
separate memberships of these sub-central jurisdictions; a fixed number
of levels of sub-central jurisdictions and one uniform design for the
1 Hooghe, L. and G. Marks, Unravelling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-
level Governance, in American Policy Review, 2003; and ibid., Contrasting Visions
of Multi-Level Governance, in I. Bache and M.Flinders (eds.), Multi-Level
Governance: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Oxford University Press, chapter 2,
2003.
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whole system.2 By contrast, Type II systems are defined by: task-
specific jurisdictions; overlapping memberships; an unlimited number of
jurisdictional levels and a flexible design.3
Some criticisms of this theoretical and policy concept have been
expressed. First of all, it is not really a proper theory, but rather an
approach. The main difference between multi-level governance and
other integration theories is that it ignores the continuum or grey area
between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism and leaves in its
place a descriptive structure. Furthermore, multi-level governance does
not address the sovereignty of states directly, but instead simply states
that a multi-level structure is being created by subnational and
supranational actors. Finally, the transfer of loyalty and sovereignty
between national and supranational entities and the future of this
relationship in the EU is not specifically addressed.
2. Multi-level governance in the context of globalisation
If we relate the concept of multi-level governance to the context of a
growing multi-faceted globalisation, the current policy debate exhibits
an ongoing tension between pro and contra views as well as paradoxical
interpretations of its consequences: globalisation can be frightening,
stimulating, overwhelming, destructive or creative, depending on one’s
point of view; there is a widespread sense of instability and insecurity in
economic, social and political developments with repercussions on
governance structures; and there is a growing concern about the impact
of globalisation on culture and identity at various policy levels. In short,
as previously mentioned in preceding chapters, globalisation as a
phenomenon and a process is an opportunity if its positive and negative
consequences are well managed at different policy levels involving a
variety of actors. Common (institutional) solutions are proposed on
different levels to manage diversities.
In line with the definition of governance given in the first part of this
book, global governance is defined as the system of rules and
institutions established by the international community and private
actors to manage political, economic and social affairs. It warrants
serious attention. Good governance, at both the national and global
level, should further values such as freedom, security, diversity, fairness
2 The simplest such systems might involve, under a national government, a set of
provincial authorities each with broad ranging, identical powers and responsibilities;
and clear separate responsibilities for a given territory and population.
3 Traditional examples include countries such as the U.K.; relevant contemporary cases
are found in many large urban areas, in which responsibility for different functions
and services are divided among many different bodies, each organised in their own
way, with different territorial boundaries, different numbers of sub-levels.
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and solidarity. It should also ensure respect for human rights,
international rule of law, democracy and participation, promote
entrepreneurship and adhere to the principles of accountability, efficacy
and subsidiarity. We consider the United Nations and the multilateral
system the best means of responding to the challenges of globalisation.
Policy answers to these challenges are to be elaborated at the global,
European, national, regional and local level.
Various economic, political, social and cultural requirements need to
be distinguished to achieve a proper multi-level governance structure:
1) In the fields of economic governance, rule setting is required for
managing and controlling market economies. There is an ongoing, wide
debate on the role of (financial) markets and how to meet the needs and
aspirations of people in their own communities. Therefore, (new)
institution-building (i.e. rule setting) needs to favour progress and well-
being in a social context.
2) In the field of political governance, the debate concerns some
major policy themes such as: Fair rules do not automatically lead to fair
results. Institutional efforts are needed to help those countries and
regions in a weaker position. Currently, trade and investment are often
favoured over human rights and the environment, partly due to a
“democratic deficit” at various governing levels; The role of the state
should be revisited based on the rule of law, democratic institutions and
the work with social actors. Political governance should develop
(institutional and policy) capacities to respond to the rapidly changing
political and economic landscape. It has to accommodate internally to an
increasing vocal civil society and, externally, to a growing number of
policy constraints; and finally, the nation state is not doomed to
disappear but it is now just one actor in the international political
system, and has to work together with international governmental and
non-governmental organisations in order to elaborate the necessary rules
for the newly emerging governance structure at the global level.
3) In the peoples and citizens oriented social and cultural
governance, a fairer framework for the movement of people and a
respect for cultural diversity are essential. This would guarantee internal
and external solidarity as well as ensure better proximity of the
citizens/public sphere to the institutional fabric.
In short, a combined multi-level governance and multi-actor
governance is taking place in an emerging flexible policy network
according to the issues, competences and interests of governments,
private actors and representatives of the civil society.
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3. Multi-level governance and the European integration process
As stated above, the development of the concept of multi-level
governance is very much related to the European integration process.
Regional integration is seen as a route towards a fairer and more
inclusive globalisation. Countries are better able to manage the social
and economic challenges of globalisation by working together on the
international scene. No other international form of cooperation is
characterised by such far-reaching integration as the European Union.
This becomes evident by the number and scope of policy areas covered
by the European Union and the way policies are developed. The
European Union can be characterised by a mix of classic
intergovernmental cooperation between sovereign states and far-
reaching supranational integration. The combination of common
decision-making with the wide area of policy areas results in a deep
entanglement of member states’ national policy levels with the
European policy level.
The multi-level governance approach describes the European Union
as a political system with interconnected institutions that exists at
multiple levels and that has unique policy features. In other words, the
European Union is a political system with a European layer (i.e.
European Commission, European Council and European Parliament,
etc.), a national and a regional layer. These layers interact with each
other in two ways: first, across different levels of government (i.e.
vertical dimension) and second, with other relevant actors within the
same level (i.e. horizontal dimension).
4. European governance in global perspective
The emerging multi-level/multi-actor approach is shaped by the
Europeanisation vs globalisation debate. The number and relevance of
actors in the European political arena has significantly increased. This is
true both in terms of their numbers and their interactions. We recognise
a dramatic increase in the areas where European rules are established
which shape the policies of nation states, regions and cities.
Within this changing context, the European multi-level and multi-
actor approach faces a number of challenges: A perception of a
“powerless state”, which loses its capacity to regulate certain key areas.
Consequently, member states have to adapt to the EU institutional
architecture and decision-making structure; Policy-making is further
complicated by the growing advocacy of non-governmental
organisations at various levels with the emergence of a European civil
society; and finally the same international intensification is also
manifest in the business sector, both within a sector or country and
within big corporations. These challenges substantially influence
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European economic, political and social developments in the globalising
world. New institution-building for economic and political governance
in a European setting is therefore crucial.
1) Governance in European perspective: principles and
capabilities of EU praxis
The basic principles guiding European governance, legally anchored
in the treaties, are democracy, social equity, respect for human rights
and the rule of law. These need to be reflected in institutions, rules and
political systems within countries, respected by all sectors of society and
applied at various levels of governance. Processes of globalisation and
Europeanisation inevitably have an impact on local values and cultures.
The trust among people bound by common values and culture is the
“glue” which binds local institutions to undertake joint actions. This
social capital is essential for Europe’s future developments and
European institution-building.
The capabilities and prerequisites for European governance are a
solid home base, efficient local governance and a focused regional
integration:
(1) Because of a lack of effective and democratic governance to
manage unity in diversity at various governance levels, the potentials of
Europeanisation are not being fully realised. Governance of
Europeanisation is bound up with governance at the national level. What
is needed, are effective political and legal institutions, strong economic
and technological capabilities, and policies that integrate economic and
social goals. A fairer Europeanisation also requires action and
empowerment of people at different levels, in local communities and
economies, as well as in the rapidly developing new forms of regional
cooperation and integration.
(2) The European policy agenda must also respect diverse local
needs and respond to their demands. The local community is part of an
integrating world. Greater decentralisation is needed, but should be
accompanied by increased capacities and resources, and effective
frameworks for democracy and participation in respect of multiple
(cultural, regional) identities. Local administration does not mean
isolation. On the contrary, globalisation and Europeanisation offer many
opportunities for national and cross-border networking, cooperation and
exchange among local authorities. Non-state actors can also play
important roles provided they have sufficient resources.
(3) Regional integration promotes more equitable globalisation by
empowering people to better manage global economic forces, improving
the negotiating power of smaller countries, building capabilities to profit
from global opportunities, and improving global economic connections.
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It should be comprised of interconnected and interacting regions. Such a
process of “open regionalism” can address some of the imbalances of
globalisation, while promoting development and equity within and
between regions. The EU praxis is an interesting example of deeper
forms of integration, including openness, social protection,
inclusiveness and respect for the rule of law, human rights, gender
equality and political democracy. The future agenda for European
governance should therefore include institutions that can bring together
different regions around further European integration in respect of
cultural and regional diversity.
2) Reform of European governance: perspectives
In analogy with the definition of global governance, European
Governance is characterised as a system of rules and institutions
established by the European Community and private actors to manage
political, economic and social affairs. As a consequence, good European
governance should further values such as freedom, security, diversity,
fairness and solidarity at various levels. It should also guarantee respect
for human rights, international rule of law, democracy and participation,
promote entrepreneurship and adhere to the principles of accountability,
efficacy and subsidiarity. According to the 2001 “White Paper on
European governance”4 the response to these new challenges so far has
been haphazard. What has emerged to date is a fragmented and
incoherent system consisting of a patchwork of overlapping networks
and agencies in the economic, social and environmental fields. There is
a wide range of diverse, partial or inadequate developments.
Reforms should enhance the representative, participatory, transparent
and accountable character of European institutions and give a voice to
people to articulate their concerns. These reforms should mobilise the
energy, commitment and sense of solidarity and responsibility of key
actors in the European Community.
5. Multi-level/Multi-actor governance and urban realities:
a promising city practice5
1) Context: urban realities
Within the restructuring of the European multi-level/multi-actor
governance approach, urban realities have become a shaping and
determining factor. Throughout history, cities have always been driving
4 Commission of the European Communities, White Paper on European Governance,
COM (2001) 428 final, Brussels, 35 p.
5 See Chapter 15 for a more extensive analysis of the importance of cities in
citizenship building and intercultural dialogue.
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forces of culture, civilisation and development in Europe.6 They express
the richness of Europe, its cultural and spiritual memory and its creative
will to make history. Urban spaces are increasingly seen in a wider
societal context, linking place, territory and scale with governance,
inclusion and identity. The specificity of the urban context is further
determined by the various governance levels that move from
hierarchical to networking relations. Cities can be seen in today’s
Europe as major vehicles to create an “urban civitas”, representing local
communities of diversified values and practices at the citizen level.
They are changing places, where tradition is continuously confronted
with modernity. Today they may offer inclusive environments for
practising governance and dialogue.
Urban policies that respond to this renewed role of cities in a multi-
level/multi-actor governance structure are manifold: they vary from the
need to develop “glocal” strategies, master spatial cohesion, propose
qualitative density in space and environment, stimulate innovating and
creative power, create urban diversity and flexibility within multi-
faceted identities, guarantee urban solidarity, social justice, cultural
diversity and social capital development, engage in city diplomacy, etc.
The creation of such a favourable environment presupposes an active
investment in strong development coalitions between public, private and
civil society stakeholders at territorial and issue levels.
2) Content: urban opportunities
Being laboratories of innovative democratic initiatives, cities may
fully contribute to the development of sustainable knowledge societies
and obtain more easily a new equilibrium between change and tradition
in a stimulating urban environment with citizens’ involvement. They are
important sustainable and living sources for building and experiencing
the multi-faceted identity of the citizens of multicultural Europe.
Throughout history they have been shaping actors for promoting and
facilitating creativity, imagination and integration. Today they are
breeding and learning places for innovative democratic processes and
meeting spaces for dialogue and encounters.
As for cultural diversity and dialogue, cities and regions have an
important role to play in taking and managing actions to disseminate
respect for cultural differences. A more structured dialogue therefore is
an important tool. Indeed, local and regional authorities have major
competences in promoting cultural activities and intercultural dialogue
6 Grazi, L., L’Europa e le città. La questione urbana nel processo di integrazione
europea (1957-1999), Bologna: Il Mulino, 2006, 397 p.
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and they bear a major responsibility for shaping and supporting the rich
variety of cultures.
Cities also have a key role in disseminating and applying best
practice and exchange of experiences in this field, in particular through
their coordination of multi-dimensional local and regional networks in
several sectors, involving all relevant actors. Examples of such
interconnecting networks exist in several member states where
governments encourage centres of community cohesion to work
together at the local level. These organisations, often having different
ethnic, religious and language backgrounds, aim at integration, foster
better bonds between the different communities and boost the
confidence of the local population. They tend to reflect the make-up of
their neighbourhood, revealing a common ground between the different
communities rather than the differences that exist between them.
In conclusion, in a multi-level/multi-actor governance structure an
imaginative city-based approach may contribute to design principles that
allow for creativity and experimentation and favour citizens’
participation at the grass roots level. In summary, cities may, on the
basis of some conditions, provide a favourable, attractive and creative
environment for citizens’ participation in (formal and informal)
democratic processes of active citizenship.
II. The Committee of the Regions: Principles and Practices
in European Multi-level/Multi-actor Governance
1. Policy lines of action
Having set multi-level governance in a broad conceptual and
European perspective, we now turn to the principles and practices of the
Committee of the Regions (CoR) in European multi-level/multi-actor
governance. The CoR is the EU’s Assembly of Regional and Local
Representatives. It now comprises 344 members – regional presidents,
mayors or elected representatives of regions and cities. Since its
establishment in 1994, it has worked to bring citizens closer to the
European Union. In 2009, the Lisbon Treaty strengthened recognition of
the Committee of the Regions’ role.
As stated above, in 2001 the European Commission published its
“White Paper on European Governance”, highlighting among other
things the role of consultation and systematic dialogue as good practices
in governing.7 The CoR moved European governance forward by
7 White Paper on European Governance, COM (2000) 428 final.
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focussing on a more shared responsibility for regional and local
authorities.
In its “White Paper on Multi-level Governance”8 the CoR stressed
the idea for a community method based on a system of governance that
involves local authorities in the framing and implementation of the
European project. In this context, multi-level governance is defined as
follows:
The Committee of the Regions sees the principle of Multilevel Governance
as based on coordinated action by the EU, the Member States and regional
and local authorities according to the principles of subsidiarity and
proportionality and in partnership, taking the form of operational and
institutionalised cooperation in the drawing-up and implementation of the
European Union’s policies.9
Concrete proposals for strengthening the involvement of Europe’s
regions and cities in future EU decision-making were set out. In
particular, the development of multi-level governance within the EU’s
governance model(s) should eventually lead to a European Charter on
Multi-level Governance. In other words, further EU political process
needs to be built in partnership with regions, cities and local authorities.
The CoR’s Mission Statement10 was restated in 2009 on its fifteenth
anniversary. It clearly defined its role, values and aspirations within the
European institutional landscape. The priority policy concerns and the
CoR’s political role in European decision-making processes are well
expressed in the speech of Mr. Luc Van den Brande on his election as
president of the CoR in 2008.11
– Strengthening Europe as a value-based community: European
collaboration is underpinned by a community of shared values such as
the centrality of the human being, freedom, equality, respect for human
rights, the acceptance of diversity as an asset, tolerance, justice and
solidarity.
– Strengthening Europe as a political project: Europe is more than a
large economic space and more than the sum of individual national
concerns. That implies that Europe should be mindful of national,
regional and local identities. It also means that Europe should be able to
8 White Paper of the Committee of the Regions on Multilevel Governance, CoR,
89/2009 final.
9 CdR 273-2011 fin
10 http://cor.europa.eu/en/about/Documents/Mission%20statement/EN.pdf
11 Luc Van den Brande, Let’s build Europe in partnership, 6/02/2008;
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_COR-08-19_en.htm?locale=FR
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play a role in an increasingly globalised world. In short, Europe must
grow from an economic project into a truly Citizens’ Europe.
– Concern about the quality of people’s life and wellbeing of its
citizens: Key issues include affordable housing, jobs, education and
lifelong learning, affordable and accessible healthcare, care for the most
vulnerable members of our society such as children and senior citizens
and solidarity between the generations.
– Recognition of the multi-level governance of Europe: a hierarchical
Europe is rejected and a “Europe with the regions, towns and local
authorities” is acknowledged. It means close collaboration and
partnerships between public authorities, private interests and civil
society organisations to respond to complex issues in the decision-
making process and to manage various policy levels.
– Due consideration of local and regional realities: In the globalised,
decentralised and flexible world, a growing awareness of the importance
assertivity and dynamism of smaller entities and regions is developing.
Therefore political and institutional structures are needed that take into
account these changes towards decentralisation, flexibility, cultural and
regional identity. In summary, local and regional realities are
substantive elements of the multiple European realities.
2. European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC)12
The CoR has taken the lead in the debate and praxis of a European
multi-level/multi-actor governance approach. Cohesion policy and
multi-level governance are two of the major policy areas that are of key
importance for local and regional authorities.13 An essential feature of
the local and regional dimension of cohesion policy and multi-level
governance is interregional cooperation between local and regional
authorities supported through networks. Such networks can promote the
dissemination of best practice across the EU and enable valuable
experiences to be shared from which mainstream policy can be
developed. Such networks also provide opportunities for joint action and
partnerships, which can stimulate local dialogues and also facilitate the
development of exciting projects so that they can get off the ground.
An important European legal policy instrument in the
implementation of the cohesion policy is the European Grouping for
12 See Territorial Cooperation- EGTC on: http://www.cor.europa.eu; Papisca, A. (ed), Il
Gruppo europeo di cooperazione territoriale:Nuove sfide allo spazio dell'Unione
Europea, Venezia: Marsilio, 2009, 187 p. and Peace, Human Rights, Vol. 3, 2010.
13 The other substantive areas of importance for local and regional authorities are: the
reform of the European budget; energy policy and climate change; the Lisbon
objectives; cultural diversity and neighbourhood policy.
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Territorial Cooperation (EGTC). The European Committee has a
specific consultative role in the area of cross-border cooperation (Article
265 of the EU Treaty). For that reason the European Committee has
been one of the main political promoters of territorial cooperation and of
EGTCs, linking it closely with multi-level governance.
An EGTC enables regional and local authorities from different
member states to set up cooperation groupings with a legal personality.
The important cooperation instrument was established in 2006 by the
European Parliament and the European Council, with political support
from the CoR.14 EGTCs enable regional and local authorities from
different member states to cooperate more effectively. An EGTC is a
tool for organising and managing cross-border, transnational or
interregional cooperation measures, with or without EU financial
support.
To carry out these tasks, an EGTC may create its own structure, have
assets and hire staff, run a cross-border transport or health service,
manage a project or programme partly financed by the ERDF, manage a
project under the Framework Programme for Research and
Technological Development, etc. But EGTCs have no powers in the
areas of policing, justice or foreign affairs. Regional and local
authorities, central governments, bodies governed by public law and
associations can all set up a EGTC by signing a convention and
adopting statutes, which must be reported to the relevant national
authorities. EGTC members must be located in at least two member
states.
In its own-initiative opinion in June 2008, the CoR indicated the
great variety of scope, territorial scales and governance solutions that
could emerge from the implementation of the EGTC regulation.15
Evidence was given as to the possible contribution to achieving
territorial cohesion through an innovative multi-level governance
format. Member states were urged to implement national provisions for
the EGTC so that all regions and cities in Europe could participate in the
scheme.
There are now 32 EGTCs operating and 17 more were in the pipeline
during 2012.16 On February 25th, 2013, the findings of the EGTC
Monitoring Report 2012 were presented by the coordinator of the EGTC
Platform.17 The report contains several new aspects that will allow the
14 Regulation 1082/2006/EC, 5/07/2006.
15 CoR, EGTC: New impetus for territorial cooperation in Europe, 18th June 2008.
16 EGTC activities are summarised and accessible to the public in the EGTC Platform
of the CoR: www.cor.europa.eu/egtc
17 EGTC Monitoring Report 2012: https://portal.cor.europa.eu/egtc/en
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evolution of the EGTC groupings to be measured. It gives an overview
of the staff directly hired by the groupings and also of the EU funding
that is actually spent on them. In addition to this, the report contains a
chart with an aggregate picture of the activities implemented by each of
the groupings. Detailed grids illustrate which EGTCs are currently
involved in health policy, transport, employment, culture and others,
including the flagship initiatives of the Strategy Europe 2020.
In summary, the EGTC is a radical step forward in implementation
possibilities for cross-border cooperation. It offers regional and local
authorities the option of creating a cross-border grouping with a legal
personality. The new EGTC instrument presents a challenging
opportunity to go for an extra-territorial approach and very much links
territorial cooperation with multi-level/multi-actor governance. The
praxis and recent initiatives of the CoR have been shaping the emerging
new European institutional framework in linking territorial cooperation
with multi-level governance. The EGTC offers “a bridge to bring ideas
to life” with a territorial and citizen focus.
3. The Ateliers of the CoR: strengthening the multi-level
governance approach
As stated in the CoR’s political programme 2008-2010, the
development of the European Union’s governance model towards a truly
multi-levelled system, is part of the core business of the European
Committee. The CoR has relaunched the debate on EU governance and
become the reference point for multi-level governance in the EU, which
will hopefully result in the adoption of a European Charter on Multi-
level Governance in 2013/2014.
Within this framework, ateliers (workshops) on multi-level
governance have been organised by the Forward Studies Unit since late
2008.18 The ateliers are structured in the form of multi-annual ateliers
cycles (e.g. 2008-2009: “Multi-level Governance in Europe”; 2010-
2011: “Co-governing Globalization: What Role for Local and Regional
Authorities?”). They are in reality, laboratories where new concepts are
tested, views shared, and innovative ideas developed and concrete
examples of local and regional governance exchanged. The ateliers
provide a new meeting place for academics and policy makers from
varied backgrounds with a view to integrating innovative ideas in
policy-oriented outcomes.
18 See Ateliers of the CoR on Multi-level Governance: http://cor.europa.eu/
en/activities/governance/Pages/cor-ateliers.aspx
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4. Scoreboard for monitoring multi-level governance at the
European Union level
As a follow-up to its 2009 White Paper, the Scoreboard on Multi-
level Governance is the tool created by the CoR to monitor on a yearly
basis the development of multi-level governance at the EU level. It
observes how far institutions have taken multi-level governance
principles on board at the early stage of their policy-making cycle,
within a clearly defined timeframe.
Thus far, two editions of the scoreboard have been produced,
covering the period 2010-2012. Each of these scoreboards provides a
comparative assessment of the multi-level governance at the EU level
under four priority policy strategies of the EU. The first scoreboard
edition (2011) reviewed the Europe 2020 Strategy, the 2020 Energy
Strategy, the Stockholm Programme and the 2010 Spring Package. The
second scoreboard edition (2012) studied the Common Agriculture
Policy, the Structural Funds, the Single Market Act and the European
Neighbourhood Policy.
Both the 2011 and 2012 scoreboard editions19 showed that EU
institutions make strong statements on the virtues of multi-level
governance, without practising a mainstreamed culture of multi-level
governance in the preparatory phases of policies, meaning that there is
often a lack of multi-level governance administrative routine. In
particular, the scoreboards demonstrate that governance practices with
respect to procedures (e.g. information and consultation, stakeholders’
involvement and responsiveness) better respect the objectives of multi-
level governance than the practices related to the content of policies
(territorial approach, subsidiarity) and the use of innovative instruments
(contracts, etc.). In short, the scoreboards reveal gaps in institutional
practices and detects potentials for a better MLG architecture when
designing policies and strategies at the EU level.
5. Towards an EU multi-level governance charter:
a collaborative process
With its “White Paper on Multi-level Governance”, the CoR pledged
to consolidate the values and principles of this mode of governance
within European and national institutional and political frameworks.
Throughout a series of ateliers and with the assistance of an external
contractor, in 2012 the CoR initiated an inclusive and participative
reflection process, leading to the drafting of a first European Union
Charter for Multi-level Governance prototype, with the view that the
19 http://cor.europa.eu/en/activities/governance/Pages/mlg-scoreboard.aspx
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existence of such a charter should lead to greater participation by local
and regional authorities in the exercising of European democracy.20
1) Co-creation workshop
A co-creation workshop, organised in Brussels by CoR Contractor
“Strategic Design Scenarios” (16/04/2012) gathered practitioners and
experts on multi-level governance for a series of hands-on design and
reflection activities. It aimed at exploring possible usages, forms and
structures for the charter before initiating a more in-depth debate on its
possible content. It is important in this perspective to contextualise the
new legal and institutional opportunities brought about by the Lisbon
Treaty as well as the current challenges (e.g. re-nationalisation,
economic crisis, intergovernmentalism, increased heterogeneity of local
and regional authorities, blocking minorities, etc.) for launching the
Charter on Multi-level Governance.
The discussion focussed on the need for a clear and readable
definition of multi-level governance, applied to a dynamic European
context. The core principles (such as subsidiarity, participation,
diversity, complementarity, solidarity, human rights, active citizenship,
partnerships, accountability, openness) should constitute the core and
real strength of the charter, and be made explicit and explained. The
(administrative) practices of good multi-level governance in line with a
renewal of the European Community method, should lead to co-
responsibility and co-ownership of the process. This would bring
citizens closer to a human-centric approach. Attention should also be
given to permanent and transparent follow-up mechanisms to implement
and enhance it.
2) Workshop on “Communicating and Disseminating the Future
EU Charter for Multi-level Governance”
With the June 2012 atelier, the innovative participatory drafting
exercise entered a final phase of joint reflection, notably on the
communication aspects of the prospective charter. The aspects of a
modern communication strategy fit for unlocking the e-features of an
EU charter of the 21st century were discussed in a half day
brainstorming session in June 2012, which included a panel of leading
communication experts and practitioners. A targeted, focussed and
visual communication strategy with a feedback mechanism (public fora
and online/Internet) towards civil society and EU citizens illustrating the
benefits of multi-level governance was said to be of crucial importance
for the policy relevance and success of the charter. The Report of the EU
20 CoR 273-2011 fin.
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Charter for Multi-level Governance was published in October 2012.21 Its
official presentation is due in early 2014.
Conclusion
Multi-level governance shapes the Europeanisation vs globalisation
debate and proposes innovative institutional responses and cooperation
mechanisms for policy issues at various levels of decision-making. In
various chapters we have already recognised an increase in the number
and relevance of actors in the European political arena as well as in the
areas where European rules are established. These developments
determine the policies of nation states, regions and cities. Within this
changing context, the European multi-level and multi-actor approach
faces a number of challenges that substantially influence European
economic, political and social developments in the globalising world.
New institution-building for economic and political governance in a
European setting is therefore crucial.
The basic principles of European governance in the global setting are
anchored in the treaties. They should be reflected in institutions, rules
and political systems and applied at various levels of governance.
Consequently, good European governance is based on the values of
freedom, security, diversity, fairness and solidarity at various levels. It
should also guarantee respect for human rights, international rule of law,
democracy and participation, promote entrepreneurship and adhere to
the principles of accountability, efficacy and subsidiarity. Because of the
fragmented, partial and often inadequate policy options for governance
issues, a reform of European governance is very much needed. It should
strengthen the representative, participatory, transparent and accountable
character of European institutions and give a voice for citizens to
articulate their concerns and participate at all levels of society building.
The Committee of the Regions has been playing a stimulating role in
moving European multi-level/multi-actor governance forward by
focussing on a more shared responsibility for regional and local
authorities. The CoR has taken an active lead in the debate and praxis of
European governance. The European Groupings of Territorial
Cooperation illustrate cross-border cooperation between regional and
local authorities within a legal and financial framework. Also, the recent
initiatives of the CoR have been shaping the emerging new European
institutional framework in linking territorial cooperation with multi-




Building “Urban civitas” in Intercultural
Dialogue Practices
Introduction
In today’s Europe we are experiencing a transformation in the
perceptions of the role cities can play in developing sustainable
communities of common interest and shared values. Cities are
increasingly seen in a wider societal context, linking place, territory and
scale with governance, inclusion and identity. Cities are hubs for
diversity, integration and intercultural encounters and of vital
importance for mobilising citizens. They are perceived as economic,
political and social assets for changing European societies. Within this
emerging new urban environment, culture and intercultural dialogue are
mobilising sources for building a democratic “urban civitas” and giving
a renewed spirit to the city.
The “genius loci”, i.e. the spirituality in the space of the city in the
21st century, is realised both by secular and sacral objects. As described
by many cultural researchers, spiritual spaces and routes are built around
the existential problems that are common to all people. They deal with
the problems of life, love, suffering and death. Problems are common
but emotions and ways of expressing them vary between cultures, creeds
and communities. Urban spaces can be understood as the lived-in spaces
that shape collective imaginaries. These are created by history,
architecture, people’s perceptions and their culture.
The working hypothesis of this chapter is the relevance of the
creative urban edge of cities in citizenship building and intercultural
dialogue. Cities can be seen in today’s Europe as major vehicles for
creating an urban civitas, representing local communities of diversified
values and practices at citizen level. They are changing places where
tradition is continuously confronted with modernity. Today they may
offer inclusive environments for practising dialogue.
The chapter is divided in three sections. In the first section we
present the broad conceptual context in which cities operate as meeting
places, confronting past, present and future in various aspects of
material and immaterial societal life. In the second section we analyse
the challenges and opportunities for cities in building creative and
sustainable urban realities in Europe. The final section looks at the
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growing importance of spiritual spaces and routes as expressions of
intercultural dialogue practices in urban areas.
I. Conceptual Context: the Urban Civitas
Urban civitas addresses the combined and overlapping themes of
inclusion, integration and diversity.1 Integration cannot be achieved
without inclusion; a society that exhibits respect for diversity and
dialogue needs both integration and inclusion. The concept of urban
civitas links the “demos” with the “polis”. Its full recognition requires
the acceptance of some conceptual responses to intercultural dialogue
and citizenship building.
1. Moving from multiculturalism to interculturalism
In accepting “urban civitas” as the underlying vision for linking
intercultural dialogue with citizenship we follow Stavenhagen’s
anthropological definition of culture as capital, creativity and way of
life.2 He distinguishes three main functions of culture. The conservation
of culture: culture as an asset, tangible or intangible and a carrier of
local identity; its protection against territorial and market trends shapes
the urban context. The production of culture: culture as a commodity
which needs to be reproduced not only to reconstitute the cultural capital
but also as a source of economic development insofar as it is embedded
in production processes. The valorisation of culture: culture as a set of
norms and capacities which enrich local communities and may be used
as bridge builders and carriers of good relations for social and economic
exchange.
A dynamic and interactive process between these three functions of
culture implies not only the peaceful co-existence of different cultures
within society but also a mutually influencing and open dialogue
between cultures. Such a conceptual change from multicultural co-
existence to intercultural dialogue may avoid the trap of cultural
relativism and provide the basis for an interreligious dialogue.
1 We refer to Peter Ramdsen’s conceptual introduction to the UDIEX-ALEP thematic
network, which brought about an exchange of experience regarding urban
regeneration and inclusion in 24 European cities. See at http://urbact.eu/en/
udiex/synthesis_prospects, September 2006.
2 Stavenhagen, R., Cultural rights: a social science perspective, in Culture rights and
wrongs, Paris: UNESCO, 1998.
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2. Recognising multiple faced identities and cosmopolitan
citizenship
The debate concerning identity and citizenship is crucial for
understanding the role of intercultural dialogue in developing advanced
forms of democracy. As previously stated in Chapter 3, identity-building
is not a constant and invariable process, but changes over time
according to criteria such as birth, family, language, religion, territory,
etc. This process has become even more complex and disturbed by
growing individualisation, intolerant and distrustful behaviour as well as
by the vagueness of the moral norms within society. In short, identity is
becoming more and more a relation identity with no exclusive
characteristics in modern societies.
The inclusion of a European dimension as an added value to a
relation identity reinforces our conceptual point of departure.
Multiplicity is therefore the basis of European identity, shaped by a
community of shared values (such as solidarity, the rule of law, respect
for diversity, attention to the person and the human dignity). This
enriching effect is certainly true for a cultural identity that binds and
unifies countries, regions and groups of persons by shared memories and
expectations. The political meaning of the recognition of multi-faceted
identities lies in mutual respect for the uniqueness of the person. It
constitutes the basis for a more authentic dialogue and solidarity within
and outside Europe, rooted in the universal human rights paradigm.3
3. Humanising globalisation
The process of humanising globalisation, defined as a multi-faceted
phenomenon and process, provides another conceptual response to the
globalisation vs Europeanisation debate. The mainly economically
dominated process of globalisation has led to a commodification and
depersonalisation of economic and social relations, a radical decrease in
the power of states in managing socio-economic activities and an
increasing control of democratic societies by transnational networks.
Europe is however not an exclusive economic space, but a community
of shared values, which is forced to re-visit its premises in a newly
emerging geo-political and economic setting.
Dealing responsively with the various consequences of globalisation
is based on a common pattern of values and mutual respect of
differences. A more “compassionate globalisation”4 is required to
3 Papisca, A., Droits de la personne et démocratie-Les cultures à la source de
l’universel, in European Commission DG EAC, Intercultural Dialogue, March 2002,
pp. 132-140.
4 Falk, R., Realizing the Copenhagen Vision: The Political Imperative, op. cit.
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combat any cultural relativism.5 Structures are needed that create zones
of common interests and shared values, as structures for civilised
confrontation and disagreement. At the same time, different cultures
need to re-examine their own realities in the context of globalisation in
order to re-locate themselves in this new reality. This implies the
emergence of a global consciousness and the acceptance of multi-
faceted identities and multiple modernities.6 In Chapter 13, the
fundamental role of education herein was stressed, mainly through the
introduction of learning processes that replace a culture of competition,
distrust and fear for a culture of cooperation, peace and mutual respect.
4. Revalorising the role of cultures in Europe
Working from an anthropological definition of culture, European
culture(s) is (are) identified as a dynamic interaction of historic,
spiritual, religious, intellectual, material, artistic characteristics and
attitudes. These characteristics illustrate the multiplicity and wealth of
European cultures, cultural expressions and traditions. These diversified
but shared cultural expressions finally make up Europe’s social, cultural
and human capital. This cultural multiplicity is also a source of inner
strength and outer pride. No culture can be missed out in the European
cultural landscape.
Although Europe is pre-eminently a space of cultural diversity (as
was explained in Part 1), respect for cultural diversity should not lead to
ethnic reflexes and exclusive attitudes. The binding role of an internal
and external open culture approach is to be a guarantee for further
European integration and a renewed cooperation with other cultures. As
a consequence, we conceive culture in the first place as a source of
inspiration for social integration, socio-economic development and
societal inclusion. It certainly may give an impulse to greater
commitment and participation of the citizen to the European project.
5. Stimulating intercultural dialogue
The term intercultural dialogue is strongly normative and is seen as a
path towards the goal of attaining ways of living together. Ray Isar’s
definition7 of intercultural dialogue as an inherently normative and
5 See Chapter 10.
6 Eisenstadt, S., The dialogue between cultures or between cultural interpretations of
modernity – multiple modernities on the contemporary scene, in European
Commission DG EAC, Intercultural Dialogue, March 2002, pp. 59-68.
7 Isar, Y.R., The intercultural challenge: an imperative of solidarity, in European
Commission DG EAC, Intercultural Dialogue, March 2002, pp. 169-183.
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voluntaristic practice of “learning to live together”,8 well suits the
purpose of this chapter.9 Intercultural dialogue can be instrumental in
softening and avoiding the (negative) consequences of the globalisation
process (i.e. the issue of minorities, migration, poverty, etc.). A dialogue
between peoples and cultures can also be constructive if it is based on
common and moral values. In the current tension between (economic)
globalisation, the need for internal and external solidarity, and respect
for different cultures and religions, such a dialogue can be a vehicle for
conviviality in which cultures influence each other without destroying
each other or clashing with each other.
As to the specific European dimension of intercultural dialogue, it is
clear that Europe as a global actor has an important responsibility to
enable and facilitate intercultural dialogue.10 Europe should be a
communicative bridge builder and boundary breaker in such a dialogue.
The specificity of the underlying characteristics of the European model
is very related to mutual understanding and learning in open dialogue.
Within this context, initiatives have been taken and policies developed
to reinforce the dialogue between peoples, cultures and civilizations.11
As such, intercultural dialogue is an integrative force of (re) creating the
urban civitas and providing urban spaces for interreligious dialogue.
In this perspective the role of education is crucial. The learning
processes for intercultural dialogue, respect for religious diversity and
civic education are based on integral human development. Places for
educational and cultural encounters are crucial for practicing Europe’s
unity in diversity.
II. Creative Urban Realities in Europe
In the second section of the chapter we focus on the urban
environment that is needed to favour actual intercultural dialogue. Urban
realities are increasingly playing a role in stimulating creativity for
economic, social, political and cultural development. Cities are breeding
grounds for inclusion, integration and diversity. Our working hypothesis
8 This concept was used by the Delors International Commission on Education for the
21st Century, in Learning: The Treasure within, Paris: UNESCO, 1996.
9 See Chapter 11.
10 Bekemans, L., Culture vs globalisation in Europe: actual tension or possible
dialogue?, in L. Anckaert, D. Cassimon and H. Opdebeeck (eds.), op. cit., pp. 191-
211; and ibid., Globalisation and Solidarity: Europe’s duty in intercultural dialogue,
in Intercultural Dialogue, European Commission DG EAC/Jean Monnet Action,
March 2002, pp. 152-168.
11 Bekemans, L., The idea and practice of Europe in a globalising world: reality and
responsibility, in Rivista Pace Diritti Umani, Vol. 1, April 2004, pp. 121-133.
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is that the “urban civitas”, as explained in the first part of the chapter, is
a major shaping factor in the promotion of intercultural dialogue. In
other words, cities matter in intercultural dialogue.
1. The urban context
An understanding of the context is crucial in any process of urban
development that includes both a transformation of the physical fabric
and a consideration of culture as a transforming power. The specificity
of the urban context is further determined by the various governance
levels that move from hierarchical to networking relations.
The conditions of urban policies that respond to this renewed role of
cities as reference frames in economy, polity, society and culture are
manifold. They may vary from the need to develop glocal strategies, to
master spatial cohesion, to propose qualitative density in space and
environment, to stimulate innovating and creative power, to create urban
diversity and flexibility within multi-faceted identities and to guarantee
urban solidarity, social justice and cultural diversity. The creation of
such a favourable environment presupposes an active investment in
strong development coalitions between public, private and civil society
stakeholders at territorial and issue levels.
2. Urban challenges
The challenges of urban realities in creating a favourable urban
context vary. For some cities, the challenges are increasing population,
rising house prices, a lack of available land, traffic congestion and
overstretched public services; for other cities, depopulation, degradation,
lack of jobs or low quality of life are the main issues. At least four key
issues require attention in urban policies. They create the (pre)conditions
for sustainable and creative urban development as well as for
intercultural dialogue.
1) Transport, accessibility and mobility
Problems of social inclusion, education, housing and public space
can be addressed through innovations in transport. Less cars often
means more civic space and civic resources for people. Many cities are
trying to reduce the negative effects of urban transport by providing
high quality public transport and better management of traffic.
Affordable access to public transport is a key component of such a
strategy. Another possibility is increasing the opportunities for cycling
and walking, which is not only a contribution to sustainability but also
to public health. Moreover, a lot of European cities have made a
substantial investment in tram or light rail systems. Successful
management of urban transport often requires the city and its
surrounding region to coordinate transport planning, construction and
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land-use. They all form part of an integrated transport strategy for the
urban area and may provide the necessary conditions for increased
citizens’ involvement into local processes.
2) Access to service facilities
Effective and affordable services related to health, culture, education,
training, retailing and public administration are vital to the quality of
urban life. They make a city and its neighbourhoods more attractive and
liveable. An unconventional and innovative solution to this challenge is
to create city-wide amenities in deprived areas. This creates services,
reduces isolation, stimulates encounters and improves the image of the
area within the broader urban context. Another innovative solution to
greater inclusion and integration of citizens into public life could be the
creation of easy online access to public services such as e-government,
e-health and e-learning.
Natural and physical environment
People want to live and work in cities with a distinct identity, where
both the natural and built environment provides good environmental,
living and housing quality. This requires coordination between various
disciplines and competences involved in urban developments.
Therefore, cities need to grow the infrastructure that can enable this
emergent energy to upscale across the whole city by capitalising on their
distinctive assets and stories.
Activities to launch urban renewal or improve urban quality require
long term and integrated redevelopment plans that are citizens-based. In
particular, housing-related programmes (such as the rehabilitation of
common spaces, the construction of social housing, cohousing, security
measures and crime prevention, efficient energy and water supplies,
etc.) will need proper financing if increased citizens’ participation in
local democratic processes is to be successful.
Culture
Culture and the management of its diversity often challenge urban
realities by creating opportunities as well as hindrances for dialogue.
Cultural amenities are a key determinant of a city’s attractiveness. In
particular, a vibrant and diversified cultural offering may be an
important place-specific factor in attracting people and creative
industries. It may provide the conditions that encourage individual as
well as business creativity. Moreover, local pride and identity and the
image a city presents to the outside world are in a large part determined
by the quality of its local cultural scene.
Culture is important for all cities, but particularly in changing the
image of a deprived city. Its role often determines the success or failure
of regeneration projects of urban areas. Festivals, exhibitions and
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cultural events are especially important in forming the brand image of a
city. Culture can also be a valuable tool for intercultural dialogue as
stated in Chapter 10 and 11. A cultural centre where communities meet,
or a local cooperation project between various neighbourhoods, offers
space for true encounters between peoples from different cultures.
Cultural diversity can also be a source of innovation and entre-
preneurship, and can become a positive force in the socio-economic
development of cities.
3. Urban opportunities
If positive solutions are given for these urban challenges, cities can
be the main actors for creating “urban civitas” in Europe, particularly for
providing the environment for intercultural and interreligious dialogue,
and hence strengthening citizenship building.
1) Cities: sources for European identity, imagination and
integration
Throughout history, cities have always been driving forces of
culture, civilisation and development in Europe.12 As was previously
clearly stated in Chapter 14, cities express the richness of Europe, its
cultural and spiritual memory. They have been meeting places on the
roads to intercultural dialogue.13 The spirituality of a place can be the
driving force for city planners and local decision makers in
rediscovering European identity.14 Cities are the stories they tell about
themselves. Pride, confidence and identity come from the collective
imagination of people across the city. There is an opportunity to
reconcile the past and to realistically link it to different possible futures
through encouraging citizen participation.
This is why policy at regional, national and European level needs to
have an urban dimension: to exchange experiences and best practices, to
help overcome urban (social and cultural) ruptures and finally to bring
forward new investment in social capital development. An imaginative
city-based approach may help urban areas to design principles that allow
for creativity and experimentation and favour citizen participation at
grass roots level.
12 An excellent overview of the role of cities in history is given by Hall, P., Cities in
Civilisation. Culture, Innovation and Urban Order, Phoenix: Weidenfeld &
Nicolson, 1998, 1169 p.
13 The programmes of cultural routes by UNESCO, the Council of Europe and the
European Union relate to itineraries that connected people. They very much focus on
practising dialogue of cultures and civilisations as a factor in the creation of a culture
of peace.
14 Flanaghan, B., The Spirit of the City, Voices from Dublin’s Liberties, Dublin, 1999.
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2) Cities: engines for sustainable growth, social cohesion and
urban quality
Cities have also often been engines of economic and social
development, creating growth, innovation and employment. Economic
and social sustainability is in this perspective a key concept in urban
policies.15 Economic, social and urban policies are mutually reinforcing:
economic growth is sustainable when it goes hand in hand with efforts
to reduce poverty, fight social exclusion and tackle urban problems.
However, significant disparities in economic, social and urban
opportunities as well as contradictory developments between northern
and southern European cities exist. They often necessitate diversified
urban policies and different types of urban action.
With increasing powers, cities today have the political opportunities
to realise their objectives of sustainable growth and social cohesion
within an increasing urban quality context. People want to live and work
in cities with clean air, green and secure spaces, attractive architecture
and high quality services, including cultural and recreational amenities.
When cities have the structures and means to create urban quality they
provide the conditions of an inclusive and democratic urban civitas for
the multicultural composition of their inhabitants.
3) Cities: facilitators for innovation and entrepreneurship in the
knowledge society
Cities often provide a stimulating environment for creativity,16
innovation and businesses. In the emerging European creative urban
reality cities can stimulate the creation and development of small and
medium-sized enterprises, micro-enterprises and social economy
enterprises, set up business incubators, provide access to finance and
other business services. In addition, experiences and practices illustrate
that cities can simplify administrative demands, improve education and
training opportunities, facilitate networking between education and
enterprises and stimulate cooperation between companies, research
institutes and universities. Being laboratories of innovative democratic
initiatives, they fully contribute to the development of sustainable
knowledge societies and obtain more easily a new equilibrium between
change and tradition in a stimulating urban environment with citizen
involvement.
15 See Girardet, S., Creating Sustainable Cities (Schumacher Briefings), London: Green
Books, 1999.
16 Landry, Ch. and Fr. Bianchini, The Creative City, A Toolkit for Urban Innovators,
London: Demos Publishers, May 2000.
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4) Cities: promoters of social inclusion, equal opportunities and
security for citizens
The urban reality often reflects disparities between neighbourhoods,
a problem that confronts Europe’s large and medium-sized cities. The
Urban Audit shows that almost all cities where unemployment is at a
level of 10% or higher, have certain areas within which unemployment
rates are at least double the city average. Within such deprived
neighbourhoods, high unemployment is linked to poor housing, poor
environment, poor health, poor education, few job opportunities and
high crime rates.
Alongside these obvious disparities, certain groups within cities
experience further disadvantage. Cities should therefore pay special
attention to integrating immigrants, and prevent the social exclusion of
young people. In short, they can favour social inclusion through
measures of security and facilitate professional, social and cultural
integration of fragile communities.
Social exclusion is at odds with the European social model that
guarantees opportunities for every citizen. It has consequences for local
businesses (less customers), for living environments (less security,
vandalism) for inhabitants (lack of “positive thinking”, creativity and
enthusiasm at work) and for the growth potential of the city (which is
less attractive). Tackling social exclusion is therefore crucial to
sustainable urban policies. Connected to the promotion of social
inclusion is also the need to guarantee citizen security. Urban safety,
and, just as important, the perception of safety, has become a vital issue
in urban policies. Cities are at the foreground for creating urban
environments favourable to social inclusion and security, and
consequently, to genuine and human-centric citizenship building and
intercultural dialogue.
III. Intercultural Dialogue Practices: Intercultural Routes
and Spiritual Spaces
Cultural Routes represent interactive, dynamic and continually
evolving processes of human intercultural links that reflect the rich
diversity of the contributions of different peoples to cultural heritage.
Though cultural routes have resulted historically from both peaceful and
hostile encounters, they present a number of shared dimensions that
transcend their original functions, offering an exceptional setting for a
culture of peace. Such a culture is based on ties of shared history as well
as the tolerance, respect and appreciation for cultural diversity that
characterise the communities involved. Cultural routes reveal the
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heritage content of a specific phenomenon of human mobility and
exchange that has developed over centuries via communication routes..
Cultural routes are not only paths of communication and transport
which include cultural properties and connect different people; they are
special historic phenomena that cannot be created by applying one’s
imagination and will to the establishment of a set of associated cultural
assets that happen to possess features in common (e.g. the Incan and the
Roman Empire Routes). Sometimes they are the result of a long
evolutionary process in which the collective interventions of different
human factors coincide and are channelled towards a common purpose
(such as the Route to Santiago, the African trade caravan Routes or the
Silk Route). The cultural richness and variety of both the
interrelationships and the characteristic assets directly associated with
cultural routes refer to monuments, archaeological remains, historic
towns, architecture, intangible heritage, cultural and natural landscapes,
etc.
The Cultural Route programme launched by UNESCO is intended to
promote mutual knowledge between civilisations and cultures while
lending visibility to their interactions. Routes provide a better grasp of
the mechanisms that in peoples’ long memories may either encourage
prejudice and misunderstanding or help to renew a dialogue between
civilisations, cultures, religions and spiritual traditions.
Cultural itineraries facilitate an effective merging of cultures through
the discovery of a common heritage and multiple identities. This is the
case in particular with the Slave Route, East-West intercultural Dialogue
in central Asia, Roads of Al-Andalus17 etc. An interesting related
initiative is the programme of interreligious dialogue “Spiritual
Convergence and Intercultural Dialogue”. Its purpose is to bring out the
dynamic nature of reciprocal cultural, artistic and textual interactions
and influences between religions and spiritual traditions that resulted
from the movement of persons, ideas and goods along the roads taken
by pilgrims, migrants and tradesmen. It has led to meetings and
exchanges along the roads of Faith where religions and spiritual
traditions developed. Cultural routes are therefore an instrument for
reading the European values that emerge from the complexity of the
cultures and societies constituting Europe.
Spiritual places refer to the sacredness of space, buildings and
objects. The condensed sacrum that is revealed or found in some places
17 The “Routes of al-Andalus: spiritual convergence and intercultural dialogue” project
by UNESCO seeks to highlight the heritage of dialogue that gradually developed in
medieval Spain and study and promote the creation of areas of dialogue between
cultures and civilisations.
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establishes the structure of the surrounding world and shapes spatial
relations. The sacred space may therefore be defined as a special case of
symbolic space. The sacred monuments, sites and texts illustrate a
common heritage with shared ethical and spiritual values. These sites
have become meeting places for spiritual leaders to work together for
peace and interreligious dialogue.
The renaissance of pilgrimaging, in particular the phenomenon of
religious tourism, should be understood from this perspective. However,
the phenomenon of the pilgrimage should not simply be identified with
the phenomenon of wandering and travelling. Its main distinguishing
feature lies in its religious and sacral implications. We are carried by the
authenticity, identity and local genius of particular places and routes
along the pilgrimage. Therefore pilgrimages should be protected from
mercantilism and commercialisation.
The spiritual rebirth linked with the renaissance of trips to places of
religious devotion is tied to the fact that man is capable of going beyond
the material sphere of his existence. Still there is a danger that
pilgrimage destinations are becoming a mere component of the tourist
industry and losing their soul. Henceforth, architects and urban planners
play an important role in finding an expression and a context for
contemporary spirituality in pilgrimage locations, separating it from the
dominating commercial activity of the tourist industry. Pilgrimages have
always been borne out of spiritual needs. The places that are visited are
sacred in different ways within different religions. Places of worship
sometimes surround holy relics and sometimes mark the place of
miraculous events. Many of these places belong to world cultural
heritage and are worshipped not only by believers but also by all people
sensitive to spiritual values in space, on the basis of the principle of
mutual respect.
Conclusion
Cities are important sustainable and living sources for building and
experiencing the multi-faceted identity of the citizens of multicultural
Europe. Throughout history they have been shaping actors for
promoting and facilitating creativity, imagination and integration. They
always have been places on the roads of dialogue. Today they are
laboratories and breeding grounds for innovative democratic processes
in which intercultural dialogue can be an important vehicle. They
provide learning places, built and non-built environments and meeting
spaces for daily experiences of intercultural dialogue and encounters for
conviviality.
In summary, cities may, on the basis of some conditions, provide a
favourable, attractive and creative environment for citizen participation
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in (formal and informal) democratic processes of active citizenship.
Roads of dialogue interconnect cities through the creation of occasions
and areas of interchange and encounters. Interconnecting cities can, as
history has proven, create the environment for intercultural practice




Learning Experiences of Participative and
Deliberative Democracy
Introduction
In this final chapter we argue that dialogue, while happening within
the participative and deliberative democratic system, may significantly
contribute to the improvement of democracy through a greater
legitimacy, through a real empowerment of citizens and through a more
active participation of citizens in public life. To break down the negative
perception of a disconnection between citizens and decision-making
institutions, the focus needs to be put on a transfer of the outcomes of
public discourse to a multi-level governance structure, thus creating an
opportunity for an increased political role for the Committee of the
Regions.
In the first part, we describe the development of a European public
sphere from the perspective of participative and deliberative democracy,
its opportunities and characteristiccs. The second part deals with three
interconnected but different learning experiences of participative
democracy: the European Movement, the College of Europe and the
non-profit organsation Ryckevelde. Finally the opportunities and
challenges of participative democracy are assessed in view of an
emerging deliberative democracy where civil dialogue becomes an
important shaping factor in citizenship building.
I. Development of a European Public Sphere in
Participatory, Deliberative and Inclusive Democracy1
The European Union faces numerous challenges in a period where
the consequences of economic globalisation are being felt: a major
consequence is the largely debated democratic deficit resulting from the
great distance between citizens and decision-making institutions. On the
citizen’s side, one may observe the decreasing trend in civic activities
1 See Karasinska-Fendler, M., How Intercultural dialogue can improve European
democracy- deliberative democracy approach, in L. Bekemans, M. Karasinska-
Fendler, M. Mascia, A. Papisca, C.A. Stephanou and P.G. Xuereb (eds.), op. cit.,
p. 85-97.
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potentially offered by democratic systems. Some experts call these
problems symptoms of morbidity or fluidity, linked to the erosion of the
sense of belonging to the local, regional, national and European
community. European societies are moving towards communities of
individuals instead of communities of persons at the expense of the
common good. In the midst of a grave systemic financial and economic
crisis, mainly due to the negative consequences of financial
globalisation, trust-worthy institutions and confidence-building
measures are more than urgent. Therefore, we believe that NGOs across
Europe should form part of a regular, structured, and guaranteed
dialogue with EU institutions. The inclusion of a new Article 8b on
participatory democracy in the Treaty of Lisbon is therefore a milestone
in the development of participatory democracy and civil dialogue.2
Within the deliberative democracy the concept of dialogue is
perceived as an inclusiveness-generating process with some specific
conditions (i.e. social interaction, respect for different and changing
views, shared commitment to problem resolution, building of a
community of interests). If democratic conversation between citizens
and governance is a central idea of democracy, there needs to be a
permanent and mutual interaction of this two-way communication.
Therefore, a particular role is to be played by various governances to
provide channels for such a bottom-up and top-down symmetrical
interaction. So it is imperative to connect this communication and
interaction to governments, policymaking and governance at different
levels.
It is a widely recognised opinion that there is no European demos,
nor a genuine European-wide public sphere or a European polis. If the
public sphere (today’s common space in society is a highly complex
network of various parts of public spheres) does not exist, how then do
we explain the citizen’s sense of belonging and commitment to
democracy and rights? Criteria include the decision-making capacity,
the deliberation process and representativeness. In the EU, a multitude
2 Article 8b of the Treaty of Lisbon (OJ 17.12.2007, C 306/1) says: “1. The institutions
shall by appropriate means, give citizens and representative associations the
opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas of Union
action; 2. The institutions shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue
with representative associations and civil society; 3. The European Commission shall
carry out broad consultations with parties concerned in order to ensure that the
Union’s actions are coherent and transparent; 4. Not less than one million citizens
who are nationals of a significant number of Member States may take the initiative of
inviting the European Commission, within the framework of its powers, to submit
any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the
Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties”.
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of discussion fora exists at local, regional, national, international and
transnational levels.
We assume that greater participation is a substantive value as an
aspect of empowerment. European citizens must therefore be given
chances to directly and personally experience what European citizenship
means in practice; this can be realised through participation in dialogue
with European institutions or through horizontal dialogue. In particular,
civil and intercultural dialogue contributes to making European citizens
a reality through encouraging their direct involvement in the integration
process. It may be crucial in developing a sense of belonging to the
Union and to making citizens able to identify with it. Therefore, the
ability to dialogue should be developed and secondly, the venues and
grounds for such dialogue need to be available. In this perspective
history teaches us some good practices.
II. Formal and Informal Learning Experiences of
Participative Democracy
More than 60 years ago, Europe was required to rebuild its future
within a framework that went beyond national borders. History was
running apace and Europe was urged to act in order to restore
confidence among its citizens. New initiatives were launched and new
organisations were created in the aftermath of the Second World War.3
They were meant to create confidence-building structures: the education
of “European” citizens was therefore a challenge to be taken seriously.
At this particular juncture between continuity and change in
European history, our case studies will illustrate interesting (historical)
examples of bringing the European integration project close to the
people, being a practice of participative democracy “avant la lettre”.
They illustrate, each with their own merits, a remarkable process of
sensibilisation of the European integration project. Moreover, they teach
us that, even in present times and dominated by new technology tools
for improving participative democracy, interesting lessons can be drawn
from initiatives, activities and good practices of learning participative
democracy that were initiated quite some time ago.
Furthermore, they also show that some prerequisites are needed for
developing deliberative democracy. The ideas and propositions
expressed at the Hague conference in 1948 were structured in the
“European Movement”. Some of the suggestions have been concretised
by the creation of the College of Europe in Bruges (B) in 1949, the
oldest post-graduate institute offering a specific European formation,
3 See Chapters 2 and 3.
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and by the launching of “Ryckevelde” in 1956, a European and
International information and formation centre promoting active
citizenships. Reflecting on their history, their vision, mission and
functions, we may learn some good practices of participative and
deliberative democracy.
1. The European Movement: a bottom-up approach shaped by
inspiration and commitment
1) Context
The International Committee of the Movements for European Unity
(ICMEU) was created in 1947 in Paris to organise and promote a
publicity campaign in support of European unity. It was the ICMEU that
convened and hosted the Congress of Europe at The Hague in May
1948. With Churchill as its Honorary President, the congress was
attended by some 800 participants (statesmen, MPs, businessmen, trade
unionists, academics, etc.). Its major objective was laying the building
blocks for peace, stability and cooperation in Europe. This was made
explicit in three ambitions: 1) to demonstrate the existence of a body of
public opinion in support of European unity; 2) to discuss the challenges
posed by European unity and propose practical solutions to
governments; and 3) to give new impetus to the international publicity
campaign. Building on the success of the Hague Congress, the
International Committee assumed responsibility for implementing the
resolutions adopted by the participants in the political, economic, social
and cultural fields. Accordingly, an Economic and Social Committee, a
Legal Committee and a Cultural Committee were set up.
The European Movement was formally created on the 25th October
1948, when the Joint International Committee for European Unity
decided to change its name. It received public support by major political
leaders.4 Duncan Sandys was elected President and Léon Blum, Winston
Churchill, Alcide De Gasperi and Paul-Henri Spaak were elected as
Honorary Presidents.
The European Movement aimed to look at the political, economic,
technical and cultural problems posed by Europe and also to inform and
mobilise public opinion in favour of European integration. It is
interesting to note in this perspective the membership of the Council of
European Municipalities and Regions and the International Federation
4 Former French Prime Minister, Léon Blum, Winston Churchill, the Italian Prime
Minister, Alcide De Gasperi, the Belgian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Paul-
Henri Spaak, the French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, Count Richard
Coudenhove-Kalergi and the German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer were elected
honorary presidents.
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of European Houses. The grass roots movement was backed by
farsighted political leaders and concrete action was supported by vision.
The European Movement was ideologically very active in the
beginning and organised many events on specific themes, preparing the
formal process of European integration. In February 1949, the Brussels
Political Congress defined individual, family and social rights that might
be guaranteed in law by a European Charter of Human Rights. It also
reviewed procedures for the appointment of delegates to the European
Consultative Assembly and adopted the statute for a European Court.
Two months later, the Westminster Economic Conference discussed
monetary issues and laid the foundations for a future European
Payments Union. Supporters of the pooling of basic industries, the
congress participants also discussed the setting up of a European
Economic and Social Committee.
The first major achievement of the European Movement was the
creation of the Council of Europe in May 1949. The European
Conference on Culture in Lausanne in December 1949 resulted in the
establishment of the European Centre for Culture in Geneva and the
College of Europe in Bruges. A few months later, the Social Welfare
Conference in Rome drew up a plan for the harmonisation of European
social security systems and proposed the creation of a European
Commissariat for Labour and Population and a European fund for
reconstruction and development. Other international conferences
followed, successively considering the integration of Germany into a
united Europe, the relations between the Europe being built and the
Commonwealth, and the situation of the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe. The European Movement also pursued an intensive
publicity campaign, particularly through the European Youth Campaign.
One of its major functions during the 1950s through to the 1990s was
the setting up of think-tanks and a network of mobilisation in the
democratic countries of Europe and in countries subjected to totalitarian
regimes. In summary, since 1948 the European movement has played an
essential role in the process of European integration by exercising its
influence on European and national institutions. It fought in favour of
the direct election of the European Parliament by all European citizens,
in favour of the Treaty on the European Union and also for a European
Constitution. Its objective was to transform the relations between the
European states and their citizens into a Federal European Union. To
achieve this goal, the European Movement always put the citizen at the
heart of community construction. Currently, The international European
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Movement5 is represented in 41 European countries and regroups 20
international Associations.
2) Working
The European Movement was led by an Executive Committee and an
International Committee that, in turn, was supported by national
councils in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, West-Germany and the United Kingdom.
To ensure that its views were heard, the International European
Movement ran a publicity campaign that was aimed at political,
economic, social and cultural leaders. It did not overlook the general
public: it held public debates and funded a great many publications,
including the monthly journal “Nouvelles de l’Europe”. Therefore,
despite experiencing ideological, human and material difficulties in the
early 1950s The European Movement constituted a tremendous moral
and inspiring force that enabled the European idea to move on to the
next stage of initial practical achievements.
2. The College of Europe:6 a unique higher learning institute on
European affairs
1) Origin
Not many institutes of higher learning in Europe have had as strong
an influence on the development of European integration as the College
of Europe. The College’s origins date back to the 1948 Hague Congress,
when Salvador de Madariaga, a Spanish statesman, thinker and writer in
exile, proposed the establishment of a college where university
graduates from many different countries could study and live together. It
was founded by the European Movement in 1949, as a result of the
European Conference on Culture in Lausanne.
The creation of the college is illustrative of the inspiring mood of the
time, present at the level of the European intelligensia and political
leadership as well as at the local level. Thanks to a number of favourable
circumstances, Bruges became a conscious and deliberate choice for the
college’s site.7 Happy coincidences that involved a group of Bruges
citizens led by the Reverend Father Karel Verleye (“les Amis de
5 http://www.europeanmovement.eu/
6 http://www.coleurop.be; Bekemans, L., D. Mahncke and R. Picht (eds.), The College
of Europe - 50 years of service in Europe, College of Europe: Bruges, June 1999.
7 The president of the International Cultural Section of the European Movement, Don
Salvador de Madariaga explicitly said that Bruges had promoted itself as the place
for a post-university institute of European studies.
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Bruges”), the European Union of Federalists as well as local, provincial
and national politicians, made the choice for the Bruges’ site happen. In
summary, the plans by the local committee and those by the
International Cultural Section merged into one project, i.e. the actual
launching of the College of Europe, with a short preparatory academic
session in September 1949 with 22 students. It was seen as an initial
step towards founding a future European University. Professor Hendrik
Brugmans, one of the intellectual leaders of the European Movement at
the time, became the first Rector of the College of Europe (1950-1972).
After the fall of communism, and in the wake of the changes in Central
and Eastern Europe, the College of Europe campus at Natolin (Warsaw,
Poland), was founded in 1993 with the support of the European
Commission and the Polish government. The College now operates as
“one college - two campuses”, strengthened by its “esprit du collège”.
2) Assessment
1) The founders of the College of Europe were sure about their
vision. For Salvador de Madariaga, Hendrik Brugmans and Father Karel
Verleye, Europe was a historic and spiritual reality, which needed to be
lived with respect to common values and enriching diversities. To
realise this potential unity, Europeans need to be formed. So the college
was created even before the existence of other European institutions.
2) This particular vision has proved to be very successful in the
construction of a common multi-level Europe. The college’s alumni
work in many strategic places of the EU; through their specific
competences and skills they have shaped its policy and complex
functioning. Again, Europe today is placed at the crossroads of its
history. Confronted with many and global challenges, Europe is
confronted with economic, political and institutional challenges and
opportunities for multi-level governance in a globalising context. Once
again, vision has to inspire difficult and concrete realisations at political
and institutional levels in order to bring the citizen closer to the
European dream.
3) Apart from its successful development, another major element of
this success story is the interaction between the college and its
immediate environment, represented by the Local Committee. The
committee, then also a section of the European Movement, was founded
in 1949 as a non-profit association to spread the idea of a unified Europe
and to stimulate interest in the workings and objectives of the College of
Europe in Bruges. Conferences were organised and a European Winter
programme was launched. From the mid 1960s, interest in cooperation
declined, mainly due to a more specialised programme, less dedication
among committee members and a more formal relationship. Only in the
mid 1990s was the Local Committee revitalised. It is now organising a
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variety of activities from conferences and concerts to visits in view of
strengthening the college’s links with the economic, social and political
environment. A final meeting ground between the college and the local
environment is the area of housing and accommodation, in particular the
many student residences in the town and the new campus in the restored
16th century Jesuit buildings. In summary, the city provides a learning
basis for the European citizens of tomorrow and offers the space to
develop plural identities for the future of Europe, a meeting place
between theory and practice.
4) The “College Formula” ensures that, for 10 months, students live
and follow together an intensive programme in a challenging and highly
stimulating educational environment, which truly prepares them to live
and work in an increasingly integrated Europe. The student body –
around 300 students in Bruges and up to 120 students in Natolin
(Warsaw) – reflects a real diversity of culture and personal experience.
It is a unique institute of postgraduate studies and training in European
affairs. In its more than 60 year history it has trained more than 8,000
students in its two campuses and has a network of more than 100
visiting professors.
3. Ryckevelde:8 a locally based and citizens’ oriented European
and international formation and information centre
1) Origin
Ryckevelde is an independent, non-profit organisation promoting
European citizenship, located in Damme (near Bruges, Belgium) and
structurally supported by the Department of Education of the Flemish
Government in Belgium and the Province of West-Flanders. The
organisation was founded as a “Centre of Europe” by Karel Verleye in
1956. As a pioneer of European cooperation, he was also co-founder of
the College of Europe in Bruges in 1949. The organisation operates
from the belief that peace in Europe – both in the past and future –
depends on a democracy in which citizens truly participate. Its main
objectives are to understand and experience Europe. This is why
Ryckevelde empowers citizens to participate in European society by
offering training and debates and running actions, events and projects on
the European integration process.
Since 1956, Ryckevelde has developed a broad experience of the
formation of young people and information about the European
integration, with the aim of bringing Europe closer to its citizens. It
favours European integration and an active European citizenship based
8 http://www.ryckevelde.be
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on some fundamental values, particularly a respect for each person
within its social context. It is an organisation that adopts a bottom-up
approach with a clear vision of transmitting forgotten factors of
European integration to European citizens, young people and adults.
2) Working
With its vision, mission and grass roots perspective, Ryckevelde has
nearly 60 years of experience in training and information activities that
have stimulated participative democracy. They concern the following
general activities:
– Training: Ryckevelde offers a variety of training sessions to schools
of secondary and higher education. They are adapted to the students’
needs, their age and educational level. Different methods are used:
interactive presentations, simulation exercises and educational games.
Adult groups are offered a variety of tailor made European training
sessions. It also publishes didactical sets for teachers and adult groups:
training sets for various target groups, didactical internet material and
educational games.
– International school projects: helping schools to set up international
projects and/or advising them with the content (didactical aspects) or
organisational (practical/grant) aspects of their projects. Ryckevelde
regularly organises international meeting sessions for teachers. They
meet colleagues from all over Europe and get acquainted with the
European educational space.
– EU Campaigns: In the week of May 9th every year, a European
campaign is launched with quizzes, debates and concrete actions that
draw people’s attention to the European integration process and make
them think about the future of the European project. A State of the
European Union is organised in collaboration with the Flemish
Parliament and the Flemish-European Liaison Office, where a critical
Europe watcher sets out his/her vision on what the European Union
should do in the coming year. At the same event, prizes are awarded for
The Junior State of the European Union, The State of Creanovative and
a Senior State of the European Union.
– Actions and debates: organisation of public debates on current
European themes, as well as simulation sessions of the European
Council with a view to raising awareness of the European democratic
decision-making process.
– The yearly Karel Verleye Prize in memory of its founding father: a
prize is awarded to students who have written a thesis on the forgotten
factors of European integration, being education, culture, ethics,
citizenship, etc.
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– Joint European projects: increasing involvement in European projects
with a view to stimulate youngsters to actively reflect on the future of
Europe, its vision and the European citizens’ needs. Ryckevelde
cooperates with the European SPES Forum in the project “Imagine
Europe”, financed as a youth democracy project within the Youth in
Action Programme of the European Union and increasingly with the
Jean Monnet Programme of the EU DG Education and Culture in its
project “EU at School”.
III. Participative Democracy: an Assessment
In the following section, some reflections on participative democracy
are presented based on previous learning experience in formation and
information on European issues. Participative democracy refers to an
exchange of a diversity of views, the modes and organisation of civil
dialogue and the citizens’ initiative.9 The principle of participation aims
at facilitating more inclusion of those issues and people that are usually
under-represented but are of major concern for European citizens. In
practice, this means the right of petition, binding referendum at peoples’
initiative, at the initiative of a Head of State, government or prescribed
by the European Constitution, removal procedures and forms of “online
democracy”, creating a European public sphere/space. We identify
advantages and disadvantages, strengths and weaknesses of participative
democracy practices and present an experience-based assessment.
1. Strengths of participative democracy
1) Content focused and citizens oriented
Contrary to representative democracy where citizens vote for
individual politicians (because they are trust-worthy) or where citizens
choose for a political party (because of the programmes’ attractiveness),
participative democracy focuses more on content themes. Representative
democracy seems to be in crisis and the public perceives that politicians
are too busy with their own agenda and less occupied with real
problems. In a participative democracy, the citizen feels that his vote has
a direct impact on reality. This increases his interest in the public cause,
the common good and strengthens the citizen’s involvement and
participation in democratic life.
The European Movement, the College of Europe and Ryckevelde all
show that the interest of citizens, students, young people and the broad
public can be stimulated by proper information, focused formation and
9 Fazi, E. and J. Smith, Civil Dialogue - Making it work better, Civil Society Contact
Group, 2006, 100 p.
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in-depth study about concrete and clear issues concerning the European
Union, framed within a long term vision. When people are informed
about the direct impact of European decisions on their life, they often
recognise the relevance and importance of the issues at stake. Once
interest is aroused, their preparedness to tackle and deepen more
complex themes grows. The above learning examples illustrate a
continuous link between people’s daily life and the European context.
Therefore methods, pedagogical tools, concrete targets as well as
privileged testimonies are crucial in building up true participative
democracy and promoting active and responsible European citizenship.
2) Agenda setting
Forms of participative democracy at the European level may put
European issues high on the political agenda in a member state. In
countries such as France, the Netherlands and Ireland where referenda
were organised either on the “Treaty for establishing a European
Constitution” or “the Reform Treaty”, attention towards the European
case has increased. European issues are (hotly) debated with positive
and negative reactions, as the current debate among EU member states
about policy answers to the crisis, demonstrates. It certainly opens up a
space for opportunities for information, communication and the role of
the media in transmitting fair and objective assessments about the EU
policies. More than in the case for European Parliamentary elections,
participative democracy focuses on specific European issues. In the
present format of European Parliamentary elections, where national
(regional) lists of candidates are presented, the elections are perceived as
mere popularity polls of national (regional) parties, beyond the scope of
the real issues.
2. Weaknesses of participative democracy
1) It remains a difficult task and challenge to explain complex
technical issues to the citizen. Moreover, concretising Europe has its
limits. The heterogeneity of the public often makes content discussion
and debate difficult. More than before, the general public has become
interested in issue-related participation and less in general debate. In
summary, it will remain difficult to inspire or motivate the totality of the
population with a general discourse. This has an impact on the
methodology and pedagogy of participative democracy, the choice of
themes and the organisation of formation and information. In
representative elections, it is often not easy to make the majority of the
population participate; this is often related to the democratic deficit, the
indifference of citizens to the public cause and the waning trust in
politics.
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2) As has been made clear in the referenda in France, the
Netherlands and Ireland, people have been voting against or in favour
for the most diverging and contradictory reasons. It is often easier to
build a coalition against a proposition in public opinion than a coalition
for it. Moreover, participative democracy tools, if not well designed and
coherently explained to citizens, can be misused. Populists and populist
parties can often very easy adapt their policies to the changing
circumstances of proposed themes in the participative democracy. This
often makes it difficult to draw general policy conclusions from the
outcomes of referenda. The European cause needs European leaders!
Conclusion
From the above short analysis the following lessons can be drawn for
the practice of participative democracy.10
1) Participative democracy covers commonly accepted features such
as a) an involvement of non-state actors, mainly individual citizens and
civil society organisations; b) an extension of the concept of citizenship
beyond the conventional political sphere; c) a focus on policy-makers’
permanent accountability between elections; d) a recognition of citizens’
right to participate in public life through alternative channels, e) a
possibility for citizens to take direct responsibility in public life; f) a
possibility for citizens belonging to minority groups to make their voice
heard in the public debate; and g) an emphasis of the role of civil society
organisations as important forces of integration and empowerment at
various levels.11
2) Prerequisites are needed for a well-functioning participative
democracy. Such an applied vision and generous commitment should be
shaped by different actors and partnerships at various policy levels, a
sufficiently pro-active and autonomous civil society, territorial
embeddedness, trust-building instruments and innovative methods,
supportive financing structure, etc.
3) The building of European public spheres assumes a move from
participative to deliberative democracy tools. Deliberative democracy is
a form of democracy in which authentic deliberation is central to
decision-making. It adopts elements of both consensus decision-making
and majority rule. Originally driven by the need to tackle the
shortcomings of representative democracy, civil dialogue appears in this
context as a means of bringing citizens back to policy decision-making.
10 See also Berger, N., Participatory Democracy: organised civil society and the “new”
dialogue, Paper given at the Federal Trust and UACES conference “Towards a
European Constitution”, London 1-2 July 2004.
11 Mascia, M., Participatory Democracy for Global Governance, op. cit.
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4) The importance of testimonies of best practices in formal and
informal learning of participative democracy: a deliberative context is
therefore needed if participative democracy is not to be reduced to a
catalyst for public moods and used for political purposes.
5) The following points arise as key challenges for the development
of (new) instruments for deliberative democracy: a) providing an
enabling structure leading to concrete outcomes; b) the need for better
horizontal coordination and equal access to information; c)
strengthening trust and mutual understanding between NGOs and EU
institutions; and d) the need for an inclusive approach.
6) Finally, European cooperation in the field of education means
direct investment in Europe’s future: a) in this perspective, the
Comenius Regio Partnerships,12 (i.e. an action under the Lifelong
Learning Programme) is important. It creates new opportunities for
cooperation in school education between local and regional authorities,
schools and other learning organisations across Europe; b) the
establishment of a European (regional) programme similar to the
Democracy Fund at the United Nations (UNDEF). Its primary purpose
is to strengthen the voice of civil society and ensure the participation of
all groups in democratic practices. It funds projects that enhance
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